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1. Introduction to the Project and The 
First Volume of The Political Economy 
of Northern Regional Development 
(POENOR) 
 
Gorm Winther1 
1.1. Preface 
The purpose of the POENOR project (Political Economy of Northern Re-
gional Development) is to carry out research on sustainable development 
and Arctic economies. POENOR was established owing to the initiative of 
the Arctic Council on Arctic human development and owing to the work-
ing group on sustainable development and Arctic economies under the 
International Conference on Arctic research Planning II (ICARP II) in 
Copenhagen in 2005 and in Potsdam in 2006. After two years of work the 
final research plan was forwarded to sponsors in 2007 and 2008.2 In 2005, 
the international consortium (IPY ID: 227) on the Political Economy of 
Northern Regional Development was endorsed by the Joint Committee for 
the International Polar Year and received financial support from the Com-
mission for Scientific Research in Greenland, the Nordic council of Minis-
                                                        
1 Activity leader for the POENOR project since 2005. IPY professor at the Department of De-
velopment and Planning, Aalborg University. 
2 Arctic Human Development Report [http://www.svs.is/AHDR/] and ICARP II – Science 
Plan 1: Arctic Development and Sustainable Development, Second International Conference on 
Arctic Research Planning (ICARP II, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2005. [http://arcticportal.org/extras/ 
portal/iasc/icarp/ICARP%20overview-0507-4.pdf] 
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ters (NCM) Arctic Cooperation Program, The Greenland Home Rule Re-
search Unit and the Obel Family Foundation.3 The planning for the IPY 
consortium 227 was established during a workshop in Ilulissat in 2005 that 
was financed by the Nordic Council of Ministers. The three-day workshop 
assembled researchers, who through forming a workgroup, agreed to en-
deavor on a project on comparative development in all Arctic regional 
Economies.4 The international consortium consists of 28 participants, and 
it embraces philosophical, social, geographical, sociological, statistical and 
economic disciplines. The consortium has participants from all countries 
with Arctic regions except Sweden and Finland. As part of the funding 
conditions, the consortium will cooperate with the Arctic Social Indicators 
project (ASI) – another IPY project financed by the NCM in 2007. The 
POENOR consortium met at an inaugural workshop at the Klitgården in 
Skagen, Denmark in 2007, and this book is an anthology of the papers 
presented by POENOR participants. In November 2008, the second annual 
workshop took place in Akureyri in Iceland. As a result of both workshops 
– yearbooks this one being the first – will be published in 2010. 
As emphasized in the Arctic Human Development Report and in relation 
to the ICARP planning process, no rigorous comparative analyses of the 
arctic regions have been conducted hitherto. The goal of the POENOR pro-
ject is to approach this work, through the international collaboration just 
described. The relevance of the project is to create knowledge on Arctic 
economies and to demonstrate the different degrees in ability to develop. 
Furthermore, it is the intention to create knowledge of a causal character in 
relation to development problems and development potentials within the 
Arctic.  
1.2. The approach and research question 
The project uses an international lens as a point of departure with a focus on 
the circumpolar region – containing political and administrative units, which 
overlap throughout the Arctic, and for which data is readily available.  
                                                        
3 The project was selected to present a case on Arctic IPY social scientific proposals, when 
The European Science Foundation and The European Polar Board launched the International Polar 
Year in the European Parliament in Strasbourg February 26 2007. 
4 Se [http://www.ipy.gl/ilulissat/program/program_final.pdf] 
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Output in the formal aggregated Arctic economy is equivalent to 25% of 
the Canadian Economy and 80% of the Saudi economy, and has an output that 
is larger than the output of the Swedish Economy.5 There is also a consider-
able amount of value added that is created each year. Nevertheless, in terms of 
monetary currents, there is a larger outflow of incomes and capital, than there 
are inflows. This phenomenon demands an analysis of the particularities 
within the structure and function of Arctic regional economies, which results 
in this dependence upon the “mother economies” of “the South”. Conducive to 
this analysis is the following research statement:  
“Taking the structure and functioning of the Arctic regional economies and the 
degree of economic dependence as a point of departure, these region’s self-
reliance and comparative socio-economic performance is analyzed. The funda-
mental problem is still the dependency Arctic regions have on their mother 
economies in the south”  
 
I will elaborate on the terminology of self-reliance below. It suffices to say 
however, that economic independence is a prerequisite for sovereign Arctic 
microstates – an issue that is highly relevant in 2009 to Greenlanders with 
the substitution of Home Rule with greater jurisdictional autonomy due to 
the new law on self-government. These discussions are relevant for other 
regions in North America; particularly for self-government in Nunavut, 
which was established in 1999, but also Nunavik and Nunatsiavut self-
government, which shares some similarities with Home Rule Law estab-
lished in Greenland of 1979.6 There are four interrelated approaches, 
which must be addressed in analyzing the problem of dependence for Arc-
tic economies. These are: globalization, climate change, socio-economic 
systems, and the level of local/regional vulnerabilities and resilience. The 
four approaches represent constraints and/or potentials regarding decreas-
ing or increasing the degree of dependence.  
                                                       
In terms of globalization, regional competitiveness is an important fac-
tor for creating increased self-sufficiency for northern regions. Analysis of 
 
5 Arctic Human Development Report p. 70 
6 Quote: “On December 1, 2005, Labrador Inuit celebrated the beginning of the Nunatsiavut 
Government. As a regional ethnic government in Newfoundland and Labrador, the Nunatsiavut 
Government has many of the responsibilities and rights of other governments, such as planning for 
sustainable economic development, protecting and preserving our Inuit culture and implementing 
social programs on behalf of our beneficiaries”. [http://www.nunatsiavut.com/en/indexe.php] 
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this kind could involve statistical and econometric methodologies using 
data on trade, capital and income movements, productivity and technology, 
and it could involve the issue of export goods and services being either 
diversified or specialized. Moreover, it includes the very important issue of 
human and social capital as well as entrepreneurial culture and work ethics.  
Additionally, competitiveness statistically speaking, serves as a tool for 
describing the aggregated Arctic economy’s self-sufficiency, and its trade 
patterns between regions and between sectors. “Holes” in the production 
linkages or missing interdependencies can be revealed in regional input-
output tables that suggest that dependency and economic relations with the 
“mother economies” determine trade patterns.7 Trade statistics, monetary 
flow analysis and balance of payment statistics can disclose these patterns, 
and at the same time, tell something about the inter-Arctic trade which does 
not play a substantial role.8 Moreover, such data could reveal the flow of 
incomes and capital between a region and the centers in “the South”. Eco-
nomic self-sufficiency refers to each regional economy’s power to create a 
value added (wages, rents and profits), that can equalize or reduce the de-
pendence of centers in North America, Scandinavia and Russia. Moreover, 
the gaps identified in local competences to cope with economy and technol-
ogy and the need for adaptation of southern transfers of qualifications, can 
for many Arctic regions explain some of the problems to preconditioning 
capacity building for self-sufficiency in the globalized market. 
Two important factors relating to Arctic dependency are the transnational 
corporations, which operate in Arctic regions and the transfer incomes from 
southern capitals to their nation state Arctic regions. The corporations mainly 
operate in mining and oil and gas production. Mega-projects cannot of 
course exclude development potentials enhancing the possibilities to create 
an enhanced economic independence. Requirements for the corporations 
regarding local employment, competence building and education of the work 
force, as well as the taxation of corporate profit, are important fators. None-
theless, the corporations should be considered entities beyond national and 
regional government control. Capital exports and the boom and bust of 
northern mining communities tell us the story of a globalized world econ-
                                                        
7 In 2009 Greenland’s national income accounting went from income based accounting to 
production based accounting. Yet national income accounting in Arctic regional economies does 
not use the same methodology from region to region. A homogenous approach is necessary. 
8 The Greenland Self-government commission in 2003 including the economic relations be-
tween Greenland and Denmark and other countries implemented an analysis of monetary flows. 
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omy with free mobility of capital and with capital exports based on transfer 
pricing between subsidiaries of the mother corporation. The question is of 
course, whether the regions can get significant revenues from taxation. In 
some cases this has proved impossible. Mining in Greenland for instance 
never paid off for Greenlandic society.  
The globalization issue in this POENOR Yearbook will mainly deal with 
the issue of southern transnational corporations that operate in Arctic regions. 
Furthermore, corporations, which operate outside the Arctic but within the 
global economy, are also within the focus of articles presented here.  
An important issue of globalization and the free mobility of factors of 
production relates to the formulation of policies and reforms, which are 
impregnated with ideological values. Since the prevalence of the neo-
classical paradigm or neo-liberalism (in terms of policy), monetarism and 
the “Friedmanite” ideology, there has been an acceptance of the free mar-
ket and private capitalism as being the only road to a prosperous society. 
Developing countries face neo-liberal conditionalities on obtaining loans 
from the World Bank and the IMF. The ideology rests on strategies of 
rolling back the frontiers of the state, while inducing privatizations and 
liberalization of markets. The Washington Consensus and the break down 
of the USSR and Eastern Europe represent this paradigm. Supra-national 
organizations like the OECD also have a homogenous approach to policy 
recommendations as seen in the OECD report on the Greenland economy 
in 1999, and in similar country reports from all over the world. Nonethe-
less, Arctic communities are not typical OECD entities, and they represent 
a mix of socio-economic systems other than laissez faire markets.  
Ongoing climate changes these years represent new problems to be 
analyzed in the context of creating independence in relation to either trans-
fer incomes or to direct investment from corporations in the centers. When 
the basics still are policy implementation that strengthens the regions abil-
ity to promote self-sufficiency, new research is needed as these changes 
create new problems and options, which impact the ability to develop. Key 
indicators for development are needed, as are the uncovering of economic 
and social consequences of climate change in order to create scenarios on 
impacts to the environment, infrastructure in general including urbaniza-
tion, energy demand and on sea and other transportation. Analysis of phe-
nomena like these does not only raises questions relevant to the field of 
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scientific research. It also raises the issue of popular co-determination in 
the establishment of scenarios and assessments related to this.  
In the future it is expected that the Northwest and Northeast Passage 
will become accessible on an expanded scale, which suggests change in the 
economics of logistics and the potentials of extracting oil, gas and other 
non-living resources. Prolonged seasons for fishing and hunting, construc-
tion, relocation of housing and infrastructure and repairs and maintenance 
due to changes in permafrost conditions all represents costs and benefits 
impacting the Arctic economy. These are new challenges that need to be 
addressed to ensure qualifications and capacity building. A change in the 
bio-diversity represents an alteration of the living resource base and the 
Arctic landscape including coastal and inland regions. This does not only 
call for environmental impact assessment, it also calls for economic impact 
assessments and analysis of the resilience of these societies in relation to 
these new conditions. Furthermore, it raises the question, whether the 
available competences in handling changes in trades, infrastructure and 
planning are able to cope with the challenges.9  
Economically, the global economies are not homogenous places. This 
calls for an emphasis on a comparative economic systems analysis as an 
approach. Arctic regions are no exception. They span widely – from 
economies representing remnants of central command systems and domi-
nant state ownership, to markets representing “laissez faire” and domi-
nance of corporate ownership. In between this dichotomy we have a social 
capitalist Canadian model and a Scandinavian type mixed system model. 
Besides these systems, the traditional economy still plays a part in the Arc-
tic. Historically the regional economies have practiced different systems 
over time, which allows for not just cross-country comparisons, but also 
for cross-sector analysis over time. In accordance with known methods 
from comparative systems analysis, it is necessary to classify and compare 
systems. Classifying normally involves types of allocative systems, owner-
ship models, the role of physical and economic planning, types of incen-
tives, sharing, social safety nets and income redistribution and in the politi-
cal sphere different self-government models and other political models. 
Empirical comparisons involve dependence indicators and data on macro-
economic stability. Moreover, it requires indicators on human development 
                                                        
9 Trausti Valsson: How the World Will Change with Global Warming, University of Iceland 
Press or [http://www3.hi.is/~tv/] 
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and social capital data related to the region’s present qualifications, compe-
tences and social adaptability in relation to handling the need for change. 
Finally, empirical analysis of the distribution of income and wealth could 
be a part of comparative system analysis.10 The work on classifying the 
Arctic systems as a part of the POENOR project is still under way, and the 
limitations of databases will determine what is possible in making classifi-
cations operational.  
Hence, due to this early stage of the POENOR project, this Yearbook 
will not analyze direct comparisons between different systems on different 
macroeconomic indicators. Reforming regional economies from one sys-
tem to another represents another type of comparative systems analysis not 
conducted here. As suggested above, globalization involves a concept of 
“modernity” rooted in the notion of the market society. Articles below deal 
with comparative issues and mainly take privatization and liberalization 
and alternative reform issues as their point of departure.  
The Local/Regional conditions are important in defining the social and 
economic dependency to centers in the south, as well as the impacts of 
globalization and climate change. They all influence central decision-
making, planning and urbanization. The absence of socio-economic analy-
sis may result in a prioritization of the larger towns and cities that are inde-
pendent of the problems of identifying local business opportunities. Hence, 
migratory studies are important at the same time as analyzing the different 
socio-economic conditions of local and regional societies. At this level, 
differences in the local sustainability of regions and the overall economic 
performance may demonstrate that societal costs of centralization are high, 
and that the local settlement’s limited capabilities and competences may 
demonstrate a lack of resilience and a much larger vulnerability. This em-
phasizes the importance of an analysis of either the dynamics of migration 
from the local settlements or preserving them. The basis for this is very 
often related to local competences and learning processes in transforming 
the new conditions into business and social opportunities. Organizational 
dependency stabilizes a dominance, which keeps the local communities out 
of important planning and decision-making processes. In terms of method-
ology, local studies include social indicators of the presence of dynamic 
                                                        
10 Distributive analysis based on Lorenz curves and calculations of gini coefficients is still a 
relatively uncovered field in Arctic statistics. Statistics Greenland has recently presented data on 
regional distributions and on household income data. 
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political and business capabilities and competences and the ability and 
outreach of local authorities to engage in the change processes. Both on a 
quantitative and a qualitative level, comparisons between local settlements 
and between regions will offer insights in local development patterns. 
To conclude, the 2008 Yearbook does not represent a full-fledged analy-
sis of the problems to decreasing or increasing economic dependence. Each 
member of the research consortium has been asked to include one or several 
of the four above approaches in their articles. The terms sustainable devel-
opment and self-reliance are concepts mentioned in many of the articles. The 
2008 workshop in Akureyri brought the consortium further to pinpointing a 
potential approach theoretically, methodologically and empirically. Future 
publications will contribute to a clarification on this issue. Yet, the reader is 
warned, the Yearbook 2008 represents a part of the “brain storming” process 
of the consortium, and it does not per se claim coherence and full adaptation 
to the problem formulated above.  
This does not mean that the Yearbook does not have anything to say. It 
should be read as a normal periodical with a theme of northern regional 
development expanded to the form of a yearbook – composed as an an-
thology of articles. A comprehensive and coherent report/book will finalize 
the work conceived during the 2007 Skagen workshop, and detailed in this 
Yearbook.  
1.3. What do we mean by “Arctic region” 
Besides the geographic demarcation determined by the Polar Circle, there 
are other definitions of the “Arctic”, which is used by Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Program (AMAP) and the Arctic Human Development 
Report (AHDR). The AHDR report comprises a preliminary approach to 
socio-economic analysis, where data compilations could not in all aspects 
cover AMAPs demarcation (AHDR report pp 17–18). The POENOR pro-
ject maintains the AHDR demarcation illustrated by the map below.11  
 
 
 
                                                        
11 “People and Politics of the Arctic, Journal of Nordregio no. 4, December vol 7, 2007 
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Figure 1. 
 
In the December 2007 issue of the Journal of NORDREGIO several de-
marcations of the Arctic are presented along with the AHDR and AMAP 
definitions. An eco-system point of departure (CAFF) or a general envi-
ronmental point of departure (AMAP) along with other physical and geo-
graphical boundaries is not operational in social sciences. The AHDR re-
port examines socio-economic conditions, cultural characteristics, along 
with political and ecological processes. These issues are the most compati-
ble with the intentions of the POENOR project. Moreover, there is a prac-
tical issue at play in terms of data compilation. Geographically speaking, it 
is not on all matters possible to compile data disaggregated. It is difficult 
for example, to do that on regions in Alaska, and henceforward the whole 
of Alaska including sub-arctic and temperate regions is included in the 
AHDR definition. With the exception of Iceland, the aggregate Arctic 
economy is composed of regional economies, having ties economically, 
 The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008 16 
politically and culturally to their “mother economies” of the south. In most 
instances, this creates the dependency patterns regarding transfer incomes.  
1.4. A decision-theoretic approach to the analysis of Arctic 
regions 
In terms of Economics, the model below can embrace the four approaches to 
analysis. It is a version I have modified to a regional Arctic economy origi-
nally developed by the Norwegian economist Leif Johansen for macroecono-
mies globally speaking. His decision-theoretic scheme developed as a part of 
his lectures on macroeconomic planning covers any economy from laissez 
faire markets to central command planned economies.12 One of the reasons 
why the model has been modified to Arctic regions is because climate changes 
as an exogenous factor is of utmost importance for future developments.  
Moreover we have a second and a third exogenous factor, because there 
are two central authorities in the model – the nation state and the self-
government state. Globalization itself is an exogenous factor. Dividing the 
models and adding endogenous factors, this has to do with decision-makers 
ability to predict or control the impacting factors on the structure and func-
tioning of the Arctic economy. 
Climate change, globalization and the nation state (Governments) decisions 
are beyond the control of either a local central authority (political self-
government) or decentralized decision makers (households, enterprises, mu-
nicipalities and interest articulating associations and organizations). Hence we 
call the sets Z, C and A exogenous, while the sets S and D are endogenous 
representing decisions taken within the regional economy. A set is composed 
of elements representing, either external states and conditions to the Arctic 
economy, policies of the nation state’s or the self-government authority. For 
example an element z belonging to Z may represent the impact of increased oil 
prices, an increase in international interest rates or exchange rates, changed 
world market prices on goods and services, or capital exports out of arctic 
economies. The Element c belonging to C could represent climate change and 
its impacts on access to the resource base. This for example, could be a vari-
able like changes in ocean temperatures, thickness of ice or the measure of the 
                                                        
12 Leif Johansen: “Lectures on Macroeconomic Planning’, vol 1 and 2, North-Holland, 1978 
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oceans ice area. The element a belonging to the set A represents policies avail-
able to the nation state’s central authority, and it could be monetary policy 
from the mother economy in the south (interest rates), fiscal policies (transfer 
incomes), exchange rate policies (import costs and export revenues for the 
arctic region). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A decision-theoretic scheme for Arctic Economies13 
                                                        
13 Leif Johansen: Lectures in Macro-economic Planning vol 1, North Holland Publishers, 1978. 
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Similar with the self-government central authority, it can still adopt its own 
fiscal policy, industrial policy, labor-market policy, social policy, health 
and education policy etc. Yet it is influenced by the three exogenous fac-
tors, which it cannot entirely control. Hence, forecasting and predicting 
partly may ease the self-government state’s planning processes. The ten-
sion between centralized decision-making and decentralized is obvious 
here. At the same time, it tells us something about the characterization of 
the economic system. If the decentralized decision makers mainly commu-
nicate with vertical streams of information to higher levels in a hierarchy, 
we have a centralized system – often connected with central planning or a 
high degree of central control. If the streams mostly are horizontal, we 
have a system in the opposite end of the dichotomy, representing different 
types of markets. In between, decentralized decision makers, forms of 
ownership and activities also characterize the economic system – taking 
subsistence as a point of departure, the issue at hand is, which other types 
of ownership structures and activities that co-exist with the traditional 
Arctic economy.  
The issue of centralization versus decentralization, ownership structures 
and types of economic activities tells us, which economic system is present 
in the regional Arctic economy, or in the figures terms – about the structure 
and functioning of the economy. 
Combining elements gives a structure and functioning of the economy, 
hence this is a resulting state x or x=f(z,c,a,s,d1;…….;dn) – of course this 
can be combined in an infinite many ways (a matrix of structures and 
“functioning” and a vector of states of the economy x). The structure and 
functioning of the economy is as well influenced by exogenous factors as 
the endogenous are, and it is not entirely defined by the issue of centraliza-
tion versus decentralization in planning. We will discuss that in the next 
section.  
The figure has preference scales W(x) for the central authority and Dn(x) 
different scales for the number of n decentralized decision makers including 
the self-government authority. A decision maker can then prioritize between 
decisions on each preference scale – the question is of course, whether this 
represents rational decision making based on symmetric information, maxi-
mizing behavior and full transparency regarding the outcome of each deci-
sions, or whether it represents a satisficing behavior based on limited knowl-
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edge, the second best, rolling and sliding planning or at worst “muddling 
through”? 
Taken as a whole, the scheme could be exemplified like this – say self-
government authority has predictions on the resource base of cod and other 
species in the future, and it has expectations of the world market price for 
cod steadily increasing and surpassing other species in the future. In addi-
tion, there are expectations for cod fishing to provide increased self-
reliance, which is attractive to the self-government central authority. Fur-
thermore, it has knowledge on development of interest rates from its nego-
tiations with the nation state. The decentralized decision makers have 
knowledge of the price development of input prices on cod. This is intro-
duced as a stimulus package from the self-government authority, which 
aims to introduce cod fishing in the future. All decision makers have ex-
pectations of different outcomes of alternative fishing technologies on the 
preference scales. Yet, cod fishing is highly valuable for the decentralized 
decision makers and especially for the self-government authority as it 
yields maximum value added taxes to revenues, which could help decrease 
economic dependency. Hence this plan is adopted and carried out. If per-
fect “team solutions” do not exist in all situations including several layers 
of decision makers, we are moving in to game theory. Conflicts and the 
introduction of non-cooperative games involve different preference scales. 
This often entails conflicting interests among decentralized decision-
makers themselves, and between the central authority (CA) and the decen-
tralized decision-makers. This does not remove the maximizing procedure, 
even when limited information is available to decentralized decision-
makers. It may however, cause less than an optimal solution unless the 
self-government authority can guide and regulate the economy in a planned 
direction using incentive schemes and directives.  
Economists having a critical inclination towards mainstream economics 
have rightly criticized commensurable preferences. This is also the case 
below in Aslaksen, Glomsrød and Myhr’s article referring standard econom-
ics, who argue that the agents of society, companies and consumers are sub-
ject to their economic interests as a main motivating force, irrespective of 
social, cultural and ecological contexts. Ecological economics focuses on the 
potential of the economic agent to act from responsible self-interest. The 
authors draw attention to other accounts of rationality besides economic 
rationality. “Behavior is procedurally rational, when it is the outcome of 
 The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008 20 
appropriate deliberation”. Expressive rationality characterizes actions as 
rational, when they satisfactorily express rational evaluations of objects and 
persons: “Practical reason demands that one’s actions adequately express 
one’s rational attitudes towards the people and things one cares about”. The 
authors point out:  
“Economic valuation methods that only rely on quantitative valuations without 
taking into account the particular environmental qualities and uncertainties, can 
appear as “blind” to the natural and cultural values that are difficult to measure. 
This apparent “blindness” may induce a criticism from other disciplines that 
questions the relevance of an economic trade-off for valuation of environmental 
qualities. An alternative is to emphasize that evaluation of environmental values 
and uncertainties should take place within a particular economic, ecological and 
social context. Ecological economics focuses on a perspective of multiple 
stakeholders, each embedded in a social and cultural setting”.  
 
Nonetheless, maximizing procedures have an alternative, which was intro-
duced by Herbert Simon. In relation to the marginalist controversy, Simon 
introduced satificing as a method that can be integrated into Johansens 
system.14 This also means that maximizing utility and profits is not always 
the incentive for economic behavior, and it could be broadened to include a 
rationality that is not entirely economic in the neo-classical sense. The 
responsible consumer may for instance satisfy aspirations, including non-
economic behavior, while maximizing other aspirations of a collective and 
ecological kind. Companies and organizations may be non-profit oriented 
as presented in Chris Southcott’s article below on the potentials for the 
social economy in the Canadian North.  
                                                        
14 Machlup, F. (1946), « Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research », American Economic 
Review, 36, 519–554. Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. 
Psychological Review, 63, 129–138. Herbert Simon: Theories of Decisionmaking in Economics, 
American Economic Review, vol 49, 1959. Reprinted in Edwin Mansfield: Microeconomics – 
Selected readings. Modified to Johansens model in Gorm Winther: Den grønlandske økonomi, 
planlægning og udviklingsproblemer, Aalborg universitetsforlag, 1988.  
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1.5. Beyond the decision-theoretic scheme – a 
multidisciplinary approach? 
The decision theoretic scheme could be enhanced in to larger models of the 
arctic society. The decision model does not contain law and culture and 
sociological factors as important preconditions for a self-reliant develop-
ment, and it has not entirely conceptualized self-reliance and its compo-
nents. Figure 3 was introduced during the POENOR workshop in Skagen 
by Gerard Duhaime who attemped to introduce a multidisciplinary ap-
proach to the project. The preconditions for development have to do with 
factors of the social system introduced in the figure. Taken as economic 
factors alone, factors of production such as labor, capital and technology 
are important factors for development – capital can be both real capital and 
human capital, and the composition of the factors of production is a pre-
condition for maximizing output Y. 
Demographic factors can, regarding labor and human endowments, take 
the form of capital, and can be a long run factor for development con-
straints and potentials. Is there availability of labor, education and compe-
tences? How many persons will the labor force comprise in the future? 
How will migration develop to and from the regions (which again may 
have to do with climate changes and climate belts moving North’)? How 
many elders have to be provided with welfare? 
This is not to say, that it cannot be a part of the Johansen model as this 
is an element of decision making and planning, at both the central and the 
decentralized levels of the economy, which are determined as exogenous 
factors. Migration of labor from the south can on the other hand, have 
something to do with developments on the world market and price and 
income incentives. 
The inclusion of social factors points to the human development concept 
explained in Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach.15 
Opposed to narrow utilitarianism, human capability takes an extended hu-
manist point of view of needs. Needs, in the Sen-Nussbaum approach fo-
                                                        
15 Amartya Sen: Development and freedom, 1998. Nussbaum, Martha, and Amartya Sen: The 
Quality of Life. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993). Martha Nussbaum: Women and Human Devel-
opment, Cambridge University Press, 2000. This line of thought is also a part of humanistic eco-
nomics, see Mark A Lutz and Kenneth Lux: The Challenge of Humanistic Economics, Bootstrap 
Press, 1979.  
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cuses on substantial freedoms. Freedoms argued to be determinants to devel-
opment include life and bodily health, social needs, and the ability to engage 
in economic transactions and participate in political activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An institutional model16 
 
Poverty and an extreme unequal distribution of income, power and wealth is a 
limitation on the fulfillment of human needs and hence a deprivation of exer-
cising each individual’s capability. Sen and Nussbaum do not address the issue 
of participation in economic activities in other ways other than referring to 
property rights to be held on an equal footing with others. This is major point 
                                                        
16 Model developed by Gerard Duhaime at the POENOR seminar in Skagen, See Duhaime’s 
article below. 
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of critique to the Sen-Nussbaum approach, when using it to examine to Arctic 
societies. Property rights in the traditional meaning of the concept most often 
imply an unequal distribution of wealth. An equal distribution of wealth refers 
to a participatory or labor-managed system characterized by democratic con-
trol of real, financial, social and natural assets.17 The question is whether the 
concept of rational economic man and utilitarian ethics is the right approach to 
analyze Inuit decision-makers. The “Inuit economic man” may represent ele-
ments of utilitarianism and rational decision-making, but the cultural back-
ground representing sharing and common harvesting of nature’s living re-
sources points to another direction or a synthesis representing alternative phi-
losophies on human nature. As noted in the SLICA project presented below, 
the experiences on data compilations called for a revised and expanded con-
cept of welfare, which adapted to the reality of the populations of the North. 
Although people living in settlements are by far the poorest in Greenland, they 
still prefer to live in the settlements. The early SLICA survey experiences 
indicated a need for the development of a new research design for the study of 
living conditions in Arctic countries and regions, which from an economic, 
and, especially a cultural point of views, are different from Western Europe 
and North America.18 We can add here that this is one example of the neo-
classical concept of welfare being inadequate.  
The issue of social stratification or distributive aspects, are present in 
figure 3 as impacting factors and as assessment components. The main 
issue in neo-classical economics is resource allocation and not the distribu-
tion of income, wealth and power. This is yet another analytical constraint 
on assessing the development of Arctic societies. 
The quintessence of this model as en enhancement to our modified 
Johansen model is, that the last mentioned is a sheer economic model that 
excludes institutional factors of the social system of an Arctic society. 
Even though impacts on a self-reliant development path from institutional 
factors can be difficult to trace in empirical analysis, it would be “eco-
nomic reductionism” to exclude these factors. As illustrated in figure 4 the 
output Y=f(L,C,t,I*) could be higher due to better functioning institutional 
factors, e.g. extended freedoms and participation (I*>I), that fortify the 
                                                        
17 Jaroslav Vanek: The Participatory Economy, Cornell University Press, 1971, The general 
Theory of Labor-managed Market Economies, Cornell 1970 and (ed) Self-management, economic 
Liberation of Man, Pinguin Books, 1975. 
18 Birger Poppel’s article in the end of this Yearbook. 
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sheer economic system to a higher degree than Y=f(L,C,t,I). L denotes 
Labor, C Capital, t technology and I institutional factors. 
Enhancing the model and including socio-economic factors also implies 
an enhanced concept of capital often ascribed to as social capital – having 
reliable and well functioning institutions means, that the problem of 
asymmetric information and distrust among the systems decision-makers is 
minimized.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The impact of institutional factors 
 
Development dynamics is understood as interactions between decisions 
taken by corporations (enterprises), governments and citizens within civil 
society, but different economic systems is highly compatible with the 
modified Johansen model in figure 2. Self-reliant development and the 
regional economy’s human and technological capacity to create this devel-
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opment in a sustainable and responsible way, still could be part of a deci-
sion-theoretic approach as prioritized goals at preference scales.  
1.6. Towards a unified concept of “self-reliance”? 
Yet, what is self-reliance? Economic independence implies that the absorp-
tion (investments and consumption) of an economy is financed by the 
value added of the economy itself. Yet, regional arctic economies are in 
some cases dependant on transfer incomes from its nation state economy in 
the south; and accordingly, the gross disposable national income (Transfers 
+ accumulated value added) is much higher than the gross domestic prod-
uct (accumulated value added). Moreover, this means that dependence on 
exogenous factors like financial capital, imports, and technology represent 
another type of dependence. This other type of dependence is often associ-
ated with corporations exporting accumulated profits to companies situated 
in countries with lower taxes, as seen in third world countries. This de-
pendence can be expanded to include the international financial system, the 
IMF, and supra-national bodies like the EU. The gist of the matter is 
whether each regional economy can create a value added, that can be 
taxed. This added tax base creates substantial increases in revenues for 
local self-government authorities, that independence gradually is increased. 
Consequently, economic self-reliance is important, and it is a synonym for 
economic independence. Economic dependence on either a nation state or 
trans-national corporations economic control could be substituted by own-
ership taking the form of regional corporations and community develop-
ment corporations partly politically controlled at different levels or by local 
privately held companies or cooperatives. These ownership forms are al-
ternatives and potential carriers of an increased degree of economic inde-
pendence. 
It seems that the dependency can be divided into two concepts, namely 
economic and organizational dependency.19 Organizational dependency repre-
sents external experts or techno-structural systems giving powers related to the 
                                                        
19 The concept of organizational dependency was introduced by Ivar Jonsson in “Reflexive 
Modernization, Organizational Dependency and Global Systems of Embedded Development – A 
Post-Colonial View” in Cultural and Social Research in Greenland, 95/96, essays in honour of 
Robert Petersen, Ilisimatusarfik, Nuuk. 
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“ways of doing things” in southern “mother economies”. This dependency 
means that local knowledge is not as much included as exogenous expert 
knowledge in decision-making. Individual choice and devotion from local 
decision-makers matter, consequently the potential of an agent to influence 
decisions concerning socio-economic conditions could increase organizational 
independence. With a higher inclusion of women, empowerment, democrati-
zation, economic self-management in companies and less stratification, Arctic 
societies could reach this stage of development. 
The economic implication of a decrease in organizational dependence is 
often forgotten. However, participation, political self-government and 
economic self-management in exploiting the resources where possible can 
increase economic efficiency as often seen in empirical literature on par-
ticipatory companies, employee ownership and cooperatives. This points 
back to the institutional factors and the capability approach. Freeing north-
ern residents from organizational dependency implies institution building 
based on their own socio-cultural factors. This approach would empower 
people to unleash their capabilities, and strengthens the ability to enhance 
economic self-reliance. 
In essence, the self-reliance concept has both a material and a human 
dimension, which are interdependent of each other. Human development is 
a precondition for material development and vice-versa. Human develop-
ment involves the inclusion of humanism within economics and social 
sciences, and it involves the fulfillment of needs beyond “homo oeco-
nomicus” as indicated in some articles below.20 
1.7. The articles 
The articles of the POENOR Yearbook mainly focus on socio-economic 
impacts of globalization, economic systems and climate change. In terms 
of comparative systems, development is described as an evolution from the 
traditional economic system to a modern system. This involves develop-
ment towards state or capital controlled systems or mixed systems. This 
also involves aspects of participatory or stake holding models at the same 
                                                        
20 [http://www.humanisticeconomics.net/] – contributors are for instance Simonde de Sis-
mondi, Mahatma Gandhi, E.F. Schumacher, Herman Daly, Mark A Lutz and Kenneth Lux and 
Jaroslav Vanek. 
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time as it involves a differentiated approach within each of the two ends of 
the dichotomy. In between central planning and laissez faire markets, there 
are other systems based on either other planning models or other types of 
markets. To help us classify Arctic societies, databases presented at the end 
of this book provide us with access to different data types for empirical 
comparisons. This approach also involves the dimension of globalization.  
For the last twenty years, globalization as a neo-liberal economic policy 
has predominated the political discourse in most countries of the world, 
including those with Arctic regional economies. Often, these Arctic 
economies have different types of Government interventions. Either “the 
percentage of collectivism” is very high as for instance in Greenland and 
Nunavut, or there are different types of ventures between Government and 
private companies. Moreover, in the absence of markets – planning, regu-
lations and controls are necessary preconditions for enabling the systems to 
work. The development globally speaking, as many articles below will 
show, has a “spin off effect” on Arctic regional economies. Instead of ac-
knowledging state-interventionism as a necessity for a working system, an 
ideological and euro-centrist approach that reflects neo-liberal policy for-
mulations and the neo-classical school of thought, has formulated the de-
velopment strategies of Arctic societies. This is not to say that neo-
liberalism has prevailed or has been a success. Arctic economies are still 
not comparable to an OECD economy and probably never will be due to 
specific Arctic conditions. In order to assess whether the development of 
system reforms or existing systems have any impact on comparative de-
velopment performance variables, we need to classify the different sys-
tems. These systems have evolved in several ways as indicated by Table 1. 
The classification of systems is not just as simple as the matrix sug-
gests. Several of the social coordination mechanisms overlap. For example, 
a system may have a traditional sector, a dominant state sector, and a small 
private sector (Greenland). Alternatively, a system may have a traditional 
sector, a cooperative sector, and a private sector (Nunavik).21  
It is also possible that a system is composed of a traditional sector co-
existing with a former state owned sector (Etatism); or as today it co-exists 
with the remnants of a former Etatist economy along with a growing capi-
talist sector (e.g. the Barents region or Chukotka). 
                                                        
21 Gorm Winther and Gerard Duhaime: Cooperative societies in Nunanvik and Greenland – a 
Lesson of the Importance of Supporting Structures, Journal of Rural Cooperation, 30 (1), 2002. 
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Table 1. Classification of Arctic Social Systems 
Social Co-ordination: Ownership: 
Traditional Planning Market Compacts & Agree-
ments 
Non-ownership 
or simple own-
ership of hunting 
and fishing 
equipment 
Subsistence 
economy, (Hunt-
ing & fishing, non-
monetary rela-
tions) 
Subsistence 
Economy in sys-
tem based on 
central planning or 
indicative planning
 
Subsistence 
Economy in 
system based 
on market 
allocation 
Subsistence 
Economy in system 
based on compacts 
and agreements 
State ownership Subsistence 
Economy or 
market socialism 
an Etatist System 
Central planning or 
indicative planning 
in an Etatist or 
marketsocialist 
system 
 
Market social-
ism 
Compacts and 
agreements be-
tween State owned 
or socially owned 
enterprises22 
Private owner-
ship 
Subsistence 
economy and 
Capitalism 
Indicative planning 
in a capitalist 
market system. 
Market capital-
ism 
Compact and 
agreements be-
tween private 
enterprises23 
 
Co-operative 
ownership 
Subsistence 
economy and 
Cooperative 
system 
Planning in a 
cooperative sys-
tem and/or cen-
tral/indicative 
planning 
Cooperatives in 
a market capi-
talist or market 
socialist econ-
omy 
Compacts and 
agreements be-
tween co-
operatives 
 
Moreover, the classification procedure of for instance, capitalism or etatism24 
may cover several systems within each category. Capitalism may be “laissez 
faire” (e.g. the US), planned (e.g. France) or social (e.g. Scandinavia, Germany 
and Canada). One way of classifying the systems could be based on the sec-
toral distribution of economic activities in order to determine a dominant sec-
tor. An example of this would be distribution of employment or value added 
by each sector in order to find differences between the regional arctic systems. 
This approach could simplify the classification and make comparative analysis 
                                                        
22 The distinction follows Oscar Langes definition of social ownership. Social ownership 
means, it is all citizens that has a de facto control with the assets held in common. State ownership 
means that a planning bureaucracy control the assets.  
23 Oliver Williamson’s analysis of market and hierarchies refers to such a system creating 
transaction costs. This system is not based on free pricing and as such it is not a market system in 
the theoretical sense. 
24 Etatism is a system based on a dominant State. Sometimes the term “statism” is used. Such 
a system has a high percentage of collectivism” (government expenditures share of GDP). It can 
be the classic Soviet model, remnants of it in Arctic Russia or a modified etatism in Greenland. 
Gorm Winther: Democracy and Power in Greenland – the Appearance of a New Class?, DIIPER 
Research series no. 1, Aalborg University 2007: [http://www.diiper.ihis.aau.dk /research/3397011] 
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possible in order to appraise whether systemic factors impede or promote a 
self-reliant development path.25 
The approach of climate changes involves impacts on the resource base, 
on human development, on community development and on macro-
economic development. The question is, whether Arctic systems can show 
resilience to exogenous impacts of the structure and functioning of the 
economies. Yet, it also involves the presented critique of neo-classical eco-
nomics being an inadequate approach to a holistic analysis of Arctic social 
systems. The essence of the POENOR approach described above is that the 
three approaches the globalization impact, the systemic impact and the cli-
mate impact are tangled together as complex impacting structures imposing 
constraints and possibilities on a self-reliant development path. 
Finally, articles on the use of databases (ECONOR), and the databases 
themselves are presented in this volume. These are necessary prerequisites 
for implementing the POENOR project’s empirical analysis. The situation 
on data access for comparative analysis has in recent years, improved with 
access to ARCTICSTAT and SLICA. 
As mentioned, the tension between centralized and decentralized deci-
sion-makers could in a comparative systems context represent a dichotomy 
scale between plan and market and between state and private ownership. 
On the other hand it could also reflect the search for a “third way”, that is 
in between the poles of this. Gerard Duhaime suggests a comprehensive 
approach to arctic social scientific research in his article “Theoretical 
Foundation for the Study of Arctic Development Models”. His approach 
constitutes a search for alternatives to development paradigms based on 
either the state or market. Referring to Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nuss-
baums enhanced model of human capabilities, Duhaime is looking for a 
way to include local indigenous people in decision-making. In his article, a 
humanist development model is presented as an alternative to neo-liberal 
practices, and to state involvement from “the South”. The various eco-
nomic practices for resource exploitation – customary land uses and large-
scale extraction activities – are usually seen as separate worlds, a vision 
that traditional scientific disciplinary barriers have accustomed us to. Du-
                                                        
25 This work commenced at the POENOR workshop in Akureyri, Iceland. Having classified the 
systems, it will become possible to analyze classification variables in relation to macro-economic 
indicators, human development indicators or material well being indicators (the ASI project). Forth-
coming POENOR publications will report on the results of these statistical measures. 
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haime is of the opinion, that the conditions that create these practices, and 
their impacts, are all part of the same Arctic economic reality in a global 
context. Mega-scale projects are facing the growing political power of 
Aboriginal peoples of the Arctic, their claims for local benefits and their 
concerns for improving living conditions, and for sustaining their commu-
nities. Challenges of Arctic development require the drawing of a global 
picture of the Arctic economy. Comparisons within this global context, of 
economic practices, their various prerequisites and their various impacts 
have only recently been initiated. By adopting such an approach, it could 
be possible to arrive at a comprehensive analysis of Arctic development 
models and to shed light on their specific effects on local residents” control 
over resources, human health and education, social integration, living con-
ditions, economic equity and local participation in decision-making. 
Jack Kruse lends some support to Duhaime’s approach regarding the 
compatibility of analyzing the traditional economic system and a modern 
economic system based on mega-scale projects. Kruse in his article “Sus-
tainability from a Local Point of View: Alaska’s North Slope and Oil De-
velopment” raises the question whether large-scale multi-national corpora-
tions can interact with local communities. He asks whether there are cir-
cumstances in which world scale resource development can increase the 
sustainability of local communities. Based on quantitative interviewing of 
North Slope Iñupiat in 1977 and 2003, his findings suggest that the Iñupiat 
were as well or better off than their Iñupiat neighbors in the Bering Straits 
and Northwest Arctic regions, the indigenous people of Chukotka, and the 
Greenlandic and Canadian Inuit. Hence it seems, that combining the tradi-
tional economy with large-scale capitalism or local “peoples capitalism” 
(regional corporations) does not reduce human well being. Indicators in the 
empirical analysis included variables from the Arctic Human Development 
Report (AHDR) in describing well being as material success, good health, 
access to education, ties with nature, cultural continuity and fate control. 
These variables are based on questions asked of community residents in 
face-to-face interviews. Critical to understanding these results is that the 
Iñupiat of the North Slope successfully established a regional government 
in 1972, the North Slope Borough. The Borough’s regional boundary in-
cludes Prudhoe Bay Development and the legal right to tax energy devel-
opment facilities on state land within the Borough, to which the Borough 
has retained substantial revenues from these taxes. These revenues have 
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supported a capital improvements program that has employed many North 
Slope Iñupiat 
In the article “The Social Economy and Economic Development in the 
Canadian North: Constraints and Opportunities” Chris Southcott elabo-
rates on Duhaimes “third way” approach as being in between state and 
private ownership, and planning and free market approaches. The social 
economy understood as co-operatives, non-profit organizations, voluntary 
NGOs and other quasi organizations operating in between state and market 
is a possible instrument to deal with economic challenges faced by com-
munities in Canada’s North by enhancing economic empowerment. A 
discussion of the region’s economic development shows the constraints 
and opportunities facing the social economy. While political self-
government is in the making it is unfortunately not the same as economic 
self-management. However, attempts to expand the social economy in 
Canada’s northern communities must first properly account for several 
unique characteristics of the region’s economy that may provide con-
straints or opportunities. The traditional economy of indigenous communi-
ties, the role of the state in economic development, and the impact of re-
source development in the North are important characteristics that impact 
socio-economic development in the region. How they impact social eco-
nomic organizations must be properly understood in order for proper poli-
cies to be developed that stimulate the growth of the social economy in the 
region. Southcott has established the Social Economic Research Network 
for Northern Canada to fulfill such a purpose. It is a network of university-
based researchers and representatives of community-based organizations, 
who operate as partners, to conduct research relevant to the social economy 
of Canada’s North. The network seeks to mobilize new knowledge that 
will help develop social economy capacity in northern communities. It has 
developed a series of key research areas that hope to build on the existing 
research findings.  
In a comparative system context the question of decentralization in its 
traditional approach appears as privatization and liberalization reforms. 
Regarding privatization Hans Aage in “Enterprise Ownership and re-
sources management in Greenland”, analyzes the balance between public 
and private governance within the economic activity in Greenland on the 
basis of economic theory. In Greenland, all conceivable forms of market 
failures impair the efficiency of the market. Government interference is 
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imperative, primarily because of social externalities and resource depen-
dence, but it entails risks of policy failures, i.e. unproductive rent seeking. 
The advantages of government and market governance are not combined in 
state owned joint stock companies, which on the contrary, are often (local) 
monopolies. These monopolies are largely exempted from all types of 
checks, from the market as well as from government. The inability of gov-
ernment to make long-term commitments is an argument for the devolution 
of power, and in some cases, even to the market by privatization. However, 
when strong social externalities and resource management are involved, 
the arguments points towards either state enterprises with full democratic 
control, or delegation of policy making power to an independent profes-
sional body subject to detailed and binding prescriptions. Contrary to Du-
haime and Southcott however, Aage is skeptical about the feasibility of a 
third way based on democratic ownership and control by members of local 
communities. 
Liberalization, and the introduction of a market society in an arctic re-
gion, raises concerns over possible distributive effects and as a worst-case 
scenario poverty. Greenland has hitherto relied on state ownership and 
planned prices based on cross subsidization. Gorm Winther in his article 
“The Reform on Uniform Prices and its Consequences for Households in 
Greenland Settlements” presents reforms on the uniform price system. Al-
though seldom articulated by political decision-makers, the consequences of 
reforms appear to encourage an exodus from smaller settlements into towns. 
The reform package is a gradual transformation on several prices on differ-
ent goods and services hitherto being uniform and based on cross subsidiz-
ing. The case analyzed in the article is the 2005 reform to utility rates for 
households in settlements. The intention of the reform was to create so-
called “cost based pricing” which divided Greenland in two parts – the 
“competition towns” of Qaqortoq, Nuuk, Sisimiut and Ilulissat did after the 
first year after the inception of the reform saw an immediate price decrease 
of 50%, and the remaining part of Greenland should over five years gradu-
ally see a 50% price increase. The motive behind a two-tier reform was that 
tax cuts should equalize price hikes on energy and water in “loser towns and 
settlements”. Nevertheless, one can hardly doubt that this tax reform will not 
be able to capture the price and tariff increases of this kind. Settlement 
household’s purchasing power will be decreased if not compensated in some 
way, for the massive spending increases. We still, however, need a more 
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accurate picture of how many households in the “loser cities and settle-
ments” that are affected by the combined tax and price reforms. We also 
need a more accurate picture of the impact to utility costs for households due 
to fluctuations in world oil prices.  
The privatization and liberalization urge is not just something that re-
lates to Greenland, it also relates to Iceland. For the last twenty years, glo-
balization as an economic policy has predominated the political discourse 
in most countries of the world. Since the nineties, when Iceland privatized 
its state bank sector, the economic structure and the class structure have 
been changed. Using the example of Japanese transnational corporations 
and the Keiretzu, which refers to families or networks that manage these 
corporations, Ivar Jonsson describes changes in Iceland as a kind of “mini-
keiretzu”. Consequently in the article “Approaching the New Transna-
tional Capitalist Class and the mini-keiretzu system in Iceland”, he sees 
three privatized banks in Iceland as being the core and base of the growth 
of three closely knitted webs of related companies in the retailing and 
transport sectors. These companies and the banks build their strong finan-
cial position on oligopoly stricken markets in Iceland that they then use to 
exploit Icelandic consumers in order to collect oligopoly-rents. Invest-
ments abroad in their original branches of industry are based on these 
rents. A new layer within the Icelandic capitalist power block emerged that 
was mainly rooted in the financial sector and with direct investments 
abroad, with a large extent financed by foreign external finance. Jonssons 
article was written one year before the international economic slump and 
the severe crisis of the Icelandic economy in 2008. Jonssons future analy-
sis of an “absentee capitalism” in Iceland will be no doubt influenced by 
these developments. The question is, whether or not this new layer of 
transnational capitalist class can survive after the collapse of the Icelandic 
financial sector? 
In Lyudmila Zalkin’s article “Local Implications of Housing Reform in 
Northern Regions of Russia”, she touches upon yet another element of 
privatizations – the housing market and the situation regarding upcoming 
markets for dwellings in Russia. Reforms were established in the nineties, 
and yet in the North, the implementation still is lagging behind, compared 
to the average standards in Russia. Some of the reform’s goals have been 
reached. Markets of dwellings have been established, and tenants have 
participated actively in dwelling privatization. However, acquisition of 
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property rights for many people is not associated with new rights and re-
sponsibilities. For a majority of people, dwelling privatization may only be 
a possibility to devolve. On the whole, therefore, the housing reform may 
follow a direction, which is opposite to the inhabitants” expectations. At 
the same time people don’t think about themselves as being participants in 
the reforms and don’t propose to change the course of events. The situation 
in Northern Russia is an attempt to move from one economic system of 
central planning to a market capitalist system. Here we see similarities to 
Greenland, where privatizations of dwellings have been underway in more 
than 10 years without obtaining the expected results. Privatization of exist-
ing housing complexes in Greenland has failed and although many incen-
tives have been created to encourage private ownership of homes, most 
housing is still based on renting instead of owning. 
Iulie Aslaksen, Solveig Glomsrød and Anne Ingeborg Myhr emphasize 
in their article “Climate change and economic system impacts on self-
sufficiency constraints and potentials – perspectives from ecological eco-
nomics” that both climate change and economic systems impact arctic 
economies. Exogenous factors like the impact from climate changes and 
the global economy strongly influence the self-sufficiency constraints and 
potentials of the Arctic societies. Traditional approaches to economic 
valuation may not be sufficient to capture these relationships. Neo-classical 
economics and the trade off model look upon nature as a good commensu-
rable with all other goods, and henceforward there is a substitution possi-
bility. The rational self-interest and “homo economicus” is however, not 
the same as responsible self-interest included in ecological economics. 
This suggests broader approaches to environmental uncertainties, which 
take into account ethical values and conflicts of interest. In order to en-
hance the potential for sustainable development and self- sufficiency, pre-
cautionary approaches require the development of processes for the ac-
knowledgement of uncertainties, facilitation of stakeholder participation, 
recognition of ethical values, and taking into account the traditional eco-
logical knowledge of indigenous people of the Arctic. As do other authors 
in this book, Aslaksen, Glomsrød and Myhr question the model of central-
ized decision making. They do so not unequivocally in order to substitute it 
with the laissez faire market represented by “economic man” and the trade 
off model, but to consider the participatory decentralized approach of local 
knowledge. Here we see a parallel to Duhaimes thoughts on a humanized 
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system framed within Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s capability 
approach. We also see parallels within Southcott’s article on the social 
economy in the Canadian North.  
Hugo Reinert, Svein Mathiesen and Erik Reinert in their article “Cli-
mate Change and Pastoral Flexibility: A Norwegian Saami Case.” identify 
four levels of Saami reindeer herding flexibility in adapting to the impacts 
of long-term climate change. At the same time their article addresses the 
impact of climate changes and the issue of centralization versus decentrali-
zation in decision-making processes in Northern Norway. The four coping 
strategies are spatial flexibility, herd structure, production and social or-
ganization. By decreasing the loss of pastoral land and counteracting the 
destruction of ecological niches, herds have the ability to cope with the 
changes. Enabling and facilitating the restructuring of herds in such a way 
that diversification can withstand dramatic climate change, is a second 
coping strategy. A third strategy relates to input – output linkages, decen-
tralizing control from outside monopolized markets in terms of selling 
reindeer meat. Being a seasonal product, reindeer herders” interests are not 
served best by outside forces, and this suggests, it is better to devolve a 
degree of control to the reindeer herders themselves. This leads to a fourth 
recommendation for decentralizing social organization, which as men-
tioned by Aslaksen, Glomsrød and Myhr includes an enhancement of local 
stake holder participation. The Norwegian State as a central authority in 
the decision-theoretic scheme maintains centralized control over reindeer 
herding, which is rationalized from thoughts on regulations evolved from 
traditional agriculture. Association in collectives as was originally the case 
among Saamis in “siidas” suggests the need to downscale and decentralize 
in order to reform the structure and functioning of the Saami economy in 
accordance with traditional systems. The authors final recommendation 
resembles the article’s above mentioning participatory systems as being an 
alternative to both etatism and market capitalism.   
Joan Nymand Larsen’s article “Climate change, natural resource de-
pendency, and supply shocks: The case of Greenland” describes the vola-
tile cycles of development in post-war Greenland. Lack of diversification 
and lower per capita incomes create an unstable environment. In general, 
the instability problem, which is likely to be linked to an uncertainty about 
availability of public and private resources may complicate development 
planning and reduce the rate of growth. This problem can be even more 
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severe due to future impacts from climate change and as such it represent 
the scenario in the decision-theoretic scheme representing exogenous fac-
tors beyond any control from a national or regional central authority and 
from decentralized decision-makers. Uncertainty is related to the difficulty 
of modeling the events and obtaining good and reliable data. According to 
Larsen, climate change and other processes occurring at a rapid pace, com-
bined with limited observational infrastructure, and a lack of timely, ap-
propriate and reliable data and information networks, present the research 
community with new challenges. One could add here that processes of 
comprehensive physical and economic planning need these data and mod-
els. New demands are placed on access to data for the study and modeling 
of these global processes, and for understanding, measuring and predicting 
the impacts of change on social systems at various scales.  
Rasmus Ole Rasmussen takes as his point of departure from discussions 
regarding consequences of ongoing climate change. In the article “Climate 
Change, Informal Economy and Generation and Gender Responses to 
Changes” discussions tend to disregard the fact that there seems to be 
measures within the communities, which are able to cope with very sub-
stantial changes. At the same time the discussions tend to forget that there 
are other ongoing social processes which, independent of processes of 
changes in climate, may become much more decisive for the future of 
many of the settlements. This analysis focuses on three elements. First, it 
should not be forgotten, that the contemporary climate change is not excep-
tional. During the last millennium Greenland has been exposed to massive 
changes in climate, which has had both positive and negative consequences 
for the living conditions. Second, communities in Greenland tend to react 
to changes, and here the traditional economy and the role it plays in adjust-
ing community life as well as adjusting to environmental, economic, as 
social changes is emphasized. This role is not specific to Greenland, and 
therefore a few references to other parts of the Arctic and their experiences 
with contemporary informal economic activities are included in the discus-
sion. Third, the discussion focuses on the ongoing social changes, as these 
changes seems to have much more influence on community life and set-
tlement patterns, that future climate changes may turn out to have. The 
social changes are much more rapid and showing more influences on re-
structuring the settlement pattern, compared to the anticipated changes in 
climate and environment. As Martha Nussbaum referred to above in the 
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capability approach, Rasmussen puts an emphasis on womens” freedoms 
representing another economy than the traditional economy. In terms of 
demographics this creates an out migration of women and settlements 
mostly populated by men exercising their traditional trade of hunting and 
fishing. 
As emphasized, of utmost importance for research in development in 
Arctic regions is access to databases and empirical analysis based on 
these. The Arctic Human Development Report pioneered social scientific 
analysis and within the field of economic systems. The ECONOR project 
from Statistics Norway took this work further as did the ARCTICSTAT 
and the SLICA project. ARCTICSTAT is the only comprehensive social 
scientific Database available today.  
All three, to be presented below, are stepping stones to further data 
compilations and empirical analysis. In Solveig Glomsrød’s and Iulie 
Aslaksen’s article “Presenting the Economy of the North (ECONOR)” 
based on ARCTICSTAT and other sources, some basic facts to the North-
ern regional Economies are introduced. One may get the impression, that 
the Arctic plays a minor role in the global economy. Yet, the Arctic has 
abundant natural resources, from petroleum and minerals, to fish and for-
ests. Given the important role of the Arctic as a provider of raw materials 
of all sorts, natural resource management is crucial, and is likely to become 
even more so in the future due to climate change. One example is the chal-
lenge encountered if there are changes to the migratory pattern or an exten-
sion of a fish stock. Another example of possible changes is associated 
with the management of mineral resources and fossil fuels. Pollution issues 
will also be of increased importance as economic activity expands in the 
Arctic. Pollution migrates across borders and affects global public goods 
like clean air, water, biodiversity and wildlife. These issues will also result 
in increasing demands on transnational mechanisms for coordination. The 
authors concludes that among several good reasons for compiling an over-
view of the circumpolar Arctic economy – there is a need for an informa-
tion platform from which to assess the sustainability of the Arctic commu-
nities in terms of natural wealth management and vulnerability towards 
global policies and trends.  
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Gerard Duhaime and Andre Caron give a comprehensive overview of the 
first inter-Arctic database which is taken up in their article “Analyzing Arctic 
Social Realities Through ARCTICSTAT”.26 
The currently available statistical data dealing with Arctic populations 
comes from multiple sources. Such a diversity of sources makes consulting 
and using this data difficult. ArcticStat was created in order to overcome 
these difficulties. It is a data bank that contains socioeconomic data dealing 
with more than 30 Arctic regions grouped as a coherent and systematic 
whole. This grouping facilitates the description, analysis, interpretation and 
comparison of the living conditions of Arctic populations. Their article pre-
sents the delimitation of the territory covered by ArcticStat, as well as the 
general method that was used to locate the sources and data, the choice of 
indicators, and an analysis of the statistical content of ArcticStat. It also 
highlights certain limitations inherent in this content. Moreover, it proposes a 
few precautionary remarks to researchers who wish to use the data found in 
the bank, to make comparisons between the various regions of the Circum-
polar Arctic. The warning is framed within examples of important concep-
tual and methodological differences in the production of the various national 
agencies from which the data originates.  
Birger Poppel in his article “Some data sources on people, peoples, 
communities, regions and human activities in dreemland” presents us with 
another reference to the comprehensive database SliCA.27 In the article we 
are both presented with data access in a Greenlandic context, as well as 
SLiCA information specific to the Greenland part of SLiCA. The SLiCA 
model and relevant literature are presented to the reader through annexes. 
Results from the SLiCA survey are now available on the project web site, 
in published articles and could be made available by special agreements 
with the research team. The results have already proven useful to initiatives 
such as the Arctic Social Indicators project and to a number of other Arctic 
Council and IPY endorsed projects such as ECONOR and POENOR. 
SLiCA has linkages to some research projects, which focus on data gather-
ing and management as well as establishing monitoring systems and net-
works to document the physical and biological changes within the Arctic. 
Furthermore, descriptive studies of two Greenland municipalities have 
been part of the point of departure for discussions about community devel-
                                                        
26 [http://www.arcticstat.org] 
27 [http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org]. 
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opment. SLiCA is both a concept and a set of results. SLiCA as a concept 
can be applied to future enhancements of the Arctic observation system 
and it can help inform policy makers, indigenous organizations, and re-
searchers.  
The POENOR project does not partake on a complete historical over-
view of Arctic development. Even so, the Skagen workshop had one pres-
entation relevant to a historical approach to examining Arctic development 
in, “Comparative-historical analysis of farming systems and agricultural 
intensification in medieval and early modern Iceland” by Jon Haukur 
Ingimundarsson. Ingimundarsson’s article hypothesis is concerned with the 
productive farming system of the Icelandic Commonwealth (10th to the 
13th century), which developed in conjunction with an elaborate socio-
political structure that was supported by a relatively large population com-
pared to the subsequent five centuries. Moreover, this period saw devel-
opment of a form of mercantile exchange and surplus distribution. The 
intensive early Icelandic farming system is compared to the characteristics 
of intensified livestock production and trade during the 19th century, and 
the first two decades of the 20th century. Specifically, Ingimundarsson first 
gives an overview of the integration of a broad-based subsistence economy 
supporting specialized sheep production and yielding surplus wool for 
export in the “medieval warm period”. Following this overview, he elabo-
rates on a chiefdom formation, or the economic rule of merchant-farmers. 
As a third issue, Ingimundarsson examines how freeholder production 
intensified in the context of mercantile activity, rural credit systems, and 
kin- and municipally-based insurance systems. Fourth, he describes a sub-
sequent de-intensification, and a change to a farming system emphasizing 
sheep reared for efficient milk and meat production. Finally the rise of rent 
tenure, communal property rights, and tributary systems in contexts of 
developing ecclesiastic institutions and colonial relations with Norway is 
presented. 
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2. Theoretical foundation for the study 
of Arctic development models 
 
Gérard Duhaime28 
I will never forget the fish, the hundreds of iridescent dead fish that floated on 
the rancid and oil-saturated water around the wharfs of the refineries. They 
were the standard welcoming committee. the spectacle that greeted us each time 
the tugboats pulled us into port. The ugliness was so universal, so profoundly 
linked with the lucrative activity and the power associated with the money of 
those who earned it – to the point of distorting the landscapes, totally turning 
the natural universe upside down – that it began, despite my aversion, to inspire 
a sort of respect. If we look at things closely, I said to myself that is what the 
world is all about. Whatever one may think, this ugliness is reality. 
Paul Auster, Le diable par la queue. 1996. Paris, Acte Sud, Poche 14920, p. 
74. (Our translation from French) 
2.1. Development models 
Development is not some mechanical phenomenon whereby the introduc-
tion of capital in a region results in general prosperity, a conception that 
presupposes that the interrelations between the actors involved follow an 
inevitable direction. Instead, it is a complex process bringing into play a 
multiplicity of actors and interrelations. Nevertheless, I suggest that the 
observation of development is likely to reveal co-occurrences between the 
aspects of the phenomenon based on models of interrelations between the 
                                                        
28 Professor chair and research chair on aboriginal conditions at dept. of Sociology Univer-
site’Laval, Quebec 
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actors. In given regions, one would find similar characteristics concerning, 
for example, economy, the health and education of the population, the 
political system, corresponding to certain regular occurrences in the rela-
tions between civil society, the State and corporations. I tested this ap-
proach in Northern Quebec, subdivided into ten ethno-geographic regions, 
using nine indicators (Duhaime and Godmaire 2002). This examination 
revealed four main models (and variations) of northern development, 
which are mainly distinguished from one another by the type of exploita-
tion of natural resources and the characteristics of the population. In those 
regions where the exploitation of resources is practiced on a large scale, 
the populations benefit from the economic spin-offs of development. But 
the populations do so in different manners, directly because the families 
earn their living from this development, or indirectly because the popula-
tions in question have been able to capitalize on the attraction exerted by 
resources. In those regions where the exploitation of resources takes place 
on a small scale, where prosperity is no longer ensured by mechanisms 
which in the past were efficient, the general situation is deteriorating not 
only because the economic infrastructure remains weak, but also because 
the populations do not have the political weight to change things. In this 
perspective, the ethnic factor would be a determinant that is much less 
important than the presence of massive resources and the ability to take 
advantage of these resources locally.  
These empirical generalizations suggest that the approach of develop-
ment “models” in the North may be profitable for underscoring similarities 
and differences, as well as factors that seem to have a decisive influence on 
the configuration of development. This approach must now be tested at the 
circumpolar level, where the differences could be much more marked due 
to the number and the diversity of the regions, the economic and political 
systems, whose elucidation could provide insight into the major factors of 
the processes in question. But there is more. These empirical generaliza-
tions may lead to theoretical generalizations, if we are willing to explore 
their potential. Do these generalizations comprise more than a typology of 
actors and their relations? Do they correspond to processes whose most 
important theoretical dimensions have only been explored to a very limited 
extent? In summary, if we plausibly assume development models, may we 
not deduce from them a theorization of the development process, where the 
variations would be but manifestations of more fundamental phenomena?  
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2.2 Deliberate action 
If the observable development reveals similarities and variations, a re-
search initiative that adopts this premiss must address two preliminary 
questions. First, are the observable models the result of the deliberate ac-
tion of the actors? 
A similar vision would first presuppose that the actors share similar 
motives for taking action and secondly that they implement coherent meth-
ods when carrying out such actions. Development brings into contact the 
corporation, the government and society in a given geopolitical area. Each 
of these social actors is pursuing its own interests, which it promotes more 
or less effectively depending on its capacities. Each of these actors repre-
sents realities, whose large complexity can only be mentioned. The corpo-
ration is a legal entity bringing together capital with a view to making it 
flourish. The government is an institution that redistributes the resources 
levied from corporations and society. Society is all of the social institutions 
other than the corporation and the government: it is the plural universe of 
individuals and the multiplicity of their social roles, associations (unions or 
voluntary associations for example) and institutions (family or church for 
example). The specific interest of the corporation is to make profits in 
order to redistribute them among its shareholders. To achieve this goal, the 
corporation will endeavor to impose its interests and the means to attain 
them on the other two collective actors, namely the government and soci-
ety. The government redistributes collectivized resources according to the 
perception that it has of the common good. The corporation seeks to im-
pose its vision of the common good on the government. Neo-liberal socie-
ties have governments that endorse this corporate vision and that seek to 
impose it on society. Society participates in these interrelations in various 
ways; it may simply contribute by its consenting silence, which in fact 
allows the corporation and the government to pursue their own logics; it 
may participate actively by indicating its preferences or claims; it may 
endeavor to impose its interests by impassioned representations, revolt or 
rebellion (Bergeron 1977).  
Globalization is the process, whereby the domination of the institutions 
of western capitalism spreads. It is achieved by the growth of “transnational” 
corporate practices and by their pressure on national governments, popular-
ized by international political-economic authorities, in order to give free 
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reign to these practices. It leads to a devalorization of local practices (corpo-
rate, governmental and social), to the generalization of the “comprador” 
mentality and the consumer ideology, and so on (Sklairs 1991). From that 
moment on, the observable development should obey this fundamental proc-
ess, and its variations should be less the result of a departure from the proc-
ess than the impact of local conditions on the process. For example, in a 
given region, the sharing of the profits of corporations with local forces 
would not contradict this approach, but would reveal a degree of political 
organization of civil society rendering it capable of imposing certain con-
straints on transnational practices. Similarly, the protectionist impulses of a 
State would reveal local conditions, like the temporary reaction of political 
powers to certain pernicious effects of globalization. Thus, the actors would 
approach development based on a vision that would first be imposed by 
international institutions capable of influencing their actions: more or less 
imperative recommendations of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank drawing inspiration from a credit rating assigned to States by 
agencies “playing the institutions’ tune”, and so on. Put in another way, local 
players would follow the directions imposed by transnational actors in their 
development efforts.  
This perspective is certainly not invalidated by the contemporary trends 
toward dismantling the Welfare State, such as the application of budgetary 
policies promoting a “zero deficit”, the “rationalization” of social policies 
(namely the systematic reduction of the social safety net created since the 
generalization of Keynesian policies), the growth of state benefits granted to 
corporations. While this perspective helps explain a large number of observ-
able phenomena in the transformation of societies, it does have its limita-
tions. Indeed, this perspective would lead us to see opposing trends as tem-
porary failures, as social deviations, which sooner or later would be over-
come by the inevitable rationality of neo-liberalism. These limitations are 
based on a monolithic and misleading vision of social action, whether on the 
part of the corporation, the State or civil society. Of course, the fundamental 
motive of a corporation is to maximize its profits; that does not mean, how-
ever, that the actions obey uniform or universal mechanisms.  
Observation has shown that, even in this universe where the means 
and the ends of the action and their relationship are explained to a very 
high degree, agents find their way according to intuitions and anticipa-
tions of the practical meaning, very often leaving the main elements at 
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the implicit state and embarking, on the basis of the experience ac-
quired in practice, upon practical strategies, in the twofold sense of 
non-theoretical implicit elements and convenient elements, which are 
adapted to the requirements and the urgencies of the action. (Bourdieu, 
2000, p 20–21; our translation from French)  
In summary, while the corporation maintains its course toward its des-
tination, it navigates according to the mariner’s art rather than according to 
an exact science, which would ignore the real constraints associated with 
the operation of the vessel, headwinds and opposing currents, for instance, 
and which would result in a shipwreck. The same is true for the action of 
the State. While the perception of the common good, which presides over 
the redistribution role played by the State, is dominated by the neo-liberal 
credo (validated by the predominant current in the economy) that general 
prosperity is achieved by ensuring the prosperity of private enterprise, thus 
requiring the abolishment of all impediments to the freedom to “do busi-
ness”, the production of the State does not universally abide by this credo. 
The production of the State is so diversified, its organization so complex, 
the questions which the State is called to rule upon belong to so many dif-
ferent fields, and the pressures to which the State is exposed come from so 
many sources, that the resulting decisions often contradict one another. 
Civil society itself is characterized by these contradictory trends. In short, 
development cannot be understood solely as the inevitable result of the 
deliberate action of the actors who purportedly have a uniform vision of 
their basic interest, a vision, which at the present time is totally dominated 
by the ideological apparatus serving globalization.  
The examples of the past abundantly show that such a thing as planning 
from the top does indeed exist and that it exerts an influence on the course 
of development, as evidenced by the major work sites having presided over 
the economic organization and local structuring of Greenland, the con-
struction of the villages of the Canadian Arctic, and of course, the Soviet 
exploitation of the Far North. Contemporary examples also show the clear 
influence of international economic/political organizations and transna-
tional practices on development. The “structural adjustments” having led to 
the budgetary deficit reduction policy hit Nunavik much harder than they 
did Québec as a whole, causing a precipitous decline in public expendi-
tures but also in the purchasing power of residents, just as transnational 
corporations were taking control of the rich nickel deposits intended for 
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exports. The same “structural adjustments” having led to the privatization 
of some of Greenland’s government corporations increased the role played 
by Danish capital on the island, whereas the island would have preferred to 
gain more freedom from the metropolis. But there are counter-
currents (such as the invention of innovative social policies or the im-
provement of some of them); above all, there exist results of development 
which cannot be accounted for by an approach founded on the deliberate 
action perspective, as if the collective actors were in fact unified entities, 
having a unique and perfectly coherent conscience; unless, of course, one 
explains the deleterious phenomena as being deviations brought about by 
confused souls who are temporarily at the helm, phenomena which should 
disappear in time. Contrary to the neo-liberal credo, the prosperity of pri-
vate business does not inevitably lead to “general prosperity” (except 
where the claim is made that an increase in the GDP is synonymous with 
general prosperity), but instead accompanies the growth of injustices; nor 
does the abolition of the obstacles to the flow of capital have the purported 
effect, increasing instead impoverishment in those countries experiencing 
massive relocations (where the social net has been overly extended, mak-
ing assistance to the unemployed more precarious), as well as the injustices 
in newly invested countries. Moreover, these examples support the criti-
cism of neo-liberalism and the validity of its theoretical argument, which 
then appears as an ideology rather than as established knowledge. 
The determinist approach alone is insufficient to explain change. Inher-
ited from the sociological tradition, it is today complemented, even invali-
dated, by other approaches that maintain that change is less due to the de-
liberate intention of meta-actors acting rationally than to the combination 
of individual choices, partially determined and partially freely consented 
to. In this perspective, which we consider complementary, that of meth-
odological individualism developed in particular by French sociologist 
Raymond Boudon, the examination of change presupposes investigating 
the field of expression of the free arbiter, once the multiple sources of so-
cial determination have been established.  
Consequently, while development reveals consistencies, similarities 
and co-occurrences, the latter are perhaps less the expression of a prede-
termined history than the result of the transformation of history by the 
reflexivity of actors, by the variations of their perceptions in relation to the 
basic purposes that cause them to act, by the plurality of the actions which 
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they take and whose coherence with the ends sought is not necessarily 
automatic, notably because they are mediatized by a multitude of interac-
tions. From that point on, to understand the sources and the dynamics of 
development, it becomes necessary to survey the actors and the normative 
sources of their actions, to examine the relations between them, to show 
the empirical processes at work and to report on the results, including 
those, which cannot be explained  
2.3. Development meaning 
While observable development reveals similarities and variations, in short 
models, a research that adopts this premise must address two prior ques-
tions, as I have mentioned. The second is the moral question, namely that 
of the meaning of development. The neo-liberal vision of development is 
an ideology dressed up in scientific garb, which claims that the increase in 
the Gross Domestic Product is empirical proof of its validity. This is an 
instrumental vision of development, the final purpose of which is the gen-
eralization of the market economy across the entire globe, which does not, 
however, mean that this approach does not work: The peculiarity of an 
ideology is not only to define a situation and to identify solutions but also 
to inspire action. In that way, the study of development models should 
examine the growth indicators and show their various aspects. They would 
make it possible to check the practical scope of the neo-liberal ideology 
and to show the mechanisms that make this ideology operative; I hypothe-
size that they would provide an initial differentiation of the regions. But 
these indicators alone do not account for the basic aspects of development, 
discredited by the predominant developmentalist discourse as “external-
ities”. If the individual is the fundamental source of all economic activity, 
as Marx maintained, should not the individual be put at the very heart of 
the notion of development and its analysis. Moral development increases 
the capacity of the individual to make his own choices, increases freedom 
and is based on foundations such as literacy and education, preserving 
physical well-being and health, the fair distribution of wealth and the 
eradication of poverty, access to information, participation in decision-
making, in short respect for living communities.  
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This postulate is not stated with a view to reaching unanimous consent. 
The advocates of globalization would see in this a fairy-tale and useless 
normativity, given that these objectives must at any rate ensue from the 
intercession of the invisible hand of the market, once the conditions of its 
perfect expression have been achieved through the abolition of the con-
straints on the accumulation of capital. The most radical forms of autoch-
tonism will also inspire differing positions, protesting that a long life in 
good health and a school education are part of immemorial values. Instead, 
this postulate is meant to serve as a foundation for the operationalization of 
this project, to broaden and guide the choice of indicators that should be 
examined in order to account for development models. Inspired by Amar-
tya Sen and its book Development as Freedom, I state that the study of 
development, whether in the Arctic or elsewhere, should take into account 
a multiplicity of factors of the social system, examine their influences on 
the relations between civil society, the corporation, and public administra-
tions as well as these very relations, to arrive at an assessment that under-
scores the models at work according to whether or not they favor moral 
development, namely a development promoting the growth of individual 
and collective freedom (Figure 1). The analytical categories must serve as 
inspiration for the choice of indicators: the method should be able to make 
it possible to evaluate the capacities of living communities with respect to 
the resources in play (financial, social and natural), the living conditions 
and the relations of power.  
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Figure 1. Humanist Development System 
2.4. Resources and development 
From my point of view, the conciliation of resource exploitation and hu-
manist development is a major stake in the Circumpolar Arctic. Renewable 
and non-renewable resource exploitation is an essential key for providing 
an economic basis for Arctic communities; it takes advantage of the exten-
sive wealth of Arctic territories while offering alternatives to dependence.  
However, it faces the great vulnerability of natural and human envi-
ronments. On the one hand, the equilibrium of Arctic ecosystems is fragile 
and its capacity for restoration is limited by the severe climate conditions. 
Moreover, rapid climate changes are bringing several transformations that 
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are affecting both the area and its inhabitants. Renewable resources, espe-
cially wildlife, are contaminated by pollutants such as chlorinated organic 
compounds and heavy metals, transported into the Arctic primarily by air 
currents and bioaccumulated through the food chain to the human body; 
environmental impacts of non-renewable resource exploitation generate 
geographically limited but severe and long-lasting pollution. Finally, re-
sources of both types are threatened by depletion as it happened with cod 
stocks, or by exhaustion as is happening with mining activities. On the 
other hand, contemporary Arctic societies are affected by resource exploi-
tation. Economic behaviors of individuals, families and communities are 
transformed by the extension of monetary incomes. Human health is af-
fected by long-distance and locally generated pollution, and by changes in 
food intakes resulting from food chain contamination and from the avail-
ability of imported industrial food. Customary hunting, fishing and herding 
are transformed by economic activities such as industrial harvesting for 
commercial purposes, by political and legal conditions such as land claim 
settlements or international bans on animal hunting. As a result of these 
rapid changes, social and cultural settings are fast changing, generating 
new ways of making a living and making sense of it, but also resulting in 
major social disruptions. Arctic communities are thus facing the challenge 
of re-creating their cohesion, if they want not only to survive but to sustain 
as a socially integrated milieu. 
To explore whether Arctic resource exploitation is or is not leading to a 
humanist development, such a program will have to link the economic 
practices with conditions that make these practices possible and conditions 
that ensue from them. This project adopts such an approach, by examining 
economic practices related to the exploitation of natural resources and their 
potential for increasing freedom of Arctic residents and communities. 
Through regional comparisons, it addresses the context in which the eco-
nomic practices take place and the impacts they generate among Arctic 
communities. 
Different types of resource utilization characterize the development of 
the Arctic regions. Customary food production still remains of significant 
economic and social importance in those regions. Subject to local deci-
sions, using local resources for today’s local needs with a view to not ex-
hausting them, supported by existing resources throughout various com-
munity networks of production, distribution and consumption, customary 
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food production still carries its symbolic value in the modern-day context. 
Even some commercial initiatives are inspired by the customary model, 
such as the so-called local “informal market” in Greenland and programs 
that support hunting and fishing activities in the Canadian Arctic. In some 
cases, however, they are no longer operating without external influences. 
Seals, polar bears and hunting, for instance, are highly impacted by na-
tional and international policies and regulations that limit local capacities. 
Nevertheless, customary activities continue to be a key component for 
Arctic communities” health and living conditions.  
At the other end of the spectrum, large-scale industries, such as gas and 
oil exploitation, nickel and copper mines, hydroelectricity and the like, are 
of primary importance. In several Arctic regions of the circumpolar world 
where they are the main source of wealth creation, most of these activities 
are promoted and supported by external sources of capital; they are subject 
to decisions made without having been influenced by local communities or 
authorities, and are first related to world markets as opposed to local com-
munities where they are established. Following this same logic, the bene-
fits rarely stay in the region, flowing instead toward shareholders in the 
rest of the world. Some of these benefits are indeed retained, such as wages 
and contracts for local enterprises. But they often come with adverse ef-
fects. The construction phases of a given project might be completed 
within a few years, leading to a decreased local work force within the cor-
porations, and making professional training and individual qualifications 
and skills rapidly outdated and no longer suitable in the fluidity of Arctic 
economies. Large-scale projects involving the local work force in the Arc-
tic often increase social stratification and inequity in wealth distribution 
and perceived deprivation; they may change consumption patterns by de-
creasing the social value of customary practices that may tend to be re-
placed by market goods and services. While local benefits stop, when the 
resources are exhausted, long-lasting consequences often persist – indus-
trial waste, tailings and environmental contamination. Since this scale of an 
industry is central in the Arctic economy, its convergence with concerns 
for humanist development is an enormous challenge for local and the re-
gional authorities.  
Over the last few decades, many economic development projects have 
promoted sustainability-oriented principles in their implementation e.g. 
Impact Benefits Agreements created for Red Dog Mine in Alaska and 
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Katinik Mine in Nunavik, local open markets in Greenland, fishery indus-
try in Nunavut and sheep farming in Greenland, proposals for co-
management regimes in resource utilization (specifically forestry) in 
Northernmost Europe to alleviate conflicts between Sami, local, and state 
authorities. They resulted from negotiation processes between giant corpo-
rations and organizations representing Aboriginal People at the local or 
regional levels. The latest initiatives were supported by the political will of 
organizations representing Aboriginal People throughout the Arctic world 
to promote sustainable development as the way to improve the economic, 
social and cultural conditions of people living in the Arctic. For instance, 
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC, 1996) and the Russian Association 
of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian North (RAIPON, 2001), and the 
Sami Parliament are all clearly working toward that aim. The entire proc-
ess is tangibly encouraged by public governments that share such a prior-
ity, for instance by the Arctic Council (Arctic Council, 2001, 1996), and by 
the Canadian Government which has adopted its own action plan for sus-
tainable development. Such initiatives are likely to promote the economic 
conditions for sustainable development as they contribute to increasing 
individual and collective wealth, as well as local and regional involvement 
in the economic development process. They especially shed light on opti-
mal means available to stakeholder organizations to create wealth among 
their communities. 
All these different economic practices for resource exploitation – cus-
tomary land uses, large-scale extraction activities – are usually seen as 
separate worlds, a vision that traditional scientific disciplinary barriers 
have accustomed us to. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that these 
practices, the conditions that create them and the impacts they generate, are 
all part of the same Arctic economic reality in a global context. Customary 
activities at the family level are closely intertwined with world influences 
and monetary incomes, as mega-scale projects are facing the growing po-
litical power of Aboriginal Peoples of the Arctic, their claims for local 
benefits and their concerns for improving living conditions, and for sus-
taining their communities. But the Arctic economy as a whole and espe-
cially resource exploitation have rarely, if ever, been approached from such 
a global perspective. Challenges of Arctic development require the draw-
ing of a global picture of the Arctic economy, which has only recently been 
done to some extent, and the comparing, within this global portrait, of 
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economic practices, their various prerequisites and their various impacts. 
By adopting such an approach, it could be possible to arrive at a compre-
hensive analysis of Arctic development models and to shed light on their 
specific effects on local residents” control over resources, human health 
and education, social integration, living conditions, economic equity and 
the like. 
Through this examination, I will check if the development models in play 
are the result of specific relations between civil society, the corporation and 
governments, influenced by multiples factors of the social system such as the 
ownership of resources (land and capital in particular), the characteristics of 
the political and economic system in which these relations unfold, and so on; if 
differentiated ties exist according to the models between economic practices 
and the living conditions of regional populations (health, education etc.) and, 
consequently, between economic practices and the conditions of individual 
and collective freedom. Many examples make these hypotheses plausible. The 
very marked disparities between the northern regions of the Russian Federa-
tion (notably between those where oil and gas resources are exploited on a 
massive scale and the other regions) have only grown following the post-soviet 
privatizations: the reduction of government services has also been felt much 
harder in the already disadvantaged regions, increasing impoverishment, food 
insecurity and emigration. I will check if the large-scale exploitation of non-
renewable resources can increase the redistribution of wealth, notably through 
the creation or improvement of services, provided that the spin-offs are re-
tained locally; but that does not necessarily presuppose an equalization of 
living conditions, which may remain highly differentiated, which may even 
grow between population strata (the stratum benefiting from development and 
the stratum left on the margin of development); nor does it presuppose an 
increase in the emancipatory capacities, for example, an improvement in 
schooling or health, since they are subject to other influences that are occa-
sionally more decisive than the growth of wealth alone. 
I propose examining, for each of the regions of the Circumpolar Arctic, 
all of the indicators listed in the ArcticStat bank, working with these indi-
cators to produce summary graphic representations (since coherent statisti-
cal analyses are unlikely, given the great diversity of the indicators), and 
differentiating the models by comparing these graphical representations. I 
will then take a more in-depth look at certain cases that seem to be typical, 
by drawing on the databank resulting from the Survey of Living Condi-
 The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008 54 
tions in the Arctic (SLiCA) when this is possible. Next, I will endeavor to 
elucidate these models, namely explain their foundations, mechanisms and 
consequences, by drawing on a vast review of the scientific literature, in-
cluding theoretical tools that are available in the sociological tradition. 
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3. Sustainability from a local point of 
view: Alaska’s North Slopeand oil 
development 
 
Jack Kruse29 
3.1. Well Being and sustainability 
We commonly assume that the actions of multinational corporations to 
extract petroleum resources in remote areas will conflict with the sustain-
ability of local communities. Such development would seem to typify the 
opposite of sustainable development. It is a non-renewable resource being 
developed by non-local corporations possessing vastly more financial re-
sources than local communities.  
This is not a paper questioning, whether from a global point of view, 
petroleum development is sustainable. Rather, our focus is on, whether 
multi-national, large scale, non-renewable developments can interact with 
local communities with the net effect of promoting, at least for a matter of 
decades, the sustainability of these communities. Put in another way: Are 
there circumstances in which world scale resource developments can in-
crease the sustainability of local communities? 
If we were to empirically test the effects of such a development on the 
sustainability of nearby local communities, what would we measure? If 
individual well being in its broadest sense increases or stays the same over 
time, can we say the same about community sustainability? The premise of 
                                                        
29 Professor Emeritus of Public Policy, Program Director Institute of Social and Economic Re-
search, University of Alaska Anchorage 
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this paper is that individual well being and community sustainability 
should at least be highly correlated. We use a six-category definition of 
well-being recommended in the Arctic Human Development Report (2004) 
as our measure of community sustainability. The AHDR categories of 
well-being are: material success, health, education, ties with nature, cul-
tural continuity, and fate control. Our measures are based on questions 
asked of community residents in face-to-face interviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Iñupiat on Alaskas North Slope 
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Figure 2: Oil Development of Alaska’s North Slope 
 
The North Slope of Alaska is home to the Iñupiat, an Inuit people. In 1977 
about 3,500 Iñupiat lived in eight villages on the North Slope (Figure 1). 
The original Prudhoe oil field is located about 50 miles from the nearest 
village, Nuiqsut. Since 1977, the development of satellite fields has ex-
panded the footprint of oil development on the North Slope. The Iñupiat 
actively hunt and fish for much of their food. On land, caribou are a major 
food resource. The bowhead whale is another major food resource, and 
bowhead whaling is the heart of Iñupiat culture. Iñupiat hunt, fish, and 
gather different species. 
The development in question is centered on state lands at Prudhoe Bay 
Alaska (Figure 2). Less than a decade after Alaska became the 49th state in 
1959, private companies discovered oil near Prudhoe Bay in 1968.  
After a nine-year period of debate and construction of the Trans-Alaska 
oil pipeline, oil production began in 1977. Since then, more than 13 billion 
barrels of oil have been produced. 
We are close to having a baseline measure of well being for North Slope 
Iñupiat communities. In 1973 the US National Science Foundation funded 
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the University of Alaska’s Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) 
to investigate the effects of energy development on Alaska’s people. In 
1977, ISER researchers collaborated with North Slope Borough planning 
staff to conduct the first probability sample survey of North Slope Borough 
residents. The original data set of 290 interviews with Iñupiat adults is used 
as the baseline for comparison in this paper. 
Our second dataset comes from the Survey of Living Conditions in the 
Arctic (SLiCA), conducted on the North Slope in 2003. The SLiCA North 
Slope data set consists of 212 interviews with Iñupiat adults. Also included 
as a basis for comparison are results of interviews with indigenous adults in 
Chukotka (534), Greenland (1062), Canada (4,700), and two other Iñupiat 
settlement regions in Alaska, the Northwest Arctic Region (204), and Bering 
Straits Region (247). A grant from the US National Science Foundation 
funded both US and Russian participation in SLiCA, including data collec-
tion in Alaska and Chukotka, design of the international core questionnaire, 
and preparation and analysis of the international data set. 
Armed with the 1977 and 2003 datasets, we can compare sustainability 
measures over both time and space. We can compare measures for North 
Slope Iñupiat between 1977 and 2003, and we can compare current results 
(collected at slightly different times in different countries, but between 2001 
and 2006) between the North Slope Iñupiat, Iñupiat in two other Alaska 
Iñupiat settlement regions, Inuit in northern Canada Inuit settlement regions, 
Inuit in Greenland, and indigenous people in Chukotka. 
3.2. Iñupiat of Alaska’s North Slope, 1977 and 2003 
Table 1 identifies the measures used for each of the six AHDR categories 
of well-being. It also displays the direction of change one would hypothe-
size given the presence of a non-local, non-renewable resource develop-
ment in a region populated by indigenous people, who actively use local 
wildlife resources for food. 
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Table 1. Measures of sustainability and hypothesized change over  
Domain Concept Hypothesized Direction of 
Change 1977–2003 
Ties with Nature Subsistence Activity 
Proportion food from subsistence 
Amount of fish and game 
Opportunities to hunt and fish 
Decline 
Decline 
Decline 
Decline 
Material Success Work for pay 
Satisfaction with job opportunities 
Kinds of things you can buy in stores 
Cost of living 
Preference subsistence job both 
Not change 
Not change 
Not change 
Not change 
Decline 
Education Education 
Satisfaction education services 
Not change 
Not change 
Health Satisfaction with health services 
Perception drinking, drugs, fighting, stealing 
Not change 
Increase 
Cultural Continuity Sharing and helping Decline 
Fate Control Voting 
Say over oil development 
Decline 
Decline 
Overall Satisfaction with village life Decline 
 
We would expect the number of subsistence activities to decrease in re-
sponse to one or more of the following changes: decreases in subsistence 
resources, reduced dependence on local resources due to increased in-
comes, and reduced time for hunting and fishing due to increased time 
working. The latter two changes are based on the optimistic assumption 
that the non-local development would increase local job opportunities. For 
similar reasons, we would expect a decrease in the proportion of food com-
ing from subsistence harvests. Due to expected conflicts between resource 
development and local wildlife populations (e.g. disturbance of caribou), 
we would expect a decrease in satisfaction with the amount of fish and 
game available locally. Again due to resource conflicts as well as conflicts 
between resource development and hunting access (e.g. pipelines as barri-
ers to travel), we would expect a decrease in satisfaction with opportunities 
to hunt and fish. 
Optimistically, we might expect non-local resource development to cre-
ate more job opportunities, drawing Iñupiat into the labor force. Since the 
Prudhoe Bay development is a remote enclave, separated from the nearest 
community, a more realistic hypothesis would be that there would be little 
local employment benefit associated with the development. We therefore 
would hypothesize that labor force participation and satisfaction with job 
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opportunities would stay the same. Using the same logic, we would not 
expect local incomes to increase. Supply links to the development bypass 
local communities and flow directly between Anchorage and Fairbanks 
and Prudhoe Bay. Local availability of goods and services in the communi-
ties would therefore be expected to remain unchanged. The separation of 
the development from local economies would also have little expected 
effect on the cost of living. Barrow already had jet service in 1977, for 
example so the Prudhoe Bay development would not have caused a de-
crease in transportation costs to the North Slope. 
Although oil development might not bring new jobs to village residents, 
it might raise resident expectations about wage income. This expectation, 
coupled with hypothesized conflicts between resource development and 
subsistence, would lead us to hypothesize that Iñupiat might shift in their 
preference from a subsistence, or mixed mode of subsistence and wage 
production, to a preference for wage work. 
Concerning the domain of education, the disconnection between re-
source development and local jobs would mean little change in local incen-
tives for education. There would also be no reason to expect that education 
services would improve, so we would hypothesize that satisfaction with 
education services would at best remain unchanged. 
Likewise, we would hypothesize that satisfaction with health services 
would remain unchanged. If the development enclave were completely 
unassociated with local villages, we might also expect village social prob-
lems to remain unchanged. But we might also hypothesize that the pres-
ence of even small numbers of non-local workers in villages would intro-
duce new sources of alcohol and drugs, increasing levels of social prob-
lems. Since traditional helping and sharing values are maintained in large 
part through participation in subsistence activities, reduced subsistence 
resources and local hunting and fishing opportunities would be expected to 
decrease sharing and helping in communities. 
We would expect that the negative effects of a non-locally controlled re-
source development would undermine Iñupiat perceptions of being in control 
of their own fate. As a result, we would hypothesize a decrease in civic par-
ticipation, with fewer Iñupiat choosing to vote. More directly, we would 
expect a decrease in satisfaction with Iñupiat influence over oil and gas de-
velopment as the negative impacts of such development materialized.  
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Overall, we would hypothesize a decrease in Iñupiat satisfaction with 
life between 1977 and 2003.  
Now we turn to our empirical results. In 2003, 61 percent of Iñupiat en-
gaged in five or more subsistence activities in the previous 12 months 
compared with 27 percent in 1977 (Table 2). Sixty-two percent of house-
holds in 2003 reported that half or more of their meat and fish came from 
their subsistence harvests. In 1977, 37 percent of households reported that 
half or more of their food (not just meat and fish) came from their house-
hold subsistence activities. The two measures differ somewhat, and we 
would expect that the proportion of meat and fish coming from subsistence 
would be higher than the proportion of food as a whole (e.g. including 
vegetables and beverages). The direction of change, however, is not the 
hypothesized decrease. 
Almost half (48 percent) of Iñupiat in 2003 were very satisfied with the 
amount of fish and game available locally, while in 1977 the figure was 
only six percent (Table 2). We should explain, that in 1977 caribou har-
vests were being restricted by the state, and the International Whaling 
Commission was threatening to close down Iñupiat bowhead whaling. The 
high absolute level of satisfaction with the amount of fish and game avail-
able locally, however, leads us to refute the hypothesis, that resource de-
velopment would be accompanied by a decrease in satisfaction. 
Nine in ten Iñupiat in 2003 were satisfied or very satisfied with oppor-
tunities to hunt and fish while 51 percent of Iñupiat in 1977 reported, that 
they were satisfied with the time, they spent on subsistence (Table 2). 
Summarizing changes in our measures of ties with nature, we can conser-
vatively conclude that Iñupiat ties with nature have persisted through 25 
years of North Slope oil development. 
Turning now to the wage economy, 77 percent of Iñupiat adults worked 
for pay in 2003 compared with 65 percent in 1977 (Table 2). This differ-
ence is significant (p< 0.05), but not substantial. It likely reflects the con-
tinuation of a trend already underway in 1977 for young women to enter 
the labor force. Iñupiat in 2003 were somewhat less likely to be satisfied 
with local job opportunities (43 percent “satisfied” or “very satisfied” ver-
sus 66 percent “good” or “very good” in 1977). As we shall explain further 
in the discussion section of this paper, the decline in satisfaction may re-
flect the fact that village wage opportunities have fallen in recent years. 
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For much of the intervening years, however, job opportunities exceeded 
those in 1977. 
Satisfaction with the availability of goods and services remained virtu-
ally unchanged, while satisfaction with the cost of living improved (35 
percent satisfied or very satisfied in 2003 versus three percent “good” or 
“very good” in 1977, see Table 2). Recall that our hypothesis was that 
satisfaction with both the availability of goods and services and the cost of 
living would remain unchanged. 
Contrary to our hypothesis that Iñupiat would become more likely to 
prefer wage employment, we see that two out of three in 2003 continued to 
prefer a mix of wage employment and subsistence activities (Table 2).  
We also did not expect Inupiat to become more educated as a result of 
oil development. Probably the major factor affecting education levels on 
the North Slope, however, are increased local educational opportunities. In 
part, the increase in village high schools in Alaska during the 1980s was a 
statewide response to a court mandate made possible by state oil revenues. 
In part, the increase from 14 percent to 25 percent of Iñupiat with more 
than a high school education is likely due to an increased demand for edu-
cation in local jobs and increased local education opportunities, as for ex-
ample, provided by the Barrow college (Table 2). 
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Table 2. North Slope sustainability comparisons, 1977 versus 2003 
 1977 (%) 2003 (%) 
Number of Subsistence Activities   
0 32 11 
1 or 2 22 15 
3 or 4 19 13 
5 or more 27 61 
Total 100 100 
Proportion of Household Food (1977) Meat & Fish (2003) From Household Subsistence Harvest   
Less than half 47 7 
About half 16 31 
More than half 23 24 
All 14 38 
Total 100 100 
Satisfaction with Amount of Fish and Game Available Locally   
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 14 1 
Bad/Dissatisfied 22 3 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 37 8 
Good/Satisfied 20 39 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 6 48 
Total 100 100 
Satisfied with Time Spent on Subsistence   
No/Mixed, Somewhat, Very Dissatisfied 49 9 
Yes/Somewhat, or Very Satisfied 51 91 
Total 100 100 
Worked for Pay in Past 12 Months   
Yes 65 77 
No 35 23 
Total 100 100 
Satisfaction with Job Opportunities   
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 4 17 
Bad/Dissatisfied 7 19 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 23 21 
Good/Satisfied 49 29 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 17 14 
Total 100 100 
Satisfaction with Availability of Goods (and Services)   
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 6 10 
Bad/Dissatisfied 13 15 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 27 17 
Good/Satisfied 41 40 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 12 17 
Total 100 100 
To be continued…… 
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Continued 
 1977 (%) 2003 (%) 
Satisfaction with Cost of Living  
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 44 21 
Bad/Dissatisfied 30 25 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 23 19 
Good/Satisfied 3 25 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 0 10 
Total 100 100 
Preferences for Subsistence and Wage Work  
Mostly Subsistence 13 9 
Mostly Wages 18 27 
Both 69 65 
Total 100 100 
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Table 3. North Slope sustainability comparisons, 1977 versus 2003 
 1977 (%) 2003 (%) 
Formal Education   
Less than Elementary 17 6 
Elementary or some High School 41 30 
High School 27 40 
More than High School 14 25 
Total 100 100 
Satisfaction with School   
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 6 3 
Bad/Dissatisfied 10 7 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 21 10 
Good/Satisfied 52 40 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 11 40 
Total 100 100 
Satisfaction with Health Services   
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 2 4 
Bad/Dissatisfied 6 14 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 14 12 
Good/Satisfied 59 42 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 19 28 
Total 100 100 
Satisfaction with Drinking, Drugs, Fighting, and Stealing (1977) and How Safe Feel 
Outside at Night (2003) 
  
Very Bad/Unsafe 48 12 
Bad 33 0 
Mixed 14 0 
Good/Rather Safe 2 34 
Very Good/Very Safe 2 55 
Total 100 100 
Satisfaction with Sharing and Helping (1977), With Community Promotion of 
Sharing (2003) 
  
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 0 0 
Bad/Dissatisfied 5 1 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 26 5 
Good/Satisfied 46 36 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 23 58 
Total 100 100 
Number of Elections Voted   
None of last elections 14 16 
One 4 5 
Two 7 8 
Three 11 9 
Four 15 9 
Five 49 53 
Total 100 100 
To be continued……. 
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Continued 
 1977 (%) 2003 (%) 
Satisfactions with People’s Say Over Petroleum Development   
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 10 6 
Bad/Dissatisfied 18 7 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 36 22 
Good/Satisfied 34 39 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 3 26 
Total 100 100 
Satisfaction with Village as a Place to Live   
Very Bad/Very Dissatisfied 1 2 
Bad/Dissatisfied 9 4 
Mixed/Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 17 10 
Good/Satisfied 51 46 
Very Good/Very Satisfied 23 38 
Total 100 100 
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Table 4. North Slope sustainability comparisons by region 
Men Number of Subsistence activities engage in 
within last 12 months 
North 
Slope 
Northwest 
Arctic 
Bering 
Strats 
Canada Green-
land 
Chakotha 
 8,7 8,3 9,5 - 5,7 8 
       
 % 
Propotion of Meat and Fish Consumed by 
household traditional food       
None 7 9 8 1 0 9 
Less than half 31 23 36 24 33 34 
About half 25 27 25 35 27 29 
More than half 37 42 31 39 40 28 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Satisfaction with Amount of Fisk and Game 
Available Locally       
Very satisfied 48 58 24 - 9 5 
Somewhat satisfied 39 33 36 - 54 34 
Not satisfied or neither 13 9 40 - 37 71 
Total 100 100 100 - 100 100 
Satisfaction with opportunities of hunt and fish       
Very satisfied 62 66 40 - 13 5 
Somewhat satisfied 29 30 33 - 58 25 
Not satisfied or neither 9 4 26 - 29 70 
Total 100 100 100 - 100 100 
Work Status in previous 12 months       
Worked in past 12 months 77 75 73 88 80 86 
Did not work in past 12 months 23 25 27 12 20 14 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Satisfaction with job opportunities       
Very satisfied 14 15 6 11 4 1 
Somewhat satisfied 30 34 24 31 28 9 
Not satisfied or neither 57 51 70 57 68 90 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Satisfaction wit availability of goods in local stores      
Very satisfied 18 12 10 - 7 2 
Somewhat satisfied 42 37 28 - 48 21 
Not satisfied or neither 40 51 62 - 46 77 
 100 100 100 - 100 100 
Satisfaction wit kost of living       
Very satisfied 9 7 2 - 3 2 
Somewhat satisfied 27 27 20 - 36 7 
Not satisfied or neither 64 66 79 - 60 91 
Total 100 100 100 - 100 100 
Preferred ways of making a living       
Working on a wage job 27 14 9 - 56 40 
Both wage and harvesting, herding or processing 65 74 85 - 14 28 
Harvesting, herding or processing 8 12 7 - 30 32 
Total 100 100 100 - 100 100 
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The percentage of Inupiat very satisfied with local education services in-
creased from 11 percent to 40 percent between 1977 and 2003 (Table 3). 
Satisfaction with health services also increased (19 to 28 percent). We 
hypothesized no change in satisfaction. In 1977, only four percent of In-
upiat perceived the level of drinking, drugs, fighting, and stealing were 
“good” or “very good” (Table 3).  
In 2003 55 percent of Inupiat reported that they felt “very safe” outside 
at night. While these questions differ, the results do not support the hy-
pothesis that perceptions of local social problems would worsen. 
Inupiat perceptions of cultural values also appear to have persisted between 
1977 and 2003 (Table 3). Fifty eight percent of Inupiat in 2003 were “very 
satisfied” with their community’s efforts to promote helping and sharing val-
ues. In 1977, 23 percent of Inupiat thought local sharing and helping was “very 
good”. Again the results are contrary to the hypothesized decline. Turning to 
fate control, voting participation appears to have remained virtually constant 
(Table 3). Contrary to our hypothesis, however, satisfaction with Inupiat influ-
ence over oil development increased between 1977 and 2003, with 26 percent 
of Inupiat “very satisfied” in 2003 compared with three percent who rated 
people’s say over petroleum development “very good” in 1977. 
Our final time series comparison is satisfaction with one’s community 
as a place to live. In 1977, 23 percent of Inupiat felt that their community 
was a”very good” place to live. In 2003, 38 percent of Inupiat were “very 
satisfied” with their community as a place to live, a significant increase (p< 
0.05). We now turn to a comparison of sustainability measures for the 
North Slope, two other Inupiat settlement regions of Alaska, and three 
international comparisons: northern Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka. 
3.3. Iñupiat of Alaska’s North Slope and other Arctic 
Indigenous Peoples 
Alaska’s North Slope has not been the only Arctic region to experience 
large-scale resource development. We also must keep in mind that there 
are many other regional differences that may account for variations in our 
sustainability measures. Other factors being equal, however, we can hy-
pothesize that the large-scale non-locally controlled petroleum develop-
ment on the North Slope would be associated with lower levels of sustain-
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ability among North Slope Inupiat than their Inupiat neighbors in the 
Northwest Arctic and Bering Straits regions, as well lower than among 
fellow Inuit in Canada and Greenland. Given the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Chukotka is a special case, and we would expect measures to be 
lower there than on Alaska’s North Slope. Before turning to results we 
should also note that many sustainability measures are not available from 
the Canada data set. 
With the exception of Bering Straits region Iñupiat in 2003 North Slope 
Iñupiat engaged in as or more a diverse set of subsistence activities as Arc-
tic indigenous residents in our comparison regions (Table 4). North Slope 
Iñupiat households harvested as high or higher a proportion of their meat 
and fish. They were somewhat less satisfied in 2003 than Northwest Arctic 
in Iñupiat with the amount of fish and game available locally, but more 
satisfied than their Arctic indigenous neighbors. The same is true with 
regard to their satisfaction with opportunities to hunt and fish. 
North Slope Iñupiat participated in the labor force as much as Alaska 
and Greenland neighbors, and slightly less than their indigenous neighbors 
in Canada and Chukotka (Table 4). In 2003 they were as or more satisfied 
with local job opportunities, more satisfied with the local availability of 
goods and services, and as satisfied with the cost of living. North Slope 
Iñupiat were somewhat less likely to prefer a combination of wage and 
subsistence activities than their Inupiat neighbors in 2003, but considerably 
more likely to do so than Chukotka indigenous adults. 
As far as education is concerned, in 2003 North Slope Iñupiat were 
similar to Iñupiat in the Northwest Arctic and Bering Straits regions. North 
Slope Iñupiat were more likely than Canadian Inuit in 2003 to have at least 
a high school education and less likely than Greenland Inuit and Chukotka 
indigenous adults population. 
North Slope Iñupiat was the more likely to be very satisfied with the 
quality of local education services in 2003 than indigenous adults in any 
other comparison region. The same was not true with regard to health ser-
vices, where North Slope Iñupiat were more likely to be very satisfied than 
Inuit in Greenland or indigenous adults in Chukotka, as likely to be very 
satisfied as Inuit in Canada and Bering Straits Inupiat, while less likely to 
be very satisfied with local health services than Northwest Arctic Iñupiat.  
Satisfaction with public safety among North Slope Iñupiat was lower 
than among northern Canadian Inuit and higher than Greenland Inuit and 
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Chukotka indigenous adults. North Slope Iñupiat were more likely in 2003 
to be very satisfied with promotion of helping and sharing values than all 
but their neighbors in the Northwestern Arctic region, where the level of 
satisfaction was about the same in 2003.  
Voting participation on the North Slope was comparable in 2003 to other 
Arctic regions (Table 6). One in four North Slope Iñupiat in 2003 were very 
satisfied with the influence Iñupiat had over the management of resource re-
sources like oil, gas, and minerals. This compares with one-in-five Northwest 
Arctic Iñupiat, about one-in-ten Bering Straits Iñupiat and only three percent 
or less of Greenland Inuit and Chukotka indigenous adults. 
In 2003, North Slope and Northwest Arctic Iñupiat shared the highest 
level of overall satisfaction with life in their communities; more than one-
in-three were “very satisfied”. In the Bering Straits region, one-in-four 
were very satisfied, while only one-in-twenty Greenland Inuit and one-in-
one-hundred Chukotka indigenous adults were very satisfied. 
Table 5. Summary of North Slope sustainability comparisons 
Domain Concept 2003 vs 1977 N. Slope vs Elswhere 
Ties with 
Nature 
Subsistence Activity Substantially better Better except in 1 region 
 Proportion food from subsistence Somewhat better About the same or better 
 Amount of fish and game Substantially better About the same or better 
 Opportunities to hunt and fish Substantially better About the same or better 
Materials 
Success 
Work for pay Somewhat better About the same 
 Satisfaction with job opportunities Somewhat worse About the same or better 
 Kids of things you can buy in 
stores 
About the same About the same or better 
 Cost of living Substantially better About the same or better 
 Perference subsistence jo both About the same Same as other Alaska regions 
Education Education Somewhat better About the same except lower 
than Greenland, Chukotka 
 Satisfaction education services 
 
Substantially better Better 
Health Satisfaction with health services About the same About the same or better 
 Perception drinking, drugs, fight-
ing, stealing 
Somewhat better Better than some, worse 
than others 
Cultural 
Continuity 
Sharing and helping Substantially better Better 
Fate 
Control 
Voting About the same About the same 
 Sayover oil development Substantially better Better except same as NW 
Arctic 
Overall Satisfaction with village life Somewhat better Better except same as NW 
Arctic 
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3.4. Discussion 
We have just seen that, on most measures, Iñupiat were as well or better 
off in 2003 than they were in 1977. Table 6 summarizes our time and spa-
tial comparisons. We have also seen that North Slope Iñupiat, again on 
most measures, in 2003 were as well or better off than their Iñupiat 
neighbors in the Bering Straits and Northwest Arctic regions and as well or 
better off than the Inuit of northern Canada, the Inuit of Greenland, and the 
indigenous people of Chukotka.  
Our comparisons are far from the results of controlled experiments. 
North Slope Iñupiat, who were dissatisfied with the effects of development 
could have moved off the North Slope. Other regions have experienced 
development as well. All regions have been exposed to a myriad of 
changes besides development. Still, the picture we see in 2003 is far better 
than what we might have projected in 1968, when oil was discovered on 
the North Slope. 
What do these results say about the general effects of large-scale devel-
opment on local communities? Only that there appears to be at least one set 
of circumstances under which large scale, non-local resource development 
can take place in a region, while at the same time local community sustain-
ability is maintained or even improves. What are these circumstances? 
Critical to understanding the results just presented is that the Iñupiat of 
the North Slope successfully established a regional government in 1972, 
the North Slope Borough. The borough’s regional boundary includes the 
Prudhoe Bay development and the borough has the legal right to tax en-
ergy development facilities on state land within the Borough. As a result of 
this power of taxation, the borough has received billions of dollars in oil 
tax revenues over the past 35 years. Between 1996 and 2006 alone these 
revenues totalled $224.8 million (DOLWD 2007). These revenues have 
supported a capital improvements program that has employed many North 
Slope Iñupiat (56 percent of North Slope Iñupiat adults worked for the 
borough at least once in 1977 and 28 percent worked for the borough on 
the job they worked the most hours on in 2003.). The successful results of 
the capital improvements program and borough operations expenditures 
are reflected in the time and spatial comparisons given above. 
The borough also funded its own Department of Wildlife Management, 
normally a state and national activity. It also established a regional Wild-
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life Management Advisory Committee. These and other actions made it 
possible for North Slope Iñupiat to influence resource development activi-
ties. None of these actions would have been possible without oil-derived 
tax revenues, but it also took vision and leadership to understand and even 
to create opportunities to intervene in the development process. 
The Inupiat have also been lucky. A series of offshore lease sales by the 
federal government in the 1980s failed to produce economically viable 
offshore petroleum prospects. The Inupiat noticed the effects of offshore 
exploration activities on the movement of bowhead whales, and they have 
often testified about their concerns that offshore petroleum development 
would gravely harm their subsistence way of life. During the period we are 
comparing, however, most development activities occurred on land as 
expansions of the Prudhoe Bay development. 
As Figure Two illustrates, onshore oil development on the North Slope 
has expanded greatly over the past thirty years. And more developments are 
being planned. The cumulative impacts of these expansions may be of an 
entirely different magnitude than that experienced by the Iñupiat to date. 
These new developments would largely occur on federal lands, yielding far 
lower revenues to the North Slope Borough. Taken together, the smaller 
revenue stream and the cumulative geographic reach of petroleum develop-
ment may spell the end to the era of local sustainable development. On the 
other hand, the Inupiat continue to actively intervene in the course of devel-
opment. They once again prove their ability to create conditions, where local 
community sustainability is possible along side of non-renewable, non-
locally controlled large-scale development. 
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4. The social economy and economic 
development in the Canadian North: 
Constraints and opportunities 
 
Chris Southcott30  
4.1. Introduction 
Few societies have undergone economic transformations with the rapidity 
that communities in Canada’s north have over the past 100 years. These 
communities have moved from an economy based almost entirely on sub-
sistence hunting and fishing, to an economy dominated by the industrial 
exploitation of natural resources, to an uncertain future in a world increas-
ingly dominated by a knowledge-based post-industrial culture. These 
changes have introduced a great deal of stress accompanied by social and 
economic problems. Recent trends have increased the likelihood of social 
challenges but some have also offered promise for these communities to 
become increasingly involved in finding solutions to these challenges. 
Political trends have shown an increase in self-government and the poten-
tial for political empowerment. Unfortunately, the movement towards eco-
nomic empowerment in these communities has been less evident. The 
dominance of a dependent economy controlled by large resource corpora-
tions is likely to continue into the future as diamond mining and oil and 
gas development increase in their importance. 
                                                        
30 Professor, Chair and Research Director, Lakehead University and Social Economy Research 
Network for Northern Canada Yukon College, Whitehorse, Yukon 
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Despite the dominance of large-scale industrial resource exploitation 
controlled by external institutions, the recent political trends have had an 
influence on some aspects of the northern Canadian economy. Demands 
for local input into new environmental and development decisions and the 
rise of new resource co-management arrangements have opened up a re-
newed interest in looking at economic alternatives that serve to increase 
the involvement of these communities in their economies. A new approach 
that has emerged is linked to the “social economy”. The social economic 
perspective is an extension of what in the past has been termed community 
economic development. The social economic perspective seeks to offer, 
and legitimate, a third option to economic development that in the past has 
been pushed aside in favor of large-scale private sector resource develop-
ment and state-based initiatives. It refers to a strategy to develop and en-
hance both the vitality and social and educational capital of Northern 
communities through organizations that are more directly controlled by the 
communities themselves. The social economy refers to those institutions in 
the community that are neither primarily profit-oriented nor state-driven. It 
refers to organizations whose primary purpose is to serve social goals in 
the community and whose structures are based on participatory democratic 
principles. 
This paper attempts to examine the potential for social economic devel-
opment in Canada’s north. The underlying hypothesis of the paper is that 
the development of this perspective in the north is heavily dependent on its 
ability to adapt to several key political economic characteristics that domi-
nate the economies of northern communities. This paper attempts to out-
line these characteristics and point to their possible impact on any attempt 
to develop sustainable economic development based on the social economy 
in Canada’s north. The main characteristics to be discussed are the tradi-
tional economy of indigenous communities, the role of the state in eco-
nomic development, and the impact of resource development in the North. 
The paper starts by introducing the notion of the social economy. It then 
gives an overview of the economic history of the Canadian north. This 
overview highlights the historical development of characteristics that im-
pact the formation of the social economic sector in northern communities. 
We then discuss the above-mentioned characteristics and the impact, which 
they are likely to have on social economic development in the region. Fi-
nally we conclude with a brief description of a major research project, that 
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is currently under way dealing these issues. A research plan is outlined 
which will assist attempts to further develop social economic organizations 
in the region. 
4.2. The social economy 
Although the term social economy is not widely used in Northern Canada, 
the ideas and relationships that are the foundation of what others are now 
referring to as the social economy are prevalent throughout the North. 
Much work has been devoted to a definition of the social economy 
(Lévesque and Mendell, 2004). Chouinard and Fairbain (2002) have noted 
that, outside Quebec, the social economy is often referred to as community 
economic development. The central notion of both terms is, that they in-
clude economic activities, that are not state-driven and not profit-driven. 
They include a large “third sector” that is often ignored (Quarter, 1992).  
Although no strict agreed upon definition of the social economy exists, 
its common characteristics are often the fact that social economy organiza-
tion do not have as their primary purpose to obtain a return on capital. 
They are, by nature part of a stakeholder economy, whose enterprises are 
created by and for those with common needs, and accountable to those 
they are meant to serve. They are generally managed in accordance with 
the principle of “one member, one vote”. They are flexible and innovative 
and most are based on voluntary participation, membership and commit-
ment. In the North we intend the definition to include traditional land-
based activities, co-operatives, voluntary organizations, unions and other 
activities, whose primary purpose is not for profit or for the state. (Bou-
chard et al, 2006) 
The social economy is made up of organizations in the not-for-profit 
sector that seek to enhance the social, economic and environmental condi-
tions of communities. They use the tools and some of the methods of busi-
ness, on a not-for-profit basis, to provide social, cultural, economic, health 
and other services to communities. Types of social economy organization 
in Canada’s north are retail and artistic co-operatives, indigenous rights 
organizations, recreational and cultural organizations, non-profit organiza-
tions, the voluntary sector, charities, foundations, credit unions, and other 
social enterprises. They operate in areas ranging from housing to commu-
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nications and in areas such as recycling, home care, forestry, restaurants, 
catering, Aboriginal economic development and manufacturing. These 
enterprises are flexible and sustainable tools that allow communities to 
address objectives related to social and economic concerns, while further-
ing goals of community participation and control. 
4.3. Historical development of the northern Canadian 
economy 
A proper understanding of the constraints on opportunities for social eco-
nomic development in the Canadian north should start with a discussion of 
the historical development of the region. In particular this history stresses 
the impact of these different economic systems on the autonomous devel-
opment of these communities. The definition of Northern Canada used in 
this particular paper refers primarily to the territorial north: that is to say 
the three territories of the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. 
It should also be pointed out that much of what we discuss relation to the 
territorial north can also apply to Canada’s provincial norths.  
One way to understand the historical development of the northern Cana-
dian economy is to look at the current economies of communities in the 
circumpolar region as the accumulation of several layers of economic sys-
tems. Here this work is inspired by the earlier work of Tim Ingold who 
traced the shift of reindeer herding peoples in the circumpolar north through 
three separate “modes of production” (1980:2). He labeled these modes 
hunting, pastoralism, and ranching. While Ingold used the term mode of 
production, this author is less convinced, that the economy of northern Can-
ada can be reduced to an integrated deterministic theoretical system sug-
gested by modes of production. As a result, the chapter refers to the much 
more open concept of economic systems. Within each of these economic 
systems one can see similarities in the accompanying social relations but 
with a great deal of variations. In the classical Marxian sense, a mode of 
production does not build on a previous mode of production. It eliminates it 
altogether. The argument in this chapter is that the contemporary economic 
structures of Canada’s north are not universally controlled by one specific 
mode of production. Rather that each historical economic system leaves a 
base which continues to influence later systems. One particular economic 
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system can be dominant but previous economic systems continue to exercise 
influence in these communities. 
While rejecting Ingold’s use of mode of production as our main historical 
typology, the chapter does endorse his evolutionary perspective. It is possi-
ble to see general common historical evolutions throughout the history of 
Canada’s northern communities. These changes are not necessarily inevita-
ble or unilinear. Still, it is possible to see a general historical change in these 
communities as they went from hunting and gathering, to fur harvesting, and 
to industrial resource exploitation. This discussion sees these communities as 
the cumulative result of several ideal-type layers of economic systems. The 
first layer is a system we can call a “traditional hunting and gathering econ-
omy”. The second layer is a system that we can refer to as pre-industrial 
colonialism. The third layer can be called industrialism (or modernization). 
The forth and most recent layer is that of globalization. The current economy 
in Canada’s north is the product of a combination of these layers. Although 
the importance of each layer varies from region to region, most are impacted 
in one way or another by each of these layers.  
The hunting and gathering economy was usually the first economic sys-
tem that occurred in the region. It has received quite a bit of attention from 
ethnologists and anthropologists both in its current forms and past forms. For 
our purposes it is enough to point out that this economic system is the most 
common economic system among the Indigenous peoples of the region. It is 
still practiced to varying degrees by almost all of the communities. 
In Canada’s north the traditional hunting and gathering economy has taken 
many forms but can be generalized as consisting of two main sub-types of 
subsistence activity: inland hunting and fishing; and maritime hunting.  
4.4. Hunting and gathering communities 
The hunting and gathering economic system is seen as the one that, while not 
benign, has the least negative environmental impact. It is the economic sys-
tem that, in most cases, is portrayed as giving the indigenous communities 
the greatest autonomy from outside human interference, an autonomy that is 
often compromised by a heavy dependence on environmental conditions. 
Sahlins portrayal of hunting and gathering societies and “the original affluent 
society” tried to show that these communities were not constantly suffering 
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from starvation but were quite enriched. (Sahlins, 1972) Sahlins notes how 
primitive exchange in these hunting and gathering societies were based on 
values of sharing, that are fundamentally different from the profit-oriented 
values of contemporary capitalism.  
Since the 1970s, Brody’s vision of Inuit life as being fundamentally dif-
ferent from other types of societies has been very influential. (Brody, 
1973) Associated with the notion of autonomy from inequalities, is also a 
notion of general autonomy from outside human relations. Hunting and 
gathering societies are often analyzed as being isolated from other socie-
ties. In the north especially, geography serves as a barrier to non-local 
influences prior to the rise of Europe colonialism. This vision of an 
autonomous existence has been criticized by anthropologists such as Eric 
Wolf, who have argued, that it is an illusion to view foraging societies as 
having been isolated from the larger historical changes in human societies. 
(Wolf, 1982)  
The above discussion leads us to see that the image of pre-modern 
hunting and gathering societies as living independently of outside influ-
ences is overly simplistic. While their relative degree of separation from 
these forces was much more extreme than many other societies, they did 
have historical links to global economic systems. These links were neither 
continuous nor constant. They traded for goods when convenient or when 
forced to. Most of their activities were devoted to their own particular sus-
tenance rather than the needs of a global market. This changed considera-
bly with the rise of furs as a market commodity. 
4.5. Pre-industrial colonialism 
The creation a demand for furs in a market largely controlled by Europeans 
had a profound impact on northern communities. The fur trade introduced a 
new system of relations to the circumpolar world that can best be called pre-
industrial colonialism.31 Under this system, the circumpolar region came to 
be much more influenced by outside forces: forces shaped primarily by the 
                                                        
31 Another term that might be just as appropriate is mercantilist colonialism. The term pre-
industrial colonialism is used primarily to note that the political aspects of the relationship be-
tween northern communities and national powers did not undergo any rapid changes with the rise 
of industrialism while the economic relationships did. Until recently, it was these economic rela-
tionships that can be held primarily responsible for changes in these relationships. 
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economic demands of primarily European peoples. Colonization meant that 
the indigenous populations of the region now became more directly sub-
jected to the demands of the colonizing power. Europe became the center of 
economic decision making, while the circumpolar regions, along with other 
areas of the world, became the periphery, the subservient region. This eco-
nomic system was made up of several key elements including the fur trade, 
whaling, European settlement, and the transformation of reindeer herding. 
The unique aspect of this particular system was that it introduced European 
domination while maintaining some aspects of traditional activities. Pre-
industrial colonialism did not put an end to the traditional hunting and gath-
ering economy. It transformed that system to meet the needs of European 
and other consumers. 
Pre-industrial colonialism impacted communities in Canada’s north-
west soon after the establishment of Europeans in North America. Indige-
nous peoples such as the Ottawas and the Hurons had started trading with 
the French as early as 1550, bringing furs from the northern interior to the 
rendezvous at Tadoussac in the northern part of the St. Lawrence Valley. 
Despite knowledge of fur resources in the northwest of Canada, there were 
still obstacles to the movement of the French into the region of which the 
most important was the attempt by the Canadian-based administrators of 
the fur trade to strictly regulate the trade.  
These obstacles did not affect the British. They had been gathering 
quite a bit of information about Hudson’s Bay since 1509. For much of the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the English had been interested in 
the area as a possible Northwest Passage to the orient. Unlike the French, 
the British were not interested in the potential of the region for furs. De-
spite these intentions, it was the quest for furs, which quickly came to 
dominate their interests. 
In 1667 a group of investors received a royal commission, which gave 
them the control of trade in whatever lands they may discover. An initial 
voyage into Hudson’s Bay set out in 1668. They returned to England in 
1669 with enough furs to ensure a profit for the original investors. In the 
meantime the loose syndicate of investors had solidified into a more 
closely-knit company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, which included some 
of the more powerful men in England at the time.  
The trading system that was developed was one where the Company es-
tablished themselves at a mouth of a large river flowing into Hudson’s Bay 
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and James Bay, where their ocean-going ships could find a safe harbour-
age, and waited for the aboriginals to bring the furs to them via the interior 
river systems. The trading system established by the Hudson’s Bay Com-
pany had an immediate impact on the French trading system as furs nor-
mally sent southeast were now diverted to James Bay as Natives sought 
out better prices and better goods for their furs. This led to a system of 
competition that was to last until the 1820s. Despite attempts by the French 
to oust the English from Hudson’s Bay and James Bay through the use of 
force, the Hudson’s Bay Company was able to maintain control of the 
more profitable trade northern trade routes. 
The French attempted to contain this trade by establishing an inland 
trade system stretching from the Great Lakes to Northern Alberta. A series 
of trade posts were established to try and cut off the trade of furs going 
towards the posts located on Hudson’s and James Bay. Eventually this led 
to the Hudson’s Bay Company establishing rival posts inland to counter 
the French influence. Following the loss of New France to Britain in 1760, 
the French fur trade system was taken over by a new rival fur trading com-
pany, the Northwest Company, whose trade posts eventually stretched 
from Fort William on Lake Superior to the Mackenzie River delta in the 
Northwest Territories. It was the competition between these two trading 
systems that dominated relations between Europeans and the indigenous 
people of Northern Canada until the 1820s. Each system tended to favour 
different strategies in order to ensure that they had continued access to the 
furs that were in such demand in primarily European markets. The 
French/Northwest system tended to favour the establishment of trading 
relations through close personal contact with the peoples who were actu-
ally harvesting the furs. They established forts inland close to the tradi-
tional lands of the harvesters and often established connections through 
marriage. The Hudson’s Bay Company preferred the less expensive system 
of having the furs brought to the posts on Hudson’s Bay and James Bay.  
Competition between the two companies eventually led to a forced 
merger between the two. Following the merger the new Hudson’s Bay 
Company expanded operations into the Yukon in order to deal with com-
petition from the Russian American Fur Company based in Russian occu-
pied Alaska.  
No matter which company dominated trade in Alaska or the Canadian 
North, similar tactics were used in order to ensure that furs were harvested. 
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The most important of which was the creation of a dependence on Euro-
pean goods, and later European foods, for the survival of these people. 
(Innis, 1961: 388) Progressively the indigenous peoples of Canada’s 
Northwest would spend more and more of their time harvesting furs in 
order to meet the demands of the international markets. This meant less 
and less time spent following the traditional subsistence activities upon 
which they had depended for their survival in the past. This was possible 
as long as European goods were available to replace these subsistence 
activities, but when the world market for furs such as beaver collapsed in 
the 1840s, the harvesters were faced with the stark reality that the world 
economy no longer had a demand for the main good that they had de-
pended upon for their survival. This, combined with the inability of these 
peoples to easily return to their traditional activities resulted in severe 
hardships. (388)  
While the Inuit of Northern Canada escaped the earlier period of the 
Canadian fur trade relatively unscathed due to the markets preference for 
furs from Boreal forest-based animals, when the Arctic fox became a fash-
ionable fur in the first decade of the 20th century, they too were exposed to 
the same changes that the indigenous peoples of the Canadian sub-Arctic 
were exposed to earlier. (Damas, 2002) 
Pre-industrial colonialism of the circumpolar region was not only based 
on the harvest of furs. Whaling was an important economic activity in the 
region starting in the 17th century. At that time the world markets started to 
develop an increased demand for whale products. Prior to the development 
of petroleum-based products, whale blubber was an important source of oil 
used for lamps and as a lubricant. Even more sought after was whale ba-
leen, which prior to the discovery of new rubber-based products, was used 
in such things as corsets. As more accessible whale populations were de-
pleted, whalers started moving into the seas off Greenland and the Eastern 
Arctic 
While production started in the 1700s in the Davis Strait, by the 1840s 
it was centered round the Cumberland Sound. By the 1860s American 
whalers had expanded into Hudson’s Bay. Whaling was never centered in 
any area for a long period of time as whale stocks quickly became depleted 
and new areas had to be found. Initially, contact with the Inuit was spo-
radic. As was the case with Greenland, at first the Inuit saw little need for 
the goods that the whalers tried to trade, but as time went on, they started 
 The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008 82 
to learn how to use these products and as such develop a desire for them. 
(Eber, 1989: 11) By 1851 American whalers started to winter in the region. 
Wintering had an important impact on the local population.  
“…The Inuit left their small scattered camps where bands of relatives lived to-
gether to gather at winter harbours and at the shore stations. They put at the 
service of the newcomers their knowledge of the land, their seamanship, and 
their labour in the whaleboats. They provided fresh country food and warm, 
handmade fur clothing. In return the whalers provided their astonishing fire-
power and their southern goods. Whaling became a mutual endeavour…” (12) 
 
In the Western North American Arctic, American whalers first arrived in 
the Bering Strait in 1848. They slowly spread out across the area north of 
the Chukotka Peninsula and along the North Slope of Alaska. By the 1890s 
they had arrived at the grounds north of the Mackenzie Delta and had es-
tablished a base at Herschel Island. Contact in the Western Arctic was 
more constant in the region and while …“it started later than did whaling 
in the east, the western Arctic whaling industry made up for in intensity for 
what it lacked in longevity.” (Coates, 1985: 137,138) In the west an exten-
sive and relatively constant cooperative relationship was established al-
though the exploitive nature of the whaling industry meant that as one area 
was depleted, the Inuit had to abandon traditional areas and move with the 
whalers in order to continue these exchanges. As well, because of the in-
tensity of contact, exchanges were sometimes more destructive to the Inuit 
in the west Arctic than was the situation in the Eastern Arctic. (Coates, 
1985:140) 
The whaling boom of in the eastern Arctic had started to decline by the 
last decade of the 19th century. The earlier efficiency of the whalers meant 
that it became harder and harder to find whales in the region. In the west-
ern Arctic production continued until the first decade of the 20th century, 
when synthetic products replaced whale baleen and petroleum replaced 
whale blubber. By 1907 whaling in the North American Arctic had col-
lapsed. The impact on the Inuit was considerable, although it would have 
been worse had not an Arctic fur trade emerged at the exact time of the 
collapse of whaling. Coates notes that the transition to fur trading was 
eased by the fact that whaling was based on relations similar to that of the 
fur trade. (Coates, 1985: 138,139) 
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During pre-industrial colonialism, communities in the Canadian north 
were significantly transformed. This transformation is characterized by a 
shift from a subsistence-based economy to one, which combines subsis-
tence with a dependence on servicing the economic needs of primarily 
European populations. The activities that make up these services are not 
however foreign to these indigenous peoples. In most instances they do not 
require a radical transformation of their lifestyles. Trapping for the fur 
trade, whaling, and associated activities such as clothes production, are all 
extensions of traditional hunting and gathering activities rather. The life-
styles do change as dependence is increased but it is a fundamentally dif-
ferent situation from that brought about by industrialism where these tradi-
tional activities became totally devalued. This situation changes radically 
with the arrival of industrialism in the region. 
4.6. Industrialism 
The next type of economic system to be introduced into the region was that 
of industrialism. During the 19th century it spread throughout the European 
world. By the end of the 19th century it had started to spread to the Canadian 
north. The essence of industrialism is the pursuit of wealth by the increasing 
rationalization of the production process. This occurs through the increasing 
division of labor and the expansion of markets. This process used markets to 
find the most efficient means of producing and selling a product. As if done 
by “an invisible hand”, markets, if left unhindered, would find the best way 
of distributing products and wealth so as to maximize the benefits to every-
one. Still, for those who introduced the industrial system to the Canadian 
north, allowing this region to benefit in the wealth produced by industrialism 
was not one of the priorities.  
It has been pointed out that the industrialism that was introduced into 
the Canadian north was fundamentally different from the individualistic 
entrepreneurial capitalism that is often associated with frontier develop-
ment following the ideas of the American historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner. In his discussion of the industrial development of the sub-Arctic 
regions of Canada, historian H.V. Nelles has pointed out how rational 
planning and close government-industry cooperation was utilized to ensure 
that both the government and industry would maximize benefits. (Nelles, 
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2005) Nelles also points to the importance of American capital and indus-
trialists in these regions. Morris Zaslow outlines how the construction of 
railways in Canada from the 1870s onwards started to open up the northern 
regions of what is now Ontario, Quebec and the Western provinces. 
(Zaslow, 1971) Mining and forestry operations started to develop when 
American and other international markets opened up for these raw materi-
als and when foreign capital became available to develop these operations. 
Both the federal and provincial governments played a major role in coordi-
nating these developments. 
From a symbolic perspective, the Klondike gold rush is probably the 
most well known mining development in Canada’s north. It certainly fol-
lowed Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier model of development at the 
beginning. When gold was discovered in the Dawson area of the Yukon in 
the 1896 it brought a rush of at least 30,000 non-indigenous people in the 
region in a space of a few years. What Canadian historians have tended to 
highlight in this development was not the mining of the gold itself but the 
attempts by the Canadian government to control what was essentially an 
American development. According to Zaslow, “…In the Yukon Territory 
we see the interaction between official Canadian policies and Canadian 
institutions and a community largely comprised of Americans and express-
ing the American frontier ideology….”. (1989:134). While the rush re-
sulted in a short term mining development based on individually owned 
stakes, after a few years this initial “American frontier” situation had 
changed considerably. “By 1900 Dawson was a suitable place for orderly 
family living, and by 1902 it was reported to be as Canadian as Toronto.” 
(Zaslow, 1989: 147) 
The Yukon gold rush can be seen as a good example of the inefficien-
cies of a frontier-type of industrial development in the north. Coates and 
Morrison describe how the Yukon gold fields had started to change in the 
first decade of the 20th century.  
“…(By 1909) The days of the individual prospector and the mining methods 
that produced the gold rush were finished as an important economic 
force…Now the symbol of the goldfields was not the pan but the 
dredge…Dredges processed tons of gold-bearing gravel each day and could 
make a profit on a trace of gold in each cubic yard – pay dirt that could not 
support a miner working with simpler techniques…” (2005: 157) 
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This need for new technology to rationalize the production process meant 
that the government had to work closely with the American and British 
investors who had the capital to purchase and utilize this technology to 
ensure that conditions would allow them to make a sufficient return on 
their investments. This meant granting a “virtual monopoly” over many of 
the resources to run their operations. (Coates and Morrison, 2005: 158) 
Less than 10 years after the initial discovery of gold, industrial activity in 
the Canadian north was dominated by a new logic based on close coopera-
tion and planning between the national government and international capi-
tal. The distances and conditions in the north meant that the long-term 
interests of both investors and the government could only be met by long-
term planning and a rationalistic exploitation of natural resources.  
This was the logic followed in later industrial developments in the Ca-
nadian north such as silver and lead mining in the Mayo-Keno region of 
the Yukon starting in 1906, radium mining in the Great Bear Lake area in 
the 1930s, and gold mining in the Yellowknife area starting in the 1930s. 
This logic became even more prevalent following World War 11 where 
American government actions, with some help from Canada, had rapidly 
established new transportation systems in the Canadian north such as the 
Alaska Highway, and a series of northern landing strips and airbases. The 
legitimized in the eyes of many the superior nature of industrial develop-
ments planned by both government officials and industrial interests. Fol-
lowing the war, industrial activity in the territorial north of Canada became 
almost entirely controlled by federal government as the region became “the 
bureaucrat’s north”. (Coates, 1985: 1910) The 1950s and early 1960s saw 
an increased pace of highway construction, a railway to Great Slave Lake 
and the opening up a new lead/zinc mine at Pine Point and several other 
mining developments. In the 1960s, when it became apparent that large oil 
and gas deposits existed in the Mackenzie Delta region, the government 
ensured that development would be largely controlled from Ottawa. 
How can this type of industrialism be best characterized? The fordist 
model industrialism developed by the Regulation school theorists has several 
advantages in studying northern industrial development. Fordism differenti-
ates a period, when capitalism was competitive and entrepreneurial to a pe-
riod, when capitalism was planned. (Jenson, 1989) This planning was in 
large part due to the desire of capital to become more efficient by investing 
large amounts of money in a more capital and technology intensive system 
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of production. In order to allow the safe investment of this capital, the social 
and economic environment had to be made secure and stable. This required 
the development of a close relationship between the state and capital. On a 
secondary level the workers in this new system of production had to be given 
certain rights and social conditions to ensure stability. In other words, capi-
talism became more organized.  
In northern regions the resource-based fordist industrialism became the 
dominant model of industrial development for several reasons. One of the 
most important was the need to become as efficient and as technology 
dependent as possible because of the geographical situation. Distances and 
lack of local labour meant that developments usually depended on large 
capital expenditures. Capital could not be raised unless there was a cer-
tainty of sufficient returns. In addition, the fordist model fit with the colo-
nial interests of the national states. Close cooperation between state and 
capital meant that the national states could continue to exercise a close 
control of developments and so ensure that national objectives for these 
regions could be followed. 
In the Canadian north industrialism did not initially have a direct effect 
on indigenous communities. Most industrial developments resulted in 
separate communities constructed specifically to serve the needs of that 
particular industrial project. These northern resource dependent communi-
ties were particularly pure forms of industrial communities that existed in 
southern Canada. Indigenous communities often were completely isolated 
from these developments. They were not isolated however from the wel-
fare state policies that accompanied fordist industrialism. The implementa-
tion of these policies had serious impacts on these communities (Damas, 
2002; Fossett, 2001) 
4.7. Post-industrialism? 
Since the 1970s, social scientists have begun to talk about a fundamental 
transformation occurring in contemporary society. Industrialism is decreas-
ing in importance. New post-industrial forces are superseding the forces of 
industrialism. According to Bell, advanced capitalist societies were mov-
ing from economies dominated by the transformative processes of industri-
alism to a new type of society emphasizing “the centrality of theoretical 
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knowledge as the axis around which new technology, economic growth 
and the stratification of society will be organized”. (Bell, 1973: 112) 
Under industrialism, circumpolar regions were at a disadvantage be-
cause it was always cheaper to produce goods close to the markets that 
bought these goods. Apart from those resource industries that had to be in 
the North, most industries were located in the central regions because that 
was where the markets were. In a post-industrial knowledge economy, 
production no longer has to take place close to the main markets. The new 
information technologies mean geographical space becomes less important 
for the economy. To a certain extent, people can choose to live and work 
where they want to instead of where the market wants them to. The poten-
tial exists for Northern areas to benefit from this new situation. 
4.8. The social economy and the Canadian North 
The role and use of social economy organizations is unique in the North 
given the region’s particular conditions. As has been shown above, histori-
cally, two types of communities have characterized the North: resource-
dependent communities dominated by settler societies and indigenous 
communities characterized by a mixed economy (Southcott, 2003). Re-
cently a third type of community has gained in importance – the Service 
Sector community (Bone, 2003). Research on the impact of resource de-
velopment in Northern communities has shown that a fundamental contra-
diction exists between the organizational principles of large-scale resource 
exploitation enterprises and “the local social economy” of these communi-
ties (House, 1981). The impact of mega-projects on Northern indigenous 
communities has been an important issue in recent research (Bone, 2003). 
These projects are typically industrial in nature and affect the communities 
in varying ways. Research has indicated that the rapid introduction of ford-
ist-style relations and consumption patterns has conflicted with the tradi-
tional hunting and gathering economy and traditions. This conflict has led 
to serious situations of social instability and the myriad of social problems 
that this instability brings (Chabot, 2004; Niezen, 1993; Stabler, 1990).  
While these are all issues that underlie recent social research on commu-
nities in Canada’s north, there are three characteristics that can be high-
lighted as having an important impact on the social economy sector in these 
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communities. The first is the existence of a mixed economy in the region’s 
indigenous communities. Communities rely not only on wages from labor, 
but on the continued existence of subsistence hunting and fishing activities. 
The next characteristic is the continued importance of the state in Canada’s 
north. A colonial culture combined with an economy dominated by “fordist” 
logic and recent implementation of paternalistic welfare state policies has 
meant a strong role of the state in the northern economy. Finally, the de-
pendence on large-scale resource exploitation found in northern resource 
dependent communities could also be seen to have an important impact on 
the formation of a social economy in the region. 
4.9. The mixed economy 
Researchers have noted that most indigenous communities in Canada’s north 
can be characterized as having a mixed economy (Abele, 1997; Stabler and 
Howe, 1990). In this mixed economy, income-in-kind, from the land through 
traditional economic activities and cash income from wages and social trans-
fers, are shared between community members. The unique aspect of the 
Northern mixed economy is the relative importance of subsistence activities. 
Abele makes the case that this mixed economy can only be maintained 
through state policy measures to regulate land use and to provide social 
transfers. In the current post-fordist climate the ability of the state to provide 
these measures is increasingly questioned and as such the mixed economies 
of these communities are threatened. Stabler and Howe have pointed to the 
impending crisis arising in the Northwest Territories due to the fiscal auster-
ity of governments and the reduction of social transfers.  
Other things such as accelerating resource wage opportunities and destruc-
tion of habitat and wildlife patterns also threaten the mixed economy. Youth 
are being affected by increased exposure to new cultural ideas. Television, 
videos and the school system are challenging the ability of the mixed economy 
to adapt. Subsistence activities are being challenged by a desire to engage in 
other type of activities. These changes make it harder to keep the production 
from the land as an important part of northern indigenous economies. 
Despite these challenges the traditional subsistence hunting and fishing 
economy continues to exist. It is viewed as important source of food when 
economic changes turn boom times to bust times. It also continues to exer-
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cise a cultural importance and an important part of the identity of these 
communities. Values characterizing subsistence hunting and fishing are 
still important basic values for the communities as a whole. These values 
include the importance of group cooperation and sharing. As such these 
values do serve as a potential source of encouragement for social economic 
sector development. The notions of utilitarian self-interest that characterize 
the private sector do not totally dominate the economic logic existing in 
indigenous communities. As such social economy organizations have the 
potential to be seen with a greater degree of legitimacy than in other types 
of communities. The continued presence of a mixed economy can therefore 
be seen as opening up opportunities for social economy development. 
The mixed economy is not the social economy. There are important dif-
ferences that research in the north needs to understand. The notions of non-
profit activities or democratic decision-making central to the social econ-
omy are not central concepts to the mixed economy. The cooperative alter-
native democratic discourse that characterizes social economy organiza-
tions elsewhere in Canada are largely foreign voices in indigenous com-
munities of Canada’s north. As such the mixed economy also represents 
constraints on social economic development. 
Many of the activities that dominate the mixed economy can be easily 
integrated into the social economic paradigm because they both go beyond 
simple utilitarian economic notions. Sahlins has argued that the traditional 
economy of indigenous societies can be considered part of the social econ-
omy in that much of its pre-capitalist values still play an important role in 
the region and act in contradiction to the profit-seeking values of contem-
porary “affluent” society (Sahlins, 1972). Other aspects of the mixed econ-
omy that do not fall under a strict capitalistic or state-based economic 
paradigm are more easily integrated into a social economy paradigm.  
4.10. The state and the social economy in the North 
The Canadian north has always been a colony to southern interests. Its 
historical development is profoundly marked by this fact (Coates, 1985). 
Despite current trends towards increased self-government, the Territorial 
North is still heavily dependent on the federal government for the provi-
sion of services and decision-making. Given this history, it is not surpris-
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ing that all of the people who live in the Territorial North rely upon pub-
licly funded education, health care and social welfare.  
This historic role of the state, first as a colonial power, then as the pro-
vider of common welfare state and modern services means that the social 
economy in the north had been affected by different forces than other regions 
of Canada. The state has been more directly involved in the development of 
services that are usually developed by social economy organizations. The 
most illustrative example of this is the role of the federal government in the 
development of consumer and producer co-operatives in the region 
(MacPherson, 2000). Paternalistic state policies, no matter how well inten-
tioned, can be seen to have had an impact, sometimes positive but often 
negative, on the development of social economy organizations in the North. 
4.11. Resource dependence and the social economy 
Historically speaking, communities in the Canadian North exist primarily 
for two reasons: to provide a homeland for the indigenous peoples of the 
region or to facilitate the exploitation of a natural resource by non-
indigenous outside powers. While whaling and fur harvesting were the 
initial resources exploited by these outside interests, the creation of perma-
nent communities of non-indigenous peoples was largely a creation of 20th 
century industrial needs. While the Yukon gold rush at the end of the 19th 
century has tended to create the image that Northern communities were 
created by individual adventurers using their entrepreneurial frontier spirit 
to exploit the Northern wilderness, the historical reality of development of 
non-indigenous communities in the North is one of the planning and con-
struction of resource dependent communities designed by outside corpora-
tions in partnership with the federal government. 
These communities were based primarily on mining. The dominance of 
one main industry means that there exists a high degree of “dependency” in 
these communities and, because of the cyclical nature of commodity pro-
duction, they have a high degree of instability. The specific economic 
characteristics are: one dominant employer who is usually a large industrial 
corporation based outside the region, the industry is capital intensive and 
technologically intensive, jobs are primarily unskilled or semi-skilled 
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“blue-collar” occupations, relatively high wages, few employment oppor-
tunities for women, a small retail sector, and a small service sector. 
Demographically a highly mobile population, a high degree of youth 
out-migration, a young population with fewer older people, more males 
than females, larger families, and greater ethnic diversity characterize these 
communities. The cultures of these towns tend to be dominated by a high 
degree of dependency, a “wage-earner” culture (as opposed to a “stake-
holder” culture), a male-dominated blue-collar culture, lower levels of 
formal education, and a negative environment for women. 
Sociologists such as Lucas and Himelfarb have shown these towns to be 
different than agricultural-based and fishing-based communities. (Himelfarb, 
1982) According to Lucas, fishing towns, agricultural towns and tourist 
towns, while they may be resource-dependent, are not single industry com-
munities. Such communities are made up of “small capitalists (and) entre-
preneurs”, who have a lifestyle, which “differentiates them from the popula-
tion of a community with a single industry base,” (Lucas, 1971: 14) 
These particular socio-economic conditions lead to a social economy 
that can be seen to differ from other types of communities. The absence of 
a stakeholder culture and the lack of economic empowerment can be seen 
to engender a lack of commitment to the community and a culture of de-
pendence that can be seen to negatively affect the development of social 
economy organizations. Previous research has shown that other than rec-
reational-oriented organizations, there are few non-profit or voluntary or-
ganizations (Himelfarb, 1982). 
4.12. Researching the potential of the social economy in 
Northern Canada 
A recent grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada has provided funding for a Northern social sciences research 
network to study the potential for the development of the social economy 
in Northern Canada. The main objective is to create a network of univer-
sity and college-based researchers and representatives of community-based 
organizations, operating as partners, to conduct research relevant to the 
social economy in Canada’s North. In addition to the above, the overarch-
ing objectives of the program are: to support research, and help mobilize 
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new knowledge, that will help develop social economy capacity in North-
ern communities; contribute to defining policies by evaluating government 
policies and programs applicable to the social economy; improve the per-
formance of organizations and enterprises in areas that are important to the 
social economy in Canada’s North; demonstrate through, for example in-
ventories, statistics, comparative analyses the actual and potential contribu-
tion of the social economy to the various sectors of the economy of Can-
ada’s North; contribute to a Northern perspective on debates relating to 
sustainable development; develop Northern Canada’s international contri-
bution to, and visibility in, areas relevant to the social economy; and en-
sure the development of research capacity and the training of Northern 
students in the area of the social economy through their participation in 
research projects and through the development of curricula.  
The network will be organized around four research themes. The first 
theme is the conceptualizing, inventorying, and evaluating of the Northern 
social economy. The other three themes are related to the specific character-
istics underlying the social economy of the North as discussed above. In 
regards to the first theme, an important initial task of the network will be to 
establish the social economy as a research priority and to solidify linkages 
between social economy organizations, the territorial colleges, and univer-
sity-based researchers. This will be partially achieved through establishing a 
categorization and inventory of existing social economy organizations. Us-
ing questionnaire surveys and interviews, the problems and issues facing 
these organizations will be investigated in an attempt to delineate both the 
issues obstructing social economy development in the North and the best 
available assets to enhance this development.  
The next theme tries to examine impact of resource dependence on social 
economy organizations in Canada’s north. It builds on previous research that 
has examined the importance and effect of varying resource regimes on 
Northern communities. (Lucas, 1971; Bernard, 1977; Berger, 1978; Cox, 
1975, House, 1981, Simard, 1982; Osherenko and Young, 1989; Duhaime; 
1991; Elias, 1991,1995). Recent research has added to this (Southcott, 2000; 
Myers, 2001; Caulfield, 2000 and 2004; McPherson, 2003; Duhaime, 2004). 
Projects associated with this theme would look at the past, present and po-
tential impact of varying resource extraction regimes on the development of 
the social economy and the evolution of government programs. It would 
examine differing resource regimes based on the type of resource, the condi-
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tions of the resource development, and co-management conditions. Using a 
variety of indicators, research would attempt to determine which conditions 
best promote social economic development.  
Differing co-management regimes will be highlighted and comparisons 
will be made. Traditional renewable resource management arrangements 
may be crucial to the social economy of Northern indigenous communities 
(Berkes, 1987; Feit, 1991; Collings, 1997). Case studies of these systems 
will be compared to new co-management regimes associated with non-
renewable resource development projects (Hensel and Morrow, 1998). The 
potential for co-management regimes to enhance social economic endeav-
ors and community resilience could be evaluated (Berkes and Folke, 1998).  
Linked to co-management is the larger picture of devolution. Decoloni-
zation has taken many forms in the Canadian North (Broderstad and Dahl, 
2004; Saku, 2002). These include the creation of Nunavut, the Nunavik 
Political Accord, 1984 Inuvialuit Agreement and Yukon First Nation Land 
Claims Settlement Act to name a few (Hicks, 1999). The impact of these 
varying arrangements on social economic development needs to be studied. 
Another project will evaluate the experiences and contributions of small-
scale community resource-based enterprises. Such enterprises will be re-
lated to evolving economic development regimes in the North as was as 
past evaluation of small-scale enterprises (Myers, 1996). A study of these 
enterprises will help to define the potential contribution of such “alterna-
tive” development to the social economy of Northern communities.  
The third theme examines the impact of state policies on social econ-
omy organizations in northern communities. Given the historical impor-
tance of the state in the development of Northern communities and the 
importance of public sector employment in the region (Rea, 1968; Irwin, 
1988; Salter and Salter, 1997) a series of research projects would look at 
the past, present and potential impact of the state and public policy on the 
social economic development in the North. One project would build upon 
past research which examined the state promotion of co-operatives in the 
North (MacPherson, 2000; Hammond Ketilson and MacPherson, 2001). 
These co-operatives have become the dominant business structures in 
many Northern communities. This research would link with research cur-
rently being undertaken by Hammond Ketilson and MacPherson on Abo-
riginal co-operatives in the North.  
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Education is an important resource for the development of the social 
economy in the North. Past education policies and practices have been 
shown to have severe negative consequences for social cohesion – espe-
cially in Indigenous communities (Lamothe and Lemire, 1994; Darnell and 
Hoem, 1996; Vick-Westgate, 2002). How can we use the educational insti-
tutions in the North to better stimulate the social economy? A research 
project would examine current educational practices and curricula with a 
view to assessing their impact the social economy.  
One area where the social economy can have a positive influence in 
Northern communities is in improving health and well-being. Here re-
searchers stress the importance of local civic involvement as an important 
determinant of ones” well-being. (Hild and Stordahl, 2004) Active partici-
pation in ones community has been shown to be potentially one of the most 
effective ways of combating the social pathologies that exist in many of 
these communities (Bjerregaard, P. and Young, T. Kue, 1998). Case study 
analysis of situations where volunteering and other aspects of the social 
economy has been used to enhance social capital and community engage-
ment resulting in improved situations of well-being can help find ways of 
better utilizing the social economy to promote community health (Gibson 
and Gibson, 1999).  
The forth and final theme will examine the impact of traditional subsistence 
activities in social economy formation. As mentioned above, traditional 
economic and social activities of Northern indigenous communities are in 
themselves a model of social economy. (Wenzel, 1995, Wenzel et al, 2000; 
Nuttall 1991; Proulx and Gauthier, 2005) A key objective for research in this 
theme area is a better understanding of the relationship between sharing, a 
subsistence economy, traditional indigenous cultures and values, and social 
cohesion in Northern communities. One project would look at the transfor-
mation that this traditional model of social economy has undergone as it was 
exposed to new influences. Certain research indicates that the importance of 
the traditional social economy of sharing is being transformed (Stern, 2001; 
Chabot, 2004). Others note that despite changes the importance of the shar-
ing economy remains central to community integration in Northern indige-
nous communities (Condon et al, 1995; Collings et al, 1998; Wenzel, 2000). 
Traditional activities are now portrayed as important coping strategies for 
indigenous communities faced by global influences (Martin, 2001). In many 
cases the responses have not been appropriate to meet the needs of the peo-
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ple (Zamparo and Spraggon, 2005) Research looking at the evolution and 
effective performance of the traditional sharing social economy of Northern 
indigenous communities needs to continue.  
4.13. Conclusions 
Recent economic transformations in the Canada’s north have created many 
challenges for communities in the region. The social economy is a possible 
instrument to deal with these challenges by enhancing both the vitality and 
social and educational capital of Northern communities through organiza-
tions that are more directly controlled by the communities themselves. At-
tempts to expand the social economy in the region’s communities must first 
properly understand several unique characteristics of the region’s economy 
as they characteristics offer both constraints and opportunities. The above 
discussion of the region’s economic development has shown that the tradi-
tional economy of indigenous communities, the role of the state in eco-
nomic development, and the impact of resource development in the North 
are all important characteristics that impact social economic development 
in the region. How they impact social economic organizations must be 
properly understood in order for proper policies to be developed that 
stimulate the growth of the social economy in the region.  
The Social Economic Research Network for Northern Canada has been 
developed for such a purpose. It is a network of university and college-
based researchers and representatives of community-based organizations, 
operating as partners, which is conducting research relevant to the social 
economy in Canada’s North. The Network seeks to mobilize new knowl-
edge that will help develop social economy capacity in Northern communi-
ties. It has developed a series of key research areas that hope to build on 
the existing research findings. A research plan is outlined which will assist 
attempts to further develop social economic organizations in the region 
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5. Enterprise Ownership and Resources 
Management in Greenland 
 
Hans Aage32 
Is not the State a question? All society is divided in opinion on the subject of 
the State. Nobody loves it, great numbers dislike it, and suffer conscientious 
scruples to allegiance. And the only defence set up, is, the fear of doing worse 
in disorganizing. (Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1850. Montaigne, or the Sceptic).33 
5.1. The privatization surge 
During the past three decennia a surge of enthusiasm for privatizations and 
liberalization of markets has flooded the world. This enthusiasm overtook 
the coasts of Greenland some years ago. “The heaviness of the public sec-
tor” should be reduced by means of “privatization or liquidation of gov-
ernment owned enterprises”, “outsourcing of more activities” and creating 
“real prices” that “genuine reflect costs”.34 In Greenland these reforms 
meant changes to the time-honored system of uniform price system.35 All 
this has been established as dogma, and it is often easy to get away with 
                                                        
32 Professor, DSc (Economics), Dept. of Society and Globalization Roskilde University, Denmark 
33 Emerson, 1987:89–90. 
34The uniform price system before reforms were implemented after the millennium was based 
on the concept of goods and services having the same price, wherever sold in Greenland. The 
uniform price system was based on cross subsidizing.  
35 Fællesudvalget, 2003:5,8,55; jf. OECD, 1999; Motzfeldt, 2000:6,9,11; Paldam, 2000; Grøn-
lands Erhvervsråd, 2002; Aage, 2003b, 2003a:10–11. The global enthusiasm appears to become 
less buoyant because of problems, among other things from the privatization of railways and 
health care in England, The Economist, 29 June 2002, pp 71–73. 
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postulating these changes indiscriminately and without argumentation. The 
Joint Committee for Business Development in Greenland recommended in 
2003, that there ought to be a 50 per cent reduction in government owned 
enterprises as well as 50 percent increase in outsourcing of public services 
to private providers, and by 2014, that there ought to be a reduction of 
government owned housing “by 5 per cent annually”.36 The joint commit-
tee cheerfully assumes that this will create “market mechanisms”, a “sus-
tainable economy”, “entrepreneurs and gazelle enterprises” and a “brand-
ing” of Greenland. There is however, no trace of attempts to critique or 
evaluate the probability of achieving the goals of these reforms – namely 
economic independence and growth in Greenland. 
Unfortunately it is not that simple. The question is how economic deci-
sions should be made, how to strike a balance between market and state, 
between on the one hand individual decisions in the market, where each 
person seeks his own advantage, and influence is determined by the size of 
his purse, and on the other hand collective decisions in the political proc-
ess. In terms of collective decisions everybody in principle has equal influ-
ence through voting. Hence, what is the optimal balance between private 
and public governance in economic life in Greenland? Below some argu-
ments are presented which are based upon economic theory, and these 
arguments are relevant when forming an opinion about this complicated 
question.  
5.2. State and market 
Government and private companies differ fundamentally, because money 
owned and spent by a private company, is owned by the company, whereas 
money in a government owned company is always taxpayer’s money. 
One’s own money and taxpayers’ money are completely different types of 
funds.  This difference asserts itself even though in both types of compa-
nies, owners can be far removed from employees, who actually perform 
the work. Contrary to government companies, a private company has a 
direct incentive to maximize profits by saving costs and by producing – 
and inventing – the types of output that the public is prepared to pay for. 
                                                        
36 Fællesudvalget, 2003:8,55,60,74. 
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The incentive to earn profits is at the same time a limitation of the private 
company. It is forced to maximize profits in order to survive. A govern-
ment company is not to the same degree, compelled to keep costs low, but 
neither is it limited by profit requirements. It can take some social consider 
ations into account. 
In many situations there is a coincidence between private profit incen-
tives and broader interests of society. Even if everybody only seeks his 
own advantage, all activity in society is in a sense, directed towards the 
common good by “the invisible hand of the market”. This is an expression 
first used in 1776 by Adam Smith, which marked the dawn of economic 
welfare theory. 
The starting point of the theory addresses the important and very gen-
eral problem of coordinating decisions concerning resource allocation in an 
optimal way, when the given variables are: individual preferences, techni-
cal possibilities, and initial resources. 
This is a prolific formulation of many types of problems, but not of all 
types of problems. The general theoretical results are two fundamental 
theorems on welfare theory concerning perfectly competitive markets, 
which constitute the essence of microeconomic theory – an explicit formu-
lation of what the invisible hand of Adam Smith can accomplish:  
 
 Every competitive economy is Pareto efficient. 
 Every Pareto efficient resource allocation can be attained through a com-
petitive market mechanism, with the appropriate initial redistributions.37 
 
This means, that in a well functioning competitive market, resources are 
not wasted so nobody may benefit from them. This is the meaning of the 
very broad optimality concept of Pareto – it is a minimum requirement 
concerning optimality, which nobody could possibly reject. Only obvious 
waste is ruled out, and there are generally a large number of Pareto optimal 
allocations, which could differ in many respects, especially concerning 
impact upon income distribution. The great advantage of Pareto’s broad 
concept of optimality is that it does not require arbitrary interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. Nevertheless, it gives rise to the two powerful fun-
damental theorems of welfare theory. Therefore, the market is a potent 
                                                        
37 Stiglitz, 2000:60. 
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democratic mechanism, where individuals can express their preferences 
very effectively through their consumption patterns. In a free competitive 
market there will be no waste. To leave the market to itself without politi-
cal interference is in many cases an excellent solution. The market has an 
important merit, namely that its incentives work well. In other words, it is 
not difficult to make producers maximize their profits or to make consum-
ers maximize their personal utility as they do this themselves. On the other 
hand, it becomes problematic for efficiency, if there are incentives for 
government employed bureaucrats, who are reluctant taxpayers, and at the 
same time they still enjoy free public services. 
5.3. Market failures 
Much can be said in favor of free markets. But the fundamental theorems 
of welfare theory, i.e. the invisible hand of the market only works for the 
common good if kept in check by competition and other restrictions. There 
are many cases, where the market mechanism does not function appropri-
ately, and where political governance therefore is necessary. These so-
called market failures are classic examples within economics textbooks.38 
These market failures are described in further detail below with reference 
to Greenland’s economy: 
 
 Imperfect competition. 
 Public goods. 
 Externalities. 
 Incomplete markets. 
 Imperfect information. 
 Macroeconomic disturbances.39 
 
To these six examples there should be added two further problems related to 
market equilibrium and Pareto optimality: 
 
 Distribution. 
 Merit goods. 
                                                        
38Fællesudvalget (2003:18). 
39 Stiglitz, 2000:85–87. 
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It is characteristic for the Greenland economy that the efficiency of the 
market is impaired by all conceivable forms of market failures, massively 
predominant and overwhelming everywhere. 
Imperfect competition, which limits market efficiency, is endemic in 
Greenland because of its vast landscape, its dispersed extension of geogra-
phy and its small numbers of population. Because of the scattered settle-
ments, even small artisan shops and service enterprises often enjoy local 
monopoly power in isolated parts of the market. However, the economy is 
dominated by a small number of large companies. Of the total 15.618 em-
ployees within production companies, Royal Greenland alone accounts for 
2.306 (15 percent). A further 7.004 persons (45 percent) are employed by 
one of the 11 largest companies which are either fully or partly state 
owned. In comparison, about 12.000 persons are employed in public ad-
ministration and services.40 
Often large companies are natural monopolies. This means that there are 
unexploited economies of scale in the trade concerned, so that it would be 
inefficient if there were a competitive market with more than one company. 
There are many natural monopolies in Greenland, where the total economy is 
too small for companies to reach an efficient size. It is hard to imagine many 
competing companies within sectors like retail trade, transportation or energy 
supply, because fixed costs (e.g. administration costs), become large as com-
pared to turnovers, when there are more than one or a few companies.  
Externalities are economic activities that have production costs, which are 
not reflected in prices or accounts. The effects are external to the economic 
agent, who caused them, and the market is unable to handle these types of 
activities in an optimal way. Air pollution is an important example of a nega-
tive effect, for which the market cannot collect any payment. In Greenland, 
social and cultural effects of company decisions are heavy externalities. For 
example, the relocation of just one company may erase the basis of existence 
for an entire smaller town or village.  
Imperfect information, or totally absent markets are further sources of 
inoptimality. Together these two failures create an important market failure, 
possibly the most damaging of all. The market is myopic with a short time 
horizon. This results in a market that is not capable of allocating optimally for 
the long run or making decisions for the distant future. This could include 
                                                        
40 Grønland 2005:138,146–148, 332. 
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impacting investments in infrastructure, which carry great weight in Green-
land – where information is sparse, where unborn generations are part of the 
problem, and where there is no market price formation at all. Long run con-
siderations are not the forte of the market. 
Free markets may well create macroeconomic disequilibria, first of all un-
employment. Unexploited resources in small, isolated towns and villages in 
Greenland necessitate political intervention for the sake of efficiency, but also 
for the sake of income distribution. As a rationale for political action, dis-
tribution effects are outside the very broad optimality criterion of welfare 
theory; Pareto’s criterion is satisfied, if resources are not wasted and provide 
utility for someone regardless of the distribution of utility. However, distribu-
tion is a paramount political issue, which is for example an important part of 
the justification for maintaining the system of uniform prices of water, elec-
tricity, and heating. This is also justified in sustaining habitation and produc-
tion in small towns and villages and in Greenland at large despite adverse 
conditions. 
Finally, some policy measures are justified by reference to so-called merit 
goods, which are types of goods that we as members of society inflict upon, 
or take away from ourselves for no other reason than our best interest. This is 
the case even if we unfortunately do not comprehend it and as individuals, are 
not willing to pay for them, respectively abstain from them voluntarily. Ex-
amples are compulsory education, subsidies for kindergartens in kind rather 
than in cash, subsidized theatres, bans on narcotics and gambling, and excise 
duties on alcoholic beverages. Often, other reasons are also invoked, particu-
larly the distribution and externality arguments. This paternalism is com-
pletely outside the logic of the optimization. As the problem formulated 
above indicates – the sovereignty of consumers’ preferences is the basic prin-
ciple, and the fixed point, on which the whole theory turns. 
5.4. Natural resources 
Together these peculiarities imply that in Greenland, it is not the exception 
but the rule, that the invisible hand of the market badly needs assistance 
from visible and firm political intervention. Furthermore, a weighty market 
failure has not even been mentioned yet, namely the so-called public 
goods. The concept of public goods does not refer to, whether they are 
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produced by private companies or by government, but rather to specific 
features related to their consumption.  
The fundamental theorems of welfare theory apply to private goods 
only, of which consumption is rival (if one person consumes the particular 
good, other people cannot do it simultaneously) and exclusive (the owner 
can prevent other people from consuming the good and thus collect pay-
ment for it). When these conditions are not fulfilled, various types of pub-
lic goods emerge, which the market cannot allocate optimally, as indicated 
with table 1. In the last example, fish stocks were shown to be of vital im-
portance to Greenland’s economy by constituting 87 per cent of exports.41 
Unlike a navigation buoy, a fish stock is not a pure public good. The use of 
a buoy by one vessel does not preclude other vessels from doing the same. 
However, fish that are caught by one fishing-boat cannot be caught by 
another boat. However, an attempt to prevent boats from exploiting fish in 
the sea is almost as complicated as preventing boats from utilizing the 
buoys. 
Table 1. Consumption patterns and types of goods 
Rival consumption exclusion Private goods Food items, clothing health care 
 
Non-rival consumption 
Non exclusion 
 
Pure public goods Navigation buoys, snow clearing, 
police 
Non-rival consumption  
exclusion 
Ticket goods A bride, seats in a football stadium 
 
Rival consumption non  
exclusion 
Common goods Clean air, fish stocks 
 
If exploitation of a fish stock is determined by individual decisions in the 
market, the result will be economic overfishing, exactly like a common, 
which can be used freely by all peasants in a village; over grazing will be 
the end result, hence the phrase “the tragedy of the commons”. The expla-
nation is that new fishing-boats will start fishing, as long as the cost of a 
new boat (the marginal cost) is less than the average return of fishing. A 
new fisherman is only concerned with his private return. This return is 
equal to the average, as all boats get the same catch, and he does not take 
into account that his new boat will reduce the catches of the boats already 
in operation. A maximum total catch for all fishing-boats together in a 
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single year requires that new boats are added only as long as the marginal 
cost is less than the net increase of total catch (the marginal catch), which 
in turn, is less than the average catch. On top of this, come more far reach-
ing complications related to biological over fishing, which may damage 
fish stocks in the long run. It appears that the problem of overfishing may 
be interpreted as an externality problem, cf. the example of clean air as a 
common public good, and air pollution as an externality. 
The solution is that the privilege of exploiting the fish stock (and the 
privilege of exploiting the atmosphere) should be bestowed upon one sin-
gle owner.42 Whether the owner is an individual person or the state, it is in 
the interest of the owner, to guarantee, that exploitation is regulated opti-
mally. With this solution, one important economic problem of common 
goods can be solved. The other big question is regarding who or where the 
proceeds of harvesting should go. Ownership rights, or the privilege of ex-
ploiting the fish stock has a value in money terms called resource rent. 
There are weighty arguments that say resource rents should go to 
Greenland’s Home Rule government, either by taxation or equivalently, by 
public ownership. These arguments are compatible with widespread no-
tions of justice – that user rights of natural resources should belong to the 
people and not to any particular individual. Moreover, taxation of the re-
source rent – which does not originate in any productive activity, but sim-
ply from ownership of the resource – is a rare example of an efficient tax 
in that, it will not distort economic decisions. Another example of this kind 
of tax is a head tax or other types of lump-sum taxes. Most other taxes, like 
an income tax or an alcohol tax, inflict distortions upon economic activity. 
In these particular cases, a distortion of the supply of labor and a (benefi-
cial) distortion of alcohol consumption are incurred. 
In Greenland, the fisheries” resource rents have traditionally been given 
away for free, to private fisher-boat owners by “grandfathering”. Grand-
fathering is the passing on a form of tradable fishing quotas for shrimps for 
an indefinite span of years. However, in principle, it is possible to cancel 
them with a given notice of five years.43 Several procedures for con-
fiscating resource rents are possible. Examples of such a procedure could 
include the selling of permits by auction for the highest bid, taxing permits, 
or by taxing the value of catches less wage costs and other costs. The last 
                                                        
42 Coase’s theorem (1960) about externalities; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992:293–305. 
43 Benchmarkingudvalget, 2003:104–107,121,146–147; DRUG, 2006:76. 
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procedure has been in use in Iceland for a number of years, at a 6 per cent 
rate of taxation, which is expected to increase to 9.5 per cent.44 Auctioning 
of quotas is very seldom used. Among the problems regarding this ap-
proach is, that it has proved difficult to prevent collusion between the rela-
tively few buyers, and that it is also difficult to determine the time limit of 
quotas. 
“The impartial committee”45 rejects selling quotas by auction for the rea-
son, that it will increase income uncertainty in fisheries. This conclusion is 
supported by the “the advisory committee”, which shares this judgment con-
cerning quotas for short time periods. The argument appears hard to under-
stand. The major income uncertainty in fisheries is caused by instability of 
world market prices for shrimp. For example shrimp prices were cut by half 
from 2001 to 2004.46 Price fluctuations like these will be absorbed by quota 
prices, if quotas are sold by annual auctions. Therefore, annual auctions will 
stabilize income in fisheries and the transfer income risk (as well as resource 
rent) to the Home Rule government. If auctions do not function properly, it 
is relatively simple to tax away the resource rent instead. 
There is a certain limited trading of shrimp quotas, but prices are not 
known to the public or to the government, so the size of the resource rent is 
therefore also unknown.47 “The impartial committee” observes, that “it is 
likely that some people earn even rather large amounts of money in fisher-
ies”, but adds, that it is “also relevant to appreciate that private (risk will-
ing) capital is accumulated in society”.48 Resource rent is not mentioned at 
all by “the joint committee”, which confines itself to a disapproval of “the 
public domination”.49 
Because of distinctive features of the fisheries, significant political 
regulation is imperative. Collective political decisions by government and 
individual decision makers in the market are generally closely interwoven 
in all modern societies. Government can intervene in the economy in a 
multitude of ways. There is a whole spectrum of government regulatory 
procedures, ranging from full government rights of ownership and disposi-
tion, to various forms of branch and enterprise specific regulations (like 
                                                        
44 DRUG, 2006;86. 
45 DRUG, 2006:76–77. 
46 Grønland 2005:181–182. 
47 DRUG, 2006:76; Lund, 2006. 
48 Det uvildige udvalg, 2005:81. 
49 Fællesudvalget, 2003:24–25; cf. Paldam, 1994:81–84,160–182. 
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specific laws), to inspection obligations, concessions and leasing, subsi-
dies, business support schemes and specific taxes and duties. At the other 
end of the spectrum are the most general legal and taxation systems, and 
traditional macroeconomic policy. 
This also applies to ownership rights. The contrast between public and 
private ownership of productive capital and resources is easily exagger-
ated. Ownership rights are made up of several elements, which can be 
separated and divided, namely the right of using capital and resources, the 
right to receive income from them, and the right of realizing their value by 
sale. Taxation of profits, in combination with tax exemption of losses, 
corresponds to government ownership of part of the right of income. Taxa-
tion of capital and the auctioning of fishing permits correspond to govern-
ment ownership of part of the capital value. In Greenland’s fisheries, gov-
ernment intervention of all three types of ownership rights (user, income 
and capital value rights) by regulation, taxation and quota prices must by 
necessity, be so thorough, that it comes close to the planned economy end 
of the spectrum. 
5.5. Policy failures 
Thus there are urgent arguments in favor of “public domination”50 in 
Greenland’s economy. Moreover, the fact that the market mechanism is not 
particularly prevalent is a problem much too easily overlooked by privatiza-
tion and market-fetishism invocations. Classic welfare theory and the two 
fundamental theorems do not speculate very much about, who the particular 
market agents are, except that they attempt to maximize profits and utility. 
But evidently, agents who can acquire a monopoly, for example in retail 
trade or fisheries, must be big agents. Generally, the typical production agent 
is not a single person, but a big company like a joint stock company with 
many employees and owners. A big company is a vertical organization gov-
erned by long-term contracts for lines of command and relations of authority. 
A big company is exactly the antipode of the market, which is a horizontal 
structure, where buyers and sellers meet and agree on a price and a quantity 
from deal to deal. When theory proves that the market is efficient, the ques-
                                                        
50 Fællesudvalget, 2003:25. 
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tion arises over, why the typical production agent in the market, is an alien 
structure to the market – namely a company (in contrast to consumer agents, 
who are typically single persons and price takers). 
The answer to this riddle is not very surprising; that anything else 
would be too awkward, or in other words, that transaction costs would 
otherwise become prohibitive.51 Thus, there exists practically no proper 
labor market. Although the market for day laborers or dockers with steve-
dores as buyers are examples, and so are markets for slaves and “inden-
tured labor”.52 Most contracts for buying and selling of labor are long 
term, complicated and incomplete. 
                                                       
One could be inclined to believe that the same argument should imply 
that big government is a functional structure like big companies. Unfortu-
nately there is a decisive difference between companies and government. 
While size is not the issue, many multinational companies have turnovers 
that exceed those of many national governments. The difference is that 
companies are governed by money power and private ownership rights, 
whereas the state is governed politically and has a monopoly of collecting 
taxes and using coercion. 
From this follows the notion that government is not compelled to maxi-
mize profits and is able to take broader social considerations into account 
in order to correct market failures. But these presumptive advantages are 
more or less counterbalanced by the fact that government has less incentive 
to limit costs, such as corruption costs. This is due to the fact that civil 
servants, contrary to private company employees, never use their own 
money (or the company’s money) but the money of the taxpayer. As men-
tioned in the introduction, these two moneys are completely different 
things. This gives rise to policy failures, which according to the privatiza-
tion and market-ideology, are normally much more harmful than the mar-
ket failures, they were supposed to correct. 
Yet, policy failures cannot be ignored. Unless the political system is 
permeated by honesty and incorruptibility, there is a risk that economic 
activity becomes deflected towards “rent-seeking”. “Rent-seeking” is prof-
itable, but usually entails an unproductive activity such as seeking tax fa-
 
51 Coase’s theorem (1937) on the nature of firms; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992:38. 
52 A person, particularly in England and the colonies in the 17th and 18th century, who sold 
the disposal of their persons and labor power for long periods, often 7–10 years, either voluntarily 
or because they were criminals or indebted. 
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vors, monopoly concessions, subsidies and resource rents.53 These activi-
ties are also labeled DUP (directly unproductive profit-seeking). The larger 
the public sector, the larger the risk. In the case of Greenland, “rents” are 
enormous, because of resource rents, and because of the so-called “block 
grant” – which is a cash payment equal to 1/3 of Greenlandic GDP paid by 
the Danish government to Greenland’s Home Rule government.54 
5.6. Government owned joint stock companies. 
Now, as one could possibly imagine, government owned joint stock com-
panies would be the perfect mean, which could combine the advantages of 
government ownership and private enterprise. Government owned joint 
stock companies are private legal subjects, the majority of shares to which 
are owned by government. 
In Denmark they became the predominant form of public enterprise dur-
ing the 1990’s. For example, the public energy company, DONG, and the 
bridges across the Great Belt and the Öresund are organized in this way. 
In Greenland, companies owned by the Home Rule government domi-
nate the business sector. Among the 40 largest companies in 2001, gov-
ernment controls 14. These 14 companies account for 68 percent of turn-
over and 79 percent of employment engaged by the total 40 companies. 
However, governments owned joint stock companies do not appear to 
combine all the advantages of privately and publicly owned firms. Rather, 
government owned joint stock companies combine all the disadvantages. 
This becomes evident by inspecting the types of governance used in these 
three types of firms, and how the pursuit of its own interests by management 
is constrained by market forces and the political process, respectively.  
Private firms are monitored by shareholders, banks and other creditors, 
customers, and by the risk of hostile take-over. Firms owned purely by 
government, on the other hand, are subject to political monitoring like 
other parts of public administration. This monitoring is unfortunately not 
always as efficient as numerous cases have demonstrated in Danish local 
administrations – where intimacy is often a problem (fortunately Danish 
municipalities are not allowed to engage in normal business activity). 
                                                        
53 Winther, 2006; Greiffenberg et al., 2003. 
54 Lund, 2003; Aage, 2005. 
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Government owned joint stock companies violate the golden rule that 
economic responsibility and economic decision-making capability should 
always go together. Responsibility and decision-making are largely exempt 
from all these monitoring mechanisms. Political monitoring is weak as it 
does not figure in the budget, and it is not subject to laws on public insight 
into public administration. 
Market monitoring is not very powerful either. These companies are of-
ten natural monopolies, like the bridges across the Great Belt and the Øre-
sund. Shareholder control on the part of government is often lenient, and 
will become even more lax in the future as a government committee report 
concerning government owned joint stock companies in 2003 explicitly 
recommended, that ministers should not have power of instruction towards 
government representatives in company boards. The committee refers to 
the 65 law on joint stock companies, which attaches shareholder decision-
making competence to the general meeting of shareholders.55 Even if this 
is not unheard of, dominant shareholders in private companies cooperate 
with members of the board, who were appointed by them. 
Table 2. Ownership, turnover, and the number of employees in Greenland’s 40 
biggest companies (according to turnover) in 2001. 
number of 
companies 
turnover million 
DKK 
number of 
employees 
Ownership 
 %  %  % 
Private ownership 26 65% 2.077 31% 1.190 22% 
government owned 7 18% 3.020 45% 3.121 57% 
Partly government owned 3 8% 1.210 18% 974 18% 
subsidiary companies of totally/   
partly government owned 
4 10%   359 5% 193 4% 
Total 40 101% 6.667 99% 5.478 101% 
Source: Fællesudvalget, 2003:25 
 
Creditor monitoring is limited as well because credit to government owned 
joint stock companies is virtually guilt-edged for banks, who can trust the 
government’s power to collect taxes as being reliable collateral. When 
Royal Greenland is able to obtain credit on favorable terms from the inter-
national capital markets, it due to widespread expectations among banks, 
that the Home Rule Government will never allow Royal Greenland to go 
bankrupt. Expectations like these are backed by hard evidence. In 2001 for 
                                                        
55 Finansministeriet et al., 2003:33–37. 
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example, the government supplied 200 million DKK to Royal Greenland to 
overcome acute problems. Other companies like KNI and Royal Arctic 
Line also received crisis support from government in recent years.56 The 
Home Rule government accepts a liability as a guarantor de facto, if not de 
jure, in return for favorable credit terms for companies. 
The presumption is that government owned joint stock companies have 
neither private firm’s incentives to keep costs low nor state enterprises’ 
capabilities of taking broader social considerations into account. A gov-
ernment owned joint stock company is not the best, but the worst of all 
conceivable types of company structures. 
The opportunities for “rent-seeking” of suspect character increase si-
multaneously with the weakening of market and policy monitoring.57 This 
is not to say that government owned joint stock companies never function 
properly.58 This was indeed the general experience with government 
owned joint stock companies created in Denmark in the 1990’s, even 
though it is not possible to conclude, whether or not this reconstruction of 
existing state owned enterprise affected efficiency.59 
Government owned joint stock companies might also be preferable to 
outright privatization, as some possibility for beneficial government moni-
toring is preserved. For example, the British government insisted on privat-
izing tracks and other fixed capital of the railways in 1996, although they 
are a natural monopoly. In the first years, the private owner, Railtrack, 
financed huge profits to shareholders by selling off landed property and by 
neglecting maintenance and investments for improvements, which came 
close to asset stripping of the company. When the poor state of tracks 
eventually caused some serious railway accidents and recurring delays, the 
company was finally renationalized in 2001 in order to forestall bank-
ruptcy.60 The Home Rule government owned Arctic Umiaq Line must also 
be considered a natural monopoly. It was privatized in 2005-2006, but in 
the course of less than one year, it had to be renationalized at a reportedly 
loss of 100–150 million DKK to the government.61 
                                                        
56 Politiken, 27. marts 2003; Paldam, 2000:41. 
57 An illustrative description with reference to Greenland is provided by Paldam, 2000:39–43. 
58 But the opposite is more widespread, cf. Paldam, 2000:38. 
59 Greve, 2000:100. 
60 The Economist, 17 October 2001, pp 17,39–40; Aage, 2003a:15–17. 
61 Sermitsiak’ 47 (29. september 2006, nr. 39):37,Erhverv1, (13. oktober 2006, nr. 41):2. 
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Pure private firms, and pure state firms, can also function properly just 
as health care in Denmark and Greenland, the postal service, and the Dan-
ish State Railways have in the past.62 All evidence indicates that Danish 
public firms were efficient and well managed, as compared to correspond-
ing public and private firms in other countries. As the evidence is far from 
convincing, it is strange, that the superior efficiency of private, as com-
pared to public firms is now firmly established as dogma. 
Whilst it is now possible to privatize just about anything, it is not nec-
essarily sensible. The recurring theme of “winners and losers” that seems 
to inevitably follow privatization reforms is worrying, as is the speed and 
inevitability with which such reforms is sold to the populace. Much of the 
journey on which we are embarking, as we reshape government is being 
undertaken on faith.63 There is a “folk theorem” (or what would be a folk 
theorem, were it true) that says that anything the government can do, the 
private sector can do as well or better.64 
Documentation for allegedly large savings on production costs by pri-
vatizing and outsourcing is remarkably poor. While outsourcing cost re-
ductions at rates of 20–30 per cent are often flung out,65 more careful 
meta-analyses seem to indicate, that savings are rather at rates around 6–12 
per cent, and are widely varying.66 It should be added, that very little is 
known about two other important entries – namely deterioration of quality 
and administrative costs67 except that “private providers have stronger 
incentives to slacken on quality”.68 
                                                       
5.7. The long run 
How do we explain the proliferation of government owned joint stock com-
panies? It cannot as a priori, be excluded, that it is an expression of an in-
considerate, ideological swell of fashion, that the origin of which as regards 
to Denmark, can be traced to intensified requirements from the EU for liber-
 
62 DSB is an abbreviation of the Danish State Railways (de danske Statsbaner). 
63 Hodge, 2000:246. 
64 Stiglitz, 1994:31. 
65 DØR, 2004:229; Paldam, 2000:37. 
66 Hodge, 2000:155. 
67 Aage, 2003a:12–17. 
68 DØR, 2004:274,224. 
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alization of the public sector.69 More rational reasons are also possible for 
government to give up its direct, democratic control of its activities for the 
purpose of leaving governance to a narrower, private profit maximization 
approach. This is related to the limitations of political governance, and oddly 
enough they stem from the very far-reaching powers of government them-
selves, which stand in the way for credible commitments. Government is 
capable of revoking most of its decisions later on. 
The economic advantages of privatization are derived from the inability 
of government to make certain commitments, in particular, the commit-
ment to competition and the commitment not to subsidize.70 
Very often, problems of the inability of government to make commit-
ments emerge when a balance has to be struck between short term gains on 
one hand and the prevention of long term problems on the other. As men-
tioned above long-term considerations are not the forte of the market. In-
deed, it is not the forte of politicians either, as there is always an election no 
more than four years ahead. It is a temptation to go for short-term benefits at 
the expense of foregoing long term goals. Although contrary to private firms, 
government in principle has the possibility of taking social considerations 
into account. Paradoxically, privatization may be a solution to this dilemma. 
It can provide a method to guarantee social considerations exactly, because 
private firms are compelled to stick to narrow profit seeking. 
The first and classic example is, that it is difficult for government to 
commit itself to not subsidize ailing public firms. For this reason, these 
firms have a well-founded expectation, that government will bail them out 
in an emergency. It creates less political trouble to subsidize, than to close 
down. In the long run, subsidizing may conserve an inefficient business 
structure and reduce incentives for cost efficiency. A “hard budget con-
straint” may improve economic efficiency, which is one among other, 
long-term social considerations. 
This efficiency argument can justify full privatization, if competition 
works, and if conditions for market efficiency are fulfilled. In Greenland 
they are not. There, full privatization will prove brutal as well as hazard-
ous. Efficiency arguments have been invoked as reasons for creating gov-
ernment owned joint stock companies in Denmark.71 It is hardly convinc-
                                                        
69 Greve, 2000:100–103; Finansministeriet, 1993:7,59. 
70 Stiglitz, 1994:179. 
71 Finansministeriet, 1993:57–73. 
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ing however, that the weakening of political monitoring without corre-
spondingly strengthening market monitoring should improve efficiency for 
companies like DONG, the bridges across the Great Belt and the Øresund 
and Royal Greenland. These are all big companies, who enjoy a local mo-
nopoly and are subject to rather soft budget constraints. 
A second example is the neglect of long-term maintenance. It is more 
exciting to initiate new spectacular projects, rather than using money one 
year after another on something as dull as maintenance of for example rail 
tracks, which consequently have been postponed for years in Denmark. 
There is a parallel problem of upkeep for Home Rule government owned 
housing, which recently called forth extra grants from Denmark. The pro-
posal to let the Labor Market Additional Pension Fund in Denmark be in 
charge of railway investment is not rationalized by cost savings. It un-
doubtedly becomes more expensive, because the fund is inserted as an 
extra link in need of a profit, and furthermore, with no prior experience 
concerning railways. The rationale is that the state once and for all com-
mits itself to spending large amounts of money for several years on railway 
renovation, which is not subject to annual budget approvals.72 
The so-called public-private partnerships probably are also rationalized 
in this way. Similar arguments are possible as justification for organizing 
the bridges across the Great Belt and the Øresund. In the case of govern-
ment owned joint stock companies, it is probably legitimate to lift direct 
political control from the rates policy, but it is hardly evident. 
A third example is that certain painful and impossible political decis-
ions are transformed into private conflicts of economic interest – as for 
example, the conflict in the Spring 2006 between Royal Greenland and the 
fishermen’s organizations concerning trading prices of shrimp.73 The issue 
was the income of fishermen, and that the Home Rule government was 
tempted by short term yields, thereby paving the way for future claims 
from the fishermen and from everybody else. The construction of a govern-
ment owned Joint Stock Company partly lifts the problem out of the politi-
cal sphere. 
A fourth example, very much like the preceding ones, is that sensitive 
long-term decisions are masked as market determined, commercial and 
                                                        
72 Politiken, 14.–15. august 2006. 
73 Sermitsiak’ 47 (14. april 2006, nr. 15):6, (21. april 2006, nr. 16):7, (27. oktober 2006, nr. 
43):10–11. 
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economic inevitabilities. The system of uniform prices is a major form of 
subsidization for habitation and production in small town and villages 
across Greenland Arguments in favor of its abolition are mainly coined as 
purely economic arguments about “spurious” prices versus “cost true” 
market prices, and competitiveness in “growth regions”.74 However, there 
is a possibility that savings due the abolition, will accrue to enterprises that 
in the past, were not entitled to the specific low energy and water prices for 
the fisheries industry. The savings will be absorbed as monopoly profits 
rather than they will reduce prices.75 
5.8. Democracy 
Thus, it is conceivable to argue that social considerations can be sustained 
by transferring direct political control to private, economic interests fully 
or partly through privatization, outsourcing, or by means of government 
owned joint stock companies. The risk is however, that private profit seek-
ing becomes the prevailing force. 
In Greenland, there are crucial arguments in favor of preserving a strong 
political weft of collective political decision making rather than individual 
decisions making in the market. This need is connected to weighty social and 
cultural considerations and a massive resource dependence. 
Any private firm even Greenland must know the initial conditions and 
marks for the bearing. When carrying out policy for a whole nation, mat-
ters are not as simple as they are in a private firm. It is impracticable to 
escape the problem that matters must be considered in their entirety, and 
that things are connected and cannot be separated. When a local firm earns 
profits and employs more workers, everybody becomes wealthier. Those 
who increase in wealth, become more competent by working, and become 
more enthusiastic about education. In this context, social tensions and 
problems are reduced. Contrariwise is it in the case of liquidations. The 
problem and challenge is to spur productive business activity in Greenland. 
This process is subject to the condition, that living standards in Greenland 
should be at the same level as in Denmark’s towns and villages. When 
carrying out business policy, it is impossible not to carry out social, re-
                                                        
74 Fællesudvalget, 2003:8,15,61; Sermitsiak’ 47 (14. marts 2006, nr. 12):14–15. 
75 Fællesudvalget, 2003:33. 
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gional, and labor market policy simultaneously. According to “the joint 
committee” there ought to be “a clear separation of commercial goals and 
distributional considerations”, so that enterprises do not “risk to ending up 
as employment projects”.76 However, this is not feasible, because the real-
istic options are either to pay public subventions as business subsidies, or 
to pay public subventions as social benefits. If decisions are left to the 
market, and if market efficiency is the dominant criterion, then business 
activity in Greenland will become minuscule.77 Royal Greenland would 
then move fish processing to the biggest towns, to Denmark, and to other 
countries. If Greenland is left at the mercy of the market, it is easy to imag-
ine, that first villages and later on the whole of Greenland will become 
depopulated. 
Questions like these cannot be left to market mechanisms. Outright pri-
vatization of Royal Greenland is the object of an on-going debate, and it is 
partly effectuated for the KNI.78 It is hardly a solution just as privatization 
is not the solution for efficient regulation of fisheries. However, democ-
ratic control can be improved by transforming government owned joint 
stock companies into proper state enterprises, which are subjected to direct 
and full political governance. This is especially true if complete public 
insight is assured concerning circumstances and arrangements as far as 
international business competition allows, and if strong, independent audit 
functions are an integral part of enterprise governance. The most inexpen-
sive solution undoubtedly would be to employ Danish civil servants in this 
attempt. As a democratic mechanism, the market possesses great advan-
tages, but for theoretical and empirical reasons, this claim is insufficient, 
when the economy is small, or when social and cultural externalities are 
large, or when natural resources are significant – as is the case in 
Greenland. 
Concerning natural resources, it may well be argued, that the political 
system should delegate its decision making power, but arguably, not to the 
market mechanism. It is difficult to explain, why for example the Danish 
energy company, DONG, is organized as a government owned joint stock 
company. Delegation of power is a possible solution to the inadequacies of 
the political system concerning long-term objectives – namely the tempta-
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77 Lund, 2005. 
78 Winther, 2003:122–123; Politiken, 27. marts 2003. 
 The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008 120 
tion to reap short-term gains instead of preventing long-term losses or ca-
tastrophes. Delegation to private markets is not the only possibility, and 
rarely the best one. Another possibility is self-governance, i.e. that those 
directly involved make the decisions themselves. This has proven worka-
ble in some cases regarding cultural affairs and for university research. In 
the economic sphere, this has been attempted in employee ownership and 
employee governance. In Greenland,79 although successful examples exist, 
especially in small enterprises with large amounts of human capital like a 
group of dentists working together, the overall experience is not particu-
larly promising, neither in theoretical, nor in practical terms. 
A third possibility is that democratically elected politicians voluntarily 
delegate their decision making power to an independent body of profes-
sionals, who firstly enjoy confidence and secondly are constrained by strict 
prescriptions. In health care, procedures like this are used for deciding 
certain painful or impossible priorities, as they are left to physicians. In 
monetary policy the system has proved efficient; the problem is that poli-
ticians are tempted to finance public expenditures by printing money rather 
than by collecting taxes, and it is easy and fine in the short run, but a catas-
trophe in the long run. The solution is to have a more or less independent 
central bank in charge of monetary policy. In some cases an even more 
radical solution has been used, namely to leave monetary policy to so-
called currency boards, which are obliged to issue local currency only to 
the extent, that it is covered by reserves of foreign, hard currency. Still 
more drastic was the currency reform in West Germany in 1948, when 
confidence in the new currency system was guaranteed by an occupational 
power, as the new D-Mark notes were flown in from the USA. 
There are strong parallels between governance of a monetary system 
and governance of a renewable natural resource. In both cases, direct de-
mocratic control has proved highly problematic. Efficient and sustainable 
long-term exploitation of fish stocks and fair distribution of the returns, 
including the difficult problems of the distribution between living and 
future generations, is a principal issue for democracy in Greenland. There 
are thus sensible arguments in favor of delegating governance to an envi-
ronment board as a suitable form of indirect democratic governance.  
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6. A partial reform of the uniform price 
system and the consequences on 
households in Greenland settlements80 
 
Gorm Winther81 
6.1. Introduction 
The main purpose with this article is to use critical analysis to elucidate 
problems related to the 2004 and 2005 proposal, and adoption of a reform of 
the price system on utilities in Greenland. The uniform price system had 
until 2001 existed all over in Greenland since the days of Danish colonial-
ism. The system continued to exist throughout the post-colonial development 
stage, where since 1979 administration of most of Greenland’s affairs was 
done through the Home Rule government. The drafts and data related to 
them, allow us to do calculations on the consequences to household incomes 
and migration. It is not a secret any more, that political and administrative 
decision-makers in Nuuk have adopted the same policy on migration as the 
Danes did back in the sixties, when trying to enforce a speedy exodus of 
                                                        
80 This article was finished in 2006, and it does not include recent developments such as an in-
creasing up going trend in utility and fuel prices in Greenland. The primary data used was compiled 
in 2005 from the KNI Pilersuisoq Inc., the Nukissiorffit Inc. and the Home Rule Government. More-
over, the partial data and information was obtained from Egil Borchersen Arctic Technology centre 
Sisimiut, Niels Mønsted, the municipality of Uummanaq and Olafur Nielsen, the Home Rule dept. of 
Housing and Infrastructure. Secondary data was compiled from publications from statistics 
Greenland.  
81 Professor at the Department of Development and Planning. Aalborg University. Activity 
leader for an international consortium under the third international polar year working with the 
POENOR-project (The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development). 
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labor from the settlements and smaller towns into the larger towns. The sec-
ond phase of reforms deals with the pricing of utilities (electricity, heating 
and water). 
The rapid speed of the utility pricing reform process that began in 2004 
did not leave much room for public debate. The final legislation was pub-
licly available, when the “Landstinget” (Home Rule parliament) in 2004 
had its fall gathering. Here, it was finally initiated after the adjournment. 
The time constraints did set limits for voicing alternative calculations. 
Actually the short time frame made alternatives impossible, because the 
database, which the calculations were based on, was not made publicly 
available, but through parts of enclosed material within different reports. 
By and large, it seemed that the partial reform on utility pricing was has-
tened through the home rule parliament “Landstinget” without the neces-
sary time for municipalities and other decentralized decision-makers to 
come up with alternative analyses.  
The public debate that took place on the partial reforms revealed that 
politicians in the ruling coalition and home rule civil servants, tried to play 
down the negative economic impact of the reforms to Greenland wage 
earning families in small towns and in settlements. For instance, it was said 
that worries on seeing the same urbanization patterns as in the sixties were 
exaggerations. People do not just move due to price increases on utilities. 
These arguments were used to explain the price reform being part of a 
reform package in 2004, which also contained tax breaks for low-income 
families in an attempt to equalize a fall in real incomes.  
The reform aimed at so-called “cost based pricing”, meaning that the 
four professed competition towns of Qaqortoq, Nuuk, Sisimiut and Ilulissat 
should have lower prices, because of economies of scale, while the rest of 
Greenland should have higher prices. The reform process should be grad-
ual. But this process was already in 2005, complicated by price hikes on 
gas oil, petroleum and regular gas. The energy forms of gas oil and petro-
leum are crucial for the settlements. They are used for heating houses and 
for transport of hunters outside the settlements and towns.   
In this paper I will point out that it was problematic to assume, that the util-
ity price reforms would not impact low-income families in settlements and 
smaller towns. This is done by looking at the tax reforms” effect on income 
brackets and on the falling purchasing power in settlement households. In 
2005, Rasmussen emphasized an encroaching poverty within the settlements 
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among households partially or fully based on subsistence income. The distri-
bution of income in Greenland in general is extremely skewed with a gini-
coefficient higher than in the US. This problem can only be made worse as a 
consequence of the dramatic price increases on energy in the years since 2004 
(Rasmussen, 2005, Rasmussen and Petersen, 2006). 
I present an alternative to the price reforms. In 1998 a working group 
published a report (The so-called FANG report) with a suggestion to a 
solidarity reform.82 The idea in this report was to hold settlements and 
outskirt districts indemnified. This was not the central principle in the 2005 
reforms implemented on utility prices. Even if we take the tax breaks into 
consideration, it is clear that a non-defined amount of families in some 
towns and all settlements will feel the combined effect from reform as a 
net-increase of the cost of energy (Winther, 2005, 2006).83  
6.2. The total reform package 
Table 1 provides an overview of the reform package including the reform 
on utility prices. Not all reforms mentioned in the table have been carried 
through. In 2001, the Home Rule government approved a so-called liber-
alization of the air traffic, which called for a segmentation of the future 
market into two parts – the competition routes and the routes based on 
service contracts. There was no change in the expectations of the reforms. 
Introducing so-called cost based pricing should have led to price decreases. 
Already in 2001, this proved to be wrong, because airport taxes and other 
costs contributed to price hikes for air tickets.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
82 The Association of Private Businessmen in Greenland (Foreningen af private Nærings-
drivende i Grønland). The group had as one of its members the Danish supply sider Martin Paldam 
and the CEO of the Greenland Bank Frank Kristensen. It is to this day a paradox, that the actual 
reform implemented contains less solidarity than the suggestions in the FANG report.  
83 The calculations here are solely based on data as they were in 2004. Later changes may 
have modified more current results. Yet, considering the price hikes internationally on oil and gas, 
a full-scale implementation of the gradual reforms probably will change the picture to an even 
more drastic situation. 
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Table 1. Overview of the total reforms 
Company: Before reform: After Reform: 
Air Greenland Cross Subsidized Tickets Liberalization in 2001 
 
Royal Arctic Line Uniform System of Freight Rates 7 levels of rates in 2003 
 
Nukissiorfiit   Uniform pricing of Utilities Annual rate increases of 10% from 
2005 in settlements and smaller towns
 
KNI Inc. Subsidies to Transport of Goods and 
services to smaller towns and settle-
ments through service contracts  
 
Abolishment and decreases of agreed 
payments in service contracts 
 
Tele Greenland Cross Subsidizing in relation to deficit 
on Supply Obligations 
Not implemented yet 
 
It is imperative when assessing the consequences of abandoning the uni-
form price system, that we approach this study to address the totality of 
partial reforms and their impacts on Households and Enterprises. Looking 
at Table 1, it is obvious that the totality of reforms can have in depth, on-
going impacts on local communities not being profitable in the neo-
classical micro-economic sense. Before the reforms were initiated, the 
principle was that goods and services should cost the same throughout 
Greenland. After 2001, airfares, freight rates, utility rates and prices on 
goods and services in the settlements increased, as will rates for telecom-
munication in the future. This raises the living costs in settlements and 
outskirt regions, and if the “economic laws” behind the policies work as 
expected – among mainstream economists, civil servants and politicians – 
this could promote a transfer of populations from local communities to the 
more competitive towns. Going beyond the narrow approach, which aims 
for a swift migration of labor through use of disincentives (to stay in the 
local community) and material incentives (to shift to a full consumerist life 
in the competition towns), one needs to analyze the long-term implications 
(including the socio-economic) of the reform packages. In terms of the 
macroeconomic effects, the long run costs include the incurred costs of 
moving a large segment of the population (i.e. establishing housing, infra-
structure, health facilities, education etc.) along with the hidden costs re-
lated to social complaints on health problems, alcoholism, drug addiction, 
unemployment and marginalization. These social problems were quite 
apparent after the tremendous material leap forward following the great 
reforms of the central planners in Copenhagen during the sixties. 
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Such an approach suggests, that we need to calculate both benefits and 
costs of the total reform. Furthermore, one should try to forecast behavioral 
changes due to price changes through establishing representative calcula-
tions on the effects of the total changes in costs and expenses for enter-
prises and households. Finally, the distributive changes are crucial in un-
derstanding the social effects and problems created by the reforms. This 
Paper however, only presents the impacts of the partial reforms to utility 
pricing. Additional data needs to be compiled, before we can step further 
towards understanding the situation completely.  
6.3. Tax reform and income in the settlements 
As indicated, the reforms to utility pricing should be seen in combination 
with the partial tax reform implemented in 2004. The idea was that the re-
forms should compensate the worst-off households in smaller towns and 
settlements.  
The combined intention of the two reforms was to change and simplify 
the income distribution policy in the following ways: A person’s deduc-
tions and standard deductions, when computing the final tax were in-
creased by 10.000 kr., and at the same time the Home Rule Govern-
ment issued a taxed percentage for the common municipality tax, that 
was increased by 2 percent. 84 
Uniform prices on electricity, water and heating were rearranged 
from January 2005. The subsidy to water and electricity for the fishing 
industry was gradually to be removed over an undefined time frame. 
For the households, another principle was introduced. The adaptation to 
so-called prices based on “real costs” should cumulative after the first 
five years had reached 50% of the real cost level. The block grant from 
the Home Rule to the municipalities should be rearranged, so that a 
                                                        
84 There are several tax technicalities related to this. First the issue of deductions, these are re-
lated to all income earners paying income tax, while the standard deduction substitutes actual costs 
to interest, union fees, unemployment insurance, child allowances and expenses related to personal 
business operations. In this way there is always a tax-free bottom bracket of the total income. In 
2004 it went from 48.000 kr. To 58.000 kr.. The common tax paid to municipalities covers com-
mon municipality expenses, and it is a part of an equalization scheme, where poorer municipalities 
are subsidized from this pool of revenue.   
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coordinated distribution of grants and tax burdens related to the equali-
zation for the municipalities could take place. 
Greenland has a proportionate tax system as opposed to the Danish State 
progressive state tax system. However, when the tax-free bottom bracket in 
the proportional system is increased, there is a certain progression in taxation 
that ensures partial compensation for lower income groups. This is explained 
by the magnitude of incomes – the more earned kroner the tax-free deduc-
tion is distributed over, the less deduction per each marginal earned krone is 
achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax Breaks
500000 
400000 
Figure 1. Tax breaks without proportional stretches85  
(Left blue columns are the old final tax, and right red columns are the new) 
 
The argument for an increase in taxation is that the economically “strong” 
citizens have an income big enough to provide themselves with all neces-
sary goods and services – including durable goods. Additionally, these 
citizens also have a lot more for savings, other wealth creation and luxury 
consumption. From marginal earned Kroner, they can pay more to cover 
costs related to the reforms of uniform pricing. The difference between the 
old and the new final tax is illustrated in figure 1. This shows that the dif-
                                                        
85 A proportional stretch refers to a progressive system with several tax percentages of the in-
come liable for taxing. Several stretches for instance two divide the diagram in to say the first 8 
brackets with a lower percentage and the last 8 with a higher. In this case the final tax paid for the last 
krone would increase even more, when compared to the old final tax. Moreover, if a progression was 
implemented as a part of the reform in 2004, this would have raised revenues even more than seen in 
figure 1. Comparing to the first brackets, the last brackets increase would be relative higher than in 
the figure and the trend takes a steeper partial linearity for the second 8 brackets.  
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ference in change between the old and the new final tax in 2005 is modest. 
The figure consists of 18 income examples at 50.000 kr. intervals -starting 
with the lowest annual income of 150.000 kr. and ending with an annual 
income of 1.000.000 kroner. The figure is solely illustrative. The 
Greenland tax system is relative simple, when compared to the Danish 
system, so hypothetical calculations can easily be made. The figure only 
illustrates personal incomes and not household incomes. Households with 
double incomes have doubled deductions. The crucial question is: how 
much (ceteris paribus) does households incomes improve or deteriorate, 
when exposed to price increases relating to the reforms and price increases 
on fluid fuels that are due to changes at the world market? Are the tax 
breaks enough to compensate?  
One should recall Social compensations not regulated after the incep-
tion of the reform. The lack of regulations in this sense adds further dete-
rioration to living conditions. Subsidies to rents for low-income families, 
that safeguard their purchasing power on other essential goods and ser-
vices, do not cover expenses to utilities.  
The first bracket in figure 1 shows the final tax for an annual income of 
150.000 kr, the second for 200.000 kr., the third 250.000 kr. and so on. Im-
mediately it is evident that for the lower brackets, few see actual tax breaks 
after the tax reform. Mostly, the final tax paid increases. The tax breaks are 
mainly for the two first brackets, and they are already negligible for the sec-
ond bracket. Going in to further detail (with income brackets at 10.000 kr. 
intervals), we get a more detailed picture as seen in table 2. 
Table 2. Tax breaks for different incomes 
Gross Income Old Final Tax New Final Tax Tax Break 
140.000  42.228 39.928 2.300  
150.000  46.368 44.268 2.100  
160.000  50.508 48.608 1.900 
170.000  54.648 52.948 1.700 
180.000  58.788 57.288 1.500 
190.000  62.928 61.628 1.300 
200.000  67.068 65.968 1.100 
210.000  71.208 70.308   900 
220.000  75.348 74.648   700 
230.000  79.488 78.988   500 
240.000  83.628 83.328   300 
250.000  85.698 85.498   200 
260.000  87.768 87.668   100 
270.000  91.908 92.008  -100 
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Table two’s detailed calculations give a clearer picture. Incomes from the 
140.000 kr. bracket will take the greatest advantage of the reforms. The 
Workers who make the annual minimum wage for as organized worker in 
the Greenland trade unions (SIK) fall into this category. An annual income 
between 260.000 kr. and 270.000 kr. does not constitute an advantage. In 
2005, this income level (at fixed working hours) would then be some 125 
to 130 kr. per hour. Going below the 140.000 kr. – the gains from the re-
forms would be even higher for incomes taxable after the deductions. I will 
include examples of this in the coming calculations on household incomes. 
Here with the examples, it suffices to say, that the issue is whether the 
gains from the reforms give net gains or net losses, when including in-
creased expenses due to the price increases on utilities.  
6.4. Energy consumption in the settlements 
Incomes in the settlements are either based on fishermen and hunters with 
very low monetary incomes, which are then supplemented with harvesting 
for own consumption, or on sole wage earners often the wives of fishermen 
or hunters. Moreover, there is a third household category on social transfer 
incomes in at least half a year, where a person is entitled to help. 
It is an open question, whether calculations on heating consumption in 
the settlement households have ever been made. The Greenland settlement 
statistics contains uncertainties related to problems with the data compila-
tions. Basic statistics are difficult to work with. Hence, estimates are neces-
sarily based on the capacity of typical primitive heating technologies used in 
the settlements. Housing is based on small households, where heating is for 
one to two ship stoves that cook or melt ice. This is evident from table 3, 
from which we can see that more than 90% of the housing are family houses 
with an average housing area of approximately 87 square meters.  
Other local information for the North Greenland outskirt districts (in 
and above the old Uummannaq Municipality) indicate that very little hous-
ing that was build before 2001 is larger than the 69 square meters. This 
type of house is characteristic of the “Illorput House”. This house type is a 
standard house for “self-builders” – easy to build and obtainable with sup-
port from the Home Rule government.  
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I have added some estimates on the consumption of energy and water in 
table 4 below, where different calculation examples are provided on the 
basis of different housing areas. It should be emphasized here, that the 
examples cannot be taken as representative for all households. Like in 
earlier drafts from the Home Rule administration, such a representative 
study still remains to be seen. 
The table follows an assumption of one room per person in larger 
houses. This holds statistically true, but not in practice, because there are 
many cases of larger houses being occupied by singles, couples, or a single 
parent with children. There are however, smaller houses being occupied 
with many people, so that one person per room is impossible. Despite this, 
small-scale housing statistics on occupied rooms in the inter-municipality 
statistics (from Statistics Greenland for 2004) show, that there is approxi-
mately one room available per inhabitant in the settlements. In other 
words, the housing areas are very small, yet they can be divided in several 
rooms (bathroom and kitchen being excluded). This tells us that the density 
of housing in relation to the area of the house can be high, but one does not 
in all cases see several people occupying the same room. 
Table 3: Types of housing in Greenland Settlements in 1998 
N=3.372 % Average Area 
1-2 family houses 93.8 87.3 
Row houses 4.3 76.9 
Housing with floors 0.5 64.5 
Other types 1.4 41.2 
Kilde: Statistics Greenland, 2006. 
 
From the available statistics, it is not possible to determine the specifics of 
individual households within the settlements. In 2004 the number of 
houses in the settlements was at 3430 units with an average unit (bath 
room, kitchen and outer walls) being 56 square meters. The counting of 
inhabited rooms despite the size was 10.327 rooms or 1.1 rooms per in-
habitant. On average there were 2.8 inhabitants per housing unit, which 
corresponds with the assumption of one available room per person.  
Table 4 has included water consumption per household, assuming each 
household has an individually countable consumption. Often water is 
fetched from common tap houses, and this of course raises the question, 
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whether estimated consumption rates from the suppliers are correct, and 
whether water is a free good in the settlements. 
Regarding heating, in northern Greenland only a few older houses built 
by the Greenland Technical Organization (GTO) are heated by petroleum. 
Houses build in the period 1978–2000 had mostly 69 square meters area. 
Later, smaller housing dimensions became the norm. Now if we take the 
North Greenland districts as our point of departure, most of the houses are 
heated with gasoil (diesel). As such we will in the following, exclude petro-
leum as a heating source – assuming that this gives a pretty good picture of 
the conditions in Greenland settlements in general.86  
Table 4. Size of housing with energy and water consumption per house in  
settlements in 2004 
Rooms Houses areaa  El Per House: 
Water 
Heat 
Houses/ship stoves:   Kwh m3 Litres 
1 846b 40 2000c 120 1742d 
2 165 40 2000e 120 1742d 
3 1039 50 2500f 200 3485g 
4 653 69 2500f 275 3485g 
5 329 75 3000 300  
6 49 85 3250 340  
7 6 100 5000 340  
Houses heated with 
oil fired boilers 
    Consumption 
1 -    - 
2 -    - 
3 -    - 
4 216    2904 
5 109    2904 
6 6    2904 
7 2    2904
 
a estimated Mean  
b for amount of rooms not reported (25 houses) estimated   
 by the frequency distribution of the remaining houses.  
c occupied by a single  
d House with one Stove  
e occupied by a couple without children  
f occupied by a couple with children  
g House with two stoves  
 
                                                        
86 E-mails from Niels Mønsted, Uummannaaq municipality and from Olafur Nielsen, Home 
Rule Dept. for Housing and Infra structure, Juli 2006 
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This is partially confirmed by other data related to the consumption of gas 
and petroleum used in small scale fishing and hunting activities and heat 
garnished by petroleum stoves. I have worked with KNI Inc’s data on 
budgeted consumption quantities of gasoil (diesel), petroleum and regular 
gas both in total consumption rates and for each settlement. The figure for 
total consumption of all settlements shows, that the use of petroleum was 
22% of the consumption of gasoil. This confirms that North Greenland 
settlements to a certain degree represent the rest of the country. The reason 
why petroleum is in less demand is due to the use of ship stoves, which 
require the same fuel as ship engines. These engines run on gasoil (diesel). 
Additionally, some stoves function less efficiently on petroleum, because 
they are built for a thicker fluid.  
Taking the Housing Statistics as our point of departure (the settlement 
statistics), one can estimate a distribution on housing areas, rooms and 
members of the household as suggested in table 4. The estimated quantities 
of electricity and water follow model calculations delivered by the supplier 
of electricity and water “Nukissiorfiit”. This company also delivers heating 
in towns, but in the settlements neither central heating services nor district-
heating services are provided.  
Decisive for the estimates is the amount of persons per household. None-
theless it can be assumed, that large oscillations in the consumption of heat-
ing do not take place. Often the small houses need the same amount of heat-
ing. This is because many heating systems are without regulation technolo-
gies that would automatically bring temperatures down in warmer periods. 
Instead, many houses often maintain a constant high temperature, adjusted to 
cold periods. The consumption related to washing, cooking, electronic de-
vices etc. is probably the same, whether one or two people occupy a house.  
An estimated 10% of the settlement houses have fuel oil burners (the 
North Greenland number). In the following it is assumed, that these are 
distributed over larger households with the same weight as in the total 
count. In the case of oil burners and water borne systems, considerable 
savings can be realized. According to some settlement residents, it is pos-
sible to halve consumption by introducing this technology. 
A part of the heat generated by ship stoves disappears up through the 
chimney, and in addition, they are difficult to regulate downward without 
the flame fading out. Typically then, more heat than necessary is con-
sumed. A Danish company delivers ship stoves to heat vessels and settle-
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ment houses. Taking company data as our point of departure, it is possible 
to estimate settlement household consumption of heating. In table 4 an 
estimate is made on how the households could heat the dwelling area using 
either one or two stoves. The oldest households in the settlements had two 
stoves of the same type as the company delivers typically a 66MK stove.87 
The medium type of house, built from approximately 1985 to 1990, was 
suited with two to three smaller 66MK stoves. The construction of these 
houses did not include the issue of, whether future residents wanted to use 
an electric stove or a gas stove in the kitchen. This foregone choice is not 
included in the computations. The newest “do it yourself” “Illorput” house 
is delivered with two newer types of stoves (the 67MS ship stoves), which 
include a hot water tank and three to four radiators. Typically only one of 
the stoves is in use at a time, and we integrate this assumption in the calcu-
lations, while data on smaller households are assumed to have two 66MK 
stoves running.  
On the basis of technical data, the volume of consumption of gasoil is es-
timated as indicated in Table 4 for the two types of stoves and for the house-
holds with fuel oil burners and a water-borne heating system. The Danish 
company delivering to summer houses and ships in Denmark denotes a 
minimum and a maximum of oil per. hour consumption, where we use the 
maximum consumption. The use of the maximum consumption is rational-
ized by the fact, that the warming of a summerhouse in Denmark can hardly 
be compared with the warming of the settlement houses in the Arctic using 
the same stove. For a 66MK oven, the maximum consumption is disclosed to 
be 0.3 per liter pr. hour with a space heating at maximum of 23 cubic meters 
with insulation. A 67MS stove on the other hand, it is set to be 1 liter per 
hour with a minimal space heating without insulation at 62 cubic meters and 
at 103 cubic meters with insulation. 
The table contains some inaccuracies because an “educated guess” im-
mediately infer, that larger buildings with more than two stoves is unlikely 
to occur, because it would be very expensive to heat, when you calculate 
the yields the stoves can provide. Cubic measurements can be estimated on 
the basis of building code requirements for 2.1 meters from floor to ceiling 
– the “illorput” houses are 2.3 m. from floor to the ceiling inside. A mean 
of the height of a settlement house could then be 2.2 cubic meters. 88 
                                                        
87 This is not a general technical conceptualization but a company number for the product 
88 E-mail from Egil Borchersen, Center for Arktisk teknologi. 
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Nevertheless with such figures in mind, the estimate in table 4 is low, 
when 66MK stoves are used. If an ideal situation occurs regarding the 
heating of small un-insulated houses, the 67 MS is probably the stove the 
“rational consumer” uses. This is because, it at least in an un-insulated 
house (under Danish conditions), can heat 62 cubic meters. Even if there is 
insulation, a stove (based on Danish figures) can barely heat up the house. 
If a house that is 40–69 square meters, uses a 67 MS stove, the heating 
economy is better even when un-insulated (again Danish figures). It is not 
enough to have one stove turned on, while under extreme cold conditions. 
Whichever of the two stoves are used, we estimate the same consumption – 
one 66Mk stove can barely heat the little house with a consumption of 
1742 liters even if the house is isolated, and a 67 MS can if the house is 
un-insulated or better isolated. 
Results differ, if a water-born heating system and a fuel oil burner is in-
stalled. In table 4 we assume, that if all larger houses are heated using this 
technique, expenditures can be reduced with 50%. 
After calculating a 24 hours period of consumption and assuming that 
heating is regulated with the same temperature as indicated above, we can 
estimate an eight month heating season, or a consumption of 242 days as 
demonstrated in table 4.  
The maximal estimate for the stoves deviates quite a lot from estimates 
based on local knowledge. For the 66MK stove the consumption rate for 
24 hours is not more than 7.2 liters, while for the 67MS, it is 24 liters. 
Local estimates without looking into types of stoves, suggest a 24 hours 
consumption of some 12 – 18 liters. The median and mean is here 15 liters 
per 24 hours, and thereby represents a consumption rate, that is double the 
max value for the 66MK, which was given by the company. Hence, alter-
native calculations based on local knowledge yields another and more 
costly results. The annual consumption is then 4095 liters for the ship stove 
and 2048 for the fuel oil burner. 
6.5. Different estimates on the consumption of utilities and 
water in the settlements. 
Price increases have already occurred due to the reform on uniform prices 
and due to increases in world market prices. The estimated consumption is 
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based on historical data. While we may predict future developments based 
on those, we cannot predict it accurately, if recent changes are as volatile as 
seen with changes with oil prices. One problem here is the elasticity of de-
mand – it is possible to make a prediction for water consumption, but we do 
not have sufficient data for other utilities.89 In the following, the elasticity is 
not analyzed. 
From the data we have, we can establish an average household with 
three members living in a house of 56 m2 with three rooms. The male is 
assumed to be a hunter and fisherman, the woman a wage earner or re-
ceiver of social transfers and the child is 14 years old. According to a re-
port on the Greenland Hunters trade, it is often the case, that a family’s 
earnings follows this pattern with the woman’s income being relatively 
fixed and the man’s based on hunting and fishing – is quite oscillating 
(Rasmussen, 2004). 
The data in table 5 and 6 is based on price information on utilities from 
the energy company Nukissiorfiit, while other prices on gasoil, petroleum 
and fuel stems from data obtained from the KNI inc.. The consumption of 
electricity and water is based on model calculations done by Nukissiorfiit. 
The consumption of gas oil assumes a household using two stoves, and the 
consumption of petroleum and fuel is based on KNI estimates of hunters” 
activities, when out camping and hunting in smaller boats. 
Depending on the method of heating calculation, it is possible to com-
pute a price index with 2004 as the basic year. In table 6, a detailed compu-
tation pattern is presented by first using the data on the consumption of gas 
oil with two 66MK stoves.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
89 Oil in Greenland is bought as futures securing a fixed price for a period. Nonetheless, the 
volatility is still there after the period has expired. In the case of oil and electricity our database 
was not sufficient. And the price increases due to the reform also created an abrupt time series. 
90 Calculations performed in 2005. 
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Table 5. Consumption of utilities and water for an average family in an outskirt 
settlement in North Greenland in 2005 – house 56 m3, 3 persons in the household. 
The Households  Quantity Unit price Expenditure 
Consumption of Electricity and water:    
Consumption of electricity 2800 2.84 7952.00 kr. 
Consumption of water 224 26.64 5967.36 kr. 
Consumption of Gas oil:    
(2 66MK’s) 3485 3.81 13277.85 kr. 
Consumption of petroleum 514 3.91 2009.74 kr. 
Consumption of Fuel 1199 3.86 4628.14 kr. 
Alternative Heating:    
Gas oil (1 ovn 67MS)* 1742 3.81 6638.54 kr. 
Fuel Oil Burner 2904 3.81 3319.27 kr. 
Local Knowledge:    
Gas Oil  3630 3.81 13830.00 kr. 
Fuel Oil Burner 1815 3.81 6915.15 kr. 
* A stove with a maximal heating effect of 103 insulated m3 is assumed.  
 
Using a Laspeyres index, we assume fixed quantities and variable prices. 
Consequently, table 6 tells us, how much an average household in 2005 
and 2006 should have paid, if the quantities consumed remained un-
changed at the 2004 level.  
Table 6. Calculation of a Laspeyre Price index House 56 m3, 3 persons in the 
household.* 
 2004 2005 2006 
Electricity  6328  7532  7952 
Water  4843  5551  5967 
Gas oil  8469 12093 13278 
Petroleum  1347  1835  2010 
Fuel  3441  3741  4628 
Total expenditures (66MK): 24427 30751 33835 
Index (66MK) 100 126 139 
Index other heating tehniques, other 
expenditures unchanged: 
   
67MS 100 122 135 
Fuel oil burner 100 118 129 
* Inaccuracies due to rounding 
 
The other indices follow the same procedure using table 5’s calculations. 
The cost saving heating techniques gives the households lower expendi-
tures. The increase in heating expenditures shows a variance between 29 
and 36 percentage points in table 6 using expenditures calculations for 3 
years. The average annual growth in expenditures is approximately 16%, 
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while the expenditures relative to 2004 increases with 39% for the calcula-
tions based on the 66MK stove.  
The results of the calculations do not match the Statistic Greenland’s 
consumer price index entirely. Usually, the GS index uses the initial year 
in determining the fixed amount, while the index used in table 6 takes an 
end-year as its point of departure due to lack of data. GS uses 1995 as the 
starting year. In addition, the GS index includes both towns and settle-
ments, including cities receiving price cuts as a result of the reform on 
uniform prices. The most recent detailed price index from GS includes 
entries on electricity, liquid fuels and heating. As far as Nukissiorfiit tariffs 
systems of heat are maintained in cities, it is hardly price discrimination, 
which unilaterally materializes. It is not, that the four “competitive cities” 
get lower prices than other cities, villages and remote districts – rather it is 
an increase in world market oil prices materializing. 
The January prices in GS’s CPI show that since 2004, there has been an 
average annual increase of 10%, while the figures for liquid fuels alone 
indicates an annual average increase of 22%. The development from Janu-
ary 2004 to 2006 showed an increase from index 106.1 to 128.8 for total 
energy consumption, and for liquid fuels alone – from 112,3 to 166.6. Ac-
cordingly, considerable price increases in this area are partly due to the 
reform of uniform pricing and partly due to the fact that world market de-
velopments may have worsened the purchasing power for settlement 
households. This could perhaps be equalized by the tax breaks. We will 
look into that below. 
It is often said, that a Laspeyre index illustrates the “most stupid con-
sumer in the world”, because he neither is influenced by price increases 
nor will he substitute expensive goods with cheaper goods. Nonetheless, 
electricity, water, gas oil, petroleum and fuel have limited substitution 
possibilities, since they are necessities for living in settlements. Due to this 
the demand is inelastic. What happens in reality is that families substitutes 
food items with non-food items, when prices on utilities, gas oil, petroleum 
and fuel increase.91 This also means, that country food substitutes imported 
food items.  
                                                        
91 The Home Rule Owned and Operated retail chain KNI Pilersuisoq Inc. supplying the set-
tlements and some towns has experienced these patterns of consumption in the settlement stores. 
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6.6. Do the tax breaks equalize the price increases?  
We will not use the model prices, that earlier were presented in the Home 
Rule government and Nukissiorfiits report on the development in prices 
from 2005 – 09.92 Development has already deemed these figures some-
what unrealistic, even though they still lie within a small margin of error. 
In short, the assumption was that charges in settlements and smaller towns 
could increase cumulatively with 50% within the whole period, or maxi-
mum with 10% per year. In the four competition towns of Qaqortoq, Nuuk, 
Sisimiut and Ilulissat the idea was that an immediate price decrease of 50% 
should take place.93  
These percentages should be put in relation to the costs, because the aim 
is to implement so-called “real cost prices”. Using the actual prices instead 
of model prices raises the question of, whether price increases are due to 
planning or exogenous factors related to price increases stemming from the 
world market? I will not get in to details here, but it should be mentioned as 
a “rule of thumb”, that if the oil price in Greenland increases by 10%, the 
price of electricity increases by 9% per Kwh.. Price increases due to fluctua-
tions in the $ exchange rate can be dealt with by buying dollar futures, which 
is done by the KNI Pilersuisoq Inc.. The development in world market prices 
represents the same. The insecure factor these days is the oscillating prices 
and the question of, whether oil prices will remain high. If they do, it may 
mean, that in coming years, buying of futures leads to, that our average set-
tlement family’s purchasing power will diminish further. 
In table 7 our point of departure is an average income increase of 2%, 
which is close to the development of minimum wages at the Greenland 
labor-market. The 2% does not in all cases reflect the true picture. Some 
trades see higher wage increases than others. This raises the question, 
whether the prices on country food follows the development in minimum 
wages. The modest increases in table 7 are due to the 2% that is distributed 
over the goods and services in the CPI from Statistics Greenland. Fuel and 
energy only represent a minor weight in the Greenland CPI. Hence, the 
income in table 7 is adjusted upwards with this weight under the assump-
                                                        
92 The Home Rule proposal for the transition and equalization of the uniform price system for 
power, water and heat. 
93 This has never been implemented due to unexpected price increases on imported oil. 
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tion, that price changes on remaining goods and services also are to be 
covered by the 2% average increase with the same weight as in the CPI. 
Table 7. Average household of three in a 56 m2 house with two 66MK stoves – 
purchase power changesa 
 2004 2005 2006* 
Household income 263.000 263.526 264.053 
End tax 69.305 64.026 64.255 
Disposable income 193.695 199.500 199.798 
 
I. Annual change  5.805 298 
Expenditures: Energy, Water and fuel    
Electricity 6.328 7.532 7.952 
Water 4.843 5.551 5.967 
Gas oil 8.469 12.093 13.278 
Petroleum 1.347 1.835 2.010 
Benzin 3.441 3.741 4.628 
Total 24.427 30.752 33.835 
 
II. Annual Change  6.324 3.084 
Annual change in purchasing power (2 66 MK ovne) I-II  -520 -2.785 
* Danish Kroner. Calculated using price cataloque from Nukissiorfiit no. 12. January 2006 
(roundings are made) 
 
With the new deductions built into the tax reforms, and despite an increase 
in the tax rate, it is illustrated that the tax relief almost offsets the expendi-
ture increase the first year. After this, it is followed by a moderate growth 
in income in the following year. The net added expenditures for the house-
hold are the difference between the annual change in the disposable in-
come and household expenditures on energy and water. The first year 
shows a modest net additional cost for the household of 520 kr., while the 
second year shows a stronger negative development. The household’s dis-
posable income is reduced this year by 2,785 kroner, or 232 kroner per 
month. It is apparent, that if the reforms to uniform prices are implemented 
as planned, there will be a sustained additional squeeze on the budgets of 
the settlement households for the years after 2006.  
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6.7. Computing different cases of households 2005–09 
Using the income relations in the settlements as our point of departure, we 
can roughly estimate household incomes in this way: 
 
 A single fisherman or hunter with or without income from fishing and 
hunting lives in a 40 square meter house. 
 A single woman with one child, on welfare, lives in a 40 square meter 
house. 
 A hunter’s family where the husband is self-employed and the wife is a 
wage earner lives in a 69 square meter house with a child.  
 A hunter’s family where the husband is self-employed and the woman 
depends on welfare lives in a 69 square meter house with a child.  
 A worker’s family lives in a 69 square meter house with two children.  
 A family of 4 children lives in a 69 square meter house. 
 
Table 8 below finalizes the calculations with examples of different house-
hold’s disposable amounts after tax breaks and price increases.  
The heating calculation here is based on one 67MS stove or 1742 liters 
of gas oil per household. This time our estimate includes the whole reform 
period of 2005 – 09, which is the time horizon for gradual increases in 
charges towards a 50% cumulative increase in utilities in 2009. 
Additionally, the households have expenditures on gasoil, petroleum and 
fuel, where a conservative estimate of 2% increases are added annually. 
These are also added to the model prices on electricity – every time oil in-
creases with 3 Danish øre per liter, electricity increases by 1 øre. As is again 
showed, the tax reform has had the intended effect the first year with respect 
to offsetting the planned rate increases. The households got a net tax relief.94 
But the following years the disposable amount is impaired with some 2000 
to 3000 Danish kroner after tax. Each of the following years with the pro-
jected increases in the price of electricity and fuel represents a further dete-
rioration of household’s welfare on top of the already computed ones 
 
 
                                                        
94 The hunter living below what normally would be considered a poverty line is however 
struck severely. His annual income is some 40.000 to 50.000 kroner. 
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If the tendency with price hikes on oil since 2005 remains at a high 
steady level, our estimated increase of 2% is much too cautious. The ex-
penditures for households in settlements will become even higher! 
Table 8: Calculated disposable income effects 2005–2009 for an array of households 
in settlements 
 Annual Change, disposable income (Danish Kroner): 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Hunter  -2879 -2077 -985 -602 - 582 
Mother (1 child) 4938 -2068 -976 - 593 - 573 
Hunter and wageearner, no kids 3428 -2166 -1188 - 721 - 709 
Family both Wageearners, 2 kids      
Hunter and woman on welfare, 2 kids      
Hunter and wageearner, 4 kids 1946 -2348 -1451 -1010 -1028 
(Lowest energy consumption of gas oil – one ship stove of the 67 MS type) 
 
Table 9 shows that the portion of disposable income going towards utilities 
is increasing. This means a fall in total revenues in KNI Pilersuisoq’s set-
tlement stores, because households substitute food for non-food items.95  
The cost of electricity, fuel and water in Table 9 represents an ever-
increasing proportion of disposable income after taxes. It is especially the 
poorest of households that will lose purchasing power in the settlement 
store. The loss of purchasing power may again be expected to lead to the 
substitution of “non-food” items with “food” items, because a hunter al-
ways has necessary operating expenses, to cover his own “business”. 
Table 9. Energy and water expenditures share of total disposable incomes for an 
array of settlements households 
 Share per year (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Hunter  32.8 39.9 44.1 46.2 47.5 48.8 
Mother on Welfare, one kid 22.5 24.8 27.5 28.8 29.6 30.4 
Hunter and wage-earner, no kids 11.8 13.9 15.3 16.1 16.7 17.2 
Wage-earner family, two kids  9.2 10.9 12.1 12.8 13.3 13.8 
Hunter and woman on welfare, two kids 15.8 18.2 20.0 21.2 22.0 22.8 
Hunter and Wage-earner, four kids 13.0 15.2 16.7 17.8 18.4 19.1 
                                                        
95 This should be seen in the context of another of the partial reforms the cuts in the service 
contracts between KNI Pilersuisoq Inc. and the Home Rule Government regarding servicing the 
settlements with goods and services. The gist of the matter here is that the liberalization may hit 
the stores supply, and hence we have yet another deterioration of living conditions in settlements 
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6.8. The Uniform Price Report of 1997 
There is no doubt that for some households, the tax reform will fail to cap-
ture the price and tariff increases of the kind, we have just counted on. In 
addition, there is a bill for the other parts of the overall reform presented in 
Table 1 above. Settlement household’s purchasing power will decrease if 
not compensated in some way for the spending increases. We still, how-
ever, need a more accurate picture of how many households in the “losing 
cities” and the settlements are impacted by the combined reforms as well 
as by increases in the price of oil.96 
In 1997, the association of private businessmen in Greenland and the 
“Siumut-Atassut” Home Rule Government coalition reviewed the uniform 
price system and proposed two alternatives (FANG report, 1997).97 The aim 
of reform was then, partly based on commercial stability, and partly based on 
a solidarity principle, which was taken out of the “Siumut-IA” Home Rule 
coalition government’s final proposal for reforms of utility prices in 2005. In 
1997 the solidarity principle was interpreted in two ways: 
 
 Unconditioned solidarity, which means that no group fares worse, than 
it is now.  
 Social solidarity, which means that no low-income group fares worse 
than it is now. 
 
It was recommended, that the social solidarity principle should be pursued, 
so that the total cost of financing the elimination of cross subsidies on 
freight, telecommunications, retail prices, energy and water, and air traffic 
was financed by a general tax increase across Greenland. 
An increase in the Home Rule Government tax of 4% was recom-
mended, which in 1997, should have been enough to cover cross subsidies 
of 135 million kr. or in 2003 prices approximately equal to 220 million kr.. 
To the extent that there would be savings options on public budgets, this 
could help to lower the marginal tax rate. The group behind the report did 
not move beyond, what the Home Rule Government did in 2005. It is now 
                                                        
96 dividing in “winner” and “looser” towns refers to the towns experiencing price decreases 
and vise versa. 
97 FANG is an abbreviation for “Foreningen af private næringsdrivende i Grønland” (The As-
sociation for Private Businessmen in Greenland). 
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however the common municipal tax, that increases with fewer percentage 
points and not the Home Rule Government tax. This is very surprising 
because the coalition in 2005 was a “centre-left wing government”, while 
the authors to the FANG report were a Danish supply side professor and a 
neo-liberal CEO from the Greenland Bank. 
Probably inspired by economic reforms in China, the element of soli-
darity translated into a zoning of the Greenland economy, henceforth con-
sisted of a so-called free zone, and a normal zone. In terms of distributive 
impacts, the “Pareto-efficiency” jargon was translated into the rule that no 
group in the free zone should be made better off, while at the same time, 
groups in the normal zone should be made worse off. It was at this point, 
that the Home Rule government’s final proposal on uniform price reforms 
differed from the early report in 1997. 
The report suggested that in relation to free municipal zones:  
“On this basis (proposal for liberalization, GW) we propose a compensation 
system for the current uniform price system taking the form of a zoning of the 
economy. The basis for zoning is to seek liberalization, where it will lead to 
economic benefits. In the areas where it is expected that deregulation would 
have significant adverse effects, we suggest a preservation of the current uni-
form pricing system taking the form of maximum pricing. Hence, a breakdown 
in 2 zones – in the free zone a liberalization is implemented, while the rest of 
the country maintains a uniform pricing system” 
 
And later regarding the price level in the normal zone, it was clearly stated 
(page 14): 
“In the normal zone services are delivered to the current price level, and thus 
the social compensation system is preserved for this zone, while at the same 
time this zone is protected from the adverse effects of liberalization (my em-
phasis, GW)” 
 
The uniform price committee in 1997 acknowledged that an introduction of 
a pure market economy could not be implemented across Greenland (page 
14). It was noted, that there are geographical locations with a limited mar-
ket basis that could not underpin a realization of business gains. This could 
cause distortions in the form of extremely high prices or a range of services 
that would disappear! 
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The free zone should include the four so-called “competitive cities” 
Qaqortoq, Nuuk, Sisimiut and Ilulissat, while the remainder of Greenland 
could volunteer to join the free zone if the local municipal council wished. 
By introducing “cost based” prices in the free zone, future incentives could 
mean the establishment of new businesses and the strengthening of exist-
ing businesses competing in the import and export business. Eventually 
real wages in the free zone should rise, which would attract workers. 
Economies of scale in the free zone could then be realized. 
Two financial solutions were discussed in this connection. The first, the 
self-finance model could imply, that it would be taxpayers in the free zone, 
which finance the removal of the uniform price system. This would mean 
that taxpayers in the rest of the country would not be affected by the impo-
sition of the zone model. A differentiated national tax could finance the 
reform. To counteract settlements in the free zone being hit, a solidarity 
fund was proposed, whose purpose was to re-compensate all settlements in 
Greenland for charge increases and tax increases. 
The second model was the mutual funding model based on the idea that 
all incomes in Greenland through a general tax increase would pay for the 
removal of cross-subsidization. It was in this context that it was recom-
mended that low-income groups should be compensated through the estab-
lishment of a solidarity fund. 
Whatever model, it should be said, that the initial presentation of the 
report and its proposals were socially balanced, while at the same time, 
there was a process of liberalization beginning. This could be effective, 
given that “flex price problems” and monopoly problems related to “fixed 
pricing” or “price hiking” could be solved. The original paper in 1997 
would not lead to additional “net bills” to be paid by some families in 
“looser towns” and in settlements outside competitive towns. This would 
probably require the opposite of the neo-liberal philosophy regarding de-
regulation and “cost based” pricing, that took place with the actual imple-
mentation of the reform on utility pricing.  
 
 
 
 
 The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008 146 
References 
Arbejdsgruppe: FANG og det grønland-
ske landsstyre: Rapport til landsstyret 
vedrørende reform af ensprissystemet, 
(unpublished) Nuuk 1998. 
KNI, årsrapporter. 
Landsstyreys forslag til overgangs- og 
udligningsordning for at omlægge 
ensprissystemet for el, vand og varme.  
Nukissiorfiit, Årsberetning 2003 og 
2004  
Nukissiorffits prisblade Politisk-
økonomisk beretning (2004) (upubli-
ceret) Økonomidirektoratet Grønlands 
hjemmestyre,  
Rasmussen, Rasmus Ole (2005), Analy-
se af fangererhvervet I Grønland 
(upubliceret). Grønlands Hjemmesty-
re – Direktoratet for Fangst og Fiskeri 
og NORS – Nordatlantiske Regional-
studier, Roskilde Universitetscenter. 
Rasmussen, Rasmus Ole and Petersen, 
Carsten: Fiskeres og fangeres ind-
komster i bygderne er alarmerende 
lave, Atuagagdliutit, 16–18, 20–22. 
Rasmussen, Rasmus Ole and Petersen, 
Carsten, Det skæve Grønland, Ser-
mitsiaq 47 (8), 38–41 
Statistics Greenland: Bygdestatistik, 
2003: 1 
Statistics Greenland: Tværkommunal 
statistik, Bygdestatistik, 2004:3. 
Statistics Greenland: Energiforbruget i 
1999, Energistatistik, 2003: 1. 
www.refleks_olieovne.dk: Refleks – et 
verdensnavn i olieovne 
 
 
7. The transnational capitalist class and 
the mini-Keiretzu system in Iceland98 
 
Ivar Jonsson99 
For the last twenty years, globalization as an economic policy has pre-
dominated the political discourse in most countries of the world. The 
worldwide globalization lobby is strong, and one gets the feeling that a 
fundamental change is taking place in the world economy and that a new 
base for worldwide prosperity is being born. This picture does not seem to 
reflect reality. International economic activity has increased in rather lim-
ited areas in terms of branches of industry and geography (L. Weiss 1998 
and I. Jonsson 2006). However, the social and political impact of this in-
creased trans-nationalization is relatively much greater than the changes in 
the economic base. In this paper we will discuss the case of Iceland. The 
discussion is to be considered as the first part of a research project that 
observes how the relative mismatch in the development of the economy 
and socio-political structures appear in the emergence of a new transna-
tional capitalist class (TNCC) with roots in Iceland. The rise of the new 
TNCC has not only undermined the balance of power between class frac-
tions and power blocs, but emerges as well in new forms of lifestyle within 
the emerging leisure class.  
The final part of the research project will discuss the impact of the socio-
economic structural change on social and environmental policy during recent 
years. The main aim of this paper is to discuss the growth of the transna-
                                                        
98 This article was finished in December 2007, before the international economic crisis set in. 
99 Professor, the Bifrost Business School, Iceland and former associate professor at “Ilisi-
matusarfik” (The University of Greenland).  
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tional sector in the economy of Iceland and describe the main features of the 
analysis that will follow in later parts of this research project. 
7.1. Introduction 
In the ideal world of capitalism as presented by Adam Smith in his book 
The Wealth of Nations, published more than 200 years ago, there is no 
space for economic or political privileges, or exploitation by any minority 
group within society. Impersonal transactions in perfectly competitive 
markets by free, and totally independent or “sovereign” individuals, hin-
ders the concentration of wealth and power. As a consequence equality, 
law and order in society are secured. This happy state of society has never 
existed as there is neither an “invincible hand” nor a mechanism that se-
cures optimal use of resources and optimal level of production through the 
transactions of “self loving” and competing individuals. More importantly 
for our discussion, it is even more unlikely that such a state of happiness 
will exist in very small economies (I. Jonsson 1995). Small economies 
suffer from greater problems of oligopoly and monopoly than larger 
economies, and as a consequence the underlying trend towards undemo-
cratic governance and oligarchy is strong. Micro-economies like the Ice-
landic economy suffer from structural strains due to its small size, oligop-
oly and oligarchic trends. In recent years this situation has in many ways 
been intensified by intensive trans-nationalization of companies in the 
retailing, financial and transport sectors. Hitherto unknown levels of con-
centration and centralization of capital and wealth has created a new trans-
national class that threatens not only democracy and sovereignty of indi-
vidual citizens, but also entrepreneurship and endogenous sources of eco-
nomic growth.  
The core of the matter may be summarized along these lines:  
 
a) Following privatization of the state bank sector in Iceland in the 1990s, a 
kind of mini-keiretzu system developed in which three privatized banks 
became the core and base of the growth of three closely knitted webs of 
related companies in the retailing and transport sectors.100 These com-
                                                        
100 Keiretzu, refers to families or networks that manage Japanese corporations 
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panies and the banks built their strong financial position on oligopol
stricken markets, which they use to exploit Icelandic consumers in order 
to collect oligopoly-rents on which they base their investment abroad in 
their original branches of industry. Having accumulated substantial in-
vestments abroad, they have a capital base and securities large enough to 
have foreign banks finance their further investments on top of loans 
from the Icelandic banks and shares bought by pension funds in the Ice-
landic companies. This strategy enables the companies to overcome the 
shortcomings of the small home market, and create new sources of capi-
tal accumulation.  
y 
                                                       
b) Icelandic consumers finance their consumption by loans from the oli-
gopoly mini-keiretzu banks. As a consequence, indebtedness of the 
Icelandic population has increased tremendously along the road, so 
that Iceland is now the most indebted nation in the world.  
c) Since the 1990s, the governments have deregulated the financial market 
and helped outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)101. OFDI leads to 
a spiral of depreciation of the local money (the Icelandic krona); it leads 
to increasing inflation due to increasing prices of imported goods and 
increasing wages as a response to inflation. Moreover, it leads to de-
creasing investment in domestic industries as profit margins are ex-
pected to lower due to higher wages and real costs of production. The 
government has responded to this scenario with a strategy, that has in-
creased demand for the krona. The government allowed the building of 
one of Europe’s largest hydropower plants (Karahnjukavirkjun) in order 
to foster large increase in inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) in the 
aluminum industry by transnational companies. In addition, Icelandic 
bonds have been issued in European financial markets that have ap-
pealed to foreign investors due to their high interest rate. These bonds 
have stimulated considerable demand for kronas. However, in the long 
run this strategy is problematic, as the krona is vulnerable to the conse-
quences of speculation and shifting mood in international bond markets. 
As the nominal exchange rate of the krona has tended to fall after con-
struction periods in the hydropower and aluminum plant sectors, the 
central bank had to increase the interest rate level to prevent inflation 
from rising. The level of interest rates in Iceland is now more than dou-
 
101 Usually called “outward offensive” or “Viking offensive” by the transnational capitalist class. 
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ble the rate than in the other Nordic countries. Higher interest rates un-
dermine the profitability of investment in domestic production and in-
dustries. The result is creeping stagnation in the local economy. 
d) The class system has transformed over the last 15 years, from a rela-
tively homogeneous class system into a polarized class system – in 
which the social cleavage between the transnational capitalist class and 
the traditional capitalist class is deepening alongside the increasing po-
larization between wage earners and the capitalist classes. 
e) We will now discuss the development highlighted above in more detail 
and start with analyzing the transformation of the economic base of the 
class system in Iceland. 
7.2. The transformation of the transnational sector in Iceland 
The process of globalization and de-regulation in the world economy has 
changed the conditions of class formation in many countries. This develop-
ment has led to an increase in a group of people that has been called “the 
transnational capitalist class”. Globalization is set about by forces such as 
mass media, corporations, global economic forces, institutions, structural 
policies and global marketing (L. Sklair 2001: 2). These forces or structures 
and networks are realized by active strategies and actions of individuals, who 
belong to an emerging new “transnational capitalist class” that 
“…pursues people and resources all over the world in its insatiable desire for 
private profit and eternal accumulation. This new class is … composed of cor-
porate executives, globalizing bureaucrats and politicians, globalizing profes-
sionals, and consumerist elites.” (L. Sklair 2001: 4).  
 
It is through consumerism, that globalization is legitimized and repro-
duced. This is an ideology, that presumes that the meaning and value of 
our lives are to be found principally in what we possess, which can never 
be totally satisfied with our possessions (a feeling that is constantly created 
by ever-changing fashion and style). This ideology also assumes, that the 
goods and services we consume are best provided by the free market 
driven by profit maximization (ibid: 6). 
As we will discuss below, Icelandic companies that have become trans-
national in recent years have grown extremely fast. As a consequence, a 
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new transnational class appears to have emerged and grown fast. The fig-
ure below highlights our framework to analyze the development of the 
class system in Iceland since the 1970s. 
As the framework highlights, the TNCC1 has emerged as a new actor in 
Icelandic society and has passed other classes in terms of income and eco-
nomic power. This new class distinguishes itself from the other two frac-
tions of the TNCC with reference to income and economic power. By eco-
nomic power, we refer to power within companies and their number of 
employees, relations between companies regarding investment and inter-
locking directorship and influences on economic policy formation of go-
vernments. 
As a consequence, TNCC1 has gained a hegemonic position in the Ice-
landic society. The different categories of classes presented in the figure 
refer to:  
The transnational capitalist class: fraction I = main owners of shares in 
international companies with roots in Iceland (TNCC1); fraction II = ma-
nagers of TNCs’ plants located in Iceland (TNCC2); fraction III = mana-
gers of governmental bodies and state apparatuses that work on building 
the infrastructure of transnational capital accumulation and legitimize it 
ideologically (TNCC3). 
The domestic capitalist class (DCC) is constituted by class fractions 
such as: the domestically based classes of wholesalers and retailers and 
fishing capitalists as well as the small group of manufacturing capitalists 
(DCC1); Another fraction of DCC refers to managers of governmental 
bodies and state apparatuses, that work on building the infrastructure of 
domestic capital accumulation and legitimize it ideologically (DCC2). 
The state and stakeholders bureaucratic class (SSBC) consists of mana-
gers of ministries and institutions within the spheres of the welfare state, 
the judicial system and foreign affairs. Furthermore, this includes em-
ployees of interest groups who concentrate on societal distribution of in-
come and life chances.  
The wage earning classes (WEC) consists of scientists, specialists, skil-
led and unskilled labor, that work in jobs that are not part of societal power 
centers in which social policy formation takes place. Following the pro-
jects on building the hydropower plant, Karahnjukavirkjun, in East-
Iceland, the building of new aluminum plant there and enlarging aluminum 
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plants in West Iceland, a large number of foreign workers have been hired 
by TNCs like Impreglio and Bechtel. 
As a consequence to this increase in numbers, foreign workers have be-
come a much larger group within the WEC than ever before. As the social 
conditions experienced by these workers are much worse than workers of 
Icelandic nationality, the WEC is arguably split into WEC1 (workers of 
Icelandic nationality) and WEC2 (foreign workers). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The transformation of the class system in Iceland since the 1990s 
7.2.1. The growth of the transnational sector in Iceland 
The growth of the transnational sector indicates that the transnational capital-
ist class in Iceland has grown in recent years. This is particularly true in 
terms of the new TNCC1. We will now focus on the growth of this sector in 
reference to the scale of production and number of employees. We will first 
highlight the transnational sector of inward direct investment and then ob-
serve the new transnational sector of outward direct investment 
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7.2.2. The transnational sector of inward direct investment 
The bulk of inward foreign direct investment is in the aluminum and ferro-
silicon industry. In recent years investment in this sector has increased fast, 
and so has its production. This development appears clearly in the export 
statistics as the structure of export has changed rapidly in recent years. Fish 
and other marine products accounted for 51% of merchandise exports and 
34% of total exports in 2006. This figure was 82% and 60% respectively in 
1991. Led by aluminum melting and medical and pharmaceutical products, 
exports of manufactured goods have been growing rapidly in importance and 
accounted for 38% of merchandise exports in 2006. The export of services 
has also soared, as the economy becomes increasingly service-oriented. Ser-
vices now account for almost 35% of total export revenues while in 1990 the 
share was 26% (Central Bank of Iceland 2007). 
Table 1. Foreign direct investment position, by type of investment 
Inward investment1 Total 
Year Equity Intra-company loans  
1989 7,886 -1,259 6,627 
1990 7,418 710 8,129 
1991 5,864 3,335 9,199 
1992 5,652 2,225 7,877 
1993 5,880 2,620 8,500 
1994 6,610 2,045 8,655 
1995 7,448 972 8,419 
1996 7,719 5,616 13,335 
1997 14,364 9,882 24,246 
1998 24,006 8,297 32,303 
1999 25,062 9,598 34,660 
2000 33,177 8,959 42,136 
2001 62,872 7,780 70,652 
2002 56,116 8,176 64,292 
2003 61,670 23,040 84,709 
2004 94,152 33,293 127,445 
2004 236,853 59,697 296,550 
2005 413,078 125,329 538,407 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland 2007 
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Investments by TNCs in the electricity intensive sector of aluminum pro-
duction have increased, following the strategy to build the new mega hy-
dropower plant, Karahjukavirkjun. The large-scale investment projects in 
the aluminum and power sectors launched in 1997 are nearing completion. 
When these projects are completed in 2009, the total production capacity 
of aluminum melters in Iceland will be 800 thousand tonnes per year (tpy), 
up from 270 thousand tpy in 2005.  
Power capacity needs to be stepped up by 80% to supply them with suf-
ficient energy. The long-term impact of these investments will increase the 
share of aluminum in total merchandise exports so there will increase from 
20% in 2005 to roughly 40% in 2009 (ibid.). 
Table 2. Direct investment from abroad: Inflows by industrial sector 
(Millions of kronur) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 10.839 4.958 13.463 16.912 7.987 24.475 51.704 194.062 271.764
Metal and mechanical products 1.709 567 -74 409 1.773 1.071 20.258 41.168 64.934
Financial activities 3.268 -255 559 2.473 686 -771 93 146.898 162.206
Source: Central Bank of Iceland 
 
Inward direct foreign investment has increased fast in recent years. This is 
particularly true concerning 2005 and 2006 as can be seen from table 1. 
It is interesting to note that the main source of inward foreign invest-
ment in equities has not been the TNCs of the aluminum industry, but in-
vestors in the financial sector. As appears in the following table 2 (see 
Appendix 1 below for more details). 
The development highlighted above has strengthened the power position of 
the TNCC2 – particularly in terms of regional policy formation as the TNCs in 
the aluminum sector are effective in creating jobs over short periods. 
7.2.3. The new transnational sector of outward direct investment 
Liberalization of cross-border capital movements has resulted in profound 
change in the composition of residents” financial asset portfolios. Before 
full liberalization in 1995, residents owned only approximately €156 mil-
lion (13 b. kr) in foreign securities. By the end of 2006, this figure had 
increased to €12.7 billion (1,200 b.kr), or the equivalent of 105% of Ice-
land’s GDP. In 1995, Iceland’s outward investment stock was equivalent 
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to approximately 14.5% of GDP. Eleven years later, in 2006, it had risen 
more than twenty-six-fold to 396% (Central Bank of Iceland 2007). 
Figure 3 and 4 below show, that there was a turning point in 2004 as 
outward foreign investment increased from around 4 billion Euros in 2003 
to over 23 billion Euros in 2006. The main reason for this shift was the 
privatization of former state banks and the deregulation of financial mar-
kets. International acquisitions and internal growth led to tenfold the 
growth of the banks” turnover between 2000 and 2006 as acquisitions and 
internal growth led to tenfold the growth of the banks” turnover between 
2000 and 2006. 
The three commercial banks have subsidiaries and branch offices in e.g. 
the UK, USA, Scandinavia and continental Europe (Central Bank of Ice-
land 2007). Figure 5 below highlights the development of the bank system 
since 1990. 
The transformation of the bank system and the de-regulation of the 
economy have had considerable impact on the class system in Iceland. The 
trans-nationalization of the banks and the retailing sector has created a new 
group of wealthy people, who have the bulk of their income stemming 
from investments abroad. 
This development is the main reason for the polarization of Icelandic 
society with foreign workers on the low end of the spectrum and the new 
transnational class on the top end. We shall now observe the base of this 
new class in terms of the companies they own. 
7.2.4. The size of the new transnational sector of companies leading the 
outward foreign direct investment  
The rise of the new TNCC1 in Iceland raises the question: Who are they, 
and where do they come from? The TNCC1 comes from the main compa-
nies in the financial and retail sectors, but some companies in other sectors 
have also trans-nationalized fast in recent years102. It is worth keeping in 
mind when looking at the figures below, that the population of Iceland was 
304.334 in 2006 and the labor force was counted at 174.600 people. The 
GDP in 2006 was 1.162 billion ISK, or around 9,3 billion GBP. The GNP 
of Iceland in 2006 amounted 1.076 billion ISK or around 8,6 billion GBP. 
                                                        
102 Information on the companies was collected from their respective annually reports and 
homepages during October to December 2007.  
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Figure 3. Outward direct foreign investments (% of GDP in different countries). 
Source: Central bank of Iceland, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Outward foreign direct investments and portfolio capital owned abroad by 
residents (at year end) 1998 – 2006. 
Source: Central bank of Iceland, 2007 
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7.3. The structure of the transnational sector 
The sectors, where the transnational companies operate are the financial 
sector, the fishing and food sector, the retail and real estate sector, pharma-
ceutical products and sea freight.  
7.3.1. The financial sector: 
 Kaupthing Bank (Total assets 42,9 billion GBP in 2006 and operating 
income 1,4 billion GBP, 2700 employees of which 1100 in Iceland) 
 Landsbankinn (Total assets 16,4 billion GBP, net operating revenue 0,7 
billion GBP. Number of employees 2313 in 2006 of which 61% in 
Iceland, 19% in UK and Ireland, 19% in Continental Europe and 1% in 
USA) 
 Straumur-Burdaras (investment bank) (total assets 6,9 million EUR, net 
operating income 2006: 0,3 billion GBP, number of employees around 
450 of which 112 are located in Iceland and 187 in Finland) 
 Glitnir (net operating income 2006: 0,5 billion GBP) 
 Pension funds (have wide range of investments in the companies in the 
transnational sector as well as foreign companies) 
 Norvik (3000 employees worldwide in retailing of foods, furniture, 
sportswear and timber processing plants as well as owning banks in 
Latvia and Russia. By 2004, Norvik was Iceland’s tenth largest 
company with a total turnover of over 221 million GBP). 
7.3.2. Fishing and food sector: 
 Samherji (Operating revenues was around 0,19 billion GBP in 2006 
Owns enterprises in Iceland, Faroe Islands, Germany, Poland, U.K and 
Canary Islands) 
 Bakkavör (20000 employees in 8 countries, 55 factories, turnover 1 
billion GBP in 2006). 
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Figure 5. The Development of the bank System of Iceland. 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland 2007 
7.3.5. Retailing and real estate: 
 Baugur Group (75000 employees, 3000 stores worldwide, turnover 9,8 
billion GBP. Baugur Group owns 27% in 365 the largest media 
company in Iceland) 
7.3.6. Other sectors 
 Actavis (pharmaceutical – Tunrover in 2006 around 2,1 billion GBP 
with approximately 11000 employees in 40 countries, 500 in Iceland) 
 Eimskip (sea freight) (Total assets 0,9 billion GBP and 0,5 billion GBP 
in operating revenues in 2006, 9500 employees of which 8500 work 
abroad in 13 countries) 
 Samskip (sea freight) (Total assets 0,06 billion GBP and 0,17 billion 
GBP turnover in 2004. In 2006 the company had around 1400 
employees in 14 countries) 
 FL-Group (Total assets 2,1 billion GBP in 2006 and investment income 
around 0,34 billion GBP. Among shares in companies that FL-Group 
The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008  159 
had shares in 2006 are the Icelandic bank Glitnir. (30.4%), AMR 
Corporation.(6,0%), Finnair Oyj (22.4%), Royal Unibrew. (24.4%), 
Bang & Olufsen (10.4%) and Aktiv Kapital (13.3%). 
7.4. Analyzing class relations – where to go from here 
The discussion above is but a part of a larger research project. The main 
object of the research to follow will be on the economic, political and so-
cial relations of the new transnational capitalist class in Iceland. Hence, the 
emphasis will be on the concentration as well as the centralization of capi-
tal in the Icelandic economy. The development of concentration of capital 
will be approached in terms of market shares of main companies in the 
different branches of industry that will be analyzed. Concerning centraliza-
tion of capital, the focus will be on the interlocking directorship (see I. 
Jonsson and F. Jonsson 1992 and J. Scott and Griff 1985) in terms of man-
agers that are also board members of the companies within the transna-
tional sector. Furthermore, interlocking shareholding will be analyzed in 
terms of intra- and inter-company ownership of shares.  
As for political relations, the relations of the companies in the transna-
tional sector and their managers with ties to political parties, interest 
groups and media will be observed and analyzed in terms being the “inner 
circle” of the transnational capitalist class (M. Useem 1984 and F. Jonsson 
and I. Jonsson 1992).  
Concerning social relations of the TNCC, the polarization of Icelandic 
society will be analyzed both in terms of income distribution and the Gini-
index, as well as in terms of life-style patterns, and in particular, regarding 
“leisure-class” behavior) cf. T. Veblen (2007) and M. Weber’s (1974) 
concept of “status”. 
Finally, the transformation of the Icelandic socio-economy and the role 
of the new transnational capitalist class will be analyzed in terms of the 
emerging “absentee capitalism” (I. Jonsson 2006). A development of this 
sort would presume, that the new transnational class would in that case 
move the headquarters of companies to the metropoles of the richest de-
veloped countries, and direct their companies around the globe from there. 
As a consequence, the new transnational capitalist class of Iceland would 
live abroad. 
 The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008 160 
References 
Central Bank of Iceland (2007) The 
Economy of Iceland, Reykjavik: 
Central Bank of Iceland  
Jonsson, I. (1995) West-Nordic Coun-
tries in Crisis, Copenhagen: Copen-
hagen Business School. 
Jonsson, I. (2006) “From Colonialism 
to Institutional Dependency” in Re-
thinking Nordic Colonialism, Hel-
sinki: NIFCA. 
http://www.rethinking-nordic-
colonialism.org/files/pdf/ACT1/ 
ESSAYS/Jonsson.pdf  
Jonsson, F. and Jonsson, I. (1992) Innri 
hringurinn og íslensk fyrirtæki, 
Reykjavik: Social and Economic Re-
search Institute of Iceland. 
http://www.bifrost.is/Files/Skra_000
8125.pdf  
Scott, J. and Griff, C. (1985) Directors 
of Industry, Cambridge: Polity. 
Sklair, L. (2001) The Transnational 
Capitalist Class, London: Blackwell. 
Useem, M. (1984) The Inner Circle; 
Large Corporations and the Rise of 
Business Political Activity in the US 
and UK, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Veblen, T. (2007) The Theory of the 
Leisure Class, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Weber, M. (1974) From Max Weber, 
H.H. Gerth og C.W. Mills (ritstj.), 
London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.. We-
ber, M.  
Weiss, L. (1998) The Myth of the 
Powerless State, New York: Cornell 
University Pres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008  161 
Appendix 
Direct investment from abroad: Inflows by industrial sector (Millions of kronur) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total 10,899 4,958 13,463 16,912 7,987 25,475 51,704 194,062 271,764 
Agriculture & fishing -21 55 3 -21 -4 3 1 1 1 
Mining & guarrying of which: 165 1 23 62 -140 -8 -3 -5 -6 
Extraction of pretrolieum  
and gas 
- - - - - - - - - 
Manufacturing  
of which: 
1,764 2,801 11,458 1,317 5,287 5,137 25,294 43,420 85,107 
Food products -46 2,344 1,173 -1,927 423 553 475 1,082 16,566 
Textile and wood activities -8 - -2 - - - - - - 
Petroleum, chemical, rubber 
and plastic products 
100 -110 4,004 2,592 1,056 3,380 2,992 2,654 3,462 
Metal and mechanical 
products 
1,700 567 -74 409 1,773 1,071 20,258 41,168 64,934 
Office machinery, com-
puters, medie, tv and com-
munication equipments 
- - 6,355 243 2,036 133 1,570 1,484 145 
Vehicles and other transport  
equipment 
- - - - - - - - - 
Electricity, gas & water - - - - - - - - - 
Construction 529 535 165 1,808 43 -16 112 194 237 
Trade & repairs 2,176 705 1,103 -162 6,093 -6,665 276 21 5,100 
Hotel & restaurants - - -4 -1 154 13 31 1 -16 
Transport & communication 
of which: 
-33 -294 126 19 1,054 -1,095 -3,089 2,995 1,638 
Land, sea and air transport 131 -138 -151 -22 2,372 -1,043 2,036 1,241 3,215 
Telecommunications -164 -156 276 41 -1,918 -52 -5,125 1,754 -1,576 
Financial activities of which: 3,268 -255 559 2,473 686 -771 93 146,989 162,206 
Monetary industries - - - - - - - - - 
Other financial intermedia-
tion of which: 
3,268 -255 559 202 655 -771 93 146,898 162,206 
Financial holding  
companies, Insurance & 
activities auxiliary to in-
surance 
- - - 2,272 30 - - - - 
Other financial intermedia-
tion and insurance activi-
ties, software, research, 
management holding etc. 
of which: 
2,874 1,292 6 12,826 -5,234 28,963 28,117 620 17,527 
Real estate - - - - - - - - - 
Other services 119 118 23 -1,108 47 -85 873 -83 -30 
Central Bank of Iceland, Statistics & IT. July 16, 2007 
 
 
 
8. Local implications of housing 
reforms in the northern regions of 
Russia 
 
Lyudmila Zalkind103 
One of the major recent developing reorganizations taking place in the 
Russian economy has been a reform of the housing sector. This is impor-
tant, given that changes in the housing sphere have marked influences on 
the macroeconomic situation as a whole – since expenditures in connection 
with housing are responsible for considerable proportions of both the fed-
eral and the regional budgets. At the same time, the construction of new 
houses is considered to be one of the main ways to stimulate economic 
growth.  
8.1. Outline of the housing reforms 
The Russian housing reform began in the middle of 1990s just as many of 
the other more recent reforms in Russia. The main goals and tasks of these 
reforms were formulated in the legislation “Principles of Federal Housing 
Policy” (1992) and within the acts: Federal Program “Dwelling” (1993), and 
the Concepts of Housing Reform in the Russian Federation (1997).  
 
 
                                                        
103 Associate professor at the Dept. of Social Sciences of the North Institute for Economic 
Studies, the Kola Science Center, Apatity, Russia. 
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The goals of the reforms included:  
 
 Establishing a free market for houses.  
 Improvement of housing quality. 
 Improvement of housing services. 
 
The reduction to budget expenditures for communal and housing services – 
through the establishment of a market for housing – aimed at increasing the 
housing quality, improving housing services, as well as providing an over-
all reduction of federal and regional budget expenditures. In order to 
achieve the reform’s goals, four major policy measures were planned:  
 
 The privatization of dwellings.  
 The de-monopolization of the communal and housing services market 
through a liberalization of both the demand and supply. 
 Changing the state subsidiary policy in two ways 1) A gradual 
reduction of state subsidies for housing and communal services, and 2) 
A transition from subsidizing municipal communal services to 
subsidizing low-income people 
 A rise of prices for communal and housing services aiming at 
increasing the attractiveness of this type of business 
8.2. Changes of housing ownership and management  
The federal government was interested in a fast privatization of housing. In 
the Soviet period, all multi-dwelling buildings were state or municipal 
property. Hence, the object of property ownership was only buildings con-
sidered to be units with single dwellings. In 1991 however, the new Law of 
Dwelling Privatization was adopted, and special state agencies were estab-
lished throughout the country. Property rights to individual dwellings were 
given to the tenants without payment, and the tenants only paid the costs of 
issuing the documents of ownership – showing that the dwellings had be-
come their private property. But after the private sector appeared in house-
holds with individual objects of property, tenement-houses also began to 
be split up. Flats became legal units, with economic and legal liability. 
Still, even if there was no ownership but only usu fruct rights to flats dur-
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ing the Soviet Period, the rights of usu fructus also encompassed other 
rights such as104:  
 
 Rent support helping to realize income entitlements. 
 Registration of grand children that enabled inheritance rights. 
 Flat exchange options, including pro forma marriages.  
 The registration of relatives, enabling the realization of other rights. 
 
In many ways, the rights up till the late 1980s were more or less informal 
interests, which could be seen as a legal framework defined through a com-
mon property perspective. This however gave way for the Law of Dwelling 
privatization through on one hand the legalization of actual regulations en-
couraged by a decrease in transaction costs, and on the other hand through 
the definition of a new set of legal relationships and property rights.  
According to the law, flats in multi-dwelling buildings could be property 
of different owners. These owners at the same time, received additional 
property rights or so-called “common property of the multi-dwelling build-
ing”, which included such things as the walls, the roof, sanitation system, 
land, etc. The common property became a joint ownership of all dwelling 
owners in a specific building encompassing also the corresponding mainte-
nance responsibility. Hence, privatization of dwelling entails serious conse-
quences for the tenants. There are consequences not only through the dis-
posal rights of the flat, but also through the possibilities for disposal of adja-
cent land and the responsibility for the maintenance of the building.  
Passing property rights to the current tenants therefore included the transi-
tion of management responsibilities. Before the change, a special municipal 
company conducted management of the house. Now, according to the Housing 
Code (2004), the responsibility of the housing management had been turned 
over to an assembly of dwelling owners. This new organization was supposed 
to elect one out of three possible forms of management schemes: 
 
 A direct management by the dwelling owners.  
 An association of dwelling owners, a housing co-operative, or another 
form of a consumers’ co-operative. 
 A private or municipal management company. 
                                                        
104 Under Onore’s classifications of rights (Kapelyushnikov, 1990).  
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Every dwelling owner of a specific house should be officially informed of, 
when an assembly is held (date, time, place, agenda). An assembly is le-
gitimate, when more than 50% of the dwelling owners of the house are in 
attendance.  
According to the Housing Code, all dwelling owners are required to 
participate in the management and assembly of the house. If an assembly is 
not convened, or if there is no quorum, the municipality appoints a man-
agement company to be responsible for the management of the house. 
8.3. Description of housing in the Northern Region  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the social development of the Russian North was 
given the special attention of the State. Most of the housing was built 
during this time with standard designs of central Russia. But the quality 
of the houses and the housing design did not meet the requirements de-
termined by the northern conditions, e.g. due to limited insulation and 
thus limited heat-retaining (Gavrilova, 2002). At the same time a large 
number of the houses were built as temporary buildings and even as 
camps. Accordingly, northern regions today are on average characterized 
by a level of depreciation higher than 50%. In some northern territories 
the level is even more critical and is as high as 70%. This situation im-
plies that actual expenses for major repairs do not provide funding for the 
rebuilding of housing. Similarly, the depreciation of heating and sanitary 
system is higher than 60%105. The share of ramshackle and hazardous 
housing is responsible for more than 10% of the available housing in 
Koryakia, Sakha-Yakutia and Taimyr. These dangerous forms of housing 
in other northern regions contribute with shares between 3% and 9%. 
(Russian Regions, 2005) 
In all northern regions (except Evenkia), the share of housing service ex-
penses in household expenditure is higher than the average level in Russia 
(Russian Regions, 2006). In the northern region, the cost of housing service 
is 5–6 times higher than in central parts of Russia. Among the explanations 
of these differences are for example the higher levels of transport cost, as –
                                                        
105 See for example, Committee for Northern and Aboriginal Affairs (2006). 
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ell as the costs of building materials and other commodity costs, which are at 
a considerably higher level than the Russian norm.  
8.4. Building new houses in the North 
Until 1991, the volume of construction of houses in all northern regions per 
person was higher than the Russian average. The dynamics of the construc-
tion are presented in table 1 below. During the 1990s however, there was an 
economic recession in Russia, which led to a reduced construction activity in 
all Russian regions. A construction boom was experienced in the beginning 
of 2000, but this was not the case for all northern regions. 
The Northern regions may be divided into two groups. The first group in-
cludes 5 regions, where the volume of new construction has turned out to be 
rather close to the Russian average. These are the so-called “oil regions” 
which include the Khanty-Mansi, the Yamalo-Nenets, and the Nenets 
Autonomus Okrugs (AO). The group also includes the Sakha-Yakutia Re-
public, which is the main gold and diamond mine region in Russia, as well 
as Chukotka, which in 2002-2005, also demonstrated a high rate of construc-
tion growth. The growth started with the arrival of a new governor, the oli-
garch R. Abramovich. In 2006, however, the Chuckchee boom was reversed 
into a recession. This change may partly be explained by governor’s loosing 
interest in the “Chukotka project”106. However, the main part of housing for 
newcomers had already been built when this happened.  
The second group includes 8 northern regions, which have demon-
strated a low level of new construction. During 2000–2006 the volume of 
construction of new housing was as low as 4% compared to 50% of at 
Russian average. For instance the volume of construction has been zero 
since 1998 in Koryakia. In 2006 an earthquake destroyed three settlements. 
The federal government decided to subsidize house building for tenants in 
these settlements, so in 2006–2007, new houses were built as substitutes 
for the destroyed ones (Kolch, 2007). In spite of the fact that Evenkia is an 
oil region, the level of construction was generally low. There was however, 
a short increase caused by the involvement of SC “NK Yukos” in socio-
economic development of Evenkia in 2003. 
                                                        
106 According to NES agencies, in 2006 Governor R/Abramovich submitted an application for 
resignation and was not fired.  
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Table 1. Residential building commissioning, square metres per 1,000 persons 
 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Kvanty-Mansi AO 663 569 257 488 475 400 479 394 509 
Yamalo-Nenets AO 976 398 195 235 356 247 288 320 467 
Sakha-Yakutia 665 629 258 374 264 276 252 275 304 
Nenets AO 445 250 297 291 116 227 198 776 182 
Chukotka AO 595 71 17 181 244 389 493 475 131 
Evenkia AO 494 400 56 113 114 400 172 231 135 
Komi 537 346 252 113 147 159 142 161 182 
Karelia 450 234 86 108 96 119 135 126 158 
Arkhangelsk oblast 423 138 57 74 80 71 80 91 151 
Magadan oblast 505 79 31 37 17 39 23 52 82 
Taimyr AO 492 71 52 128 0 175 0 3 0 
Koryakia AO 796 171 0 0 0 0 0 0 434 
Russian Federation 417 277 225 227 247 267 307 326 390 
8.5. Privatization and housing management 
The share of privatized dwellings reached a level of 50% by the beginning 
of 2000. This percentage has now reached 77% in Russia. The level in 
northern regions is indicated below in table 2. The difference to the general 
level in Russia is due to various reasons.  
In the case of the Murmansk region there are some restricted military 
towns, and in general, people employed by the military are not interested in 
privatization since the employment is time-limited and characterized by 
temporary residence. Hence, the level of dwelling privatization is very low 
in these towns.  
The Koryakia, Chukotka and Evenkia regions, where the low level of 
privatization is connected to a lack of demand for dwellings, represent 
another case. However, as a whole, it is difficult to give an unambiguous 
evaluation due to the slow increase in dwelling privatization in the North. 
A higher level of temporary housing such as could explain this illustrated 
by the case of the Murmansk region. Another explanation may be found in 
the low incomes of people in northern regions, as well as in the negative 
expectations of socio-economic development of the territories. 
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8.6. Housing reforms – The inhabitants” opinion  
A case study on the public evaluation of the consequences of the housing 
reform was conducted in the town of Apatity, in the Murmansk region in 
2006. It was a special survey that involved the participation of 500 house-
holds.107  
An overall estimation of the housing reform suggests that in spite of a 
general negative attitude to any reform, people’s opinion turned out to be 
both positive and negative. Table 3 shows the results of answers to the 
question: “What do you expect for yourself and your family in relation to 
the housing reform?”  
The answers were more or less divided in half – a group of 37% show-
ing optimism and another group of 41% being pessimists. The ratio relates 
to the people’s expectations and is reflective of two different groups of 
evaluations.  
Table 2. Level of dwelling privatization, % of housind 
 1999 (%) 2001 (%) 2003 (%) 2005 (%) 
Korvakia AO 33,0 34,0 31,6 35,5 
Chukotka AO 23,5 27,0 27,9 29,7 
Magadan oblast 42,2 47,0 50,5 54,4 
Sakha-Yakutia 53,0 61,0 66,1 68,0 
Taimyr AO 38,2 40,0 44,6 51,2 
Evenkia AO 25,0 35,0 33,1 36,6 
Yamalo-Nenets AO 34,2 45,0 51,8 57,8 
Khanty-Mansi AO 40,0 51,0 53,7 66,5 
Komi 36,0 52,0 55,6 54,4 
Nenets AO 43,5 52,0 55,0 53,6 
Arkhangelsk oblast 42,0 49,0 52,9 61,3 
Murmansk oblast 45,4 48,0 54,0 62,2 
Karelia 48,7 42,0 47,5 54,3 
Russian Federation 58,1 64,0 68,3 73,7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
107 Universal set of the survey was population of an area of Apatity (size of universal set – 1616 
householders). Sample: size – 498 householders; random, step – 3; miscalculation =  4,5%.  
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The housing reform created expectations of improvements of housing ser-
vices, appearance of new forms of housing services, new options for par-
ticipation in house management, and a rise of security as illustrated in fig-
ure 1. Nevertheless, today’s results of the housing reform are far from what 
people expected. This is illustrated on the upper figure depicting the expec-
tations (yellow or light=”I hope for”, green or dark=”I fear”) and on the 
lower figure, regarding the evaluation of the outcome (yellow or light =”It 
happened; green or dark=”It did not happen”). The hopes were high re-
garding improvements, but it was accompanied by a fear of rise in prices. 
The outcome was disappointing regarding the improvements, while the 
only expectation fulfilled was the rise in prices! 
Table 3. Answers to the question: “What do you expect for yourself and your family 
in relation to the housing reform?” 
               Including 
 Total (%) Dwelling owners (%) Tenant (%) 
Only good 15,6 16,0 14,0 
More good, than bad 21,8 22,0 20,0 
More bad, than good 25,3 26,0 24,0 
Only bad 16,0 16,0 16,0 
Can not answer 17,4 17,0 18,0 
Other answers 3,9 2,8 6,9 
 
It is therefore not difficult to understand the pessimistic evaluations of the 
housing reform, where the results in many ways turned out to be opposite 
to the expectations. At the same time, an explanation for the optimism 
evident in table 3 may be in connection to preconcieved notions about the 
housing reform process in general. 
8.7. Dwelling privatization 
Most people (44%) reported that they privatized their flats “for their chil-
dren”. Some people (27%) wanted to move, which was easier after the 
privatization. It was generally a surprise, that as much as 17% of the peo-
ple perceived the privatization as “a good investment”. Other answers in-
cluded statements like “I want to have my own property”, “I want to be an  
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owner” or “property is better than nothing”. Among municipal tenants, 
there were people who wanted to privatize the dwellings, but were not able 
to do so for different reasons. Around 22% did not have the necessary 
money, while 20% did not have the time, and another 10% were afraid of 
high taxes. However, 50% of tenants thought, they should do it as a sav-
ings for their children, while a total of 24% of the tenants refused the 
dwelling privatization. As a consequence, around 80% of the population 
was interested in privatization. So in reality, both the state and the sampled 
respondents were in favor of the privatization. This enabled the state to 
carry out the process quite quickly. Consequently, in Apatity in the middle 
of 2007, as much as 73% of the dwellings were privatized! 
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 b) results
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Figure 1. A Comparison of the expectations and opininions of results. 
8.8. House management 
In this case study, we tested the awareness of the inhabitants regarding the 
different forms of housing management. In the questionnaire, the respon-
dents could choose more than one answer. The most known form of man-
agement was the dwellers” association, which included 36% of the re-
sponses. The second most common answer was the private company organi-
zation included 21% of the responses. The least common answer was the 
self-management type, which was indicated in only16% of the responses. 
Another question was related to the possibilities of changing the man-
agement form. About 18% of the respondents thought that it would be 
possible to organize the association in their house, while 30% thought that 
such a change would be impossible. In relation to a private management 
company, opinions were divided into three groups. The first group con-
sisted of 25%, who wanted to keep the municipal company, because they 
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were afraid of changes. The second group (34%), would have liked to have 
a private company, and higher quality of services at higher prices. The 
third group (21%), preferred a cheap private firm. 
The survey concludes, that among other things there may be a quite low 
information level and at the same time a rather high degree of opinion 
differentiation. Relevant housing legislation does not automatically include 
stimulus for a majority of the population in order to instigate changes in 
the housing sphere. The tenants, who may be ready for changes, are more 
or less hostages of a majority. Correspondingly, new forms of house man-
agement could be unclaimed in many cases, and hence municipal company 
management will be kept.  
8.9. Conclusion 
The housing reform seems to be among many reforms in Russia that are far 
from completion. Parts of the goals of the reform have been reached. A 
market for dwellings has been established and tenants have participated 
actively in dwelling privatization. The northern region is however, lagging 
behind the Russian average in both the rate of privatization and the volume 
of housing construction.  
Acquisition of property rights for many people is not associated with 
new rights and responsibilities. For a majority of people, dwelling privati-
zation may only be a possibility to devolve. On the whole, therefore, the 
housing reform may follow a direction, which is opposite to the inhabi-
tants” expectations. At the same time, people don’t think about themselves 
as being participants in the reform process, nor do they think they possess 
the ability to change the course of events.  
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9. Climate change and economic 
system impacts on self-sufficiency 
constraints and potentials – 
Perspectives from ecological 
economics108  
 
Iulie Aslaksen, Solveig Glomsrød and Anne Ingeborg Myhr109 
Arctic nature and societies are strongly impacted by climate change as well 
as global economic development. The impacts of Climate change are ex-
pected to change Arctic nature and livelihood far beyond what is observed 
now. The Arctic economy has considerable wealth in natural resources, 
from petroleum and minerals to fish and forests. Arctic nature provides 
resources for the world market and subsistence livelihoods for indigenous 
and local people. Hunting, fishing, herding and gathering still have large 
importance for providing food as well as maintaining social relations and 
cultural values. Research initiatives of Arctic Council, the Arctic Human 
Development Report (AHDR 2004) and the Arctic Climate Impact As-
sessment (ACIA 2005), have given important knowledge about Arctic 
societies and how they are impacted by climate change. The intertwined 
nature of the subsistence and market economies is characteristic for the 
                                                        
108 Financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is gratefully acknowl-
edged. We also thank Anne Skoglund and Marit Vågdal for excellent technical assistance, word 
processing and editing. 
109 Senior researcher, Dr. polit. Iulie Aslaksen, Statistics Norway, Senior researcher Solveig 
Glomsrød, Statistics Norway and Senior Researcher, Dr. Scient. Anne Ingeborg Myhr, Genøk/ 
Norwegian Institute of Gene Ecology, Science Park Tromsø, Norway. 
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Arctic societies, as described in the report from the ECONOR project 
(Glomsrød and Aslaksen (eds.) 2006). Climate change impacts and other 
environmental problems can dramatically affect the conditions for subsis-
tence activities and the well-being of the indigenous and local people. 
Knowledge about these changes is crucial for identifying conditions for 
economic, environmental and cultural sustainability and self-sufficiency in 
the Arctic, within the framework of the global economy.  
Given the substantial environmental uncertainties affecting the Arctic, 
the irreversibility of climate change impacts, and the complex ethical is-
sues involved, we argue that an economic valuation and risk management 
should be supplemented with other approaches. The value of Arctic nature 
should reflect its importance in subsistence production, biodiversity protec-
tion and ecosystem services. The ecological value of the Arctic is inter-
twined with the cultural values, and traditional ecological knowledge that 
is crucial for improving the information basis for sustainable development. 
The research area of ecological economics suggests broader approaches to 
environmental uncertainties, taking into account ethical values and con-
flicts of interest. In this paper, we discuss how perspectives from ecologi-
cal economics can be helpful in evaluating the uncertainties of climate 
change impacts and economic system impacts on nature and society in the 
Arctic. This perspective provides a framework for addressing conse-
quences for self-sufficiency constraints and potentials.  
9.1. Uncertainty, valuation and ecological economics 
The Arctic ecosystems and social systems are unique on a global scale and 
represent a valuable part of our common ecological and cultural world 
heritage. To develop precautionary strategies for sustainable development, 
interdisciplinary approaches are needed, including approaches based on 
ecological economics (Costanza 1989, 2001; Norgaard 1994; O’Neill 
1993, 1996, 2007). Ecological economics suggests broader evaluation 
methods are needed for assessing uncertainty and accommodating scien-
tific disagreements. This includes diverse perspectives on the value of 
nature, including stakeholder participation and deliberative processes. 
(Vatn 2005). In ecological economics, the focus on uncertainties in valua-
tion and complexities in ethics leads to a broader approach to environ-
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mental risk and value, with an increased focus on the process of knowledge 
generation and value assessment (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991, 1994). Tak-
ing into account potential harm to different stakeholders implies a wider 
context than what cost-benefit analysis includes. New institutions for par-
ticipatory processes are needed to strengthen dialogue between stake-
holders and secure the role of less powerful stakeholders. For example, 
cooperation between indigenous people across the Arctic represents an 
emerging institutional framework for a stronger voice.  
Ecological economics expands the perspectives of traditional mainstream 
economics in several respects: In traditional mainstream economics, nature is 
seen as a “good” similar to other (produced) goods, and there is no particular 
priority given to the valuation of nature in the sense that is the basis for life-
sustaining processes. This approach to valuation of nature presupposes that 
there is a trade-off between the value of nature and other values, values are 
supposed to be commensurable: a loss of nature is assumed to be compen-
sated by a gain in other values. Ecological economics, on the other hand, 
explicitly recognizes that nature is the basis for life, and that valuation of 
nature requires valuation methods beyond monetary valuation (O’Neill 
1996). Economy and ecology are derived from the same Greek word, oikos, 
meaning house, our home on planet Earth, and a wise economic household 
management must take into account the ecological limits of the Earth. Eco-
logical economics thus recognizes that the value of nature is a much more 
complex concept than what is suggested by the market-based value concepts 
of traditional economics. 
In traditional economics, the appropriate value concept from the view-
point of society is “opportunity cost”, suggesting that the value of preserv-
ing a particular quality of nature or culture should be weighed against the 
cost of another opportunity forgone, irrespective of the inherent qualities of 
nature. Ecological economics approaches the valuation of nature in terms 
of the qualities it expresses. O’Neill, Holland and Light (2007) argue for 
the spatio-temporal particularity of nature:  
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The history and the location of a particular place in nature matter, giving the 
place a particular quality. Nature qualities and the cultural values embedded in 
that particular nature must be understood and valued through their representa-
tion of a particular place at a particular time. The place and time where they be-
long gives nature and culture their distinct value, a value that cannot be re-
placed. The complexity of valuation of nature is compounded when the quali-
ties of nature are intertwined with cultural values.  
 
Standard economics emphasizes that the agents of society, companies and 
consumers, are subject to their economic interests as being the main moti-
vating force, irrespective of social, cultural and ecological context. Eco-
logical economics focuses on the potential of the economic agent to act on 
responsible self-interest. There are other accounts of rationality besides 
economic rationality:  
“Behaviour is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of appropriate delib-
eration” (Simon 1976).  
 
Expressive rationality characterizes actions as rational when they satisfac-
torily express rational evaluations of objects and persons:  
“Practical reason demands that one’s actions adequately express one’s rational 
attitudes towards the people and things one cares about” (Anderson 1993). 
 
In traditional economics, environmental problems are conceptualized as 
externalities, external to the responsibility of the economic decision-maker. 
Ecological economics draws attention to the assumptions underlying the 
notion of the “Economic man”. Spash (2002) refers to the institutional 
economist K.W. Kapp (1950) who criticized the concept of externality as not 
taking into account that “the pushing of damages onto others and avoiding 
the associated costs is to be expected as a normal and prevalent activity of 
the successful economic agent” (Kapp quoted in Spash 2002, p. 5).  
Economic valuation methods that only rely on quantitative valuations 
without taking into account the particular environmental qualities and un-
certainties, can appear as “blind” to the natural and cultural values that are 
difficult to measure. This apparent “blindness” may induce a criticism 
from other disciplines that questions the relevance of economic trade-off 
for valuation of environmental qualities. An alternative is to emphasize 
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that evaluation of environmental values and uncertainties should take place 
within a particular economic, ecological and social context (Aslaksen and 
Myhr 2007). Ecological economics focuses on a perspective of multiple 
stakeholders, each embedded in a social and cultural setting.  
Taking the specific ecological and social context into account provides 
a basis for precautionary approaches. Precautionary approaches require 
development of processes for acknowledging uncertainties, facilitation of 
stakeholder participation, recognition of ethical values, and accounting for 
the value of traditional ecological knowledge of Arctic indigenous people. 
Combining traditional and scientific knowledge about nature is an impor-
tant part of understanding the resilience capacity of ecological and social 
systems, and enhancing the potential for sustainable development and self-
sufficiency.  
The different perspectives of traditional economics and ecological eco-
nomics become more apparent in their approaches to climate change pol-
icy. For example, the approach to uncertainty within ecological economics 
involves a distinction between weak and strong uncertainties. Weak uncer-
tainty refers to the lack of knowledge about future events, which can be 
characterized in terms of risk and probabilities, given from observation 
(objective probabilities) or by expert advice (subjective probabilities). 
Strong uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge about the future, which 
involves ignorance. Future possible outcomes may be unknown in which 
case, attributing probabilities to unknown states may be meaningless.  
Other approaches other than standard methods of risk analysis are 
needed, involving stakeholder participation, ethical values and precaution-
ary perspectives. Moreover, the use of discounting to reduce future values 
raises ethical issues not dealt with in traditional economics. Analysis of 
regulatory approaches, such as tradable permits, uses market models that 
may not capture crucial aspects of the institutional, technological and po-
litical context. The essence of the economic argument is that the best ac-
tion can be determined by comparing consequences. A harmful action is 
justified by creating enough goods to compensate (Spash, 2002). 
Some of the differences between ecological economics and traditional 
economics, as discussed above, are briefly summarized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Perspectives from ecological economics on valuation of nature 
Topic Traditional economics Ecological economics 
Compare value of nature 
and other values 
Values are commensurable 
Nature has no particular 
priority over other goods 
Nature is the basis for life 
Valuation of nature requires methods 
beyond monetary valuation 
Ethics 
 
Nature and culture in 
context 
Externality 
Opportunity cost 
Value of nature and culture are 
intertwined 
Traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK) 
 
Relationship of humans 
and nature 
Instrumental value of nature Spatio-temporal particularity of 
nature 
 
Motivation Self-interest  Responsible self-interest 
 
Interests Aggregate interests Stakeholder interests 
 
Future Economic growth Sustainable development 
 
Uncertainty Risk management 
Probability assessment 
Weak uncertainty 
Precaution  
Case-by-case evaluation 
Strong uncertainty 
9.2. Traditional ecological knowledge 
In a broader approach to environmental uncertainty, a precautionary per-
spective recommends that traditional ecological knowledge is appropri-
ately acknowledged. Traditional ecological knowledge is defined as the 
knowledge, practice, and beliefs about dynamic relationships between 
living beings and the environment; a knowledge which has evolved in 
adaptive processes and been handed down from generation to generation 
(Berkes 1999, Ingold 2000, Selin 2003). In the Arctic, traditional ecologi-
cal knowledge about animal migrations, ice patterns, vegetation and 
weather is important in order to supplement and enrich scientific data on 
the impacts of climate change (ACIA 2005). The concept of resilience 
refers to the capacity of an ecosystem or social system to recover and re-
generate after harmful exposure to stress (Berkes, Colding and Folke 
2000). Combining traditional and scientific knowledge about ecology is 
considered an important part of understanding the resilience capacity of 
ecological and social systems, as well as identifying factors that can en-
hance it (Gadgil, Olsson, Berkes and Folke 2003). Traditional ecological 
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knowledge is embodied in practices and stories (narratives) that provide a 
systematic outline of the information relevant to particular habitats, ecosys-
tems and landscapes (Helander and Mustonen 2004).  
Reindeer herding is an example of how traditional ecological knowl-
edge is relevant for the adaptation to the impacts of climate change. The 
texture of snow and ice is an important determinant for reindeer in access-
ing food. In reindeer herding, “reading” nature is the ongoing process of 
observing and evaluating grazing pastures and weather conditions. The 
texture of snow and ice, wind directions, the sequence of changes in na-
ture, are all factors, which determine access to pastures and the behavior of 
the reindeer herd (Heikkilä 2006). This information can serve as a basis for 
improved perception of the impacts of climate change.  
Taking traditional ecological knowledge into account reminds us that 
there are multiple ways of knowing the world, and that the categories of 
knowledge may not be as well defined as suggested by modern science. 
Awareness of traditional ecological knowledge should encourage the devel-
opment of participatory, community-based resource management systems 
that allow diverse approaches to knowledge, practices and beliefs.  
9.3. The precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle has been suggested as an approach to handle 
situations with large environmental uncertainty and potentially irreversible 
consequences. The goal of the precautionary principle is to protect human 
beings and the environment against hazards, by avoiding damage before it 
takes place. The purpose of the precautionary principle is to provide guide-
lines for evaluating new technologies, new economic activities, or new 
public policies, in situations with strong uncertainty about environmental 
hazards. A report by UNESCO (2005) suggests the following definition: 
“When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is 
scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or 
diminish that harm.”  
Some economic activities in the Arctic pose considerable risk to the 
vulnerable nature. Petroleum exploration, mining, transportation, tourism 
and other activities have the potential to considerably alter the Arctic envi-
ronment (Ford et al. 2006). The challenge is to develop sustainable eco-
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nomic activities, like for example sustainable tourism that can ensure that 
new economic activity benefit indigenous and other local people (Du-
haime, Rasmussen and Comtois 1998).  
An important task for future assessments of self-sufficiency constraints 
and potentials is to conduct vulnerability studies of Arctic communities. 
These studies can better provide a basis for evaluating both environmental 
and social change. The perspectives, knowledge and concerns of indige-
nous people and other local Arctic residents are essential (ACIA 2005, pp. 
1020). Studies of climate change impacts need to be conducted in the 
framework of stakeholder involvement, with dialogue between local resi-
dents, industry and government. As some will gain and others lose from 
the impacts of climate change and changing economic opportunities, 
stakeholder involvement is necessary to represent the diverging interests; 
and evaluate how self-sufficiency constraints and potentials are affected. 
As a particular illustration of the precautionary principle, we suggest 
the framework used in a report published by the European Environmental 
Agency (EEA 2001) that has re-examined the histories of a number of 
previous environmental problems in terms of the precautionary principle. 
They emphasize the “late lessons” for precaution that can be drawn from 
previous environmental problems, where “early warnings” of harm were 
available, but not heeded. Based on experiences from the past, the report 
suggests guidelines for precautionary strategies that will enhance the po-
tential for sustainability and self-sufficiency (Box 1). The final words of 
the ACIA report serve as a reminder to the importance of applying the 
precautionary principle for sustainable development and enhanced self-
sufficiency in the Arctic: “While more studies and a better understanding 
of the expected changes are important, action must begin to be taken to 
address current and anticipated changes before the scale of changes and 
impacts further reduces the options available for prevention, mitigation and 
adaptation” (ACIA 2005, 1020). 
A further application of this framework, to cases of environmental un-
certainty in the Arctic, is the topic of our ongoing research and thus beyond 
the scope of the present paper. Here we briefly ouline some examples from 
case studies of Saami reindeer herding (ACIA 2005, 978; Reinert 2006, 
Tyler et al. 2007) to illustrate some of the main points of the framework 
suggested by “Late lessons from early warnings”. The ACIA (2005) report 
points out that the reindeer herding is not only affected by climate change, 
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but also by the political and socio-economic environment in which it exists 
(ACIA 2007, pp. 971). The flexibility to move reindeer herds between 
summer and winter pastures represents an important part of the traditional 
adaptive strategy, which may be challenged by climate change and difficult 
ice and snow conditions (ACIA 2007, pp. 981).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1. Late lessons from early warnings 
 
To enhance the adaptive capacity and self-sufficiency of reindeer herding, 
as well as traditional hunting, fishing and herding activities in other Arctic 
regions, stakeholder participation of indigenous people is crucial. Indige-
nous people’s participation is crucial because of their reliance on the 
changing environment, and because their adaptive capacity has sustained 
their livelihood in the Arctic environment. For example, indigenous peo-
ple’s observations of weather patterns and animal movements contribute to 
the understanding of climate change (ACIA 2005, pp. 992). Involvement 
of indigenous and other local people will contribute to an adaptive and 
precautionary perspective by accounting for qualities, values and uncer-
tainties that are easily overlooked in risk assessments. Indigenous people 
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therefore help in obtaining a more complete understanding of the interrela-
tions between livelihood, climate change, economic development and pub-
lic policy.  
An important point is that public policies need to be evaluated in terms 
of real world conditions. Reindeer herding is strongly impacted by climate 
change, and a precautionary approach needs to evaluate: to what extent 
policy measures are in accordance with strategies of adaptation. This 
means that stakeholder participation is crucial, and that indigenous and lay 
knowledge should be taken into account, with traditional ecological 
knowledge being of particular importance. In Saami reindeer herding in 
Norway, management of herd size and composition including the killing of 
reindeer and the processing of meat is influenced by models of agricultural 
husbandry, where the relevance for reindeer herding may be questioned 
(ACIA 2005, 978; Reinert 2006, Tyler et al. 2007). Such influence may 
increase the vulnerability of reindeer herding to the impacts of climate 
change. It is therefore important to reconsider management practices and 
policies to see how strategies of adaptation to climate change can be devel-
oped and improved.  
In Norway, important advances in legislation have been achieved, in 
order to secure the cultural survival of the Saami people. These important 
legal changes recognize the importance the natural environment has on the 
securing the cultural continuity of the Saami people. The lifestyle and cul-
ture of the Saami are crucially dependent on securing land rights where 
their reindeer graze, and are able to be herded between the winter pastures 
on the inland tundra and the summer pastures on the coastal meadows. 
However, for the Saami people living on the coast and who are dependent 
on small-scale coastal fisheries, the situation is much more precarious. The 
survival of their culture will depend on fishery management policy. In a 
study of coastal zone management in Norway, Buanes et al. (2004) ex-
plores stakeholder participation involving Saami fjord fishermen in North-
ern Norway. Traditional economic viewpoints are used in arguing that 
large-scale fisheries are more profitable, and that it is too expensive for 
society to maintain populations in remote areas. It is important to consider 
alternative economic perspectives that highlight the context of valuation of 
cultural values embedded in valuation of nature. If this outlook is applied 
to the fish stocks in the waters of Northern Norway, they would have a 
higher value that a market price of fish due, simply due to the spatio-
The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008  185 
temporal particularity these fish stocks have as a basis for of livelihood for 
indigenous and local people. The cultural landscapes of the coastal com-
munities also have a higher value due to the cultural values embedded in 
the nature qualities.  
The high degree of public involvement in the preparatory work in legis-
lating the rights of the Saami in the coast fisheries, is a good example of 
taking real world conditions into account, as well as the interests, assump-
tions and values of different social groups. A high degree of public in-
volvement and contact between local people and the experts provides a 
basis for systematically scrutinizing the justifications, benefits and poten-
tial risks, as called for in the “late lessons” framework.  
9.4. Conclusion 
Increased activity in petroleum exploration, the manufacturing industry, 
transportation, tourism and other services has the potential to alter the Arc-
tic environment considerably. Precautionary approaches require the devel-
opment of processes for acknowledging uncertainties, facilitation of stake-
holder participation, recognition of ethical values, and taking into account 
the traditional ecological knowledge of indigenous people in the Arctic. 
Combining traditional and scientific knowledge about nature is an impor-
tant part of understanding the resilience capacity of ecological and social 
systems, enhancing the potential for sustainable development and promot-
ingself-sufficiency. 
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10. Climate Change and Pastoral 
Flexibility: A Norwegian Saami Case110 
 
Hugo Reinert,Svein Mathiesen and Erik Reinert111 
The Scandinavian Sámi are one of more than twenty circumpolar ethnic 
groups that traditionally practice reindeer herding. Climate change will likely 
affect the practice of pastoralism in Sámi areas severely. Winter tempera-
tures may increase significantly, while changes in precipitation and wind 
will affect snow patterns. Traditional Sámi pastoralism is well adapted to 
handling rapid change in extreme and often unpredictable environments, and 
past responses to climatic variability may offer clues as to how long-term 
and permanent climate change can be successfully managed. The paper ar-
gues that the key to successful management lies in maximizing herder flexi-
bility in responding to changing conditions. Between the four nation-states 
that currently include Sámi pastoralism within their territories – Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Russia – have a surprising amount of variety in their 
systems of governance. Due to limitations of space, our discussion here fo-
cuses specifically on the Norwegian case. We propose that in the face of 
climate change, timely adjustments are made to national governance struc-
tures, aimed specifically at maintaining and re-establishing conditions for 
pastoral flexibility. This will be key to ensuring the survival of Sámi reindeer 
herding – both as culture and as economic practice. 
                                                        
110 The work on which this paper is based has been supported in part by the Research Council 
of Norway, project IPY EALAT-RESEARCH: Reindeer Herders Vulnerability Network Study: 
Reindeer pastoralism in a changing climate, grant number 176078/S30. 
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10.1. Background 
Indigenous reindeer pastoralism has been practiced in the Sámi areas of 
Scandinavia and Russia for centuries. The gradual solidification of national 
borders in the region – e.g. the border treaty between Norway and Sweden 
in 1751,and the border closure with Finland in 1852 (Eidheim 1999) – has 
had a dramatic impact on reindeer herding practices. Increasingly circum-
scribed by territorial sovereignty claims and the systems of governance 
established within them, reindeer herding has over time, developed differ-
ently within each respective country. (Jernsletten and Klokov 2002). Our 
discussion in this paper will focus specifically on the case of reindeer herd-
ing in Norway, drawing mostly on examples from the district (fylke) of 
Finnmark: the northern-most district of the country. Finnmark is subject to 
the most extreme climatic conditions as well as being home to the densest 
concentration of both reindeer and reindeer pastoralists (Reindriftsforvalt-
ningen 2008). 
For most of the last two centuries, the Norwegian state has strongly 
pursued an assimilationist policy of “Norwegianization” towards the in-
digenous Sámi population. In recent years, particularly following the large-
scale Sámi ethnopolitical mobilization during the second half of the 20th 
century, “Norwegianization” has generally given way to a more progres-
sive stance on indigenous issues. Norway is today a signatory of ILO Con-
vention 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, and in certain re-
spects – land rights, for example – the situation of the Sámi in Norway 
compares favorably to those in neighboring countries. All is not well, how-
ever – particularly in the case of reindeer pastoralism. Under the guise of 
“scientific rationalization” and “modernization”, the ongoing reform and 
restructuring of the reindeer herding sector has often continued along 
markedly ethnocentric lines; extending, for example, to the legal invisibil-
ity of traditional Sámi terminology and the introduction of key terms or 
concepts derived from sedentary Norwegian agriculture. Over the last two 
generations, the interventions of the Norwegian state have dramatically 
rearranged the face of herding itself, in a lasting and mostly irreversible 
manner. These changes coincide with radical shifts in lifestyle and con-
sumption patterns, the mechanization of herding practice, increasing de-
pendence on the cash market, demographic trends, as well as escalating 
tourism and other forms of regional development: e.g. road-building, 
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windmill parks, nature reserves, hydroelectric complexes. The current 
long-term prospects of reindeer pastoralism look precarious; factor in the 
likelihood of drastic and permanent climate change in the near future, and 
the question of sheer survival – of the practice, the culture and of the rein-
deer herding community – becomes pressing. 
In the remainder of the report we identify four levels of pastoral flexi-
bility as being particularly significant for meeting and adapting to the ef-
fects of long-term and permanent climate change. We also examine some 
of the principal factors that are currently impacting on this flexibility, in-
cluding the role of the Norwegian state and its current system of govern-
ance. In the closing section, we consider some of the ways in which nation-
states may not just hinder but also assist indigenous practices – specifi-
cally, Scandinavian reindeer pastoralism – in confronting and adapting to 
climate change. 
10.2. Spatial flexibility 
Reindeer are migratory animals. Herders exercise a distinct but limited 
degree of control over their movements, or their “territorial bindings” 
(Magga, Oskal and Sara 2001). The reindeer have a degree of autonomy, 
and often seek out necessary or favorable conditions on their own – locat-
ing grazing grounds, or patches of snow to escape insects for example. 
Under difficult conditions, this autonomy needs to be complemented by the 
skilled practice of human herders. The complex landscape of the north 
offers a plenitude of ecological niches; one of the key skills of herding lies 
in identifying and making use of these niches to meet the shifting needs 
and requirements of the herd. This, in turn, requires the ongoing and finely 
tuned observation of pastures, temperature conditions, ice and snow quali-
ties, weather systems and wind directions: all factors which determine 
access to pastures and the behavior of the herd (Heikkilä 2006). Such 
monitoring is particularly important on the winter pastures, where the 
availability of feed through snow becomes vital and where, under certain 
circumstances, the ability to rapidly move a herd to appropriate grazing 
grounds can determine life or death for a large number of animals. Quali-
ties of the snow-cover – such as density, hardness and depth – are key to 
determining access to forage, and therefore the suitability of winter grazing 
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grounds (Tyler et al. 2007). These qualities can vary rapidly and over short 
distances, depending on local landscape features, weather systems and 
other factors (Sara 2001).  
Climate change will likely significantly impact reindeer herding areas 
(ACIA 2005). The paradox of extreme climates is that often – at least to 
local users who possess the necessary know-how and familiarity of the 
landscape – it is precisely the extreme climactic variation, which makes the 
land habitable (Ingold 2000). This applies to reindeer herding as it does 
elsewhere. As one herder put it: 
“The more landscape types one has – that is, alternatives with which to meet 
different situations – the more secure reindeer pastoralism will be over a longer 
period of time. Contrariwise, in a uniform landscape without alternatives one is 
left helpless when faced with natural changes (within a season, between years) 
(Mikkel Nils Sara, quoted in Paine 1992).” 
 
Presently, and for the last few decades, the range of spatial options avail-
able to Norwegian reindeer herders has been shrinking at an increasingly 
rapid rate. This is spun on by factors such as escalating motorization, real-
estate and infrastructure developments, competing territorial claims by 
other stakeholders and the exponential growth of the regional tourism in-
dustry. Compounding this is a pattern of piecemeal restitutions for territo-
rial losses where the value of an area of land is calculated in isolation 
without factoring the systemic or aggregated effect of multiple losses on 
long-term viability (Bjørklund and Brantenberg 1981). This has contrib-
uted to placing the spatial economy of reindeer pastoralism, at least in 
Norway, in a state of acute pressure. The damage caused by progressive 
loss of spatial options, as ecological niches disappear in the transfer of 
ownership to other actors, is compounded by structures of spatial govern-
ance that are often rigid and inflexible. The system of grazing districts 
sections off pastoral space, imposing strict timetables for migrations and 
establishing penalties for infringement. Similarly, national borders divide 
territories and limit potential access to ecological niches.  
At least in Norway, one of the central problems in the state manage-
ment of reindeer pastoralism has also been the insufficient appreciation, on 
the part of administrative bodies, of the complexities and unstable charac-
ter of pastoral space itself. Appropriately, reindeer herders themselves refer 
to the “barnyard thinking” of the administration; shorthand for the assump-
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tion, which often underwrites interventions and policy that the spaces of 
herding operate as stable, controlled, regulated and predictable environ-
ments – similar, in nature, to a barnyard. As we discuss in the next section, 
key environmental variables that significantly condition pastoral practice in 
Finnmark – such as predator loss and the loss of animals to extreme cli-
matic conditions – have often been ruled out, explicitly, from the scientific 
models that underwrote management policy (Lenvik 1988, 1990; see also 
Reinert 2006). Effectively, the environments of the far north have been 
assumed to present an environment similar to the more placid south: con-
trolled, offering stable climatic conditions. This has created severe discrep-
ancies between theory and practice.  
This “barnyard metaphor” has had serious implications for the relation-
ship between administrative theory and pastoral practice. A successful 
system of reindeer herding governance must be premised on the assump-
tion of an environment that is not stable and unchanging – but rather inher-
ently unstable, and subject to rapid changes that may be cyclical but which 
are also generally unpredictable in nature. Any strategy at the national 
level to build climate change sustainability in reindeer pastoralism must 
urgently take this into account.  
10.3. Herd structure 
Crop diversification is a well-known adaptive strategy, particularly among 
cultivators in extreme environments (e.g. Bradshaw, Dolan and Smit 2004). 
By maximizing phenotype variation within their crops, Peruvian potato cul-
tivators create robust crops with a wide spectrum of resistances, thus mini-
mizing the risk of catastrophic crop failure caused by any specific given 
factor (van der Ploeg 1993). In comparison, mono-crop production produces 
(potentially) higher yields but requires carefully controlled environments and 
– due to genetic homogeneity – remains highly vulnerable to specific threats, 
such as pathogens or weather conditions, which can wipe out entire crops 
(Scott 1998). In the context of reindeer pastoralism, genetic and morphologi-
cal variability within the herd – that is, compositional diversity – offers simi-
lar advantages. Not coincidentally, traditional definitions of a “beautiful 
herd” emphasize diversity and the interplay of different traits as an element 
of aesthetic appreciation (Oskal 2000, Magga 2006). 
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Conceived as one of the key points for rationalization – and thus, of in-
terventions to raise productivity – the problem of herd structure illustrates 
succinctly the tricky entanglements of knowledge and power that inform 
relationships between herders and the state. At the most basic level, the prob-
lem concerns gender ratios. In the 1960s, reindeer herds in Finnmark typi-
cally comprised a large number of adult males – somewhere between a quar-
ter and half, many of which were castrates (Paine 1994). Large males were 
required for transportation purposes, to help keep the herd gathered and the 
general level of activity of the females low. Bulls helped protect the herd 
from predators, and could more easily break crusted snow and ice, which 
opened the snow pack and provided access to underlying vegetation for the 
herd. Although there is considerable variation, today in large part due to 
efforts to “scientifically” maximize productivity – few herds in Finnmark 
comprise more than 10% large bulls (Nilsen 1998). The elimination of bulls 
is a result ofincorporating reindeer herding into the output-maximizing mass 
production paradigm of scientifically rationalized agriculture. 
In the name of maximizing meat output, scientific rationalization has 
shifted the ratios between males and females within herds. For the same 
reason, it has also tended to reduce and simplify genetic and morphological 
diversity within the herd. This reduction also reduces complex sets of traits 
to the simple standard for maximizing meat production. The traditional 
structural diversity of reindeer herds represents a coping strategy, aimed at 
reducing their vulnerability to the effects of unfavorable environmental 
conditions. In a manner analogous to crop diversification, the presence of a 
wide range of genetic traits and resistances within the herd serves to dis-
tribute and offset the risks associated with extreme and unpredictable envi-
ronments. This principle is alien to the practices and ideologies of modern 
agricultural mass production (Scott 1998).  
The rationalization-driven demand for higher meat yields has led to an 
overall homogenization of herds, with compositional ratios and animal 
traits selected to maximize the meat output of individual animals (Reinert 
2006). While apparently rational, one danger of this strategy lies in its 
elimination of survival value from the meat output equation. In excluding 
survivability as a variable, it posits that the herd exists in a safe and per-
fectly controlled environment. In practice of course, particularly in the far 
north, this is anything but the case. By ensuring the survival of the herd as 
a whole and preventing the loss of other animals, reindeer with an indi-
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vidually low meat output may play a vital but indirect role in maximizing 
the productivity of the herd. Consider an influential statement by the agri-
cultural scientist Dag Lenvik: 
“Within normal sheep rearing, meat production based on old uncastrated rams is 
unthinkable. No sheep farmer would use the winter feed – the marginal factor – 
on a herd of rams that produce less meat than the ewes can produce through the 
yield of lambs. Today, the line of thinking should be the same in reindeer herding. 
Male animals that are superfluous from the point of view of procreation occupy 
grazing grounds that could be employed, instead, for cows... A herd of male ani-
mals larger than what is necessary for good insemination results should in that 
case be based on factors other than meat production... such as tourism or special 
management techniques” (Lenvik 1990: 31–32) 
 
To Lenvik, survival simply does not figure as a variable – his thinking on 
herd structure is entirely contained within the “barnyard metaphor”. He 
assumes that pastoral space operates as a safe, stable and homogeneous 
space and that herd structure can therefore be reduced to the question of 
maximized meat output. The article makes no mention of environmental or 
climatic variations at all, except to exclude them as potential factors to 
explain differences between herding in Finnmark and Trøndelag, to 
whichLenvik categorically states are “not due to predators or other natural 
circumstances” (1990: 34). In the context of our argument, Lenvik ap-
proach serves as an example – denoting the problematic relationship be-
tween the high-modernist, state-endorsed discourse of scientific agricul-
ture, and the knowledge forms and practices of reindeer pastoralism. Sig-
nificantly, Lenvik himself is today no longer directly involved in reindeer 
herding administration, and in recent years there has been a move towards 
greater recognition of the impact of local environmental variables on rein-
deer herding practice, particularly in Finnmark. Analogously, forms of 
indigenous herding knowledge today benefit from a greater degree of rec-
ognition, and there are coherent efforts to integrate them in both scientific 
research and policy.  
Of course, simplified herd structures and an increased orientation towards 
maximizing meat-output have not only been the result of managerial ideol-
ogy, or state-backed efforts at scientific rationalization; practical factors also 
play their part. For example, the increasing prevalence of extensive herding 
methods driven by factors such as the mechanization of herding practice, 
larger herd sizes and changing demographic patterns (Beach 1981) – have 
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contributed to a changed relationship between herder and the herd in tradi-
tional practices. For example, herders spend less time in close contact with 
individual animals, and decreased engagement with the herd takes place on 
different terms (Paine 1994). More and more, herding practices require less 
knowledge of individual animals for managing the herd as an aggregate. 
With this change, the complex classificatory taxonomies of traits and charac-
teristics that were relevant two generations have adapted accordingly (Bjørk-
lund 2004). Over the course of the 20th century, herd structures have also 
changed to meet the changing requirements of herders themselves. This 
change is exemplified in herd structure’s increased integration into the mar-
ket, and their dependence on commercially available products such as fuel 
for snowmobiles (Pelto 1973). These factors off-set the significance of state 
administration and any future policies that address herd structure as being a 
problem for climate change adaptation.  
The consequences of simplified herd structures and reduced heterogene-
ity remain largely unknown, and circulate at the anecdotal level. For exam-
ple, some herders say the dispersion pattern of female-dominated herds 
across the landscape has changed (Reinert et al. in press). According to herd-
ers, a herd with few bulls is also far more “nervous” and more exposed to 
predators than a traditional herd. There is need for further analysis of this – 
but given, what we know, it seems reasonable to assume, that the effects of 
altered herd structures on climate change vulnerability will be negative. As 
part of an overall strategy to ensure adaptive capacity, we would recommend 
that increased morphological and genetic variation within the herd be en-
couraged. Despite the increased recognition granted to indigenous herding 
knowledge, there is still a pressing need to systematically address the prob-
lematic relationships between scientific and traditional knowledge in rein-
deer herding – both in herd structure and elsewhere. 
10.4. Production 
Meat-production has been one of the key areas for state intervention into 
pastoral practice for the last few decades – certainly, since the first reindeer 
herding agreement of 1976. Keywords here have been rationalization, indus-
trial mass production, orientation towards mono-crop meat production, regu-
larization of production cycles (that is, stabilizing the meat output of the 
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industry), centralization of production facilities and the professionalization 
of the herder community. This is one area, where the environmentally condi-
tioned specificity of pastoral practice manifests in force. Fresh reindeer meat 
is a seasonal product. Animals are only slaughtered during autumn and win-
ter. Decisions concerning which and how many animals to slaughter are also 
made, year by year, on the basis of long-term strategies, cash-flow situations, 
the overall condition of the herd and estimates concerning coming years or 
market fluctuations. The supply curve for reindeer meat is thus irregular, 
both within any given year and between years – with production peaking at 
certain times of the year, and an oscillating annual output that depends on 
conditions that may range from the overall state of grazing grounds to the 
degree of financial insecurity perceived within the industry. Traditional mod-
els of pastoral accumulation – which emphasized “capital on the hoof” and 
often minimized its translation, through slaughter, into standard forms of 
capital – reflected the need to anticipate “bad years” by maximizing the 
number of animals (Ingold 1980). Environmental irregularity and unpredict-
ability are encoded in traditional herder knowledge – in the form of maxims, 
proverbs, anecdotes, and folklore (Helander and Mustonen 2004, Nergård 
2006). In expressing this unpredictability is the Sámi saying, “One year is 
not the next year’s brother”. In the face of this, one of the administration 
goals has been to regularize production in order to stabilize the meat output 
of the herding industry. As in the case of herd structures, this aim is based on 
a theoretical misrepresentation of the inherently cyclic or unpredictable as-
pects of herding practice – ill-informed at best, dangerous at worst.  
The pressing demand for a stable and invariable meat output curtails the 
adaptive flexibility of herders. Ensuring productive flexibility is a complex, 
composite problem. The demand for stable output is generated not only by 
the state, but also by the market. This is a common problem. For decades, 
within the regime of centralization, the marketing of reindeer meat was dele-
gated to outside actors, whose interests were at odds with those of reindeer 
pastoralists (Reinert 2002). In this sense, the market and the structure of the 
reindeer-meat commodity chain are both implicated as factors that affect the 
climate change resilience of reindeer pastoralism. The common practice of 
establishing reindeer meat as a seasonal or cyclically available commodity, 
with an irregular supply curve, will likely contribute to easing the impacts of 
long-term climate change. 
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It is worth emphasizing again that flexible productivity or, the ability to 
regulate the out-take of animals through slaughter in response to shifting 
conditions – is a key adaptive strategy in the pastoral tool-box. Within the 
traditional subsistence economy, this was made possible in turn by the 
flexible organization of livelihoods. Reindeer pastoralism represented one 
of several key economic activities, and, in bad years, it was supplemented 
by activities such as hunting, fishing and berry harvesting (e.g. Berg et al. 
2003). Clearly, conditions have changed and this is no longer the viable 
strategy, it once was. Reindeer herding remains a seasonal activity how-
ever, and there are still traces of this flexible adaptation, that for example is 
aparent, in the prevalence of multiple-income herder households (Nilsen 
and Mosli 1994). We would suggest that measures aimed at enabling a 
more flexible approach to production, and to the practice of pastoralism 
itself would help increase the adaptive capacity of the industry as a whole. 
More flexible approaches would include for example, relaxing require-
ments associated with the loss of herding licenses. An important element 
of such a strategy might be to devolve a degree of control – e.g. over the 
issue of herding licenses – to the industry itself. This would relate to the 
fourth aspect of flexibility that we identify as central to climate change 
adaptation, namely social organization. 
10.5. Social organization 
Historically, flexibility has played a key role in the social organization of 
herding labor. Individual herders associated in working within collectives 
called siidas, have a degree of flexibility in moving between them. Extended 
kinship networks provided recruitment grounds for temporary labor when 
required (Bjørklund 1991; Paine 1994). The general secretary of World 
Reindeer Herders” Association has stated that “nothing is liable to arouse 
more disturbance within reindeer husbandry than encroachments on its inter-
nal organisation” (Turi 2002: 71). In the Norwegian case, the Reindeer Herd-
ing Act of 1978 introduced a rigid and completely alien organizational struc-
ture, built around nuclear family units organized within geographically de-
fined districts. Until relatively recently, the siida working collective was 
made completely invisible within the legal and organization optic of the 
administration (Jonassen and Kalstad 2003). Reindeer ear-marks – the tradi-
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tional, individually held marks of ownership that are assigned at birth, were 
regulated in new ways that created new distributions of ownership and dis-
rupting relationships between herders and other communities that were me-
diated through the flow of living reindeer as property (Bjørklund and Eid-
heim 1999). Such restrictions of traditional forms of pastoral organization 
represented a serious institutional constraint on the adaptive flexibility of 
herders. In many ways, this re-structuring of the reindeer herding industry by 
the administration has been a determining factor in producing the so-called 
“tragedy of the commons” in Norwegian reindeer herding (Hardin 1968). 
Relevant changes to reindeer herding were characterized by the by disruption 
of complex networks of social relations, patterns of collaboration and infor-
mal codes that regulated pasture ground allocation and resource utilization- 
the administration created an entirely new world of conflict on the tundra 
(e.g. Berg 1996; Bjørklund 1999; Paine 1992). 
The Norwegian governance system presents a case of very strong bu-
reaucratic centralization – more so, perhaps, than in other Scandinavian 
countries. To supervise less than 600 individual herding units, the Reindeer 
Herding Administration employs more than 50 people (Lie and Nygaard 
2000; Reindriftsforvaltningen 2008). In addition to this fifty, there are also 
people employed in the Ministry of Agriculture. In turn, this extensive 
administrative structure produces a constant flow of highly detailed, fre-
quently changing regulations. On one level, the extensive bureaucratization 
does provide a social and economic safety net for herders. These adminis-
trative structures are capable of providing support or subsidies in bad 
years, and mitigating the financial impact of climatic damage. Of course, 
things are never as simple as that. Incentive structures and subsidy systems 
create patterns of dependence (Paine 1977). This dependence is evident in 
Norway, where reindeer pastoralism and Sámi interests have historically 
been constructed in terms dictated by the shifting interests of central pow-
ers (Bjørklund 1995). This has meant that excessive reliance on the state 
has also left herders at the mercy of unpredictable shifts in policy and pub-
lic opinion. This unpredictability is evident in a remark made by a herder 
to one of the authors:  
“Before, we were used to working with an unpredictable nature. Now we also 
have to work with an unpredictable government administration.”  
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Importantly, the need to navigate extensive regulatory and bureaucratic 
structures also prevents rapid adjustment, on the part of herders, to emer-
gent situations. 
There are signs of a general move towards greater local autonomy. This 
move is exemplyfied in the opening of hygiene and food safety regulations 
to facilitate the establishment of mobile slaughterhouses for reindeer (H. 
Reinert 2007). Many of the structural changes, that have taken place in the 
herding industry, are complex and will be extremely difficult to reverse. A 
significant step towards re-establishing flexibility and local forms of or-
ganization would be to down-scale and decentralize the bureaucratic struc-
ture, devolving a greater degree of flexibility and control to the herders and 
the industry itself like for example, in the regulation of herding licenses. 
10.6. Conclusion 
Indigenous production systems in extreme, variable and unpredictable 
climates are based on risk minimization strategies such as crop diversifica-
tion, and skilled, flexible utilization of existing ecological and climatic 
niches. In such areas, long-term climate change will magnify already ex-
treme weather conditions, with unpredictable effects. The variables and the 
coping mechanisms involved in previous extreme climate events are simi-
lar in kind to the skills that will be required to understand, and adjust to 
permanent climatic change. Adaptive responses to dramatic environmental 
change are often encoded in traditional knowledge. In Norwegian reindeer 
pastoralism, dramatic “bad years” have occurred in living memory, and 
there are reindeer herders today, who have lived through severe but tempo-
rary climatic turns. Their knowledge and experience will be a crucial re-
source in responding to future changes. The aim, in developing robust 
strategies for adapting to climate change, must be to draw on this knowl-
edge and experience, in order to understand and strengthen the highly effi-
cient coping mechanisms that have made survival already possible for 
centuries. 
Traditionally, the challenges posed to reindeer pastoralism by an un-
predictable climate have been met through skilled adaptive practice that 
fully utilized the options presented by a wide range of ecological niches. 
Theoretically at least, reindeer herders presently have available to them, a 
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number of options and strategies by which to counteract and circumvent 
the negative effects of climatic change. In practice, however, these options 
are limited by a wide range of factors that reduce adaptive flexibility – 
including systems of herding governance that operate at the nation-state 
level. Any strategy to build adaptive capacity at the national level will need 
to consider ways in which to maintain, and where necessary, re-create 
conditions for the exercise of pastoral flexibility. Given their regulatory 
functions and the history of herder-state relations, nation-states such as 
Norway could easily be represented as obstacles to such flexibility. This is 
a counter-productive approach, however.  
Perhaps the key question that our discussion here raises is this: how can 
national systems of governance be adjusted to assist the process of building 
pastoral adaptive capacity, and increase herder resilience to the potentially 
devastating effects – short-term and long-term – of climate change? In clos-
ing, we suggest four very general avenues of possible action: 
 
 Enabling and facilitating the restructuring of herds to decrease vulner-
ability to adverse climatic conditions. Diversified herd structures will 
probably be able to better withstand dramatic climate change and 
predators. 
 Ensuring spatial flexibility and a wide range of adaptive options, 
primarily by halting the permanent loss of pastoral lands and the 
destruction of currently accessible ecological niches. This entails 
halting or limiting the appropriation of current pastoral land for other 
purposes, such as infrastructure development. This may also include 
loosening border controls and restrictions on reindeer migration 
between Scandinavian countries. 
 Establishing and maintaining a solid economic base for pastoralists, 
enabling them to absorb the costs associated with climatic change. In 
the Norwegian case, this includes specifically facilitating herder 
ownership and control over the later stages of the commodity chain – 
including production, marketing and distribution (Reinert 2002, 2006). 
 Down-scaling the bureaucratic structure and devolving control to 
herders and the herding industry itself, both at the local and national 
level 
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11. Climate change, natural resource 
dependency, and supply shocks: The 
case of Greenland  
 
Joan Nymand Larsen112 
The effects of global change are felt across the Arctic with the spread and 
growth of industrial development and the growing role and presence of 
multinational corporations becoming a reality throughout much of the re-
gion. This combined with climate change is expected to contribute to some 
of the major physical, ecological, sociological, and economic changes 
already under way. Arctic societies feel the stress of these larger on going 
processes through the impact on both subsistence and large-scale resource 
exploitation. The effect of change depends on various adaptive capabilities 
in the Arctic, with these often being compromised due to limitations with 
respect to technology, wealth, institutions, infrastructure, and human re-
sources.  
The following article presents a brief and preliminary look at global 
change with a focus on Greenland’s formal economy, primary resources, 
and trade dependency. Reference is made to existing findings on the possi-
ble future consequences of climate change. The discussion includes a look 
at options for modeling the economic impacts of climate change, including 
a structural change framework for estimating the economic impacts of 
resource supply shocks. 
                                                        
112 Senior scientist, the Stefansson Arctic Institute and Akureyri University 
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11.1. Climate change and northern economies 
Many communities in the North face a multitude of socio-economic chal-
lenges and resource constraints that limit their economic prospects and 
lower the speed of adjustment to economic change. These may include: a 
narrow and climate sensitive resource base in combination with weak or 
undeveloped infrastructure and institutions; a small and scattered popula-
tion base; and remoteness, lack of accessibility, geographical isolation and 
long distance to markets. Within this context vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity varies depending on a range of factors including economic wealth, 
technology, and human resources.  
The narrow and natural resource based economy is a central character-
istic of the formal and market based economy in the Arctic. It is also a key 
source of economic instability and raises the vulnerability to climate 
change in many local communities. Limited manufacturing and processing 
takes place locally, and a large share of food and other products consumed 
are imported (Larsen, 2002). Production costs tend to be high in the Arctic 
partly because key factors of production, such as labor, capital and tech-
nology, are imported to meet resource demand. This also reduces competi-
tiveness relative to manufactures located outside the Arctic region. Re-
source extraction activities are characterized by high costs, and resource 
development is typically conducted on a large scale to achieve economies 
of scale and to lower the costs of operating in remote regions far from 
external markets. This helps explain the growing role and presence of mul-
tinational corporations who are more likely to have the capacity to under-
take development on a larger scale. Their role and presence in the Arctic is 
growing as the region undergoes further development and becomes in-
creasingly integrated with the global economy (e.g. Sutyrin et al, 2005).  
Climate change and globalization can be expected to alter the composi-
tion and stock and flow of resources, although the nature and extent of this 
is highly uncertain and at best speculative. The ACIA science report 
(2005), IPCC (2007) report, and others, describe several possible impacts 
of projected climate change which highlight the sheer range of possible 
costs and benefits, and their associated uncertainty. For example, in the 
marine ecological system and fisheries sector expected impacts may in-
clude changes in stock and species, alteration of fish migration routes, 
changes to harvesting costs, and increased stock productivity and yield, 
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with some commercial fish species becoming both more plentiful and an 
engine of new economic growth, while others – such as shrimp around 
Greenland – may migrate further north or disappear altogether from com-
mercial harvesting. At the same time, reports suggest that increased mari-
time activity could in the worst case scenario lead to potentially devastat-
ing oil spills, the pollution of commercial fishing grounds and endanger-
ment of key species, thereby adding considerable stress to Arctic 
economies and livelihoods. In the agricultural sector climate scenarios 
point to more positive agricultural yields and economic activities with 
impacts including vegetation shifts and possible expansion of agricultural 
opportunities. Reported climate projections also highlight the mining and 
petroleum sector, where impacts such as less production costs off-shore, 
higher costs on-shore, and a shorter season for mining can be expected; 
possible increased mining costs as permafrost melt will make it more diffi-
cult to build and move heavy equipment just as it may increase the risks to 
infrastructure. (e.g. Glomsrød et al., 2006; ACIA, 2005; IPCC, 2007). 
While some of the climate change projections and their associated conse-
quences may point to an uncertain future for the Arctic, they are expected 
to be gradual and will depend on factors such as availability of resources 
and the importance of nature based activities to the region. People and 
economies will surely adapt, but at a cost and speed that is still unknown. 
Local as well as regional economies – whether market or subsistence based 
– may feel the impacts of change. Nature based activities in the Arctic are 
no doubt sensitive to climate change, but there is great uncertainty as to 
which will be impacted negatively and which positively. Abrupt change, 
however, would have significant consequences for our ecosystems, human 
structures and nature based economies, with small northern communities 
being more impacted as adaptive capabilities may already be severely 
compromised (see e.g. Budreau et al, 2006; Berkes et al, 2003). The 
AHDR (2004) and the ICARP II science reports (2005) argued that new 
threats and challenges to indigenous social and cultural sustainability have 
appeared with an increasingly rapid pace of externally forced and disrup-
tive social change, including the withdrawal from traditional hunting, fish-
ing or herding economies. Serious implications for local and regional 
economies may emerge if the consequences of global change continue to 
impinge – and at a rapid rate – on both subsistence and commercial wild-
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life harvesting and fishing, with serious implications for traditional diet 
and cultural identity (ACIA, 2005).  
11.2. Fisheries and primary-export trade in Greenland 
Small size of internal markets and a narrow resource base are basic struc-
tural features that contribute to making the Greenland economy heavily 
dependent on external trade as a key source of income. The region’s export 
trade is largely concentrated in a few commercial marine species whose 
yield and productivity is sensitive to changes in ocean temperature. Three 
main characteristics describe trade in Greenland: trade is heavily concen-
trated in a few primary products, notably shrimp and halibut; imports, 
which span a full range of manufactured goods, are predominantly used for 
consumption and intermediate inputs; and the majority of trade is with 
Denmark, though with a significant share being re-exported to other coun-
tries. Fisheries in Greenland are of considerable economic importance to 
the region, constituting the main source of economic activity and export 
revenue. But the period since the1990s has been characterized by periods 
of negative and slow economic growth, much of which can be attributed to 
swings in marine harvest, export volume and earnings, thus emphasizing 
the extreme economic vulnerability of the region (e.g. Politisk Økonomisk 
Redegørelse, 2006). Economic vulnerability and annual deviations from 
trends in exports and regional income can – as one would expect for a 
small economy such as Greenland – be largely attributed to a lack of eco-
nomic diversification, a heavy reliance on natural resources, and the asso-
ciated narrow export trade that constitutes a primary source of regional 
income. In more recent years a declining world price of shrimp has con-
tributed to a significant decline in export revenues despite larger export 
volumes. The high concentration in exports together with its high share in 
the region’s GDP helps explain the volatility of the formal economy, 
where even small shocks and disturbances can have large and lasting im-
pacts. At the same time, the persistence of economic instability must be 
viewed in combination with constraints on the region’s human, physical 
and financial resource endowment. 
The modernization of Greenland fisheries, which began on a broader 
scale in the 1950s and 1960s, including the subsequent expansion of the 
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export base, signaled the beginning of marine export as a central compo-
nent of the formal economy in Greenland. While exports can be an engine 
of growth they may also be a cause of economic instability. Climate 
change and its consequences for natural resources may be a factor in rais-
ing the level of economic vulnerability. Improved utilization of a country’s 
factors of production, expanded factor endowments, and the creation of 
linkage effects are some of the well-known potential benefits that may 
follow an export-promotion strategy. A strategy of primary export trade – 
such as seen in the case of Greenland – may prove to be largely ineffective 
however. Weaknesses may result, when markets for primary products grow 
slowly, when earnings are unstable due to price fluctuations, and when 
expected diversification around the export industry including linkage crea-
tion may be nonexistent or limited. Significant instability and fluctuations 
in earnings may result if production is concentrated in one or a few prod-
ucts, and if exports are geared only to a few external markets. A country 
will remain heavily dependent on imports of both final and intermediate 
products, as well as imported personnel in many cases.  
A study by Agnarsson and Arnason (2003) has linked the major depres-
sions in Iceland to changes in fisheries, and Vestergaard and Arnason 
(2004) have studied the relationship between GDP and real export value of 
fish products for the Greenland economy. Similarly, my research findings 
on the impact of primary export trade in Greenland suggest that while pri-
mary exports have fuelled economic growth, they have also resulted in 
economic instability which has had a dampening effect on growth, and 
thus leading to a lower rate of GDP growth than might have been achieved 
with more diversified exports (Larsen, 2004). Climate change presents 
potentially new challenges for the narrow and resource dependent 
Greenland economy, with the possibility for increased future economic 
volatility and associated consequences for regional growth prospects. 
11.3. Primary resources and trade dependency in Greenland 
Economic dependency can be defined as a condition where the growth of 
income of a country is substantially, if not entirely, dependent on external 
factors, essentially exports, imports and external finance and technology 
(e.g. Stein, 1979; Green, 1970). Economic dependency continues to be a 
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factor describing the economy of Greenland, although the level of depend-
ency has been falling. Greenland’s dependency on external markets is 
characterized in part by continued financial, trade and technological ties to 
Denmark (Larsen, 2002). In very general terms, economic structures of 
dependent economies can be characterized by a number of distinct fea-
tures, often including very few and weak relationships between different 
economic sectors where only a small fraction of production serves as in-
puts into other sectors of the domestic economy. Resource use tends to be 
less flexible than in the case of more developed economies, with signifi-
cant constraints on the ability of product-mix to adapt to the effects of 
external shocks and disturbances. Economic growth tends to be highly 
dependent on external factors, with external demand changes being largely 
central to making full use of productive capacity and in justifying and fi-
nancing large-scale investment to expand capacity. There exists a signifi-
cant disparity between the structure of domestic demand and domestic 
resource-use, which can be reflected in very high export and import coeffi-
cients. And lastly, domestic institutions tend to be significantly directed 
and controlled by the external environment. Many small, open and re-
source dependent economies, including Greenland and other small regional 
economies of the north, may fit into this framework at some level. Small 
regional economies of the north are often characterized by weak resource 
mobility and restraints on the ability to develop economic substitutes. This 
presents impediments to effectively minimizing the adverse consequences 
of external shocks and disturbances. In contrast, less economically depend-
ent economies tend to have higher degrees of flexibility, a well developed 
resource endowment, and broader economic diversification, which permit 
them to minimize the adverse effects of external shocks and disturbances 
through the utilization of domestic and foreign substitute resources. Cli-
mate change may alter the composition and concentration of production 
and trade in Greenland with possible negative consequences for the degree 
of economic stability and future income generation and growth. 
Greenland’s narrow resource base is obvious to any observer, yet the cal-
culation of the numerical level of trade concentration is useful because it 
allows more systematic analysis of the relationship between trade concentra-
tion, trade dependency, and economic growth and instability. Greenland’s 
narrow trade can be measured using the Hirschman-Gini coefficient of con-
centration and a three-digit Standard International Trade Classification 
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(SITC) code. The computed trade concentration indices show the degree of 
Greenland’s external trade concentration in the period since the 1950s. It has 
been characterized by high commodity and geographic export, with exports 
being concentrated in a few products and exported to relatively few markets 
of destination. The computed indices also measure the low commodity im-
port concentration and high geographic import concentration, with imports 
highly diversified but with few countries of origin (Larsen, 2002). Exports in 
Greenland consist mainly of primary commodities, notably fish (shrimp, 
halibut, and cod) and until more recently, raw materials (zinc, lead, and cryo-
lite). The primary export ratio has fluctuated in the range of approximately 
86 to 96 per cent in the period since the 1950s. Currently about 93 per cent 
of total export revenue accrues from primary exports, and fish exports ac-
count for close to 100 per cent of total primary export revenue. Not only are 
Greenland’s exports concentrated in a limited number of primary products, 
but the larger share of exports is either non-processed or only semi-
processed which effectively means that Greenland is losing value added, 
while at the same time forgoing an opportunity to create employment and 
economic opportunities domestically. A reduction in export concentration in 
more recent years reflects an effort to expand diversification in fish species 
harvested, and the modernization of fish processing plants to enable further 
processing. For now, the level of concentration in commodity export remains 
high however. With only a limited number of key commercial fish species 
this may render vulnerability to projected climate change particularly high, 
not least in a worst case scenario where changing ocean temperature could 
cause the disappearance of key species such as shrimp for example. On the 
other extreme, and as discussed in ACIA (2005), moderate warming is pre-
dicted to improve conditions for some of the most commercial species, and 
earlier examples exist with cod at Greenland and the Norwegian spring-
spawning herring.  
11.4. Commercial fish harvest and instability in Greenland 
Based on the estimation of dynamic time-series models, and using annual 
macroeconomic data covering the period since the 1950s, my research 
findings on the relationship between selected indicators of dependency, 
economic growth and instability in Greenland suggest that a positive asso-
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ciation exists between growth and some indicators of dependency (Larsen, 
2002, 2004, 2007). Specifically, test results based on econometric model-
ing indicate that while trade concentration is not an explanatory factor in 
the economic growth process in Greenland, primary exports have been able 
to produce trickle-down effects that have been a contributing factor in 
economic growth in Greenland’s post-colonial history. Theories have been 
developed to analyze the development of primary exporting countries. 
Among these is the staple theory (H.A. Innis (1915); R.E. Baldwin (1956); 
D.C. North (1959); Watkins (1963)), which examines the development of 
primary exporting countries in terms of various characteristics of a coun-
try’s staple. A staple is here defined as a primary product that faces a large 
and growing demand in world markets, does not require elaborate process-
ing, and has a high enough value-weight ratio to bear transportation costs. 
A central feature of the staple theory is the spread of effects and the proc-
ess of diversification around the export base and the process of economic 
development that follows. Benefits to primary-export-led growth may in-
clude improved utilization of existing factors, expanded factor endow-
ments, and linkage effects. The resulting linkage effects are referred to as 
backward, forward, and final demand linkages. Empirical evidence in the 
literature have suggested to the contrary, however, that primary exports 
may not be so effective in leading the way to economic development as 
suggested by theory. This is because markets for primary products often 
grow too slowly to fuel growth, and earnings may be unstable due to price 
fluctuations, just as the expected diversification around the export industry 
and the creation of linkages tends to be weak or non-existent. Empirical 
evidence in the case of Greenland does however support the primary-
export theory, as it suggests that trade in primary exports has been statisti-
cally significant in fuelling economic growth. At the same time, a number 
of challenges may persist in developing strategies to realize long-run sus-
tained growth. These challenges include the existing limits on resource 
flexibility, the constraints on entering into new and foreign markets and the 
difficulties associated with a very small and scattered population base 
which presents barriers to achieving economies of scale in domestic mar-
kets. In addition, the region is now faced with new challenges posed by 
climate change, which may alter the composition, availability and value of 
commercial species in the region’s export trade. 
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Macroeconomic instability can be measured as squared deviations from 
trend values, with the basic problem being fluctuations around an esti-
mated trend (Love, 1987; Khalaf, N. 1979). Using this approach, I per-
formed econometric tests for the case of Greenland, using annual trade data 
from 1950 to the present. The results show that fluctuations from an esti-
mated trend in an export instability index help explain annual variability in 
growth of GDP, and that export earnings instability is significant. Thus, 
relying on a few primary resources is – as we would expect – a key source 
of instability in the Greenland economy (Larsen, 2004). Naturally, not all 
deviations are problematic in as much as they reflect long term shifts in 
consumer tastes, technology, or factor supplies. Empirical research fur-
thermore shows that the degree of instability has a dampening effect on 
growth. Specifically, an empirical investigation into the association and 
direction of causation between economic instability and economic growth 
in Greenland shows that economic instability is negatively associated with 
economic growth, i.e. economic instability is a deterrent to economic 
growth (Larsen, 2004; 2007). Economic fluctuations are undesirable when 
they serve no useful purpose but only serve to trigger fluctuations in other 
variables such as government revenue and investment, which may have an 
impact on short run macroeconomic stability and long run economic de-
velopment. It is the sporadic elements of deviations from some “normal” 
level of earnings that are likely to be the greater cause of concern as op-
posed to regularly reversing deviations. For instance, it is possible for in-
come to fluctuate over time and yet be known in advance with certainty. 
Events that are predictable or certain do not necessarily have adverse con-
sequences, since regularly reversing fluctuations make it easier to predict 
the level of exports and income each year and to judge the correct timing 
for implementing stabilization policies. In Arctic regions, however, the 
scope for corrective action in response to economic deviations may be 
more limited due to various resource constraints including limits to eco-
nomic and political autonomy. Local and regional governments may there-
fore be less able to undertake effective offsetting policies to minimize 
shock effects, even if they could predict the future accurately. 
Lack of economic diversification and constraints on resource flexibility 
in Greenland provide part of the explanation for the relationship between 
economic instability and the uneven economic growth record. The negative 
association suggests a difficulty in predicting and reacting optimally to 
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shocks to the domestic economy and in applying the correct timing for stabi-
lization policies. Climate change may render not only weather but also eco-
nomic fluctuations less predictable. In general, a limited degree of economic 
diversification coupled with low per capita incomes can be important factors 
explaining the level of economic instability, as this creates an environment in 
which resources cannot easily be transferred. The instability problem, which 
can be linked to an uncertainty about availability of public and private re-
sources may complicate development planning and subsequently reduce the 
rate of growth of the economy below a rate, which could have been attained 
under greater certainty.  
Most northern coastal communities have an economic dependence as 
well as a historical and cultural attachment to the fisheries. O’Brien and 
Leichenko, (2000) argue that small fishery dependent societies are under 
continuous pressure, with these societies being subject to a “double expo-
sure” where climate change occurs simultaneously with economic margin-
alization. As discussed by Bærenholdt and Aarsæther (2001), Aarsæther et 
al. (2004), AHDR (2004), Lindkvist (2000) and others, many factors con-
tribute to a community’s “coping capacity”. The future of these settlements 
may depend on their ability to adapt to increased competition, efficiency, 
deregulation, and liberalization of the markets, as much as on the accessi-
bility of fishing resources for their local production systems. 
11.5. Abrupt climate change and modeling 
Economic impacts of climate change are predicted to be significantly lar-
ger under a scenario of abrupt change, as for example in the case of a pos-
sible fast melt of the Greenland ice sheet. Possible econometric approaches 
to estimating the impacts of abrupt change might include time-series ap-
proaches, sectoral approaches, and capital-stock-depreciation estimates. 
Structural change analysis using the Phillip Perron (1989) method for ana-
lyzing impacts of economic shocks to time series data could also be con-
sidered, and would provide a test for the presence and nature of structural 
change associated with economic impacts of climate change. The structural 
change approach has its point of departure in a debate over the dynamic 
properties of macroeconomic time series, with the main issue being the 
long run response to trending data series to a current shock to a macroeco-
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nomic series. Using statistical techniques developed by Dickey and Fuller 
(1979; 1981), Nelson and Plosser (1982) argued that random shocks have 
permanent effects on long run levels of most macroeconomic aggregates 
(Zivot et al.; 1992). Empirical evidence has suggested that macroeconomic 
fluctuations are not transitory and hence that most macroeconomic time 
series have a unit root, which is an attribute of statistical models of time 
series whose autoregressive parameter is one. Unit root tests can be used to 
determine whether trending data should be first differenced or regressed on 
deterministic functions of time to render data stationary. Perron (1988; 
1989) found evidence to the contrary this view, i.e. that most macroeco-
nomic time series are not characterized by the presence of a unit root, and 
that fluctuations are indeed transitory. Perron found, that most macroeco-
nomic variables are not characterized by unit root processes as widely as 
believed, but rather, are trend stationary processes coupled with structural 
breaks. He found that when a macroeconomic time series has a structural 
break, the various Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron test statistics are bi-
ased toward the non-rejection of a unit root, even when the series is sta-
tionary within each sub-period occurring before and after the breakpoint. 
The Perron test procedure could be employed for example, as a possible 
alternative method to test for the economic impacts of abrupt climate 
change with a sudden change in the stock of commercial fish species. Us-
ing the Perron test procedure for structural change analysis, I performed a 
macroeconomic time series analysis of structural change in Greenland, 
using data since the 1950s. This included econometric tests for the pres-
ence of permanent level breaks and one-time pulse changes in the real 
export and real GDP macroeconomic time series (Larsen, 2007a). The 
Perron procedure was used to test for structural change with the economic 
impacts from a closure of zinc and lead mines and the dramatic fall in cod 
stock around year 1990. Greenland experienced a shock to its natural re-
source supply and a subsequent major decrease in the region’s export base 
in 1990. The negative supply shock occurred with the closure in 1990 of 
the Maarmorilik mine. The economic impact on the export base was made 
worse by the disappearance of the cod from Greenlandic waters around the 
same time. My econometric test results showed clear evidence of a statisti-
cally significant negative level shift in the Greenland economy in the year 
of the shock to the region’s natural resource supply and the subsequent 
decline in the export base. The unit root problem disappeared, when the 
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negative level shock was accounted for. Hence, the processes became sta-
tionary, thus suggesting that the 1990 shocks led to structural change and 
were a cause of economic instability in Greenland (Ibid.). The economic 
impacts of a possible disappearance of shrimp from Greenlandic waters, or 
a north bound migration of the species with a projected increase in ocean 
temperature could be estimated using this approach. Also, the economic 
effect of a projected increase in the volume of cod and the associated 
change in export receipts could be estimated. The approach would require 
data on the projected change in the volume of the fish species and estima-
tion of future export revenue. 
Further research on the economic impacts of climate change is needed in 
the area of economic modeling with emphasis on particular commercial 
marine species. Further research is needed on local communities where 
adaptive capacities are compromised or where projected climate change is 
expected to add stress to an already weakened economic structure. 
The expected socio-economic impacts of climate change are still highly 
uncertain. Uncertainty is related to the difficulty of modeling the climate 
events and obtaining good and reliable data. New research challenges are 
presented as climate change and other processes occurring at a rapid pace 
are combined with limited observational infrastructure, and a lack of 
timely, appropriate and reliable data and information networks, including 
the spatial scale and topical breadth of the research issues related to climate 
change. New demands are placed on access to data for the study and mod-
eling of these global processes, and for understanding, measuring and pre-
dicting the impacts of change on social systems at various scales; and un-
derstanding their links with the rest of the world and their feedback 
mechanisms. Unlike more southern regions and economies at the national 
level, we lack disaggregated data for the regional and community level to 
help make accurate estimates of these impacts. 
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12. Climate change, the informal 
economy and generation and gender 
response to changes 
 
Rasmus Ole Rasmussen113 
12.1. Introduction 
In the context of contemporary discussions regarding the consequences of 
ongoing climate changes, there is a tendency to focus on sudden, recent, 
and short-term external changes, considering them to be decisive for future 
changes. Therefore, these discussions tend to disregard the fact that there 
seems to be measures within the communities, which are able to cope with 
very substantial changes. At the same time most discussions tend to forget 
that there are other ongoing social processes which – independent of the 
processes of a changing climate – may become much more decisive for the 
future of many of these settlements.  
In adding to the discussion on some of the components which may be-
come important – even decisive – in understanding climactic changes, this 
paper focuses on three elements: The first discussion will look into the fact 
that contemporary climate change is not an exceptional situation in 
Greenland. Throughout the current millenium Greenland has been exposed 
to massive changes in climate. These changes have had both positive and 
negative consequences for living conditions. During the last few centuries, 
                                                        
113 Rasmus Ole Rasmussen, Director, NORS – North Atlantic Regional Studies, Roskilde 
University, Senior Research Fellow, Nordregio – Nordict Institute for Regional Research, Nordic 
Council of Ministers, Stockholm. 
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Greenland has experienced changes in climate, which have substantially 
exceeded the present ongoing processes. It is therefore relevant to be re-
minded of, how these changes were managed.  
The second discussion will look more in depth into how communities in 
Greenland tend to react to changes, and how the informal economy plays a 
role in adjusting community life to the environmental, economic, as social 
changes. This role is not exceptional for Greenland, and therefore a few 
references to experiences with contemporary informal economic activities 
in other parts of the Arctic will be included in the discussion. The compari-
son of differences is important because the general perception often is, that 
life in the Circumpolar North is quite similar. The reality, however, is that 
the present settlement structure represents marked differences in goals, 
measures, and in means in whichpeople live in the Arctic. But it is, how-
ever, also clear that the informal economy and the subsistence sector are 
playing crucial parts in the development process, as a means of maintain-
ing a meaningful everyday life in a changing environment.  
The third discussion will focus on the ongoing social changes, as these 
changes seems to have much more influence on community life and set-
tlement pattern than future climate changes may turn out to have. The so-
cial changes are much more rapid and have more influences on re-
structuring the settlement pattern. At the same time, however, the antici-
pated changes in climate may enhance the consequences of these social 
changes. 
12.2. Climate changes 
During the 20th century several major socio-economic shifts occurred in 
Greenland. All of these changes are describable as being social adjust-
ments to real world realities (Rasmussen 2007d; Rasmussen and Tomma-
sini 2003) that have been induced by the interactions between the natural 
systems, i.e. climate change and changes in resource base, and then re-
flected through changes in the socio-economic and socio-technical system 
of resource exploitation.  
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12.2.1. First Shift – from Hunting to Fishing – sedentarization 
The first shift, from a sea mammal based economy to fisheries, occurred 
during the 1910–20’s. Mainly due to a marked increase in sea temperature, 
this shift resulted in a decrease in the sea mammal stock and an increase in 
fish stock. Combined with a population concentration around the trade 
posts in Greenland and declining world market for blubber and sealskin, 
cod became the dominating species and fundamental resource for the 
economy (Rasmussen and Hamilton 2001). 
The first commercial fishery began in Ilulissat in the 1890s (Nørrevang 
et al. 1971). This was followed by a new initiative in 1904 that enabled the 
sale of Greenland halibut in Ilulissat, and Arctic char in other parts of 
Greenland (Smidt 1989). In the beginning of the 20th century foreign fish-
eries for halibut started around Sisimiut, just as the first commercial fish-
ery for Greenland halibut was established in the fjords around Qaqortoq in 
Southern Greenland. This was followed by the building of the first proc-
essing plants for salted cod along the coast. Access to this new activity, 
and especially access to processing and storing facilities, resulted in the 
establishment of a series of settlements that were determined by their ac-
cessibility to fisheries. A substantial part of present day villages were es-
tablished in this connection. 
After World War II a new development process was initiated, aiming at 
reducing the backwardness of the economy and improving the very modest 
living conditions by bringing a modern standard of living to the popula-
tion. The G50-plan emphasized the need for new private initiatives to 
stimulate economic development, but after a number of years it became 
obvious that the privatization had not succeeded. The subsequent G60-plan 
stressed that public activities were necessary to create a take-off situation 
for the home economy so private access to public funding was seen as a 
way of invigorating the private business (Poppel 1997). Attempts to ex-
pand and industrialize fisheries during the 1950s and 1960s, however, had 
only relative success in creating a commercial and self-contained economic 
activity. Even though the capacity of the fleet was doubled from 1965 to 
1975, the total volume of fish continued to be on more or less the same 
level. In addition, a reduction in water temperature had substantial impact 
on the reproduction of the cod stock. Thus, a combination of over-
exploitation and a reduction in sea temperature prevented the cod from 
spawning, and practically wiped out the cod stock within a few years, lead-
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ing to the need for a revised approach in renewable resource exploitation 
(Rasmussen and Hamilton 2001). 
12.2.2. Second Shift – from Cod to Shrimp – Concentration 
The second important shift was instigated by the change en sea tempera-
ture, and occurred during the 1980’s. The change in temperature, which 
was causing a drastic decline in the cod stock, occurred at the same time of 
a marked increase in the shrimp stock. Until the 1950s, primarily inshore 
vessels pursued shrimps on inshore banks. However, the combination of 
cooling water and a reduced cod stock led to a massive expansion in 
shrimp fisheries (Buch, Pedersen and Ribergaard 2003). It became clear 
that the changes in the cod stock were permanent. So the 5–year develop-
ment plan in 1984 aimed at investments from cod fisheries towards the 
much more promising shrimp fisheries. The shift was supported through 
massive investments in new fishing gear and offshore vessels, which led to 
a shift from inshore to offshore fisheries, and an eventual mono economy 
based on shrimp (Rasmussen and Tommasini 2003). With a major fleet of 
offshore boats, the question of processing close to fishing grounds became 
irrelevant. The mobility of the big boats enabled them to bring the catches 
to whatever harbor offered processing facilities. With consecutive im-
provements in processing technologies and by moving processing from 
land to sea – the main processing activities were concentrated in the mu-
nicipal centers, making most of the villages obsolete.  
12.2.3. Third Shift – from Mono-resource to Increased Diversity – 
Dentralization 
The third shift includes the ongoing process towards a more diversified 
focus on fisheries. Fisheries contribute 85% of the total export value. 
Shrimp is still the backbone of the economy, representing more than 50% 
of the export value, with Greenland Halibut being the major contributor in 
the Northern Regions by contributing another 20% of the export value. In 
addition, there are regional economic contributions from snowcrab, lump-
sucker roe, and other local available resources (Statistics Greenland, 2007). 
By now the shrimp fisheries have been developed to its maximum. The 
cooling of waters, however, have contributed to a new expansion of fisher-
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ies for Greenland halibut, and during recent years, there has also been in 
increase in fishing for snow crab. Parallel to the development of fisheries 
however, is the fact that hunting for both land and sea-mammals still con-
tributes to both subsistence and commercial activities. The latter is espe-
cially prominent in areas where there are limited possibilities for fisheries 
and commercial hunting activities are therefore a major contributor to the 
local economies. At the same time it has become obvious that there are 
limitations on the expansion of economies based on renewable resources. 
The concept of “the three pillars” – Fishing, Minerals and Tourism – was 
developed in the 1990s as a strategy for further development. More re-
cently the concept of “land based activities” has been included as a corner-
stone for future economic development, and if these steps succeed, changes 
in the situation of resource dependency may eventually appear.  
12.2.4. A fourth Shift? 
A fourth shift may be under way that is caused by the present warming proc-
ess, indicated by the reduction of sea ice cover, and the returning of the cod 
(Rasmussen 2005). It is however, too early to have a precise understanding 
of the possible consequences of such a shift. And – as will be discussed – 
such changes may be overridden by other ongoing social changes.  
12.2.5. Responses 
In general, a settlement structure can be considered to be a materialized 
image of an optimization process involving three characteristics: the poten-
tials of nature, the technological and technical skills of humans, and the 
institutional and organizational structures of society. The natural potentials 
are transmitted or manifested through society’s understanding of what is 
considered a resource. What is realized as potentials is also based on the 
technological and technical skills a society possesses (Rasmussen, 1996). 
The institutional and organizational structures are on one hand required as 
a mediator between the natural potentials and the technological and techni-
cal skills, but at the same time also part of distinct dynamics between the 
individuals and their social organization of activities.  
As infrastructures and settlements are more or less durable characteris-
tics of societies, they usually do not reflect the actual characteristics of 
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man/nature relationships, but can be considered a composite of both con-
temporary and past processes. The changes in settlement structures are 
delayed due to different adjustment characteristics of societies, but also 
simply due to the mere fact that physical structures like houses, processing 
plants and larger constructs can be difficult to get rid of. At the same time, 
as social and economic processes seems to become less independent on 
both specific resources and climate conditions, the settlement pattern in-
creasingly seems to be dependent on socio-economic and political proc-
esses. A specific settlement pattern is seldom reflective of a specific neces-
sity, but instead, is part of a negotiation process, where material reasons 
may be reflected but often overruled by political means and measures. The 
present settlement pattern in the Arctic is based on decisions made decades 
or even centuries ago, and is reflective of a rationale specific to that time 
including for instance, a dispersed pattern made to take advantage of all 
available resources. These rationales, however, may no longer be valid, but 
the settlements and the physical structures are still there, becoming a part 
of other rationales. In the case of Greenland the settlement structure is 
reflecting four different rationales. One of centralization, established dur-
ing the 17th and 18th century by means of a limited number of trade posts 
serving the vast coastal areas of Greenland. One of decentralization, with 
the establishing of a larger number of settlements in order to provide pro-
duction and processing facilities close to fish resources, especially the cod 
fisheries which boomed from a temperature increase in the beginning of 
the 20th century. A new rationale emphasizing concentration of activities in 
larger settlements was established in connection with the modernization 
processes during the 1950’s and 1960’s. This process of concentration later 
led to a shift from cod to shrimp fisheries during the 1970’s and into the 
1980’s. And finally during the last 20 years, there has been a rationale of 
centralization – of services and activities – reflected through the political 
measures of Home Rule.  
12.2.6. Patterns of Change 
As discussed above, changes in climate and in resources have been crucial 
factors influencing the socio-economic changes and development, which 
has characterized Greenland during the last 150 years. A contemporary 
focus on non-renewable resources as being a basis for the future economy 
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does not change the fact that the current living conditions in Greenland will 
also experience future social changes due to environment dynamics, simi-
lar to situations characterizing the last centuries. And if the relationship is 
not a consequence of a direct connection between resource exploitation and 
climate, it will be through the dependency that is characterizing the infor-
mal economic activities.  
12.3. Informal Economy 
Terms such as “Black Economy”, “Hidden Economy”, or “Moonshine 
Work” are used with negative inference to describe the informal sector or 
informal economies. The use of these terms exemplify the difficulty 
economies, which are based on formal rule and law, have in accepting 
activities, which are more or less out of formal control. An important factor 
in this connection is the fact that these types of activities are diverse, from 
organized and random crime, through tax avoidance to simple subsistence 
activities. The negative connotations are therefore often reflecting the reac-
tion of law-abiding citizens to what they consider activities, which do not 
conform to the legal and/or moral setting. As will be argued below, how-
ever, this is a rather narrow interpretation of activities that might not only 
be individual or group based approaches to survival strategies, but also 
beneficial for societies in general.  
12.3.1. The definition 
In the following discussion a definition of informal activities is given that 
does not reflect any moral positioning, but simply the fact that there are 
activities with economic implications that are not part of the formalized 
economic system. This includes:  
 
 Economic transactions that are not registered by any formal authority. 
 Economic transactions that involve a realized (money exchanged)  
as anunrealized economic component (commodity exchange, gift 
giving etc.). 
 Economic transactions that are related to renewable resource extraction. 
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Consequently, the informal economy –or the informal sector, as these two 
concepts are used interchangeable – is somewhere in between subsistence, 
i.e. hunting and fishing for own or family survival, and the formal econ-
omy where products from hunting and fishing are sold to registered and 
registering authorities.  
12.3.2. The Role of the Informal Sector  
The informal sector creates a kind of linkage between the formal and the 
subsistence sectors. This is what is emphasized when Usher (1986) de-
scribes the complexity of the relationship between domestic/subsistence 
and commercial production, and when Dahl (1989) shows how the distinc-
tions between subsistence and cash-based economic sectors are more or 
less artificial and meaningless, as the two sectors are thoroughly inter-
woven. In the Arctic – as in other places – the local economies are rarely 
determined by the one dimensional capital/wage earner rationalities, but 
influenced – and even overruled – by other rationalities as described by 
Chayanov (Chanyanov 1966). These rationalities can to some degree be 
reflected through other economic categories, and it is in this connection 
that the concept of informal economy becomes important, as it opens up 
for an interpretation in economic terms of the dynamics of both large, but 
especially small communities in the Arctic (Rasmussen 1999, Caulfield 
1992; Duhaime 1991; Duhaime, Fréchette, Robichaud, 1996).  
The case of Greenland is in this connection of special interest. As 
Marquardt and Caulfield (1995) show, subsistence and informal marketing 
has been important development factors since the early colonial time. The 
local markets – the Kalaaliminerniarfik – arose in the 18th century with the 
specific purpose of meeting the needs of the employees of the church, the 
KGH (Royal Greenland Trade Company) and its predecessors. But at the 
same time the local markets served as a “leveler” of the differences be-
tween Greenlandic hunters and their countrymen who worked for the colo-
nial authorities. Local markets served as a redistribution channel whereby 
hunters received European goods, while Greenlandic and Danish salaried 
employees received valued country foods and locally produced items such 
as clothing and other goods.  
What is hereby stressed is the fact that an important part of understand-
ing both resilience and variation in Arctic communities, as well as their 
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economic perspectives is not only to compare the formal and the subsis-
tence sector, but to also take into account the informal sector. This is a 
perspective that is emphasized in a very recent report on the Economy of 
the North (Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2006).  
12.3.3. Valuing the Informal Economy 
There are two major problems connected to understanding the informal 
sector. On one hand, it is difficult to get access to basic data. On the other 
hand it is difficult to convert the basic data – usually qualitative observa-
tions related to participant observations made possible by extended field 
residence, or by harvest and/or diet data through recall surveys – into eco-
nomic categories. The approach to the analysis differs, but is dominated 
either by registration the frequency of consumption of country foods such 
as through Statistics Greenland (1993), the ongoing SLICA analysis, or 
registration of volume, for instance Berkes (1990) and Wolfe and Walker 
(1987). A more general approach often taken is the assigning of economic 
values to the informal and subsistence activities. This is done either 
through the replacement value, i.e. what the price would be if the same 
volume of products would have been bought in the shop, or through the 
commercial sale price, i.e. what the price would be if the quantity should 
have been sold to a local producer. Roots (1981), however, emphasizes that 
such accounting is difficult because the base of value is constantly chang-
ing. In the case of Greenland however, an objective exchange scale is more 
easy to create than in most other places in the Arctic, as the informal sector 
and the existence of local markets has resulted in a situation where price 
setting on the informal market, and in informal relations, tend to be very 
close to official shop prices. Consequently the open market price is very 
close to the real value of the products. Hunters and fishers today, however, 
have at least four possibilities of marketing country foods: to sell them 
privately within a community, to local institutions, through the local mar-
ket or to the processing plants. Only by sale to the processing plant the 
price level is considerably lower than in the three other situations. So in the 
case of Greenland the conversion is rather easy. And this is the rationale 
behind figure 1 and 2 (based on Rasmussen 2005) on next page.  
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12.3.4. Informal Economic Activities in Greenland 
There are two different views on the informal economic activities pre-
sented in the following. The first is on the differences between informal 
activities in towns and villages (Figure 1), and the other is on re-
gional/municipal differences in the role of the informal sector in the econ-
omy as such (Figure 2). 
In figure 1 the graph shows the total money value and its distribution be-
tween main categories of informal relations in both towns and villages in 
Greenland. The total value of informal economic activities accounts to 
around 130 million DKK, more or less equally divided between towns and 
villages. All towns and many villages have a local marketplace, organized 
and maintained by the municipal authorities in cooperation with KNAPK, 
the Hunters and Fishermen’s organization. To put the numbers in perspec-
tive, the total value of all landings of hunting and fishing products from the 
small and medium scale activities (excluding the large off-shore fisheries 
that has no direct impact in towns and villages) is around 4–500 million 
DKK. So as indicated through the level shown, this is a very important activ-
ity both in towns and villages, however with a substantial larger market in 
the towns, simply because of the larger share of population in these places.  
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Figure 1. Informal economy in towns and villages in Greenland. The data show re-
placement value in DKK in the main groups of activities 
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Figure 2. Main sources of income in three settlements, Sisimiut with a thriving self 
sustained economy, Paamiut with a stagnating dependen economy, and Tasiilaq with a 
detached economy. For a discussion of the three concepts, see Rasmussen and Tomma-
sini, 2003 
 
Sales to institutions include sales to kindergartens, old age homes etc., and 
accounts for only a small part of the informal economy. These sales are 
important, however, because they provide these institutions with fresh 
country-food. Similarly, the sale to restaurants accounts for a small part of 
the informal economy. The activity is increasing as tourism becomes more 
widespread. 
Sale to families and friends is an important activity in the towns, while 
the habit of gift giving, i.e. distributing the products for free, is much more 
widespread in the villages.  
The subsistence production, i.e. products for idividual consumption, is 
an important element in both towns and villages, but is by far the largest 
activity in the villages. 
In order to get a fuller picture of the importance of the informal econ-
omy in relation to other income sources, the graph on figure 2 above shows 
the main income sources for three different places in Greenland. The fig-
ures show the average income per person in each of the places. The income 
is provided primarily through formal incomes sources such as wages. Sec-
ond to formal wages is income from the direct transfers category, which 
includes pensions, child support, social support and benefits. The formal 
sale category, which includes sale to local processing units and other busi-
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nesses approved by the authorities, is subdivided in the two groups, fish 
products and hunting products. The informal sale category includes all the 
categories shown on figure 1 except own consumption, which is presented 
in this graph as the category subsistence. 
The graph shows differentiation in the importance of the various in-
come categories throughout different regions. These municipalities have 
been chosen in order to show the three corners of a triangle which would 
include other settlements in Greenland in between them: Sisimiut on the 
West-coast, one of the largest towns and characterized by a thriving econ-
omy which could be characterized as a self sustaining economy; Paamiut, 
also on the West-coast, which used to be a centre for cod processing, but 
after the cod disappeared the town has been on a steady decline, and there-
fore representing a highly dependent economy; and Tasiilaq on the East-
coast, a town which never has become an integrated part of the Greenland 
economy, and therefore is characterized as a detached economy. 
Sisimiut has its major income source from wage earnings, both in con-
nection with land-based activities and those within fishery sector such as 
work on trawlers and in fish plants. There are substantial contributions 
from transfers, typically in the form of child support, old age pensions etc., 
but also contributions from the formal sale of fish products. On top of this, 
there are contributions from the informal sale especially from the local 
market and finally from subsistence production. 
In Paamiut the incomes from wage work contributes to the economy, 
but on an equal base with the transfer payments because many of the wage 
earning opportunities vanished when cod fisheries disappeared. There is a 
small contribution from the formal sale of fish products, just as there is 
some informal sale on the local market and to institutions. Compared to 
Sisimiut, however, subsistence production plays a substantially larger role. 
In Tasiilaq the three sectors – formal incomes, transfer payments, and 
informal and subsistence activities are almost equal in size. The subsis-
tence production category is especially decisive for the individual econ-
omy, compared to the two other places. 
In relation to settlement size the formal economy, i.e. wage incomes 
and incomes in connection with the sale of hunting and fishing products to 
registered producers, clearly dominates within the larger settlements, while 
also playing an important role for the small settlements. Of equal impor-
tance within the small settlements, are the transfers, which in absolute 
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values, are of the same size as in the larger settlements, but due to gener-
ally higher incomes in larger places, the relative role of the transfers is 
diminished. Informal economic activities are important in all settlement 
types, but most markedly in the mid-sized settlements. This is partly due to 
the fact, that many hunters and fishermen from medium sized settlements 
are bringing their products to the markets in the large towns, where the 
market is larger. The subsistence sector is present at all levels, but most 
represented within the small settlements.  
12.3.5. Coping with Changes 
The patterns described above seems to be compliant with for instance the 
observations of Wolfe and Walker (1987) by showing how the combina-
tion of subsistence and commercial-wage activities provide the economic 
basis for the way of life in many rural communities. And besides the lever 
function in relation to the formal market economy, there is no doubt that 
the subsistence sector has been a crucial element in the resilience and con-
tinuous existence of many of the small settlements – “bygder” – in 
Greenland. And this is a pattern, which seems to continue in the future in 
Greenland and in the Arctic in general. Moreover, there are a variety of 
other contexts where the informal economy seems to be of importance in 
relation to the communities” ability to cope with ongoing changes. 
One thing, which seems to be absent in both Canada and Alaska is a 
market place where informal economic transactions can take place. The 
lack of a market place seems to have some implications for the mainte-
nance of traditional food as the Arctic is moving into more commercialized 
economies. As in the rest of Arctic North-America, the trade monopolies in 
Greenland tended to serve as a carrier for more southern food habits, and 
bring along alien products such as pork, beef, and especially poultry. This 
process partly succeeded in Canada, and for decades it also seemed to be 
the case in the large settlements in Greenland as well. But due to the avail-
ability of country food at the local market, and thereby the maintenance of 
a continuing demand, the products were introduced in the shops during the 
80’s, and are today considered staple foods in all types of settlements 
(Rasmussen 1998b).  
A general characteristic of the role of both subsistence and informal 
economy in the North is that they can be characterized as being a “means 
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of coping with crisis”. This pattern has definitely been seen in connection 
with an analysis of informal economic activities in Greenland and in the 
Russian north114, as well as in rural areas in Denmark115.  
Here is a lits of rationales emphasized in the surveys:  
 
 The informal economy providing support to dwindling pension 
economies, especially in connection with the economic consequences 
of devaluation of the Ruble in the late 1990s.  
 Adjusting abnormalities in wage work arrangements, for instance in 
situations where salaries to employees have been postponed due to lack 
of funding of the employer.  
 Adjusting economic discrepancies in families and among relatives.  
 Individual survival strategies or more collectively organized approaches 
to coping with crisis.  
 Enabling the maintenance of links to the formal economy for persons 
otherwise outside the formal sector, and thereby providing a re-
distribution of formal economies. 
 Maintaining local production, which may not be possible within a 
formal system due to regulations, monopolies and similar obstacles.  
 Provides local products available and accessible for a larger audience, 
such as in situations where the commercial value is low, but markets 
still exist. 
 And in Russia as in Greenland, providing the basic means of existence 
in otherwise condemned settlements. 
 
The informal economy is, in the settings described here, much more than 
what is usually thought of when referring to “black economy”. The infor-
mal economy in many ways seems to be a “problem solver”, both in rela-
                                                        
114 A number of surveys have been done in NW Russia, on the Kola Peninsula, in the Karelian 
Republic and in the Leningrad district, from 1998 to 2007. The surveys have been based on field 
work registration of different types of informal economic activities, and interviews with both 
contributors and consumers of these informal economic activities. The results are going to be 
published in 2008.  
115 In a report by Rasmussen (2007a) regarding informal economic activities on the island 
Samsø in Denmark, three important roles are identified. First for the economy of the participants, 
who in many cases are pensioners where informal economic activities are providing substantial 
additions to an otherwise limited pension. Second, by contributing to the survival and maintenance 
of a local community which otherwise would be economically challenged. And thirdly, by provid-
ing a connection between local inhabitants and tourists, as the informal economic relations seems 
to provide the tourists with a feeling of “belonging” and an experience of “authenticity”.  
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tion to risk and insecurity management. It is able to establish linkages be-
tween households, and between subsistence and the formal economy, while 
generating a economic base for many communities. In contrary to expecta-
tions, the informal economy is becoming increasingly important as Arctic 
communities are becoming more dependent on tourism. When tourists are 
visiting northern towns and villages they are not only expecting to get 
access to locally produced handicrafts, but also to meet the craftsmen 
themselves, visiting the informal marketplace, seeing how the pieces are 
produced, how the fish is caught and dried – all these elements contributes 
to the sense of relating to the place in a way which becomes an increas-
ingly important part of the touristic experience, and thereby becomes a 
major attraction (Rasmussen 2007a).  
12.4. Generation and Gender relations 
As emphasized above, marked regional gender and generational differ-
ences in aspirations and development perspectives have evolved over the 
last 10–15 years. These changes have been characterized by a pattern of 
out-migration of women (especially from rural areas), and a female domi-
nance within medium and high education (Rauhut et. al 2008). This is not a 
situation only characterizing the Nordic countries. It is a pattern, which has 
emerged in most of the developed countries, and relates to some general 
tendencies in relation to changes in the gendered division of labor, and in 
economic development in general (Rasmussen 2007b; Rasmussen 2007c). 
Moreover, it is a situation that requires a new typology in order to describe 
the changing regional characteristics. This typology should at least empha-
size the two key components: aspiration backgrounds for out-migration 
and the role of education in connection with economic development. These 
factors seem to become indicative of a new regional re-structuring.  
12.4.1. Out-migration Patterns 
As discussed in several reports (Hamilton 2003; Hamilton and Butler 2001; 
Hamilton, Haedrich and Duncan 2004; Hamilton and Otterstad 1998; Hamil-
ton and Seyfrit 1994; Rasmussen 2005), similar patterns regarding gender 
differences in affinity to rural community life seem to characterize northern 
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communities. More females than males tend to migrate permanently away 
from their home community and region. This migration is on one hand to 
look for job opportunities, which better fit their qualifications, but also social 
and cultural opportunities outside those characterizing the traditional eco-
nomic activities in their communities. These patterns are similar to what is 
found in for instance rural areas experiencing restructuring and decline of the 
agriculture sector that is parallel to the growth of the service sector. These 
economic and social changes fundamentally affect women. Indicators from 
EU research as well as research in North America reveal that the employ-
ment rates for both men and women are lower in rural areas; just as unem-
ployment combined with a lack of diversification in employment is more 
common for women than for rural men.  
The rural areas are experiencing marked demographic, social and cul-
tural changes. As the process of change in the dependency structures be-
come more evident, women tend to experience negative short and long-
term consequences in careers, earnings and pensions. This has severe con-
sequences for migration patterns that contribute to a continuing out-
migration of young and well-trained persons. As the majority of those who 
leave are women, there are negative impact on the social life and economy 
of the rural area. Negative impacts include effects on opportunities for 
marriage, the maintenance of family life and family structures, and cultural 
activities (Rauhut et. al 2008; Rasmussen 2005). 
12.4.2. Response to Challenges  
The relatively high number of women employed in the service sector has 
been argued to represent “an escape valve” from the traditional rural struc-
ture based on highly mechanized, masculine primary sector activities to-
wards a new, more diversified socio-economic structure in which women 
are able to participate, and receive a salary and social protection. These 
patterns can be seen as being connected to a number of gender-related 
differences in aspirations and approaches to change. 
In relation to questions on work and work-related activities, the percep-
tions of customary male activities related to renewable resource exploita-
tion seem to be “sticky”. The male discourse – and even more the prevail-
ing discourse in respect to males – has difficulty in moving on from what 
once were key activities, but which now constitutes only a miniscule part 
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of the available jobs. It characterizes the whole circumpolar North as hav-
ing only between 5% and 20% of the economic activities being actually 
related to the primary sector, but this fact is very seldom revealed. Instead, 
the stereotypical images of the North consistent with hunting, fishing, kay-
aks, dog-sledges, reindeer etc. are prevalent in the dominant framework, 
giving identity to the maintaining of a traditional paternalistic system. The 
maintenance of this view impairs the development of images that might 
provide an authentic framework for the upcoming generation.  
Contrary to the above is the belief that females are socialized into col-
lective activities, more attentive to other’s needs, and consequently are 
much more open to change (Rasmussen 2007c; Hansen 1992; Petersen 
2002; Nathansen 2004). As a result of this, women become less limited by 
specific job characteristics. Males seem to be socialized into paths of de-
pendency often creating difficulties in accepting other paths and changes, 
while females tend to be socialized into situations where adjustment and 
change are required. This enables females to move to new job categories 
and job options, and enables them much better adjusted to change through 
the educational system.  
12.4.3. Development Requires Space for Women and the Generation 
Since WWII, there has been a re-creation of spaces for indigenous peoples 
in the North that has included the establishment of relative autonomy and 
new spaces for development of aboriginal societies and cultures. The proc-
ess, however, seems to have stagnated with a repetition of stereotypes in-
stead of showing new perspectives. The focus on traditions as they are 
reflected in traditional male activities has been at the expense of losing part 
of the next generation, as well as showing a marked gender bias. Even the 
structures of gender relations, which have undergone changes during the 
last decades have not always been to the betterment of women’s roles and 
status. Improvement in the lives of indigenous women has too often been 
sacrificed for the preservation of a broader societal harmony. There are 
numerous situations where women have participated in the struggles to 
liberate their nations, and then afterwards find themselves under new mas-
ters, this time in the guise of their own men (Green 2007). Very often 
when the traditional gendered practices of hunting and fishing turns out to 
be of limited value to the community, violence has become a key means of 
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maintaining the power structure (Rasmussen 2007c). As a consequence 
many women and future generations in general, are seeking opportunities 
outside their communities to look for options where they are appreciated 
due to their skills, knowledge, and personal qualities, and not because they 
are needed to re-produce a stagnated patriarchy. This process does not 
cease through a repeated focus on traditional activities such as hunting, 
fishing, mining etc. – jobs only appealing to a certain group of males. In 
order for the North to play an active part in a globally shared culture and 
economy, there is a need for new initiatives that offer opportunities to well 
educated females and younger generations.  
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13. Presenting the Economy of the 
North116 
 
Solveig Glomsröd
117
and Iulie Aslaksen118 
The purpose of the ECONOR project and the report Economy of the 
North is to give a comprehensive overview of the Arctic economy. This 
also includes the subsistence economy of the indigenous people within the 
region. The report discusses the importance of the Arctic economy from a 
global perspective, with particular focus on natural resources. The report 
also discusses the likely effects climate change will have on the Arctic 
economy. These particular impacts being more relevant as temperature 
increases are expected to be more extreme and rapid in the Arctic region 
than elsewhere. With the focus on economics, this report complements the 
perspective of the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR 20004). 
This overview of the Arctic economy may help policy makers better un-
derstand the position of various stakeholders including large scale com-
mercial interests, local and central governments, the indigenous peoples, 
and Arctic citizens as a whole. 
In 2002, the population of the circumpolar Arctic was estimated at ap-
proximately 10 million. The Arctic share of global population is only 0.16 
per cent. With respect to the share of global production of goods and ser-
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vices in terms of measured gross domestic product (GDP), the Arctic share 
is somewhat higher at 0.44 per cent. While these numbers could give the 
impression that the Arctic plays a minor role in the global economy, the 
picture changes radically if we look at the relative importance raw re-
sources have to the world. The Arctic has abundant natural resources, from 
petroleum and minerals, to fish and forests. Given the important role the 
Arctic has as a provider of raw materials of all sorts, natural resource man-
agement is crucial, and is likely to become even more crucial in the future 
due to climate change. One example of a challenge encountered if the mi-
gratory patterns or extension of a fish stock change. Another example is 
associated with the management of mineral resources and fossil fuels. Pol-
lution issues will also be of increased importance as economic activity 
expands in the Arctic. Since pollution migrates across borders and affect 
global public goods like clean air, water, biodiversity and wildlife, these 
issues will also result in increasing demands on transnational mechanisms 
for coordination.  
The Arctic regions belong to different nations. A consequence of this is 
that information on social and economic issues have been dispersed and 
not easily available at the circumpolar level. This clearly applies to the 
information on the economy. Among several of the good reasons for com-
piling an overview of the circumpolar Arctic economy is the need for an 
information platform from where to assess the sustainability of the Arctic 
communities in terms of natural wealth management and vulnerability 
towards global policies and trends. A central task of this report is to con-
tribute to filling this gap by presenting a comprehensive overview of the 
scale and structure of the circumpolar Arctic economy.  
The Arctic is made up of 28 separate regions in 8 different countries: 
Arctic Russia includes the Republics of Karelia and Komi, the Murmansk 
and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, the Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi Autono-
mous Okrugs, the Taimyr and Evenkia former Autonomous Okrugs, the 
Republic of Sakha, the Magadan Oblast, and the Chukotka and Koryakia 
Autonomous Okrugs. The North American Arctic includes Alaska and the 
Northern territories of Canada (Northwest Territories, Yukon, Nunavut). 
The European Arctic consists of Greenland, Faroe Islands, Iceland and 
Arctic Norway (including the Svalbard Archipelago and Jan Mayen), Arc-
tic Sweden and Arctic Finland.  
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In resource rich communities within the Arctic, the sustainability of 
wealth management is particularly important. Resources that have been ex-
tracted from the ground represent a loss in wealth that should not be counted 
as income. However, by national account conventions it is still included as 
income. Because the natural wealth is not explicitly accounted for, it can 
easily be consumed contrary to principles of long-term sustainability. 
13.1. The economy of the Arctic 
The primary sector in the Arctic consists primarily of two types of activi-
ties, large-scale extraction of non-renewable resources and harvesting of 
renewable resources. The secondary sector (industry) plays a substantial 
role in some Arctic regions. The tertiary sector (service industries) ac-
counts for more than 50 per cent of economic activity.  
The three Russian regions of Khanty-Mansi, Yamalo-Nenets and 
Sakha, and Alaska generate more than 60 per cent of Arctic economic 
activity. Large-scale resource extraction activities are a major feature of 
the economy of these regions. Northern Russia is a major producer of oil 
and natural gas, representing two-thirds of all circumpolar economic activ-
ity. When combined with the economy of Alaska, their combined propor-
tion reaches three-quarters.  
Arctic Russia’s production is very concentrated in the regions of the 
Yamalo-Nenets, Khanty-Mansi and Chukotka. Other Russian regions have 
per capita GDP below the circumpolar average. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate 
GDP and GDP per capita for the Arctic regions. 
When the circumpolar Arctic regions are analyzed according to their 
per capita economic output, Figure 2 shows that the Canadian Northwest 
Territories have the highest per capita gross domestic product. This situa-
tion is due to a low population density combined with significant diamond 
production.  
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Figure 1. GDP, Arctic Regions. 2003. Billion USD-PPP 
 
Practically all the Arctic regions of Scandinavia, along with Iceland, 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, have a GDP per capita around the aver-
age for the circumpolar Arctic. These regions all have relatively diversified 
economies, a relatively high standard of living and denser economic devel-
opment than elsewhere in the Arctic countries.  
One should be aware that high GDP per capita levels do not automatically 
transform to high levels of disposable income and/or consumption. This is 
particularly true in the regions with substantial extractive industries. On the 
one hand, resource rents and return to capital may be transferred out of the 
region to capital owners. Although, these figures will still add to regional 
GDP, they will not be available for consumption or saving in the region.  
The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008  243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP, Arctic Regions. 2003. USD-PPP per capita 
 
On the other hand, direct state transfers will contribute to per capita levels of 
disposable income and/or consumption, but will not show up in regional 
GDP figures. Hence, a ranking of regional disposable income or consump-
tion levels in the Arctic may show a different pattern from GDP per capita. 
Figure 3 shows the composition of industries in the main Arctic regions, 
while Figure 4 shows the composition of the resource-based industries. Ice-
land, whose fishing industry continues to be important, also has a developed 
tourism industry, as do the Arctic portions of the Scandinavian countries due 
to ship and road infrastructure. Greenland is a major exporter of shrimp for 
world markets, and also has a relatively large tertiary sector. In Finland, the 
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manufacturing sector, which is relatively undeveloped everywhere else, has 
undergone a remarkable boom in the Oulu region due to the presence of the 
mobile telephone industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Value added by main industry in Arctic regions (except Russia). 2002 (Per 
cent of regional GDP). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Value added. Natural resource based and other industries by Arctic regions. 
2002 (Per cent of regional GDP). 
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When contemplating the Arctic economies, the comment is frequently 
made that the raw materials are exported out of the Arctic region with 
minimal local processing. The share of manufacturing is still low in Arctic 
regions. Economic diversity is a kind of insurance to the societies. How-
ever, secondary industries do not necessarily provide diversification. For 
instance, in fishery intensive economies, the fish processing industry 
closely follows the cycles of the primary fisheries rather than reducing the 
problems of resource and market vulnerability. 
13.2. Arctic natural resources  
The Arctic is richly endowed with petroleum, minerals, fish and forests 
that increasingly attract interest and mobilize the purchasing power of the 
global economy. Petroleum production in the Arctic is mainly taking place 
in Alaska and Northern Russia. The Arctic shares of global oil and gas 
production are 10.5 and 25.5 per cent, respectively. Further, according to a 
US Geological Survey completed in 2000, Arctic shares of global proven 
and undiscovered reserves of oil and gas are around 14 and 23 per cent, 
respectively. Hence, the Arctic is likely to continue to play a major role in 
the global energy supply.  
The Arctic holds 5.3 and 21.7 percent of the total proven global re-
serves of oil and gas. Almost all of the Arctic proven gas reserves are 
found in Russia. 
Besides proven reserves, there probably exist large endowments of un-
discovered petroleum resources. Based on geological evidence and meth-
ods, such undiscovered resources can be assessed. The Arctic share 
amounts to 20.5 per cent and 27.6 per cent of undiscovered oil and gas, 
respectively.  
In addition to oil and gas, the Arctic region contains other abundant 
mineral resources, in particular nickel, cobalt, tungsten, palladium and 
platinum. Many known reserves are not exploited because of their inacces-
sibility. Arctic Russia extracts the largest amount of minerals, but the other 
Arctic nations also have important extractive industries providing raw 
materials to the world economy.  
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Figure 5. Arctic share of global petroleum production. 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Arctic share of proven petroleum reserves 2002 Quantities indicated with 
reasonable certainty from geological and engineering information that that can be 
recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic operating con-
ditions. 
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Figure 7. Arctic share of undiscovered petroleum resources. 2002 
 
The catch of fish in the Arctic in 2002 amounted to around 10 per cent of 
the world catch. In addition to the marine wild fish catch, there are Arctic 
fisheries of shrimp and snow crab. In 2002, the Arctic catch of these two 
species was 5.3 per cent of the global catch of crustaceans. The total Arctic 
fish farming of salmon and trout was around 7.7 per cent of the world 
aquaculture production of these species. 
The forests of the Arctic make up 8 percent of global wood volume. 
These forests represent the largest natural forests in the world, but most of 
the boreal forests are uncultivated due to the harsh climate, remoteness and 
lack of infrastructure. Only 2.2 per cent of total wood removal, in million 
cubic meters, takes place in the Arctic. 
13.3. Subsistence and market economies in the Arctic 
Although the importance of the subsistence economy in the Arctic is now 
becoming more widely recognized, sufficient data is not yet available to 
give a comprehensive picture of subsistence activities. One of the purposes 
in launching the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) was to 
help to fill this gap. SLiCA is based on more than 7 000 personal inter-
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views with native adults (aged 15 and above) in Greenland, Canada, 
Alaska, and the Chukotka region in Russia.  
Figure 8 shows the proportion of meat and fish harvested and consumed 
by Arctic households is still high within Inuit communities. In total, five 
out of ten households report that they harvested about half or more of all 
the meat and fish the family ate. Six out of ten Inuit households in Chu-
kotka and Alaska report that they harvested about half or more of their 
meat and fish consumption, whereas less than ten per cent did not harvest 
at all. For Greenland, the harvest activity is smaller than Chukotka and 
Alaska with less than 40 per cent of the Greenland households reporting 
that they fish, hunt and gather half of their household traditional.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Proportion of meat and fish consumption harvested by households. Regional 
Surveys 2001–2006 
 
A socio-economic analysis of Greenland hunters was conducted in 2003–
2005, that surveyed their attitudes towards hunting, what they caught, and 
their expenses for hunting and fishing equipment (Rasmussen 2005). Esti-
mating the total value of informal supply leads to an estimate of 182 mil-
lion DKK. Table 1 shows that the total informal production is almost as 
large as total value of sales for hunting activities. 
The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008  249 
Reindeer and caribou represent principle subsistence resources for 
many indigenous people in the rural regions of the Arctic. Their value as 
nutritional and economic resource is closely connected to their value in 
maintaining culture and identity. The sustainability of reindeer and caribou 
herding and hunting relates to ecology, socio-economic conditions and the 
transmission of cultural traditions from one generation to the next, as well 
as political processes at a regional, national and international levels 
(Jernsletten and Klokov 2002, Ulvevadet and Klokov 2004).  
Climate change can substantially influence the conditions for subsis-
tence in the Arctic. The different signs of climate change have been a 
growing concern for Arctic residents. These signs include longer sea ice-
free seasons, soil erosion, melting glaciers creating torrents in place of 
streams and unpredictable weather. Moreover, environmental toxins, with 
a high degree of accumulation in northern regions, are found in Arctic 
animals at increasingly high levels.  
Table 1. Total estimated sales value and value of informal economic activities by 
professional and leisure-time hunters in Greenland. Annual average 1993–2002. 
Million DKK  
 Professional hunters Leisure-time hunters Total 
Sale 196 10 206 
Informal value 130 52 182 
Source: Rasmussen (2005). 
 
Today, indigenous peoples live in greatly circumscribed social and eco-
nomic situation. Their hunting and herding activities are determined to a 
large extent, by resource management regimes and local, regional, and 
global economic market situations that reduce their ability to adapt and 
cope with climate variability and change. While they experience stress 
from other sources, which threaten their lifestyles and cultures, climate 
change magnifies these threats. (Weller 2005). 
13.4. Concluding remarks 
The ACIA (2005) report concludes that climate change impacts are likely 
to be larger and more rapid in the Arctic than in any other region. Eco-
nomic activities, including subsistence activities, can be strongly affected 
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by climate change. As more attention is brought to the intertwined nature 
of the market economy and subsistence economy and its importance for the 
well being of Arctic peoples – an important challenge for analysts and 
policy-makers is to develop measures to understand how subsistence ac-
tivities are impacted by climate change. Subsistence activities can be in-
cluded as sustainable development indicators, or as «satellite accounts» to 
the national accounts (United Nations 1993).  
A continued effort by Arctic statistical agencies and researchers to ex-
tract and compile economic, environmental and social statistics for the 
Arctic regions is necessary to improve our knowledge base. More informa-
tion is needed on disposable income, consumption and social welfare 
within regions. Measurements to social welfare should be oriented towards 
understanding the implications of climate change and trans-boundary pol-
lution. More research is needed on Arctic natural resources, with focus on 
management strategies for sustainable development. 
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14. Analyzing Arctic Social Realities 
– ArcticStat 
 
Andrée Caron119 and Gérard Duhaime120 
Up until recently, it was hard to make interregional or international com-
parisons concerning Arctic regions in the domain of social realities. When 
data existed, they were scattered, not always available, and their internal 
and external validity was not always explicitly proven. The standardization 
and computerization of data produced by national agencies have helped 
improve this situation. In response to the growing and specific requests 
from government organizations, in particular those of the United Nations 
and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, a cer-
tain standardization of concepts and methods has gradually taken place, 
extending first to domains such as demography and the System of National 
Accounts. Moreover, the agencies have published methodological notes 
specifying the conceptual and methodological characteristics of their own 
production. Still today, the American and Canadians systems of national 
accounts exhibit differences, just as do the European systems. Work seek-
ing to increase this standardization, under the additional impetus of conti-
nental unification in America and in Europe, is continuing and is giving 
rise to new classifications, for example.  
Despite these efforts, comparisons were laborious, if not impossible, for 
a very long time. The first attempts that we made, beginning at the end of 
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the 1980s, met with numerous obstacles. It was necessary to find a repre-
sentative who would be willing to transmit, by mail or in person during 
scientific events, sets of data and metadata; a long and complex dialogue 
had to be maintained in order to render the data comparable. The secrecy 
surrounding the data emanating from the USSR made valid comparisons 
impossible, not because one could not gain access to statistics (in the years 
immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, documents of 
this nature could be bought on the street), but mainly because it was virtu-
ally impossible to evaluate the validity of such data, because the concep-
tual differences underlying the calculations of the macroeconomic aggre-
gates such as the Gross Domestic Product were fundamental and because, 
more often than not, the data concerning Arctic regions could not be found 
or were very fragmented.  
The computerization of data produced by national agencies, which be-
came generalized around the 1970s (in Canada, the first census, the data of 
which were available in electronic format, was that of 1971), but above all 
the availability of their socioeconomic databanks on the Internet, beginning 
in the mid–1990s, altered the ability to do research. Data and metadata 
gradually became more abundant and more readily accessible. But the 
burden had not been reduced decisively. To arrive at valid comparisons, 
the researcher had to complete a large number of long and complex steps, 
the success of which was still uncertain. Armed with patience, the re-
searcher first had to find the web sites of each national agency. The situa-
tion was not as straightforward as one might think. In most countries, sev-
eral agencies divvy up the work. In Canada, Statistics Canada produces 
multiple sets of basic data published on its site; these data are then reused 
and republished by provincial and territorial agencies, which also produce 
exclusive surveys. A similar situation may be found in the United States 
where it is even more complex. Not only does the U.S. Census Bureau 
supply data to state agencies, not only do state agencies produce their own 
exclusive data, there are also several other national agencies that are re-
sponsible for sets of specialized data in the economy, education and health 
fields, for example. Data concerning the Russian Federation are available 
not only on the web site of Rosstat (which used to be known as Goskom-
stat Russia prior to 2004), but also on para-State or even private sites, the 
validity of which is considered doubtful from the perspective of the na-
tional agency. Certain agencies occasionally experience partial service 
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interruptions for extended periods of time. Once the sites have been identi-
fied, the researcher must then navigate through these labyrinths, each hav-
ing its own unique interface and occasionally being characterized by a 
disconcerting complexity, in order to find the data sets she needs for her 
work. Specialists sometimes get lost in these sites, much like archaeolo-
gists in the pyramids. Besides, the researcher does not always have the 
opportunity to dig very deeply, realizing that some sites produce data only 
in the national language. During the initial years of operation on the Inter-
net of these sites, the researcher often had no other possibility than to tran-
scribe by hand the data found or, in the best of cases, to print these data. 
Computer development had not yet made it possible to select, paste on a 
virtual clipboard and then copy these data into a spreadsheet program or a 
word-processing program. It was only exceptionally that the researcher 
was able to request custom-tailored compilations, for example isolating a 
given region in particular. The researcher often came to the realization that 
regional data did not exist. But when such data were indeed available, the 
absence of flexibility in the geographical divisions did not always allow 
the researcher to have access to the data covering Arctic areas, or on the 
contrary, the extreme dis-aggregation of data in census areas required al-
most monastic patience to combine all of the data concerning an Arctic 
region in particular. In Russia, the availability of data grew after the diffi-
cult 1990s. The web site of Rosstat is impressive, especially when one 
compares the abundance of data available on the site to the scarcity, even 
the secrecy, of the previous period. Nevertheless, data concerning the Arc-
tic regions are not found on the site: to have access to such data, one still 
has to proceed by mail order and the data are delivered in Russian only. Up 
until just recently, the geographical division on the site reproduced the 
political division in “subjects of the Federation”, with the end result that 
the researcher interested in the Arctic regions had to resign himself to in-
cluding in his compilations what clearly were southern portions of repub-
lics overlapping the polar circle, comprised in the aggregate statistics (and 
then to overstate the results) or, conversely, to exclude them (and thus 
understate the results).  
Today, several of these pitfalls have been partially lifted. But others 
remain. The conceptual and methodological differences have far from 
disappeared, and they are not likely to disappear over the short term. 
Rosstat announced major efforts to make the data dealing with the Federa-
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tion more easily comparable with those concerning Europe. In the mean-
time, concordances help guide the data conversion work. Similarly, it is 
still impossible to obtain basic dis-aggregations in such domains as demog-
raphy, health and education for example, in order to grasp the reality of the 
Aboriginal People inhabiting the North. This is particularly true in Finland 
and Sweden, where the national agencies are not authorized to gather data 
on ethnic affiliation. This situation is not limited to the Arctic. Indeed, the 
United Nations Permanent Forum described the improvement of the statis-
tical coverage of the Aboriginal People as being an urgent priority on In-
digenous Issues in 2004. A survey of statistical agencies publishing disag-
gregated data for the Aboriginal People, conducted by the Statistics Divi-
sion of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
concludes that barely 80 national agencies publish such data, and do so for 
three indicators only (ethnicity, language and religion). The situation is 
such that the Permanent Forum invited those national agencies that do not 
already do so to modify their practices so that, in the future, the data can be 
disaggregated to report on the situation of the Aboriginal People. A group 
of international agencies associated with the United Nations, the Inter-
Agency Support Group, has undertaken work promoting the collection of 
social statistical data concerning Aboriginal realities.  
Finally, other barriers have recently been erected. Certain agencies such 
as Statistics Finland and Statistics Canada now apply a cost recovery policy 
to the dissemination of some of their products. This policy limits free public 
access to data subsets and requires that the researcher purchase them. This 
obligation is frequent in the case of data dealing with specific regions and all 
the more so, for indicators that are not deemed to be of “sufficient general-
ity” to be available free of charge. Hence, the difficulty of carrying out sys-
tematic comparative studies continues to be major.  
That is why we began the construction of the ArcticStat databank in 
2002. It was designed, within the context of a one-stop, systematic and 
easy-to-use framework, to help researchers identify all of the existing ta-
bles in the agencies in question dealing with the socioeconomic realities of 
the Circumpolar Arctic regions.  
An experimental phase preceded the design and development of the ac-
tual databank. The purpose of this phase was to check if it was indeed pos-
sible, in a precise domain of human activity, to identify on the agencies” 
websites tables dealing with each of the Arctic regions of all the countries 
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in question, to process the tables in such a way as to make them compara-
ble and from there, to produce a global description and analysis (where the 
Arctic can be considered as one “region” within the meaning of global 
geopolitics) and regional (where each of the regions can be compared to 
the others). We chose the measurement of the economy. To carry out the 
work, it was necessary to compile: demographic data, which are invaluable 
for making per capita calculations; economic data, measurements of the 
Gross Domestic Product according to various calculation methods, includ-
ing the industrial distribution of economic activity; data on the industrial 
distribution of the labor force to make up for possible shortcomings in 
GDP data; data on exchange rates and price indices to convert data into a 
single reference currency, and to tie them to a single reference year. The 
initiative was conclusive, but took a long time: one year of work in all, 
most of which was devoted to the search for and the processing of data. It 
led to the publication of “Economics Systems”, in the Arctic Human De-
velopment Report (Duhaime et al. 2004), the first comprehensive portrait 
of the economy of the Circumpolar Arctic based on rigorously comparable 
statistical data. Based on this experimentation, the construction of ArctiStat 
was carried out in the following years. Even before putting the databank 
into service, we had made sufficient progress to update this economic por-
trait, published under the title of “The Economy of the Circumpolar Arc-
tic”, in The Economy of the North (Duhaime & Caron 2006). This opera-
tion was also conclusive: it took only a few weeks to locate all of the nec-
essary data.  
The two publications just mentioned were the result of ambitious pro-
jects supported by the Arctic Council. From a methodological standpoint, 
our colleagues arrived in both cases at the very same conclusions that we 
had reached earlier. To carry out “Arctic Demography” within the context 
of the AHDR, Bogoyavlenskiy and Siggner (2004) had to devote most of 
the time and the resources allotted to them to collecting data. The same 
constraints were encountered by McDonald, Glomsröd and Mäenpää 
(2006), when working on “Arctic Economy within the Arctic Nations” as 
part of The Economy of the North. In short, they faced the same main ob-
stacle to making systematic circumpolar comparisons based on official 
statistics: the difficulty of finding data.  
These initiatives under the aegis of the Arctic Council represented im-
portant breakthroughs in the field of circumpolar social knowledge. How-
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ever, the approach used in both cases was the same: the comparisons were 
conceptualized and carried out according to compartmentalized ap-
proaches, reproducing more or less the structure of the fields of state com-
petence. AHDR proposes separate descriptions and analyses concerning 
demography, culture, economy, health, education; ECONOR proposes 
examining one of these fields in greater detail from a pronounced single-
disciplinary standpoint. What are the relationships between demography 
and economy in the Circumpolar Arctic? Between economy and educa-
tion? Between education and health? These works do not answer this type 
of question.  
The existence of ArcticStat henceforth makes it possible to overcome 
these limitations, which up until now had been insurmountable. By radi-
cally reducing the time devoted to locating data, this bank offers a new 
research capacity, namely that of analyzing in an integrated manner a vast 
set of valid, easy-to-find and easy-to-process data, dealing with a diversity 
of fields of human activity.  
14.1. ArcticStat an Overview 
ArcticStat is a permanent, public and independent statistical database deal-
ing with the countries, regions and populations of the Circumpolar Arctic. 
ArcticStat was born out of that vision to increase the research capacity by 
taking advantage of already existing data. It is an open-access web-based 
circumpolar socioeconomic statistical database bringing together in a sys-
tematic and coherent whole, data dealing with the population, language, 
health, education, economy, employment and other social realities. Arctic-
Stat covers the Arctic regions of countries that are members of the Arctic 
Council: United States, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Faroe Islands, Nor-
way, Sweden, Finland and the Russian Federation. 
ArcticStat was created by the Canada Research Chair on Comparative 
Aboriginal Condition of Université Laval in Québec, Canada. The core 
financial contribution was provided by the Canada Foundation for Innova-
tion; the Louis-Edmond-Hamelin Chair provided additional financial con-
tributions for Northern Research in Social Sciences, and Indian and North-
ern Affairs Canada. 
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ArcticStat was presented to the Arctic Council during the meeting of 
the Sustainable Development Working Group held in March 2006 in 
Salekhard in the Russian Federation. It was received very enthusiastically 
and obtained unanimous support. It was presented a second time to the 
Arctic Council during the Senior Arctic Officials” meeting held in May in 
Syktyvkar, Russian Federation. Once again, ArcticStat was fully supported 
and received special mention from Norway as being an “outstanding pro-
ject”. The Arctic Council officially endorsed ArcticStat during the ministe-
rial meeting held in Salekhard at the end of October 2006. ArcticStat is 
also an official activity of the International Polar Year.  
14.1.1. Design 
ArcticStat operates mainly as a portal linking users directly to the relevant 
tables on the statistical agencies” web sites; when this procedure is not 
possible, users have access to tables directly stored in the ArcticStat data-
base. The ArcticStat web site has been designed as a user-friendly tool, 
based on three simple indexes from which users can choose: countries and 
regions, indicators and sub-indicators, and different years. Map-based re-
search is also offered through an interactive circumpolar map. 
14.1.2. Geography 
There are several different definitions of the Arctic according to whether 
one relies on physical, geographical, political or administrative characteris-
tics. The territory chosen for ArcticStat draws inspiration from the regions 
covered by 3 scientific and political organizations dedicated to the Arctic: 
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Northern Forum (NF).  The territory 
of ArcticStat is as inclusive as possible. It covers all of the populations 
living in an Arctic region as well as the populations having characteristics 
that are similar to those of Arctic populations or living in a similar envi-
ronment.  
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14.1.3. AMAP (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program).  
AMAP is an international organization concerned about the environment and 
based in Oslo, Norway. Its main objective is to provide the governments of 
the 8 countries having a portion of their territory in the Arctic regions with 
reliable and sufficient information on these regions as well as scientific opin-
ions on the actions that should be taken to combat contaminants in the air, 
soil and the Arctic Ocean. Founded in 1991, AMAP is one of the 4 organiza-
tions that make up the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)121, 
an intergovernmental agreement seeking mainly to protect from pollution the 
ecosystems of the Arctic as well as the human, animal and plant populations 
that are part of these ecosystems. This agreement was passed in 1991 in 
Rovaniemi, Finland during the First Arctic Ministerial Conference122  that 
was attended by the Ministers of the Environment of 8 Arctic countries. 
Since June 1997, it is the Arctic Council123 which has been responsible for 
the continuity of the works undertaken within the context of the AEPS, in-
cluding those of AMAP.  
AMAP basically covers the land and marine regions located north of 
the 66th parallel (polar circle) as well as those located north of the 62nd 
parallel in Asia and north of the 60th parallel in North America. This ex-
tension to the south of the polar circle makes it possible to include the 
marine regions located north of the Aleutian Islands in Alaska; Hudson 
Bay in Canada and certain parts of the North Atlantic including the Labra-
dor Sea (Tables below). 
                                                        
121 The three other programs making up the AEPS are: “Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna” 
(CAFF), dealing with Arctic wildlife and plants, “Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Re-
sponse” (EPPR), the objective of which is to provide a framework for future cooperation to deal with 
environmental emergencies, and “Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment” (PAME), which is in 
charge of taking preventive or restoration measures in relation to Arctic marine pollution. 
122 Afterwards, other ministerial conferences were held: in 1993 in Nuuk, Greenland, in 1996 in 
Inuvik, Canada and in 2002 in Inari, Finland. These meetings gave birth to a fifth organization, 
“Sustainable Development and Utilization” (SDU), the chief mandate of which is to propose strate-
gies to governments to help them achieve their sustainable development objectives in the Arctic. 
123 The Arctic Council was created in September 1996 in Ottawa, Canada under the auspices of 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 8 Arctic countries. In June 1997, the Council took under its 
responsibility the organizations and programs created at the time of the adoption of AEPS (Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy) and set up the “Sustainable Development Working Group” 
(SDWG). The mandate of the Council is to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction be-
tween Arctic countries on common questions, in particular those that concern sustainable develop-
ment and the protection of the environment. The Council endeavours to establish common policies on 
the basis of research and recommendations made by the 5 working groups as well as their subgroups.  
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14.1.4. BEAC 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) is an intergovernmental coop-
eration organization for the Barents Sea region. The European Commission 
created BEAC in January 1993 at the time of the signing of the Kirkenes 
Declaration by the various Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Northern Europe 
and the Russian Federation as well124. The main objective of BEAC is to 
promote sustainable economic and social development in the Barents Sea 
region and thereby contribute to the peaceful development of Northern 
Europe125. The territory covered by BEAC is the same as that making up 
the Barents Sea region (Tables below). 
14.1.5. Northern Forum 
The Northern Forum is a non-profit international organization located in 
Anchorage, Alaska and founded in November 1991 following a series of 
international conferences on northern questions126. The Northern Forum 
has given itself two missions: improving the quality of life of the inhabi-
tants of the member regions by giving regional political leaders the means 
to take up common challenges; and supporting sustainable development as 
                                                        
124 BEAC is made up of 7 participants: one representative of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, the Russian Federation and the European Union as well as 9 observers from Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Holland, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
125 Over the years, BEAC has broadened its activities by setting up several working groups. The 
main ones are: “Working Group on Economic Co-operation”, “Working Group on Energy”, “Work-
ing Group on Environment”, “Programme Board on Exchange Grants/Higher Education and Re-
search”, “Ad Hoc Group on Health and Related Social Issues”, “Working Group on the Northern Sea 
Route”, “Steering Committee for the Barents Euro-Arctic Pan-European Transport Area”, “Working 
Group on Youth Policy” and “Working Group on Emergency and Rescue Services Co-operation”. 
126 The first international conference on northern questions was held in Japan in 1974. This con-
ference allowed the participants, political leaders from several regions of Canada and the United 
States as well as representatives of three Scandinavian countries to ascertain that they shared several 
concerns and challenges that needed to be taken up. These stakeholders came to the conclusion that 
better communication and more cooperation could greatly help improve the quality of life of their 
fellow citizens. The second international conference was held in Alberta, Canada in 1979. This 
conference, in which 22 political leaders took part, dealt mainly with the interactions between the 
development of natural resources, the protection of the environment, and housing facilities. The third 
conference, which brought together some 600 delegates, was held in 1990 in Anchorage, Alaska. The 
participants recommended the setting up of a permanent organization that would make possible 
regular meetings between the leaders of the member regions in order to discuss common environ-
mental, human, economic and technological concerns and to implement means to resolve them. The 
fourth conference was the one that officially inaugurated the Northern Forum. It took place in An-
chorage, Alaska in 1991. 
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well as the setting up of socioeconomic cooperation initiatives between 
member regions and between these regions and the rest of the world. The 
Northern Forum is made up of representatives of 25 regional or provincial 
governments of 10 northern countries127 which have in common several 
characteristics that distinguish them from the rest of the world: an econo-
my based on the extraction of natural resources, limited development in-
frastructures, a lack of local capital, a harsh climate, vulnerable ecosys-
tems, sparse, heterogeneous and largely Aboriginal populations. 
The territory covered by the Northern Forum is vast and scattered: it 
does not include all of the regions located north of the polar circle (all of 
Northern Canada and Greenland are not members of this organizations) but 
it comprises several regions that are far away (Japan, Korea, Sakhalin re-
gion in Russia, Mongolia) (Tables below). 
14.2. An inclusive approach 
The combination of the territories covered by AMAP and BEAC made it 
possible to make a first geographical delimitation of the circumpolar world. 
The latter included all of the regions located to the north of the polar circle 
and a few regions located to the south. But this delimitation was not totally 
inclusive: the Svalbard Archipelago was absent as were four Russian regions 
contiguous to the polar circle. Out of a concern to include all of the popula-
tions having characteristics similar to those of Arctic populations or popula-
tions living in a similar environment, the Russian regions contiguous to the 
polar circle and covered by the Northern Forum were added. They include 
one administrative region (Magadan) and three autonomous districts (Kor-
yak, Khanty-Mansii and Evenk). The Svalbard Archipelago, a Norwegian 
territory, was also added (See map 1 and tables below). 
                                                        
127 They are Canada (Alberta), the United States (Alaska), the Republic of China (Heilongjiang), 
Finland (Finnish Laponia and Oulu), Iceland (Akureyri), Japan (Hokkaido), Mongolia (Dornod 
Aimag), the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation (Arkhangelsk, Chukchi, St-Petersburg, 
Evenk, Kamchatka, Khanti-Mansii, Magadan, Nenets, the Republic of Komi, the Republic of Sakha, 
Sakhalin, Vologda, Yamal-Nenets) and Sweden (Norrbotten and Vasterbotten). 
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14.2.1. Assembling of maps  
Identifying the regions that are a part of the chosen geographical delimita-
tion, the boundaries of these regions and their respective capitals made a 
survey of the available geographical maps. Once this was done, a cartogra-
pher assembled a series of maps. The material put at the cartographer’s 
disposal was made up of maps on which the chosen regions were identi-
fied, as well as a list of place names in English. This map was supposed to 
include countries, regions, capitals, oceans, seas, bays, straits and the polar 
circle. The result of this operation was an original map that is rather bare 
and that may be consulted on the ArcticStat site. The map was produced 
using the English version of the MapInfo Professional software. 
14.2.2. Place names 
The consulted sources (Internet sites, books, geographical maps, atlases, 
encyclopedias, scientific journals) use virtually all the same place names, 
except for the regions of the Russian Federation (Table 2 below). The 
place names used in Territories of the Russian Federation 2001 were fi-
nally chosen as this publication presents the spellings most often found 
elsewhere.  
14.3. General method for locating sources 
14.3.1. Saturation method 
The statistical data were located using the so-called saturation method 
applied to the Internet. For each country, the starting point was the national 
statistical agency. A first exhaustive search of the agency’s site made it 
possible to locate and identify a list of available indicators. A search was 
done using each of the links proposed by the official statistical agency. A 
third search having the proposed links as its starting point was made, and 
so on, until the proposed links brought the researcher back to the starting 
point, or until they contained no statistical data, or their content strayed too 
far away from the subject matter of the search. 
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Table 1. Geographical Divisions 
Countries AMAP Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council 
Northern Forum ArcticStat 
United States Alaska No Alaska (whole 
territory) 
Alaska (whole 
territory) 
Canada Yukon Territory No Yukon Territory Yukon Territory 
 Northwest 
Territories 
No No Northwest Territories 
  Nunavut Territory No No Nunavut Territory 
  Nunavik No No Nunavik 
  Labrador No No Labrador 
 No No Alberta Alberta 
Denmark Greenland No No Greenland 
 Faroe Islands No No Faroe Islands 
Iceland Whole Territory No Akureyri Whole Territory 
Norway Finnmark Finnmark No Finnmark 
  Troms Troms No Troms 
  Nordland Nordland No Nordland 
 No No No Svalbard 
Sweden Norrbotten Norrbotten Norrbotten Norrbotten 
  No Vasterbotten Vasterbotten Vasterbotten 
Finland Lapland Lapland Lapland Lapland 
  No Oulu Oulu Oulu 
Russian Fede-
ration 
No Republic of 
Karelia 
No Republic of Karelia 
  No Republic of Komi Republic of Komi Republic of Komi 
  No Arkhangelsk O. Arkhangelsk O. Arkhangelsk O. 
  Nenets A.O. Nenets A.O. Nenets A.O. Nenets A.O. 
  Murmansk O. Murmansk O. No Murmansk O. 
  No No Khanty-Mansii 
A.O. 
Khanty-Mansii A.O. 
  Yamal-Nenets 
A.O. 
No Yamal-Nenets 
A.O. 
Yamal-Nenets A.O. 
  Taimyr (Dolgan-
Nenets) A.O. 
No No Taimyr (Dolgan-
Nenets) A.O. 
  No No Evenk A.O. Evenk A.O. 
  Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutia) 
No Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutia) 
Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) 
  No No Magadan O. Magadan O. 
  Chukchi O. No Chukchi A.O. Chukchi A.O. 
  No No Kamtchatka O. No 
  No No Koryak A.O. Koryak A.O. 
 No No St-Petesbourg No 
 No No Sakhalin A.O. No 
 No No Vologda A.O. No 
China No No Heilongjiang No 
Japan No No Hokkaido No 
Mongolia No No Dornod, Aimag  No 
Republic of 
Korea 
No No Republic of Korea No 
Notes: 
O. = Oblast 
A.O. = Autonomous Okrug 
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Table 2. Countries, regions and capitals. English Toponyms. 
Countries Regions Capitals 
United-States Alaska Juneau 
Canada Yukon Territory Whitehorse 
  Northwest Territories Yellowknife 
  Nunavut Territory Iqaluit 
  Nunavik Kujjuaq 
  Labrador Happy Valley-Goose Bay 
Denmark Greenland Nuuk 
  Faroe Islands Thorshavn 
Iceland Iceland Reykjavik 
Norway Finnmark Vadso 
  Troms Tromso 
  Nordland Bodo 
 Svalbard Longyearbyen 
Sweden Norrbotten Lulea 
  Vasterbotten Umea 
Finland Oulu Oulu 
  Lapland Rovaniemi 
Russian Federation Republic of Karelia Petrozavodsk 
  Republic of Komi Syktyvkar 
  Arkhangelsk Oblast Arkhangelsk 
  Nenets Autonomous Okrug Naryan-Mar 
  Murmansk Oblast Murmansk 
  Khanty-Mansii Autonomous Okrug Khanty-Mansiisk 
  Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Salekhard 
  
Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous 
Okrug Dudinka 
  Evenk Autonomous Okrug Tura 
  Republic of Sakha Yakutsk 
  Magadan Obalst Magadan 
  Chukchi Autonomous Okrug Anadyr 
  Koryak Autonomous Okrug Palana 
Source for the Russian Federation: Territories of the Russian Federation 2001. The national statistical agencies from 
which the data of ArcticStat are taken are: the U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Statistics Canada, 
Statistics Greenland, Statistics Faroe Islands, Statistics Iceland, Statistics Norway, Statistics Sweden, Statistics Finland 
and Rosstat. 
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Table 3. Sources of the data. 
Countries and regions Sources of the data ( ) 
United States 
Alaska 
U.S. Census Bureau (Internet) 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (Internet) 
Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development 
(Internet) 
Canada  
Yukon Territory Statistics Canada (Internet) 
Northwest Territory Statistics Canada (Internet) 
Nunavut Territory Statistics Canada (Internet) 
Nunavik Statistics Canada (Internet) 
Labrador Statistics Canada (Internet), Newfoundland Statistics Agency 
(Internet) 
Greenland Statistics Greenland (Internet) 
  
Faroe Islands Statistics Faroe Islands (Internet) 
  
Iceland Statistics Iceland (Internet) 
  
Norway  
Nordland Statistics Norway (Internet) 
Troms  Statistics Norway (Internet) 
Finnmark Statistics Norway (Internet) 
Svalbard Statistics Norway (Internet) 
Sweden  
Norrbotten Statistics Sweden (Internet) 
Vasterbotten Statistics Sweden (Internet) 
Finland  
Oulu Statistics Finland (Internet) 
Lapland Statistics Finland (Internet) 
Russian Federation  
Republic of Karelia Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Republic of Komi Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Arkhangelsk Oblast Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Murmansk Oblast Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Khanty-Mansii Autonomous Okrug Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous 
Okrug 
Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Evenk Autonomous Okrug Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Magadan Oblast Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Koryak Autonomous Okrug Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
Chukchi Autonomous Okrug Rosstat, NUPI – Center for Russian Studies Database (Internet) 
14.3.2. Inclusion criteria 
The saturation method made it possible to amass a large quantity of data. 
Only those statistics provided by national agencies were kept because they 
are public, available and, contrary to those found on other sites, recurrent 
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and of proven validity. These criteria are essential for the subsequent com-
parison work in space and time. 
In those cases where the national statistical agencies did not provide the 
data sought, or where the data were not sufficiently detailed, use was made 
of the data of regional or provincial agencies. This is the case, for example, 
of the Alaska Department of Labour and the Newfoundland Statistical 
agency, which use the data provided by national agencies, by presenting 
them in a more detailed or more precise manner when processing regional 
data (See above table 3). 
14.3.3. Importing data 
The search for data was carried out as follows: (1) find the site of the na-
tional statistical agency; (2) use, where available, the English version of 
the site; (3) locate all the sections that present data on the site, (4) locate, in 
each of these sections, the general indicator sought (population, Gross 
Domestic Product, manpower); (5) locate the specific variables related to 
the general indicator (age and sex, region, year); (6) index the table in the 
administrative site, (7) append its URL address, (8) copy and append the 
table in PDF format. All of these operations are complex, in particular 
locating elements on the web sites of agencies and indexing. Indeed, each 
agency has a site having its own characteristics and which imposes diversi-
fied ways of doing research; while some sites permit easy and fast naviga-
tion, others are highly complex. As for indexing, it presupposes an exhaus-
tive analysis of the content of each of the tables, and its categorization. The 
final list of indicators and sub-indicators is the result of these multiple 
analyses, and was developed after repeated work spanning more than two 
years. The refinement of the indicators and sub-indicators is an on-going 
operation, in particular within a context where indicators and tables are 
added to report on the pertinent statistical production of agencies.  
14.3.4. Chosen indicators and sub-indicators 
At the time ArcticStat was put into service on the Internet, it contained 8 
main statistical indicators and 63 sub-indicators (Appendix 1). The prime 
goal of ArticStat is to facilitate comparative research on the demograph-
ical, social and economic characteristics of the populations of the Arctic 
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regions. The indicators and sub-indicators were chosen with this goal in 
mind. This section provides some examples of the selected indicators and 
sub-indicators, as well as the criteria used in their selection.  
To permit comparative research concerning the population, which is 
namely a main indicator, two fundamental demographical sub-indicators 
were first chosen according to this goal: the number of people by age and 
sex. These are basics common to most statistical agencies and which are 
used in fundamental calculations such as the dependency ratio, the femin-
ity ratio, and so on. Afterwards, the numbers of sub-indicators increased 
according to the existence and availability of data and access to data to 
better describe not only the demographic structure (civil status, density, 
ethnicity, citizenship, geographic origin, language, etc.), but also the 
movements of the population (mobility, migration). 
To permit comparative research concerning the economy of Arctic re-
gions, the main indicator called “Regional Accounts” is declined into vari-
ous sub-indicators among which the Gross Product (GDP). The GDP de-
scribes the economic structure of a country or a region and makes it possi-
ble to compare this structure with those of other countries or regions. There 
are three ways of calculating the GDP: by industries (what used to be at the 
cost of factors), by income and by spending. The GDP by industry allows 
researchers to compare the relative weight of the various branches of eco-
nomic activity of two or more regions. The GDP by income is mainly use-
ful for calculating income (personal and disposable) per inhabitant. The 
GDP by spending makes it possible to analyze the weight of the various 
economic agents, namely governments, enterprises and consumers.  
ArcticStat also proposes a series of indicators and sub-indicators in 
other fundamental social fields, such as vital statistics, housing, households 
and families, education, labor force, personal income, etc. At the time that 
ArcticStat went into service, it did not have data specifically concerning 
the health field. Indicators and sub-indicators concerning this crucial and 
complex field will be added in the year following its entry into service.  
14.4. Limitations of the data 
While ArcticStat brings together data on a wide range of socioeconomic 
realities of Arctic regions, it does not cover all possible aspects. First, the 
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data included in the databank follow ArcticStat’s editorial orientations. 
Secondly, these data are limited by the production of statistical agencies 
and the availability of data free of charge and accessible in English. 
ArcticStat is updated periodically to contain, wherever possible, the 
most recent data available. However, ArcticStat is not responsible for the 
policies and practices of statistical agencies, the errors in the tables origi-
nating from these agencies, or the use made of such tables. The conceptual 
and methodological clarifications presented in the original tables from the 
national agencies have been kept in full and can be readily consulted. 
Moreover, the ArcticStat site will propose a page of meta-data, which will 
list, by country, the main concepts and methods applicable to the indexed 
tables. That way, the user can make an appropriate reading of each of the 
tables, adequately understand the content thereof, and carry out the neces-
sary operations to reconcile the conceptual differences and make valid 
comparisons. 
14.5. Analysis of the content of ArcticStat  
A summary analysis of the content of ArcticStat at the time of its launch-
ing, on October 1, 2007, reveals several variations in the statistical cover-
age by national agencies. 
14.5.1. Total number of tables per country  
The total number of tables available in ArcticStat varies considerably from 
one country to the next: approximately 1,300 in Alaska and 57 in Finland 
(Table 4). This situation is explained in part by the different approaches of 
the agencies. The U.S. Census Bureau produces, for a specific indicator, a 
separate table each year. Statistics Canada, which ranks second in terms of 
the total number of tables in ArcticStat, produces a table per region, per 
census, with the end result that the same table appears at least 3 times in 
ArcticSat (once for the Yukon, once for the Northwest Territories and once 
for Nunavut), 4 times if the table is available for Labrador and 5 times if it 
is available for Nunavik. Other agencies, which a priori, are less well rep-
resented in ArcticStat, do not have fewer data in reality. For example, Sta-
tistics Norway makes available to its users pull-down menus making it 
The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008  269 
possible to build a single table which may contain, for the same indicator, 
the four Norwegian regions covered by ArcticStat and a large number of 
years. Statistics Iceland, Statistics Greenland and Statistics Faroe Islands 
have also adopted this method for presenting their data. 
The great variation in the number of tables available in ArcticStat is 
also explained by the availability of data translated into English. In Alaska 
and in Canada, the data are produced directly in English (and also in 
French for Statistics Canada), which does not limit the number of poten-
tially relevant tables for ArcticStat. On the web sites of Statistics Iceland 
and Statistics Norway, the number of tables translated into English is very 
high. The same cannot be said for other agencies. Statistics Sweden and 
Statistics Finland are agencies which produce a large quantity of data in the 
original language but which only a small percentage is being translated 
into English. That explains why Sweden and Finland are among the coun-
tries with the smallest statistical coverage in ArcticStat. As for Rosstat, it 
does not translate into English any regional data. The data that are avail-
able in English on the agency’s site always deal with the Russian Federa-
tion as a whole. Yet the total number of tables coming from this agency is 
greater than that of Statistics Sweden, Statistics Finland, Statistics 
Greenland and Statistics Faroe Islands. This situation may be explained by 
the fact that the ArcticStat team took charge of their translation with the 
close collaboration of Rosstat; the end result of this procedure is that the 
Russian data included in ArcticStat are exclusive in terms of their avail-
ability of English. 
A third reason explains the variation in the total number of tables in Arc-
ticStat: data that are only available in return for payment.  A significant por-
tion of the production of Statistics Canada (mainly economic data) is not 
found in ArcticStat because these data are only available for a price, which is 
often high, and because agreements must be reached with this agency con-
cerning the large-scale distribution of these data. The same is true for certain 
data produced by Statistics Finland, but to a lesser extent. 
Finally, the resources available to the agencies explain the variation per 
country of the number of tables found in ArcticStat. The U.S. Census Bu-
reau and Statistics Canada are agencies that have considerable human, 
material and financial resources in comparison with European agencies 
(with the exception of Rossat which employs more than 10,000 people) 
and in particular Statistics Greenland and Statistics Faroe Islands. The 
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latter have very few resources and employ a very small number of indi-
viduals (only 15 people worked for Statistics Faroe Islands in 2006). As a 
result, the production of these agencies is very limited; Statistics Greenland 
produced its last Statistical Yearbook in 2001–2002, and Statistics Faroe 
Islands withdrew the English version of its web site for more than three 
years.   
Table 4. Number of tables by indicator and country. First Version of ArcticStat, 
October the 1st 2007. 
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Total 1306 630 70 57 75 279 275 74 108 
Dwellings 255 54 0 11 6 2 21 2 18 
Education 84 97 19 6 13 89 93 7 44 
Households and Families 269 89 0 5 0 4 30 0 0 
Labour Force 162 117 13 7 9 28 30 16 33 
Personal and Household Income 555 174 1 1 5 20 28 10 23 
Population 220 215 24 25 29 63 57 25 28 
Regional Accounts 9 2 6 4 5 34 12 9 22 
Vital Statistics 8 13 10 10 14 46 15 10 23 
 
In summary, despite a significant variation in the total number of tables, 
the Arctic regions of North America, those of Norway and Iceland are 
represented in a similar manner in ArcticStat and benefit from good statis-
tical coverage. As for the other Arctic regions, they are much less docu-
mented, particularly the Finnish regions, as the data are often limited by 
the policies of the agencies that produce these data and the resources avail-
able to them. 
14.5.2. Statistical coverage of indicators and sub-indicators  
The statistical coverage of the indicators and sub-indicators found in Arctic-
Stat are also characterized by a major variation from one country to the next 
(Appendix 2). There is an abundance of data on households and families for 
Alaska and to a lesser extent for Canada, but such data are lacking for the 
Faroe Islands, Greenland, Sweden and the Russian Federation. There is also 
a great variation in the data on housing ranging from over two hundred ta-
bles for Alaska to only two tables for Iceland and Sweden, and no table for 
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the Faroe Islands. The incomes of individuals and households generally 
benefit from a better coverage, but there is only one table of this category for 
Finland and the Faroe Islands. Regional economic data have only a minimal 
coverage everywhere and in particular in Canada. This situation is the result 
of a combination of factors, some being due to editorial decisions made by 
the ArcticStat team and others being attributable to the policies of the agen-
cies. All of the tables produced by an agency concerning an indicator are not 
necessarily found in ArcticStat. Not only must they have been translated into 
English, they must also contain data aggregated at a regional level and be 
compiled on an annual basis. These three criteria dictate the selection of the 
tables that will be included in ArcticStat. It follows that a more or less sig-
nificant number of tables is rejected, depending on the agency. For their part, 
agencies do not place the same importance on all indicators. Statistics Can-
ada produces many statistics on the income of individuals and households 
but much less information on vital statistics. Statistics Iceland produces ex-
tensive data on education and vital statistics but few data on housing and 
households. Rosstat places great importance on data related to education but 
not on the realities concerning families and households. Statistics Norway 
generates much more data on education that it does on manpower. Statistics 
Greenland is more interested in vital statistics than statistics dealing with 
housing. Clearly, the statistical production of the various agencies is not 
uniform and this is reflected in the content of ArcticStat.  
These policies particularly impact the data on Aboriginal populations 
(Appendix 2). An examination of the content of ArcticStat reveals that 
these data are characterized by a clear split between North American and 
European Arctic regions. Indeed, while there are numerous data for Alaska 
and Canada, they are almost non-existent for the other countries. The U.S. 
Census Bureau inserts in its questionnaires several questions, which are 
intended to isolate the characteristics of the Aboriginal populations living 
on its territory. The results include the Census American Indian and Alaska 
Native Summary File, which are entirely devoted to Aboriginal realities. 
Statistics Canada carries out, on a recurrent basis, several surveys specifi-
cally intended to better document Aboriginal realities, the most important 
of which is the Aboriginal People Survey. The European agencies, for their 
part, show little or no interest in this question. To learn about the realities 
of the Aboriginal people who inhabit their territories, it is necessary to 
resort to the data produced within the context of scientific research, which 
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most of the time tends to be limited to a specific aspect and which are non-
recurrent in nature. 
In summary, despite all the efforts made by the ArcticStat team to “ex-
haust” the data produced by the agencies concerning a given indicator, 
major gaps remain with the end result that the circumpolar comparison of 
certain realities remains difficult or can only be achieved by comparing 
certain regions, or should rely on other sources from monographs and sci-
entific literature.  
14.6. Precautionary remarks concerning circumpolar 
comparative research 
In an ideal world, all data would be available, both those concerning local 
populations and those specifically applying to Aboriginal peoples, and they 
would be available for all regions; each indicator would be based on an 
identical concept regardless of the population or the region to which it 
applies. However, not all of the data are available; those dealing specifi-
cally with Aboriginal populations are missing; the indicators are character-
ized by significant conceptual differences. All of these limitations must be 
considered when processing data to permit their comparison, and at the 
time of their interpretation. In this section, we will illustrate the type of 
difficulties that a user encounters when making international comparisons, 
by taking as an example the data concerning the population, economic 
activity and manpower. 
14.6.1. Analysis and interpretation of demographic data 
Most of the population data come from national censuses. The other data 
come from specific surveys, for example the Aboriginal People Survey 
carried out by Statistics Canada in 2001 and in 2006.  
It is relatively easy to find data on total populations, but for various rea-
son this is not the case for Aboriginal populations (Appendix 2). The Nor-
wegian and Swedish national agencies do not record data on their Aborigi-
nal populations with the end result that these data are included in those 
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related to the total population128. The Finnish national agency reports on 
the Aboriginal population according to mother tongue129. In Greenland, the 
data do not distinguish the ethnic affiliation, but rather the fact of whether 
or not the person was born in Greenland. In the Russian Federation, the 
ethnic composition of each of the subjects of the Federation is not very 
detailed and is presented in percentage only. To obtain a more precise sta-
tistical description, it is necessary to call on other sources, such as those 
existing at the Center for Russian Studies130, a research group attached to 
the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)131. 
Moreover, the “Aboriginal” concept, when used, differs from one coun-
try to the next. The consequence of this situation may be to overestimate 
the number of Aboriginal people (this would be the case for Greenland) or 
to underestimate it (this would be the case for Finland). The total or near-
total absence of data on the Aboriginal populations of northern Norway 
and Sweden limits the circumpolar comparisons to the total populations 
and prevents a systematic circumpolar comparison on Aboriginal popula-
tions. The demographic data of the Russian Federation date back to the last 
census conducted in 1989. Since then, there has been an exodus of Arctic 
populations to the south, which results in an over-estimate of the current 
                                                        
128 Statistics Norway recently made available on its web site data on the Sami population but 
these data are limited in number and, for the most part, are presented in the form of texts or illus-
trations (except for the data on the Sameting Election).  
129 According to a representative of the Finnish agency, this approach significantly underesti-
mates the likely number of Aboriginal people of this country. AMAP (1997) emphasizes that it is 
difficult to account for the Sami population because ethnicity is not always part of the concepts 
used in national population censuses and because there are several definitions of Sami ethnicity. 
On the basis of mother tongue, AMAP reports that there were approximately 35,000 people who 
spoke one of the Sami dialects: 20,000 in Norway, 10,000 in Sweden, 3,000 in Finland and 1,000 
in Russia (AMAP, 1997). In its 2002 report entitled “Human Health in the Arctic”, AMAP esti-
mates that this number is between 50,000 and 70,000 people. These figures are greater than what 
we obtained: none in Norway and in Sweden and about 1,600 in Finland. According to the Center 
for Russian Studies, there are approximately 1,600 in Russia. 
130 The Center for Russian Studies was created in 1995 with the financial support of the Nor-
wegian Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs. The creation of this working group was based on 
the need to produce more knowledge about Russia. This need emerged following the development 
of bilateral relations between Russia and Norway and multilateral relations between the Barents 
Region and the Baltic Region.  
131 The NUPI was created in 1959 by the Norwegian Parliament in order to promote a better 
understanding of international questions on the part of leaders and the general public. The NUPI 
has prepared and set up a wide range of research activities and has published extensive informa-
tion on international questions. The institute is independent of Norwegian foreign policy and the 
government’s economic relations. 
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number of inhabitants in these regions, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
inhabitants combined.  
14.6.2. Analysis and interpretation of economic data 
The economic data come from various surveys conducted by national statis-
tical agencies: Gross Domestic Product, labor market, education and em-
ployment, provincial or regional economic accounts. When the national 
agencies do not offer the information sought, monographs must be used. 
This is the case notably of Nunavik. However, this situation is exceptional. 
The most frequently used economic indicator at the national level is the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP describes the economic struc-
ture of a country or a region and makes it possible to compare it with those 
of other countries or regions.  
Comparative research based on measurements of the GDP pose two 
major difficulties. The first difficulty concerns the three calculation meth-
ods commonly used to determine the GDP. An exhaustive search revealed 
that only Statistics Canada provides the data calculated according to these 
three methods, with the other countries providing one and occasionally two 
methods. The second difficulty concerns the regional aspect of the data. 
The national GDP is an indicator calculated by all of the national statistical 
agencies, but this is not the case for the regional GDP. The latter is either 
absent from the available economic data, or provided in its entirety without 
details on the branches of economic activity, or available on a sporadic 
basis rather than recurrently. 
Research on manpower is also characterized by a major limitation: na-
tional agencies rarely provide economic data concerning the Aboriginal 
population. The number of jobs by branch of economic activity refers, in 
most cases, to the total populations of the regions. Consequently, the com-
parison of the standards of living between the Aboriginal people and the 
rest of the population is not possible by resorting solely to the available 
sources. As the case may be, more refined analyses must report on the data 
available elsewhere, notably in the scientific literature. 
Research on income poses the same type of difficulties as those noted 
for research on the GDP: absence of data, data calculated at the national 
level only, data available for only one of the indicators, non-existence of 
data by ethnic group.  
The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008  275 
Moreover, the interpretation of economic data calls for far greater cau-
tion since the conceptual differences require that choices be made and 
these choices affect the results. Some countries propose branches of eco-
nomic activity that are the aggregation of activities, some of which tradi-
tionally belong to the primary sector and others to the secondary sector. 
For example, Statistics Sweden aggregates the manufacturing sectors and 
natural resource extraction activities. This approach occasionally makes 
the detailed analysis of either one of these activities impossible and limits 
the comparison of the results without resorting to other sources. These 
national specificities force the researcher to re-categorize the data originat-
ing from the national accounts system. To perform this task, the researcher 
can use concordance tables that are or will be available on the meta-data 
page of ArcticStat.   
Economic data are characterized by another major limitation: they only 
concern total populations. National statistical agencies do not generally 
provide economic data that apply specifically to population segments, such 
as Aboriginal populations. To obtain such data, it is necessary, most of the 
time, to resort to monographs that are limited in space and time. Occasion-
ally, the researcher will be able to opt for the examination of “control” 
regions whose population, for example, would be Aboriginal in the major-
ity, in order to check if there are specificities. Consequently, the examina-
tion of the Arctic economy must be made cautiously since numerous re-
search initiatives have shown that everywhere the standard of living of the 
Aboriginal populations is lower than that of the rest of the population on 
the territory. If this is true, the available data will underestimate the eco-
nomic well-being of non-Aboriginal populations whereas it will overesti-
mate that of Aboriginal populations. 
14.7. Conclusion 
The added value offered by ArcticStat includes: greatly facilitating fact-
finding in the field of Arctic statistics; drastically reducing the time re-
quired to identify sources and to navigate through them, a process that is 
often complex and that differs from one statistical agency to the next; and 
permitting systematic and valid comparisons at the level of the circumpolar 
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regions (such comparisons were very difficult in the past owing to the wide 
dispersion of data). 
The simple concept developed for the construction of ArcticStat may 
offer replicable solutions to the problem of gathering multiple data. Its 
indexation procedure, which is systematic and exhaustive, offers a major 
potential, as does its map-based research device.  
ArcticStat facilitates research for the scientific community. Moreover, 
it enables national, regional and local governments, as well as the Arctic 
Council to rely on updated, valid and potentially comparable information 
to guide public policies. This clearinghouse may increase information ex-
changes between Arctic researchers and countries. Finally, ArcticStat is 
being used as a pedagogical resource for teaching, research and dissemina-
tion, especially for those stakeholders involved in Arctic programs, such as 
the universities affiliated with the University of the Arctic. 
Challenges have been successfully dealt with over the last years, such 
as raising core funding, data identification, indexing procedures, design 
and development of a user-friendly searchable web page including a map-
based interface, design and development of a fully functional and adapt-
able administrative section.  
But other challenges still lie ahead. The main challenge that ArcticStat 
faces is to successfully hold discussions with all the data-providers, mainly 
the national statistical agencies of the eight Arctic countries. These discus-
sions are important, since they can ensure the long-term sustainability of 
the database.  
These discussions should lead to permanent collaboration between Arc-
ticStat and each statistical agency. They should also lead to the creation of 
an Advisory Board, where the ArcticStat management team and participant 
agencies can meet on a regular basis to discuss all methodological and 
conceptual orientations of the database. The Advisory Board would be 
responsible for studying and proposing solutions to the problem of translat-
ing the tables that are already available in their original language, of pro-
ducing new data, particularly on Aboriginal populations, that would be 
needed to better understand the realities of the Arctic population and of 
trying to overcome the conceptual differences between the national statisti-
cal agencies. 
But the discussions are complex, just as are the solutions required to 
ensure the sustainability of ArcticStat. All of the agencies with which we 
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have held discussions, have given their consent, allowing ArcticStat to 
make use of their databases. However, certain agencies have imposed at 
times significant restrictions, which will also need to be discussed: for 
example, some tables of fundamental interest are only available on a pay-
per-use basis. In the meantime, we have set up a monitoring program in 
order to keep the database as up to date as possible. That way, the progress 
for research that has come with the creation of ArcticStat should be main-
tained and gradually improved.  
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Appendix 1 (continued over the next pages) 
Indicators and sub-indicators. First Version of ArcticStat, October the 1st 2007 
Dwellings 
Characteristics of Occupants 
Refers to the characteristics of individuals or households that occupy the dwelling: age, sex, civil status, 
worker status, type of family or household, income of the occupants, year in which they moved in, etc.  
Ethnicity  
Refers to the ethnic affiliation or the nationality or the immigrant status of the individuals who oc-
cupy the dwelling. 
Number of Occupants  
Refers to the number of individuals who live in the same dwelling or to the individual/room ratio.  
Number of Rooms/Floor Space  
Refers to the number of rooms in a dwelling or its size measured in square feet or metres. 
Tenure Status  
Refers to the status of the occupants of the dwelling in terms of ownership: owner, tenant, etc.  
Type  
Refers to the type of dwelling: detached house, apartment, rooming house, social, municipal, public 
housing, etc. This sub-indicator also includes data dealing with the occupancy, the location and the 
condition of the dwellings.  
Year of Construction  
Refers to the year in which the dwelling was built. 
Education 
Accounts  
Refers to the costs related to education, all data combined, private or public sector. 
Age 
Refers to the breakdown of students or staff according to their age. This sub-indicator is also 
indexed to identify the tables containing data on adult education even if there is no age as such in 
the table.  
Educational Attainment  
Refers to the breakdown of students, staff or the population as a whole according to the highest 
level of schooling attained or completed. 
Enrolment/Drop-Out  
Refers to the number of enrolments or students or to the number of persons who drop out, what-
ever the level of education, the type of program or the type of school.  
Ethnicity 
Refers to the ethnic affiliation or the nationality or the immigrant status of students or teachers. This 
sub-indicator also refers to any other information – number of enrolments, number of teachers, 
success rate, drop-out rate – related to ethnicity, nationality or immigrant status. 
Field of Study/Program  
Field of Study refers to the breakdown of students or staff in the different study programs: social 
studies, cabinet-making, electricity, language and literature, accounting, etc. Program refers to 
general, vocational or professional programs. 
Language  
Refers to the language of instruction or the language spoken by students or staff.  
Level of Education  
Refers to the level of instruction: preschool, elementary, secondary, tertiary, etc.  
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Sex  
Refers to the breakdown of students or staff according to their sex. 
Staff  
Refers to staff – teachers, directors, specialized staff, support staff – all data combined. 
Type of School/Ownership  
Type of School refers to the various types of schools regardless of the level of instruction offered: 
specialized schools, popular education, remote education, grammar schools, comprehensive 
school, etc. Ownership refers to the ownership status of schools: private, public, municipal, county, 
state or other schools. 
Households and Families  
Age  
Refers to the age of the head of the household or family. This sub-indicator is also indexed to 
identify the tables containing data on children or seniors even if there is no age as such in the table. 
Ethnicity  
Refers to the ethnic affiliation or the nationality or the immigrant status of the individuals who make 
up a household or a family. 
Sex  
Refers to the sex of the head of the household or the family. This sub-indicator is also indexed to 
identify the tables containing data on families headed by women. 
Size  
Refers to the number of persons per household or per family or to the average number of persons 
per household or per family.  
Type  
Refers to the types of households: person living alone, married couple with or without children, 
single-parent family, etc.  
Labor Force 
Age  
Refers to the age of employees, unemployed persons, retired persons, volunteers, etc.  
Class of Worker  
Refers to employees according to whether they work full time or part time, whether they are salaried 
employees, self-employed workers, business owners, seasonal workers, contract workers, tempo-
rary workers, supernumerary employees, etc.  
Education  
Refers to the level of schooling attained or completed or the educational training of employees, 
unemployed persons, retired persons, etc. This sub-indicator is also indexed to identify the tables 
dealing with work/studies.  
Ethnicity  
Refers to the ethnic affiliation or the nationality or the immigrant status of employees, unemployed 
persons, retired persons, etc. 
Industry/Agent  
Industry refers to the distribution of jobs, employees or unemployed persons in the various eco-
nomic activities: agriculture, forestry, commerce, transportation, food service industry, education, 
health, etc. Agent refers to the public administration, all levels combined: municipal, provincial, 
federal, etc.; and to businesses, all types combined: private, public, cooperatives, corporations, 
non-profit organizations, etc. 
Labor Status  
Refers to the status of an individual in relation to the labor market: unemployed person, retired 
person, volunteer, housewife, etc.  
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Occupation  
Refers to the distribution of jobs, employees or unemployed persons in the various types of jobs: 
manager, health care worker, store employee, teacher, mechanic, etc.  
Sex  
Refers to the breakdown of employees, unemployed persons, retired persons, volunteers, etc., 
according to their sex. 
Personal/Household Income 
Age  
Refers to the age of individuals or that of the head of the household.  
Education  
Refers to the income of individuals according to their level of schooling. 
Ethnicity  
Refers to the ethnic affiliation or the nationality or the immigrant status of the individuals or house-
holds. 
Households/Families  
Refers to the income of households or families.  
Industry/Occupation 
Refers to the income of individuals according to the type of industry in which they work or the type 
of job that they hold. This sub-indicator also includes incomes earned from jobs related to the public 
administration, all levels combined. 
Labor Status/Class of Worker  
Labor Status refers to the income of individuals according to whether they are employees, retirees, 
unemployed persons, volunteers, housewives, etc. Class of Worker refers to the income of indi-
viduals according to whether they work full time or part time, to whether they are salaried employ-
ees, self-employed workers, business owners, seasonal workers, contract workers, temporary 
workers, supernumerary employees, etc. 
Person  
Refers to the income of individuals.  
Poverty Status  
Refers to the poverty status of individuals, households or families.  
Sex  
Refers to the breakdown of individuals or heads of households according to their sex. 
Source  
Refers to the various sources of income of an individual, a family or a household: earnings, transfer 
income, interest, rent, business income, pension income etc.  
Population  
Age  
Refers to the breakdown of individuals according to their age regardless of the unity of the age 
groups.  
Civil Status 
Refers to the breakdown of individuals according to their civil status: single, married, common law 
spouse, divorced, etc.  
Density 
Refers to the population density, namely the number of persons per square kilometer or per square mile. 
Ethnicity/Citizenship  
Refers to the breakdown of individuals according to their affiliation with an ethnic group or according 
to their citizenship. This sub-indicator also includes the breakdown of the population according to 
nationality or race.  
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Geographic Origin  
Refers to the breakdown of the population according to the place of birth of individuals. This place 
may be a country or any other geographical division of the world, as well as the categories: born in, 
born out, place of birth, native, foreign born.  
Language  
Refers to the breakdown of individuals according to the language(s) understood, written, spoken 
and used. 
Mobility/Migration  
Refers to the tables dealing with population movements containing the following categories: internal 
migration, immigration, emigration, residence one year ago, moved, entered, etc. 
Projection  
Refers to the changes in the size of the population. This sub-indicator is based on projected data 
and refers to the future.  
Religion  
Refers to the breakdown of individuals according to their religion including atheism. 
Sex  
Refers to the breakdown of individuals according to their sex. 
Territorial Subdivisions  
Refers to the breakdown of individuals – not that of households – on the territory: municipalities, 
settlements, capital and regions, densely populated regions and sparsely populated regions, etc.  
Regional Accounts  
Economic Activity  
Refers to the breakdown of sectors, branches and industries that make up the economic activity of 
a country or a region. This sub-indicator also comprises the Four Pillars of Greenland. 
Gross Product  
Refers to the Gross Domestic Product of a country or a region. This sub-indicator comprises vari-
ous calculations methods: revenue method, expenditure method, at the cost of factors, etc. various 
monetary bases: in constant money, in current money, etc. This sub-indicator also includes the 
Gross National Product.  
Output  
Refers to the value of production of industrial branches and sectors. 
Value Added  
Refers to the value added in the economy by industrial branches and sectors. This sub-indicator 
also includes the gross value added. 
Vital Statistics 
Adoption  
Refers to the number of children adopted, whether officially or unofficially. 
Age  
Refers to the age of individuals in relation to vital statistics. This sub-indicator is also indexed to 
identify the tables dealing with infant mortality.  
Birth  
Refers to the number of births and the fertility rate. 
Death  
Refers to the number of deaths and life expectancy. 
Divorce and Separation  
Refers to the number of divorces or separations or to certain related characteristics: presence or 
absence of children, custody of children, etc.  
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Ethnicity  
Refers to the ethnic affiliation or the nationality or the immigrant status of the individuals in relation 
to vital statistics.  
Marriage and Cohabitation  
Refers to the number of marriages or common law unions or to certain related characteristics: 
duration of the union, type of marriage, etc. 
Population Change  
Refers to changes in the size of the population. This sub-indicator is based on real data and refers 
to the past. It also comprises data dealing with increases and decreases of population.  
Sex  
Refers to the sex of individuals in relation to vital statistics.  
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Appendix 2 (Continued over the next pages) 
Number of tables by indicator, sub-indicator and country. First Version of Arctic-
Stat, October the 1st 2007 
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Total 1306 630 70 57 75 279 275 74 108 
Dwellings 255 54 0 11 6 2 21 2 18 
Characteristics of Occupants 95 7 0 0 0 0 6 0 0
Ethnicity 33 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of Occupants 54 18 0 1 1 0 2 0 0
Number of Rooms/Floor Space 46 8 0 2 2 2 5 0 13
Tenure Status 194 36 0 1 0 0 11 0 1
Type 56 26 0 5 2 2 10 2 3
Year of Construction 39 20 0 4 2 0 5 0 1
Education 84 97 19 6 13 89 93 7 44 
Accounts 0 5 2 1 2 0 6 0 0
Age 37 84 2 0 0 39 30 2 0
Educational Attainment 52 75 1 2 4 27 4 4 5
Enrolment/ Drop-out 44 46 14 2 8 51 72 3 31
Ethnicity 13 17 0 0 1 1 4 0 0
Field of Study/Program 0 36 8 0 6 15 20 0 17
Language 4 2 0 1 0 6 9 0 0
Level of Education 34 2 16 3 7 82 78 3 37
Sex 50 84 12 1 1 60 26 5 0
Staff 0 1 1 0 2 26 8 0 0
Type of School/ Ownership 14 0 13 2 1 31 49 3 40
Households and Families 269 89 0 5 0 4 30 0 0 
Age 157 33 0 1 0 2 16 0 0
Ethnicity 53 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sex 147 24 0 0 0 4 1 0 0
Size 78 37 0 1 0 2 6 0 0
Type 190 70 0 3 0 4 24 0 0
Labour Force 162 117 13 7 9 28 30 16 33 
Age 31 67 8 0 2 9 6 3 2
Class of Worker 9 61 3 2 1 0 6 2 0
Education 55 24 0 0 4 6 7 0 2
Ethnicity 21 17 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
Industry/Agent 47 48 3 2 6 6 11 8 17
Labor Status 63 54 7 4 6 13 6 0 22
Occupation 33 46 0 0 0 4 5 5 0
Sex 120 107 12 1 5 26 15 12 3
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Personal and Household Income 555 174 1 1 5 20 28 10 23 
Age 109 54 0 0 1 4 6 0 0 
Education 18 33 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Ethnicity 91 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Household/ Families 361 58 0 0 2 6 12 4 13 
Industry/ Occupation 14 1 0 0 1 8 4 1 0 
Labor Status/ Class of Worker 99 49 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 
Person 193 132 1 1 4 16 18 8 21 
Poverty Status 156 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
Sex 204 125 0 0 0 13 6 2 0 
Source 204 107 0 1 1 16 14 5 17 
Population 220 215 24 25 29 63 57 25 28 
Age 90 122 13 12 16 39 28 7 4 
Civil Status 59 46 1 0 1 4 6 2 0 
Ethnicity/ Citizenship 104 55 4 3 1 17 6 3 1 
Geographic Origin 60 42 3 3 16 12 3 0 0 
Density 3 14 0 1 1 1 3 3 1 
Language 37 88 0 6 0 0 0 0 1 
Mobility/ Migration 53 94 7 8 12 11 19 10 3 
Projection 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 0 0 
Religion 0 28 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
Sex 99 135 16 12 16 53 23 12 14 
Territorial Subdivision 1 19 10 3 10 12 21 8 4 
Regional Accounts 9 2 6 4 5 34 12 9 22 
Economic Activity 8 0 1 1 3 19 8 2 16 
Gross Product 4 2 6 0 4 28 3 8 19 
Output 0 0 1 1 1 6 5 0 14 
Value Added 0 0 1 4 0 8 6 0 1 
Vital Statistics 8 13 10 9 14 46 15 10 23 
Adoption 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 
Age 2 1 5 2 10 30 3 2 3 
Birth 6 9 6 7 6 15 4 6 15 
Death 0 8 7 4 9 16 7 7 17 
Divorce and Separation 0 1 1 2 0 17 3 1 3 
Ethnicity 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Marriage and Cohabitation 2 1 1 2 0 14 2 1 3 
Population Change 0 0 3 5 3 3 1 4 16 
Sex 2 5 6 2 9 30 5 6 14 
 
 
 
15. Some data sources on people, 
peoples, communities, regions and 
human activities in Greenland 
 
Birger Poppel132 
Until recently little effort had been made to do comparable studies of the 
Arctic regions within the Arctic social sciences. Most Arctic social science 
have focused on community or regional analyses, while the official statis-
tics have been “national” in the sense, that the national statistical institutes 
of the Arctic States simply included the Arctic regions as part of their re-
porting of national statistics. 
For several reasons, this picture has been changing during the last part 
of the 20th century. The key role of the Arctic is now recognized from 
several perspectives. Geopolitical issues, access to resources, trans-border 
pollution and climate change are important examples. Also changed, is the 
political organization among Arctic Indigenous peoples, and the achieve-
ments they have made in their struggles for political autonomy and the 
rights to the lands, they have long occupied. As a result, there are now 
political and corporate regional institutions defining Arctic regions. Last 
but not least, the creation of the Arctic Council133 (AC) has led to discus-
                                                        
132 Research Project Chief for the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic SLiCA, at Ilisi-
matusarfik, the University of Greenland. Second activity leader for the POENOR-project (The 
Political Economy of Northern Regional Development). 
133 The Arctic Council was founded in 1996 based on the experiences from the collaboration 
between the eight Arctic States and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic in the Arctic Environ-
mental Protection Strategy, AEPS. Arctic Council is a high level international collaborative or-
ganization including the eight Arctic States, the Permanent Participants (five organizations repre-
senting the indigenous peoples of the Arctic) 
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sions about a number of different policies, areas and conditions of common 
concern throughout the Arctic. There has not least been concern about the 
living conditions of the indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents. The 
discussions on people and Arctic societies have highlighted the need to 
address the lack of knowledge, when it comes to human activities and so-
cietal development as well as impacts due to rapid change.  
To fill the gaps of knowledge, research projects and assessments focus-
ing on different aspect of living in the Arctic have been introduced to the 
different working groups of the AC for endorsement134. Furthermore, ma-
jor undertakings of the Arctic Council on climate change, pollution and 
resource exploitation have included analyses of impacts on people and 
Arctic communities135.  
The Arctic Council’s endorsed projects focusing on human activities, 
indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents have led to an increase in 
publications on these matters. The following are projects that have been 
endorsed by the Arctic council, and which contribute to the knowledge 
base on Arctic societies and peoples (the year of endorsement/publication 
is listed in brackets)136: Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic: Inuit, 
Sámi and the Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka, SLiCA (2000/2007); Fam-
ily-Based Reindeer Herding and Hunting Economies, and the Status and 
Management of Wild Reindeer/Caribou Populations (2002/2004); 
Women’s participation in decision-making processes in Arctic fisheries 
resource management (2002/2004); Arctic Human Development Report, 
AHDR (2002), The Economies of the North, ECONOR, (2004/2006); 
Women and Natural Resource Management in the Rural North 
(2004/2006).137 
                                                        
134 The scientific work of the Arctic Council is carried out in six expert working groups focusing 
on such issues as monitoring, assessing and preventing pollution in the Arctic, climate change, biodi-
versity conservation and sustainable use, emergency preparedness and prevention, and the living 
conditions of the Arctic residents. See http://arctic-council.org/section/working_groups for informa-
tion about the AC-endorsed projects and published reports. 
135 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), and The Arctic Monitoring and Assess-
ment Program ( AMAP) 
136 A list of all publications can be found on http://portal.sdwg.org/content.php?doc=23.  
137 A publication on Arctic Social Indicators, ASI endorsed by the AC in 2006 will be pub-
lished in 2009. 
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15.1. Data sources on people and human activities in 
Greenland 
Greenland is often – and for good reasons – characterized as one of the 
societies in the world that has been well covered by statistics. The societal 
development is fairly well described and documented. It is a fact that most 
central areas and fields important to societal development in Greenland 
(e.g. population, occupation, harvest, consumption and temperature) from 
the early time of colonization have been registered, reported, processed, 
analyzed, and disseminated. 
At the same time however, robust time series covering several decades 
only exist in relatively few areas. Reasons for the scarcity of robust time 
series include, among others, differences in data collection, changes of 
definitions and categories, and variations in the quality of data collected. 
Furthermore, data collected have been handled differently over the years 
due to organizational changes and different foci depending on the changing 
purposes of the end-users. Finally, it should be noted that definitions of 
variables and documentation for the data collection (what in total is called 
“meta data”) have not always been kept for future users. 
The basic data include the following sources: 
 
 Official statistics.138  
 Reports (so far unpublished) – archival data.139 
                                                        
138 Since the beginning of the 20th century statistics on individuals, sectors and institutions and 
the overall Greenlandic economic development have been mainly produced and published by 
Grønlands Styrelse (The Greenland Administration, 1908–1955); Ministeriet for Grønland (Ministry 
of Greenland 1955–1987), Grønlands Hjemmestyre (Greenland Home Rule Government, since 
1979), Statens Statistiske Bureau (The Danish Statistical Bureau, 1850–1913), Det statistiske Depar-
tement (The Danish Statistical Department, 1913–1966) Danmarks Statistik (Statistics Denmark, 
since 1966), Grønlands Statistik, (Statistics Greenland, since 1989). Among the published statistical 
summaries and annual reports – e.g: Statistiske Meddelelser (Statistical Information) (1912); Sam-
mendrag af Statistiske oplysninger om Grønland (Summary of statistical information regarding 
Greenland) 1942–1946: I-VII; Folke-, bolig- og erhvervstællinger (Population censuses including 
information about housing conditions and professions) conducted by the official statistical agencies. 
Grønland. Årsberetninger udarbejdet af Ministeriet for Grønland i perioden 1968–1989 (Greenland. 
Annual reports by the Ministry of Greenland/Prime Ministers Department during the period: 1968–
1989); Grønland – Kalaallit Nunaat. Statistiske årbøger (Greenland. Statistical Yearbooks) have been 
published by Statistics Greenland since 1990. Since the foundation of Statistics Greenland all data 
published by SG are stored electronically.  
139 Among the most prominent examples are archival data from the Greenland Administration; 
the Ministry of Greenland; the Royal Greenland Trading Company (Kongelig Grønlandske Handel 
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 Research reports and scientific investigations – including assessments, 
societal descriptions and review reports on Greenland as well as on 
communities, towns and settlements, municipalities and regions140 141  
 and surveys/survey data142 – the basic data are most often stored 
electronically. 
 Reports – developed to prepare for new legislation.143 
 Grey literature – e.g. reports and assessments prepared for 
administrative and political purposes.144 
 
In the following sections, three of these sources will be dealt with in more 
detail: the public administrative registers, and two surveys on living condi-
tions in Greenland: the Greenland survey of living conditions conducted in 
                                                                                                                         
(KGH)); and the Greenland Technical Organisation (Grønlands Tekniske Organisation (GTO)). The 
archival data includes e.g. catch reports (fangstlister) and data on sales to the fish processing plants. 
140 A few works will be listed to exemplify the comprehensive production of research within this 
category: Amdrup, Bobe, Jensen og Steensby (eds.) (1921): Grønland i Tohundredaaret for Hans 
Egedes Landing. (Greenland in the bicentenary of Hans Egede’s landing) Published by The Commis-
sion for the Management of the Geological and Geographical Surveys in Greenland.  
Berthelsen (1935–1943): Grønlandsk Medicinsk Statistik og Nosografi. (Medicinal Statistics and 
Nosology) Meddelelser om Grønland, MoG vol. 117 (1–4). KVUG.  
Mattox, W. G. 1973. Fishing in West Greenland 1910–1966. The Development of a new native 
industry. Meddelelser om Grønland bind, MoG vol. 197, 1. København. C.A. Reitzels Forlag.  
Research reports from “The Committee on social research in Greenland” published in the period 
1961–1968 – see Appendix B. 
Trap Danmark, Grønland. (Greenland) Volume XIV, Gads Forlag, 1970.  
From, Just Jensen, Friis and Kjær (1973): Levevilkår og sociale problermer i Vestgrønland. (Liv-
ing Conditions and Social Problems in West Greenland). Vol. 64. Danish Institute on Social Re-
search, SFI. Copenhagen 1975. 
141 A draft bibliography on Economic analyses on Greenland is attached as Appendix A. 
142 Since the beginning of the 1990’s a number of enquires and researchers, and public as well as 
private institutions and enterprises have conducted interview-based surveys. Most of these studies 
have led to published results, and the databases containing the basic data in most cases still exist: 
some are stored with Statistics Greenland, some at “Dansk Dataarkiv” and some in private research 
archives. The Greenland Living Conditions Survey from 1994, (conducted by Statistics Greenland), 
the Greenland Health profile (conducted by the Danish National Institute of Public Health), Socioøk-
onomisk Analyse af Fangererhvervet (2005) (The socio-economic analysis of the Hunting Trade) by 
Rasmus Ole Rasmussen and The Greenlandic part of the Survey of Living Conditions, SLiCA as well 
as a number of surveys of political attitudes etc. all serve as examples of such surveys.  
143 The surveys conducted and the reports published as part of fulfilling the mandates of “The 
Judicial Expedition” (1947–1950) and the Commissions of 1950 and 1960 respectively are promi-
nent examples in this field. 
144 There is a variety of publications in this field including investigations into different indus-
tries (e.g. hunting, fisheries, sheep breeding, and tourism), energy supply, spatial planning, educa-
tion at different levels etc.  
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1994, and the Greenlandic part of the Survey of Living Conditions in the 
Arctic, which SLiCA conducted in 2003–2006.  
15.1.1. Public administrative registers: a special, and especially useful, 
resource for official statistics in Greenland 
The data compiled by Statistics Greenland are primarily based on reports 
from various public authorities. The enhanced capability of computers has 
allowed the opportunity to realize the full statistical potential data by the 
merging of data sets from different registers. By this, we have endeavored 
to analyze Greenland’s recent social development using data already cap-
tured for administrative use. These data are either compiled as tables or 
forms or they are contained within electronic administrative registers. That 
is, data sets consisting of a number of variables related to a certain identifi-
cation code. Among the advantages of creating statistical registers on the 
basis of captured administrative data are, that data collection costs and the 
response burden are lower than if the data were collected through special 
surveys. In addition, reliance on administrative data means that Statistics 
Greenland can better ensure the ultimate quality of the individual data 
through repeated application and testing in various contexts. 
Administrative registers contain the data required to produce reportable 
statistics, not the statistics themselves. Processing and troubleshooting are 
present, when data are to be transformed into viable statistics. As experi-
ence shows, the starting point is far from ideal. Register data are often 
incomplete or incorrect. Additional problems may arise with respect to 
obtaining relevant information from a specific inquiry. As is the case with 
censuses or interview surveys, register-based inquiries involve a thorough 
processing and troubleshooting process before data are ready to serve as 
the basic elements in the creation of a statistical register, and actual pro-
duction of statistics. 
Register data can pertain to individuals, individual enterprises or by 
categories defined in accordance with international agreements – as in the 
case of economic statistical registers. At present, the following three main 
groups of registers145 are sources of official register-based statistics: 
 
                                                        
145 In Appendix C, all registers are listed including the time-span they are covering. 
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 Personal statistics: covering data on demographics, housing, edu-cation, 
labor market activities and unemployment, personal and family 
incomes, social benefits and crime. 
 Statistics on trade and industries: including a register of enterprises 
(GER: Grønlands ErhvervsRegister – Greenland’s Range on Trade and 
Industry) and covering tourism, consumer prices, foreign trade and 
renewable resource harvesting. 
 General economic statistics: public finances, balance of payments, 
national income accounts.  
15.1.2. The 1994 Greenland Living Conditions Survey and its 
Methodological Implications146 
In 1994, Statistics Greenland carried out the first study of living conditions 
in Greenland since the introduction of Home Rule147 148. The questionnaire 
consisted of 147 questions answered by 1.121 respondents.149. Because 
research within the field of living conditions was at a pioneering stage in 
Greenland, the research design for such studies was very much a copy of 
the Scandinavian model which included living conditions indicators based 
on Scandinavian traditions (Eriksen & Uusitalo 1987, Hansen 1990). The 
questionnaire primarily focused on material well being (e.g. income, em-
ployment, education, and housing). The survey produced a substantial 
amount of information as well as many questions that could not be an-
swered without a design that also addressed causal relationships.  
                                                        
146 Appendix B contains a tentative bibliography on research in living conditions in Greenland. 
147 In 1973, The Danish Institute of Social Research conducted a Survey of Living Conditions: 
Social problems in Greenland. 
148 In 1993–1994 the Danish Institute for Clinical Epidemiology (DICE) conducted a national 
Health Interview Survey aimed at giving a description of health, lifestyle, living conditions and the 
use of the health care system in Greenland for analyzing the association of disease and symptoms 
with lifestyle and living conditions. 
149 Following a decision of the Greenland Parliament Statistics, Greenland conducted a survey 
among 1500 randomly selected respondents (age 18 years and above). During the personal inter-
view the respondents were asked 147 questions about housing, education, labor market associa-
tions, private economic affairs, consumption, and leisure time use. Furthermore, two separate 
special surveys were conducted in the municipalities of Tasiilaq and Upernavik to gather thorough 
knowledge about living conditions in the outlying districts. 
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The fact that the people living in Greenlandic settlements150 generally 
scored low on most of the living conditions measures and still choose to 
stay in the settlements indicates, that the underlying concept of welfare, 
and hence the welfare dimensions employed in the survey, was incomplete 
(Andersen and Poppel 2002; Poppel 2006). These experiences called for a 
revised and expanded concept of welfare adapted to the reality of the 
Greenlandic population. Furthermore, these early survey experiences indi-
cated a need for the development of a new research design for the study of 
living conditions in Arctic countries and regions, which from an economic 
and, especially a cultural point of view are different from Western Europe 
and North America. This is the case for all the countries in the Arctic in 
which Inuit and Saami peoples are living. (Andersen and Poppel 2002; 
Andersen 2006; Poppel 2006). 
15.1.3. The Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic/SLiCA  
In 1997, Statistics Greenland started developing the preconditions for a 
living conditions survey, which addressed the welfare priorities of Arctic 
residents by focusing on the Arctic’s indigenous residents. The project was 
at first planned to be conducted in Greenland, but it soon gathered other 
interested parties. At an international workshop in May 1998 in 
Slagelse,151 representatives for Arctic residents (the indigenous peoples” 
regional and national organizations152) with Arctic social scientists and 
research institutions inside and outside the Arctic, decided to create a new 
research design to conduct a coordinated set of living condition surveys 
among indigenous peoples153 (Andersen and Poppel 2002; Andersen 2006; 
Poppel 2006).  
                                                        
150 Since the introduction of Home Rule Government in 1979, the figures on total population in 
the settlements have been stable until recently (roughly 10.000), whereas the percentage of total 
population has been slightly declining from 20% in 1980 to 17% in 2007 (ca. 9.000 inhabitants). 
151 For further information about the meeting, see [http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org/]  
Project history  Slagelse98. 
152 Inuit Circumpolar Council, ICC; the Same Council and the Russian Association of the In-
digenous Peoples of the North, RAIPON. 
153 The survey includes Inuit in Greenland, Canada and Alaska, the indigenous peoples of 
Chukotka and on the Kola Peninsula and the Saami in Northern Norway and Sweden. So far the 
Saami of Finland have not been included due to lack of funding. 
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15.1.3.1 SLiCA objectives: 
The major objectives of the SLiCA-project are: 
 
 To develop a new research design for comparative investigations of the 
living conditions of the Inuit and Saami populations in the Arctic. 
 To map the living conditions among the Inuit and Saami in the Arctic. 
 To conduct a comparative and dynamic social analysis of the causal 
relations between different individual resources and between individual 
well-being and different political, economic, cultural and technological 
settings. 
 To improve the basis for decision-making in relation to policy planning 
and implementation. 
 To establish an interdisciplinary network of researchers and research 
institutions engaged in living conditions research in the Arctic. 
 To increase the knowledge among indigenous peoples regarding their 
own, and other indigenous peoples, history and living conditions. 
 To educate and involve post docs, PhD-students, candidates and 
undergraduates in the SLICA project. 
 
In 2001, the partnership between international researchers and indigenous 
representatives of the respondents resulted in an agreement on a common 
“core questionnaire”154 for all regions included in the Survey of Living 
Conditions in the Arctic, SLiCA. The completion of the standardized 
SLiCA core questionnaire in 2001 signaled the ending of SLiCA phase I. 
15.2. Developing the international SLiCA questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed through discussions by the local, re-
gional, national, and international SLiCA workshops and team meetings. 
The content of the questionnaire emerged from early discussions on social 
goals and the multiple dimensions of conditions dimensions. The syntheses 
                                                        
154 For different reasons, adjustments have been made in the SLiCA questionnaires used in the 
participating countries and regions. In Canada, collaboration between the Canadian SLiCA team 
and Statistics Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples” Survey, APS 2001 resulted in a joint SLiCA-APS 
questionnaire. Due to these differences, international comparisons including all countries and 
regions are not possible for all variables. Further information can be found on the project website: 
[www.arcticlivingconditions.org.]  
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and recommendations from the discussions between researchers and in-
digenous representatives were brought to concluding discussions in the 
International SLiCA Management Board155. The management board itself 
is made of both researchers and representatives from indigenous groups. 
The process is outlined in figure 1 below.  
As figure 1 indicates, selecting the broad social goals and the living 
conditions as well as agreeing on the individual resources, which were to 
be focused on, was a joint effort by the indigenous representatives and the 
researchers. Operationalization of the individual resources into actual ques-
tions was initially envisioned as the responsibility of the research team. In 
practice however, indigenous representatives both individually and through 
the indigenous oversight groups, contributed significantly to the develop-
ment of questionnaire measures themselves.  
15.2.1. The SliCA Living Conditions Dimensions 
The ambition was to develop indicators reflecting the welfare priorities of 
Arctic indigenous peoples, and at the same time, increase the understand-
ing of relationships among both new and traditional dimensions of living 
conditions. It was decided to develop indicators with each of the dimen-
sions listed in table 1. 
15.2.2. From living conditions dimensions via individual resources to 
questions 
Within each dimension a number of individual resources were defined and 
from there, the operationalization into questions began. To take an exam-
ple: An overall social goal defined by indigenous partners was condensed 
into “cultural continuity”. Language was considered a very important liv-
ing condition dimension within this overall goal. Individual language re-
sources include “understanding”, “speaking”, “reading” and “writing” the 
language in question. Having singled out the most relevant individual re-
sources, the final step before pilot testing was phrasing the questions, 
which were to be directed at the respondents. In this example, respondents 
were asked to rate their ability to understand, speak, read, and write a lan-
                                                        
155 The discussions are documented on the project web site: [www.arcticlivingconditions.org.]  
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guage on a scale defined by the categories: “very well”, “relatively well”, 
“with effort”, “a few words”, and “not at all”.  
Roughly 200 questions (closed and open-ended questions) were in-
cluded in the international SLiCA core questionnaire156. The questions 
were grouped in eight sections: 
 
 Family relationships. 
 Background. 
 Productive activities in the market and the informal sector. 
 Health (physical and mental and partly through a self administered 
questionnaire). 
 Housing conditions and living standard. 
 Activities (leisure time, community activities, political activities and 
political attitudes). 
 Inuit/Saami values, religion and spirituality. 
 
Communication and Technology Health 
Community Viability Household economy 
Discrimination Housing 
Education Identity management 
Employment/Harvest Justice/Safety 
Environment/Resource management Language  
Family relations and social networks Mobility 
 Political resources 
 Religion/spirituality 
 
Figure 1. SLiCA Living Conditions Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
156 A part of the interview was conducted using a self-administered questionnaire containing a 
number of sensitive questions concerning e.g. smoking and drinking habits, use of drugs and 
domestic violence. The self-administered questionnaire was filled out by the respondent and put 
into an envelope that was sealed and not opened until the coding and data entry process was going 
to take place. 
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Figure 1. The process of defining indicators of living conditions157 
15.2.3. The local community and the environment 
SLiCA’s objective was not only to measure living standards of individuals 
and households, but also to focus on all resources – material as well as 
non-material – that individuals can apply to enhance their living condi-
tions. In addition, SLiCA’s design incorporates both objective and subjec-
tive components of understanding living conditions, the latter theoretically 
including satisfaction, expectations, and aspirations (Andersen 2006; Pop-
pel 2008). As operationalized, SLiCA’s subjective component focused on 
measures of satisfaction. “The SLiCA Data description” (Appendix D) 
summarizes the topics covered by the international core data set of SLi-
CA158. 
                                                        
157 Kruse and Hannah 1998, Andersen, 1999, Kruse and Poppel 2008 
158 The international core data dictionary with information also about analytic variables is ac-
cessible at [http://classic.ipy.org/development/eoi/]  Science Plans: SLICA data description.  
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15.3. The interviews 
Interviews were conducted face-to-face in the principal language of the 
respondent. Statistics Canada was responsible for fieldwork and data proc-
essing in Canada. The average interview length was 60 minutes in Canada 
(using a shorter questionnaire) and 90 minutes elsewhere. Interview data 
from Alaska, Greenland, and Chukotka as well as for Sápmi: Norway, 
Sweden and the Kola Peninsula were separately coded, processed159 and 
stored, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Due to 
the involvement of Statistics Canada, Canadian data is subject to the Cana-
dian Privacy Act. Application of the provisions of this act requires the 
research team to merge the Canadian data with that of the other three re-
gions within secure analysis laboratories in Canada. 
The 90-minute interviews produced 950 variables per respondent. Thus, 
one observation record in the raw data file consists of 950 variables. There 
are a total of 7,200 observations. A combination of difference in schedul-
ing and interview length resulted in a more limited Canadian data set. The 
950 variables in the international data set were used to produce 398 ana-
lytic variables. The Canadian data set includes 129 of these 398 analytic 
variables. We therefore report some results without Canadian comparisons. 
An important analytic feature of the data file is that it is possible to test 
hypotheses about relationships among variables. For example, we may 
hypothesize that income is related to education. We can use the observed 
level of co-variation between income and education to test the null hy-
pothesis, or that there is no relationship between education and income. 
While an observed co-variation does not prove that higher education leads 
to increased income, it lends support to the hypothesis. Since all the vari-
ables in a single observation are linked, it is possible to test multivariate 
hypotheses as well. 
15.3.1. The SLiCA target population 
The SLiCA target population is defined by three elements: (1) indigenous 
individuals160 aged 16 (in Greenland and Canada: 15+) and over; (2) resid-
                                                        
159 The coding was done by Jack Kruse and Marg Kruse 
160 For Greenland, the sample includes immigrants who are mostly individuals that migrated to 
Greenland from Denmark. The share of respondents that are Greenlanders (i.e. individuals born in 
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ing in households; (3) in a traditional settlement region. The current set-
tlement regions are defined and shown in figure 2, and as follows: Alaska; 
Canada; Greenland and Chukotka, Russia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Inuit and Sami settlement regions, the Kola Peninsula and Chukotka 
 
The indigenous peoples represented by the data include Inuit in Alaska, 
Canada, Greenland and Chukchi, Inuit, Evan, Chuvan, and Yukagir in 
Chukotka. Probability sampling procedures were used in each country to 
ensure, that each adult had a known probability of selection161. Results are 
weighted to properly reflect these probabilities. For reasons of cost and 
logistics, SLiCA’s target population did not include the Yupik traditional 
                                                                                                                         
Greenland) and non-Greenlanders (i.e. individuals born outside Greenland) corresponds to the two 
population groups” shares of the total population.  
161 The sampling procedure applied in Greenland is outlined in Appendix E. 
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settlement regions in Alaska, or the vast indigenous settlement region be-
tween Russia’s Kola Peninsula and Chukotka. For ease of reference, we 
refer to SLiCA results of the first part of the study pertaining to Arctic 
Inuit people. 
Please keep in mind, that technically the results do not include all Arc-
tic Inuit people162 and do include Chukotka indigenous peoples other than 
Inuit. The second part of the SLiCA study163 covers Sápmi (Sameland), the 
area that is traditionally inhabited by Sámi. Sápmi includes the Norwegian 
districts of Nordland, Troms and Finmark, the Swedish district of Nordbot-
ten, and the Russian Kola Peninsula164. 
15.3.2. The SLiCA sample summary – response rates and sampling errors 
Table 2 summarizes the main figures regarding the total population of the 
SLiCA study, the sample, the response rate and the maximum estimated 
sampling error. 
Table 2. The SLICA Sample Summary. 165 
Indigenous Settlement Region Indigenous 
Adults 
Sample 
Size 
Response 
Rate 
Maximum esti-
mated sampling 
error (plus or 
minus %s) 
Northern Alaska 11.000 700 84% 4% 
Chukotka 20.000 600 85% 4% 
Canada 22.000 4.700 83% 1% 
Greenland  43.000 1.450 83% 3% 
Indigenous Settlement Regions 93.000 7.200 83% 1% 
 
As indicated in the table, the response rates exceeded 80 percent in all 
regions. Nevertheless, we did observe a bias in favor of female respondents 
that we addressed as a final sampling weight. 
                                                        
162 SLiCA’s target population did not include Yupik traditional settlement regions in Alaska nor 
the indigenous groups occupying the vast territory between Russia’s Kola Peninsula and Chukotka. 
163 Interviewing has been concluded in Sweden in 2006 and in Norway and the Kola Peninsula 
in 2008. Data entry is concluded and preliminary results are expected to be available in the second 
half of 2009. 
164 Due to lack of funding it has not yet been possible to include the Sámi of Finland: the Lap-
pland district. 
165 The total adult population in Greenland 15+ was as the time of sampling: 43.000 (37.500 
born in Greenland and 5.500 born outside Greenland). 
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Results for Arctic indigenous settlement regions as a whole are subject 
to a maximum estimated sampling error of plus or minus one percentage 
point. Regional comparisons have sampling errors of one to four percent-
age points. Breakdowns for subpopulations and more refined geography 
are subject to larger sampling errors. 
15.3.3. The SLiCA unit(s) of analyses: different levels of aggregation and 
various categorizations 
It has been a prerequisite for the development of the SLiCA research de-
sign, that it should be possible to carry out causal analyses based on the 
interviews. The international core questionnaire employed in the 
Greenland part of SLiCA makes it possible to analyze empirical relation-
ships between the respondents” background and resources, satisfaction 
with different aspects of life as well as general satisfaction with life as 
whole. Apart from the questions originating from the international core 
questionnaire, a number of questions specifically designed by the research 
and focus groups of the Greenlandic SLiCA team have been included in 
the Greenlandic survey166. 
Even though the sampling unit is at the individual level, the respondent 
is asked about characteristics of the household: age, gender, and participa-
tion in a broad array of both formal (e.g. wage jobs) and informal (e.g. care 
of children) household activities. Furthermore, the respondent is asked to 
report on the household’s housing conditions and income.  
Taking into account differences in regional and community sampling 
probabilities and differences in response rates by gender, the sampling 
procedures applied ensure that the SLiCA sample is representative, and the 
subsequent weighing procedures make it possible to generalize responses 
to entire populations by: “country”, “region”, “region/place size’, “gender” 
and “age groups”. Such population breakdowns are reported on the project 
website, www.arcticlivingconditions.org. These levels of aggregation are 
defined as follows:  
 
                                                        
166 A more thorough elucidation of the methodological and theoretical aspects of the study, as 
well as the development of the process, can be found in Andersen and Poppel 2002; Andersen et al 
2002; Kruse et al 2008 and on the project web-site: [www.arcticlivingconditions.org.]  
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 The national level: Inuit settlement regions in Chukotka167, Northern 
Alaska, the Canadian Arctic, and Greenland. 
 The regional level: (to get yet another categorization to compare, 
different parts of the Arctic “regional capitals” were singled out to be 
then compared with “other communities”168; this categorization is 
included in the outline below in square brackets). 
 Chukotka (“regional capital” “other communities”) 
 Western Chukotka (Western region in Chukotka) 
 Anadyr (Anadyr region in Chukotka) Central Chukotka (Central region 
in Chukotka) 
 Eastern Chukotka (Eastern region in Chukotka) – (‘Eastern 
Chukotka’169 and “Other Chukotka”) 
 Inuit settlement regions in Northern Alaska (“regional capital” “other 
communities”) 
 Bering Straits (Bering Straits region in Alaska) – (“Nome” and “Other 
Bering Strait”) 
 NANA (Northwest Arctic Borough in Alaska) – (“Kotzebue” and 
“Other NW Arctic”) 
 North Slope (North Slope Borough in Alaska) – (“Barrow” and “Other 
North Slope”) 
 Inuit settlement regions in the Canadian Arctic (“regional capital” 
“other communities”) 
 Inuvialuit (“Inuvik” and “Other Inuvialuit”) 
 Nunavik (“Kuujjuaq” and “Other Nunavik”) 
 Nunavut (“Iqaluit” and “Other Nunavut”) 
 Labrador (“Happy Valley-Goose Bay” and “Other Labrador”) 
 Greenland (“regional capital” “other communities”) 
 North Greenland (Nordgrønland) 
 Disco Bay (North-western region in Greenland: Diskobugten) 
 Middle Greenland (Midtgrønland) – (“Nuuk” and “Other 
Midtgrønland”) 
 South Greenland (Sydgrønland) 
 East Greenland (Østgrønland) 
                                                        
167 In Chukotka Siberian Yupik (the Chukotkan branch of Inuit) as well as other indigenous 
peoples: SLiCA includes Chukchi, Evan, Chuvan and Yukagir. 
168 Further information can be found on www.arcticlivingconditions.org.  
169 Most of the Inuit of Chukotka (i.e. Siberian Yupik) live in the Eastern Region. 
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 Gender: In the “SLiCA Release” (Poppel et al 2007) on the project web 
site all the processed variables are broken down by gender for “All 
Inuit”. The organization of the data makes it possible to make gender 
based comparisons on a national and/or regional level. 
 Age group: As all respondents are asked about their age as well as the 
age of any other household member the point of departure in breaking 
down the data is one-year age groups. To ensure a manageable lay out 
of the tables the following age-groups are used in the “SLiCA Release” 
(2007): “15/16–24”; “25–34”; “35–44”; “45–54”; “55–64”; and “65 +”. 
15.3.4. Different categorizations of SLiCA variables – a few examples 
Apart from the more obvious ways of breaking down the data outlined 
above, the questions asked and the organization of data facilitates different 
ways of breaking down SLiCA-data and thus analyzing different distribu-
tions. Individuals can for instance be categorized and analyzed according to: 
 
 Marital status. 
 Level of education. 
 Labor market affiliation (e.g. status as employed/unemployed; wage 
earners; self-employed; fishermen/hunters; recipients of transfer 
income etc.) 
 
In the same way households can be categorized into a number of units of 
analyses like: 
 
 Households with/without kids. 
 Single parent’s/couple’s households. 
 Households by incomes (e.g. households above or below a poverty line). 
 Households by primary income source (e.g. wage, earnings from self-
employment, subsistence activities, transfer incomes etc.). 
 Households living in towns/settlements; in different 
regions/municipalities. 
 
The above mentioned are just a few examples to give an idea about the 
variety of “unit of analyses” that may be the point of departure for analyses 
based on the SLiCA data. 
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15.3.5. Protection, handling and conditions for use of SLiCA data 
All SLiCA data are based on information attached to either the respondent, 
or the respondent’s household. The data are gathered and stored according 
to national legislation and regulations. In some cases, data are stored in 
accordance to regional regulations based on formal agreements between 
the national/regional SLiCA team and the organization representing the 
indigenous peoples in the region.170 Two examples are the Canadian and 
the Greenlandic national legislations. Canadian data are as mentioned, 
subject to the Canadian Privacy Act due to the involvement of Statistics 
Canada. Parallel to this, are the Greenlandic data that are subject to the Act 
of Public Registers as Statistics Greenland initiated SLiCA in Greenland.  
The International SLiCA team is committed to conduct the research in 
partnership with the indigenous peoples and to follow ethical standards 
from the very beginning phases of the project. The ethical standards ap-
plied are the IASSA Guiding Principles for the Conduct of Research171. 
The SLiCA team has developed a special project for a Remote Access 
Analyses System (see below). Until then, the SLiCA team is open to share 
data with qualified researchers who commit to meeting the conditions of use 
of the data set. See the project web site: www.arcticlivingconditions.org  
Methods  data files (data sharing conditions).172 
15.4. The Greenland part of SLiCA 
Interviewing in Greenland was conducted over a period from December 
2003 to August 2006. The Greenlandic data comes from 1200 personal in-
terviews: 88% with Greenlanders and 12% with non-Greenlanders reflecting 
the relative share of the two population groups in the age group 15+. For 
historical reasons, the Greenlandic sample includes both the indigenous 
population (the Greenlandic Inuit) and the immigrated (mainly Danish) part 
                                                        
170 See also “Conditions for Use of the Data on the project web site www.arcticliving  
conditions.org.  
171 The Guiding Principles for the Conduct of Research was adopted by IASSA (International 
Arctic Social Sciences Association) General Assembly convened in Copenhagen May 23, 1998, 
during the Third International Congress of Arctic Social Sciences (ICASS III). 
172 The “data sharing conditions” published on the SLiCA web site were agreed upon with the 
Alaskan Native Management Board. Parallel conditions will have to be met in the other countries/ 
regions. 
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of the population. Residents in Greenland are registered by place of birth and 
not by self-identified ethnic belonging. Thus the sampling criterion has been 
place on birthplace. Based on analyses of Greenlandic SLiCA background 
data it is possible to examine whether the birthplace criterion correlates with 
self identified ethnic belonging. Survey results confirm that “born in 
Greenland” is a good predictor for self-identified Greenlandic ethnic belong-
ing as 92% of people born in Greenland identify themselves as 
“Greenlandic” and 6% as “Both Greenlandic and Danish”. This finding indi-
cates that the correlation found in Bjerregaard et al 1995 is still valid. 
The sample is generated from a population list173. The sample is ran-
domly selected in eight towns and 22 settlements in the eight municipalities 
(Upernavik, Ilulissat, Aasiaat, Nuuk, Paamiut, Qaqortoq, Nanortalik and 
Ammassalik municipalities) representing the five regions: Nordgrønland 
(Northern Greenland), Diskobugten (Disco Bay), Midtgrønland (Mid 
Greenland), Sydgrønland (Southern Greenland) and Østgrønland (East 
Greenland). 
In total, 1200 interviews were conducted in Greenland. To be able to 
carry through multivariate analyses, there was an over sampling among the 
population in the settlements. Following the validation and data entry pro-
cedures, the survey data have been weighed to reflect the demographic 
composition of the total population with regard to gender and age groups 
and mirror the variation between regions, towns and settlements 
15.5. A concluding note on sharing SLiCA data – developing 
the “tools” and the International Polar Year, IPY. 
As mentioned above, the SLiCA data can be shared if certain conditions 
are met. Hence, we were also looking for the appropriate way and tools to 
share SLiCA data. While the first phase of the SLiCA analysis only in-
volved the work of the project team itself. By making the data more avail-
able, the second phase of analysis facilitates broader research and policy 
analysis of communities. The SLiCA international team is committed to 
make the international data set available to the scientific community, in-
digenous communities of the Arctic, and to other Arctic residents as well 
                                                        
173 The Greenland Central Personal Register (CPR) containing demographical information 
about all residents in Greenland. 
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as to political and administrative decision makers at the local, regional, 
national and international levels for further analysis. Making the data more 
accessible means providing greater opportunities to access individual re-
cords of answers given during the interview processes in interviews con-
ducted around the Arctic. A major challenge of this phase is to make 
SLiCA data available and accessible, while maintaining the confidentiality 
of results. The SLiCA researchers promised that individual answers could 
not be traced to the respondent. While it is easy to remove names, ad-
dresses and other identifying information, the remaining data might still be 
used to identify individuals. (NSF proposal 2005; IPY proposal 2006) 
The original intent of the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic pro-
ject team was to make the full dataset available on a CD-Rom after removing 
all individual identifiers, and collapsing response categories for variables 
such as location (e.g. place), occupation, and income. This was done to re-
move the risk of identifying individual respondents. While the need for col-
lapsing response categories was anticipated, the degree to which this would 
pose a constraint for multivariate analyses was not anticipated. The experi-
ence of the project team from the data analyses process has convinced the 
team that the CD dataset approach would require such extensive grouping of 
response categories, that it would severely limit the range of research ques-
tions, which could be addressed. (NSF proposal 2005) 
An alternative approach to providing a CD-Rom, is to make the dataset 
available within one or more secure analysis laboratories. The SLICA team 
has been conducting its international analysis within such a laboratory 
system in Canada174. However, this approach is costly to researchers in 
terms of both travel expenses and time. The secure laboratory approach is 
also a more labor-intensive system to maintain. (NSF proposal 2005; IPY 
proposal 2006) 
To live up to the fundamental objectives and obligations agreed upon 
within the SLiCA project team and thus between researchers and indige-
nous peoples (and based upon the experience gathered), the SLiCA project 
team proposed a development within the SLiCA project: the SLiCA Re-
mote Access Analysis System (SLiCA RAAS). When the IPY organizers 
                                                        
174 To be able to compare the Canadian data that were a product of a partnership between 
SLiCA and Statistics Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples Survey, 2001 with data from the other Inuit 
inhabited regions data analyses had to be completed within Stat Can’s facilities. 
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called for “Expressions of intent” followed by calls for “Fuller proposals” 
the SLiCA group explained that:  
“We further realize that the challenge of providing analytically robust 
social science data sets and protecting the confidentiality of respondents is 
common in the Arctic social sciences. We therefore propose to contribute 
to the IPY goal of expanding our understanding of human dimensions of 
change in the Arctic by collaborating with an international team to apply 
and extend the concepts of remote access analysis to the SLiCA interna-
tional database.” (IPY proposal 2006) 
The fundamental objective of Remote Access Analysis is to provide re-
searchers with access to a micro data set for analysis (in the case of SliCA, 
this means the individual records of respondents to the SLiCA question-
naire) from their own computers. We further propose, to extend this capa-
bility to work with restricted datasets, where the sensitivity of data is suffi-
ciently high to warrant restriction of access to the raw data. Researchers, 
indigenous organizations and political and administrative authorities at 
different levels will be able to conduct analyses, while being able to view 
the micro data set itself. (NSF proposal 2005). 
An additional benefit to the remote access analysis system is that it will be 
available to researchers and analysts through a secure internet connection. 
Thus, researchers, widely dispersed Arctic indigenous organizations and com-
munities, and local political and administrative authorities will be able to con-
duct individual analyses and more easily collaborate, without incurring travel 
expenses. It is furthermore the objective to apply a full array of statistical 
analysis techniques to the dataset, while ensuring that the individual records 
remain unseen. The remote access analysis system will also be programmed so 
that researchers and others cannot inadvertently request analyses, which could 
reveal the identity of individual respondents. (NSF proposal 2005) 
The SLICA-RAAS component will focus on the spatio-temporal vari-
ability of socio-environmental conditions. SLICA-RAAS will contribute to 
the objectives of assessing the socio-economic impacts of potential future 
changes in the transitional zones, by incorporating results into an expert 
information system. This system can then be utilized for estimating climate 
change responses, sustainable ecosystem management and landscape plan-
ning in support of policy decisions. This system will also used as a tool in 
forecasting ecosystem changes and options for mitigation, by allowing the 
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ability to exchange methods on climate change monitoring, sustainable 
land use strategies, science/policy issues. 
SLiCA-RAAS aims at contributing to the IPY goal of expanding the 
understanding on the human dimensions of the Arctic by collaborating 
with an international team, to apply and extend the concepts of remote 
access analysis to the SLiCA international database. The Remote Access 
Analysis System can be applied to other Arctic datasets. These possibilities 
will be further explored once it has been applied to SLiCA. 
[http://classic.ipy.org/development/eoi/proposal-details.php?id=386] 
15.6. SLiCA data collaboration 
Results from the SLiCA survey are available on the project web site, in 
published articles 175 and by special agreements with the research team. 
These results have already proven useful to such initiatives as the Arctic 
Social Indicators initiative of the Arctic Council, and to a number of other 
endorsed IPY and Arctic Council/SDWG projects176 177. SLiCA has link-
ages to some research projects focusing on data gathering and manage-
ment. It also has linkages to the establishment of observational and moni-
toring systems and networks aimed at documenting the physical, biological 
and societal changes within the Arctic178. Furthermore, descriptive studies 
of two Greenlandic municipalities179 have formed the basis of discussions 
on community development. 
                                                        
175 An updated list of SLiCA articles can be found on www.arcticlivingconditions.org  
SLiCA-related Elements of the Sustainable Development Working Group Report. 
176 Arctic Social Indicators (ASI); The Economy of the North (ECONOR); ArcticStat; The 
Arctic Human Health Initiative (AHHI). 
177 The Arctic Human Health Initiative (AHHI) IPY#167; The Political Economy of Northern 
Regional Development, POENOR IPY#227; Social Indicator Project (ASI) IPY#462; Consortium for 
coordination of Observation and Monitoring of the Arctic for Assessment and Research (COMAAR) 
IPY#305; Study of Environmental Arctic Change, (SEARCH) IPY#916; Present day processes, Past 
changes, and Spatiotemporal variability of biotic, abiotic and socio-environmental conditions and 
resource components along and across the Arctic delimitation zone, (PPS Arctic) IPY#151. 
178 ISAC-SEARCH: International Study of Arctic Change/Study of Environmental Arctic 
Change; Indicator Database of Arctic Community Change, INDACC; Arctic Observations Net-
work – Arctic Social Indicators: Phase two (AON-SIP2).  
179 The two municipalities using SLiCA municipal profiles: Nuuk where the municipal profile 
became part of project: “Developing the competences” and Paamiut where the municipal profile 
became part of a project: “Paamiut, asasaraa” (My Dear Paamiut). 
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It is useful to view SLiCA as both a concept and a set of results. SLiCA 
as a concept can be applied to future enhancements of the Arctic observa-
tion system. SLiCA as a set of results can inform policy makers, indige-
nous organizations, and researchers. Through the decade over which 
SLiCA has taken place, we have learned a great deal about measurement, 
collaboration, field procedures, merging data sets, analysis, and data dis-
semination and discussion. Perhaps the most important SLiCA contribution 
is in its aiding the development of an Arctic community built on collabora-
tion between indigenous peoples and researchers. 
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Appendix A 
Economic analyses of Greenland (English translations of Danish titles in 
square brackets)  
This tentative bibliography on economic analyses of Greenland only in-
cludes publications focusing on the national, regional and/or sector eco-
nomic development in Greenland. Thus statistical publications, antholo-
gies, thematic issues/volumes of scientific journals, proceedings from 
workshops, seminars, conferences and congresses as well as grey literature 
(with a few exceptions) are not included in this draft. 
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Appendix B: 
Bibliography: Research in living conditions in Greenland. (English transla-
tions of Danish titles in square brackets) 
 
Grønlandsk medicinsk Statistik og Nosografi – Undersøgelser og Erfaringer fra 30 Aars 
grønlandsk Lægevirksomhed (Greenlandic medical statistics and Nosology – Investi-
gations and Experiences from 30 years Greenlandic medical activities.) Af A. Berth-
elsen. Meddelelser om Grønland Bd. 117, Nr. 1 – 4. København 1935–1943. 
Grønlands Befolkningsstatistik 1901–30 (Greenland: Population Statistics 1901–30) 
Sundhedsvilkaarene i Grønland (Health Conditions in Greenland) Det sædvanlige 
Sygdomsbillede (The typical Disease Pattern) Akutte Infektionssygdomme i Grøn-
land (Acute Infectious Diseases in Greenland) 
Udvalget for Samfundsforskning i Grønland udgav i perioden 1961–1968: (The Com-
mittee on social research in Greenland published a number of research reports in the 
period 1961–1968) 
Alkoholsituationen i Vestgrønland – (The alcohol situation in West Greenland)  
Familie og ægteskab i Vestgrønland I – (Family and marriage in West Greenland I) 
Familie og ægteskab i Vestgrønland II – (Family and marriage in West Greenland II) af 
Agnete Weis Bentzon 
Uddannelsessituationen i Vestgrønland I – (The state of education in West Greenland I) 
Uddannelsessituationen i Vestgrønland II – (The state of education in West Greenland II) 
Uddannelsessituationen i Vestgrønland III – (The state of education in West Greenland 
III) 
Kriminalloven og det vestgrønlandske samfund I – (The criminal code and the West 
Greenlandic society I) 
Kriminalloven og det vestgrønlandske samfund II – (The criminal code and the West 
Greenlandic society II) 
Befolkningssituationen i Vestgrønland – (The population development in West Green-
land) 
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Samarbejdsproblemer mellem grønlændere og danskere i Vestgrønland – (The relation-
ship between Greenlanders and Danes in West Greenland) 
Familiens organisation i de grønlandske samfund – (Family organisation in the 
Greenlandic communities) af Agnete Weis Bentzon Familiens økonomiske admini-
stration og ejendelenes tilhørsforhold i de vestgrønlandske samfund – (The family’s 
economic administration and the ownership of belongings) af Agnete Weis Bentzon  
Sociale problemer i Grønland – Levevilkår og sociale problemer i Vestgrønland (Social 
problems in Greenland – Living Conditions and Social Problems in West Greenland) 
by Anders From, Kirsten Just Jensen, Peter Friis og Anders Kjær. Socialforskningsin-
stituttet. Publikation 64. København 1975. 
Levevilkår i Grønland – den grønlandske levevilkårsundersøgelse 1994 gennemført og 
afrapporteret af Grønlands Statistik 1994–1997 (Living Conditions in Greenland – 
The Greenland Survey of Living Conditions 1994 Conducted and reported by Sta-
tistics Greenland 1994–1997) 
 
Publikationer på baggrund af 1994–levevilkårsundersøgelsen: (Reports 
based on the 1994–Living Conditions Survey – all in Danish and some in 
Greenlandic.  
 
Nr. 1 Kalaallit Nunaanni inooriaaseq / Levevilkår i Grønland på henholdsvis 
grønlandsk og dansk. (Living Conditions in Greenland) 
Nr. 2 Avislæsningsvaner i Grønland. (Newspaper reading habits in Greenland) 
Nr. 3 Fisker- og fangerfamiliers levevilkår. (Living Conditions in Fishermen’s and 
Hunters” Families) 
Nr. 4 Familiers levevilkår i Grønland, på henholdsvis grønlandsk og dansk. (Living 
Conditions among families in Greenland) 
Nr. 5 Rapport om Levevilkår i bygderne, på henholdsvis grønlandsk og dansk. (Report 
on Living Conditions in the Settlements) 
Nr. 6 Rapport om Boligforholdene i Grønland. (Report on Housing Conditions in 
Greenland) 
Nr. 7 Rapport om Arbejde og ledighed i Grønland. (Report on Work and Unemploy-
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Nr. 8 Rapport om Den sproglige udvikling i Grønland 1984–1994 (Report on the De-
velopment of Language Abilities in Greenland 1984–1994) 
Nr. 9 Rapport om Indkomstforhold i Grønland 1993, på henholdsvis grønlandsk og 
dansk. (Report on Incomes in Greenland 1993) 
Nr. 10 Rapport om Forbrug i Grønland. (Report on Consumption in Greenland) 
Nr. 11 Rapport om Skole- og erhvervsuddannelse i Grønland 1994. (Report on Primary 
Education, Secondary Education and Vocational Training in Greenland 1994) 
Levevilkår, livsstil og helbred I Grønland (Living conditions, lifestyle and health in 
Greenland) by Peter Bjerregaard, Tine Curtis, Frank Senderowitz, Ulla Christensen, 
Tine Pars Dansk Institut for Klinisk Epidemolgi og Landsstyreområdet for Sundhed, 
Miljø og Forskning. DIKE’s Grønlandsskrifter nr. 4. København 1995. 
A Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic: Inuit, Sámi and the Indigenous Peoples of 
Chukotka, SLiCA. The Greenlandic part of SLiCA 2004–2006 was initiated by Sta-
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tistics Greenland and conducted by Statistics Greenland and Ilisimatusar-
fik/University of Greenland. 
 
SLiCA is documented and partly reported in: www.arcticlivingconditions. 
org and in:  
 
Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic: SLiCA Results by Jack Kruse, Birger Pop-
pel, Gérard Duhaime, Larissa Abryutina Anchorage: Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, University of Alaska Anchorage. (2007). www.arcticlivingconditions.org.  
A Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic by Jack Kruse, Birger Poppel, Larissa 
Abryutina, Gerard Duhaime, Stephanie Martin, Mariekathrine Poppel, Margaret 
Kruse, Ed Ward, Patricia Cochran, Virgene Hanna.  In: Valerie Møller et al. (red.) 
Barometers of Quality of Life around the GlobeSocial. © Springer Science+Business 
Media B.V. (2008).  
 
The Greenlandic part of SLiCA is so far reported in: 
 
Den arktiske Levevilkårsundersøgelse, SLiCA – et komparativt og transnationalt pro-
jekt (The Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic, SLiCA – a Comparative and 
Transnational Project) by Birger Poppel In: Hanne Petersen (ed.) Grønland i verdens-
samfundet (2006). 
Interdependency of subsistence and market economies in the Arctic by Birger Poppel 
In: Solveig Glomsråd and Iulie Aslaksen (eds.) The Economy of the North. Statistisk 
Sentralbyrå/Statistics Norway (2006). 
Nogle forskelle mellem levevilkår i byer og bygder – og input til en diskussion om 
bygdernes fremtid (Some differences between living conditions in towns and settle-
ments – and input to the discussion about the future of the settlements) by Birger 
Poppel In: Samfundsøkonomen (2007). Copenhagen. 
Er subsistensaktiviteter i Arktis en del af den markedsøkonomiske virkelighed eller er 
markedsøkonomien en del af en subsistensbaseret blandingsøkonomi? (Are subsis-
tence activities in the Arctic part of the market economic reality or – is the market 
economy a part of a subsistence based mixed economy?) by Birger Poppel In: Grøn-
landsk Kultur og Samfundsforskning 2006–07. Ilisimatusarfik og Forlaget Atuagkat. 
Nuuk (2008). 
Befolkningsundersøgelsen i Grønland 2005–2007 – Levevilkår, livsstil og helbred 
(Population survey in Greenland 2005–2007 – Living conditions, life style and 
health) by Peter Bjerregaard (ed.) and Inger Kathrine Dahl-Petersen. SIF’s Grøn-
landsskrifter nr. 18, Statens Institut for Folkesundhed, København 2008. 
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Appendix C 
Statistical registers operated by Statistics Greenland and the period covered 
by the registers. * = Data are registered by individuals (persons or enter-
prises) 
 
Statistical domain Statistical register Time span  
Income & A11-tax forms  1988-* 
National Final Taxes  1988-* 
Accounts National Accounts 1986- 
Consumption Consumer price indices 1971- 
Public Finances Public incomes/spending 1986- 
Foreign Trade Import/export 1985- 
Balance of Payments  2001- 
Renewable Purchase of  
Resource Primary Products 1987-* 
Harvesting Catches 1990-* 
 Fisherman’s Handbook 1989- 
Enterprises GER (register of enterprises) 2001* 
Annual accounts  2001* 
Tourism Hotels 1995-* 
Airline passengers  1997- 
Unemployment Unemployed 1994 (1988)-* 
Demography Status 1977-* 
Births  1973-* 
Deaths  1973-* 
Relocation  1981-* 
Housing  Dwellings 1990-* 
Education  1975-* 
Crime Offenders/offences/sanctions 1991-* 
Social Benefits  1999-* 
Appendix D.  
Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic: Data Description 
The international core data set of the Survey of Living Conditions in 
the Arctic covers the following topics: 
Section A: Individual Characteristics 
Persons by age, sex, relationship, ethnicity 
Duration of residence in community/ other residence locations 
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Section B: Production 
Wage employment activity by person – (all variables for 12 months) 
Social relationships supporting wage employment 
Hunting and fishing activity by person 
Social relationships for hunting and fishing 
Aggregate harvest consumed by household 
Aggregate harvest shared by household 
Aggregate harvest received by household 
Childcare by person 
Country food processing by person 
Crafts, art, production activities by person 
Non-wage income to household, including transfer payments 
Section C: Production Resources 
Part 1: Health 
Hearing, speaking, seeing, walking, carrying, mobility 
Learning, emotional health 
Wage work activity constraints 
Hunting and fishing activity constraints 
Household work activity constraints 
Part 2: Wage employment Resources 
Formal education 
Job training 
Months want to work, not want to work  
Perceived job opportunity options 
Experience in non-local employment 
Transportation constraints 
Childcare constraints 
Job satisfaction 
Job expectations 
Job aspirations 
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Part 3: Hunting, Fishing, Processing Resources 
Education in hunting, fishing, processing 
Aboriginal language use 
Shared equipment, gas, money, labor 
Abundance of major wildlife resources 
Health of major wildlife resources 
Perceived harvest constraints 
Regulations 
Weather/climate (sea ice, fall storms, deeps snows 
Accessibility (e.g. barriers to travel) 
Equipment 
Commercial markets 
Processing capabilities 
Food storage 
Hunting/Fishing/Processing satisfaction 
Hunting/Fishing/Processing expectations 
Hunting/Fishing/Processing aspirations 
Part 4: Political Resources 
Influence on wage employment  
Influence on formal education  
Influence on hunting, fishing  
Influence on traditional education  
Aspirations for influence 
Expectations for influence 
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Section D: Expenditures and Consumption 
Household budget 
Household time use: work, domestic, leisure 
Food: sufficiency, diet, in-kind supplements 
Water: quality, sufficiency  
Housing: type, condition, subsidies 
Utilities: heat, electricity, light, cooking 
Clothing 
Equipment, supplies 
Health care: accessibility, cost 
Section E: Social Relationships & Ethnic Identity 
Where you go for different kinds of help 
Gifting, sharing 
Ethnic identity 
Section F: Community Resources 
Communication 
Transportation 
Section G: Subjective Well-being 
Spirituality 
Social relationships 
Social support 
Social adjustment 
Ethnic identity 
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Appendix E.  
SLiCA Greenland – sample design. The complex sample design and se-
lected geographical areas for SLICA in Greenland  
 
The population: (Persons living in 
Greenland age 15+ at the time of the 
data collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 municipalities 
5 main regions: South & Mid 
Greenland, Disco Bay, North-and 
East Greenland 
8 municipalities: 
S: Qaqortoq & Nanortalik; M: Nuuk 
& Paamiut ; 
D: Ilulissat & Aasiaat; N: Upernavik; 
E: Tasiilaq 
TOWNS 
1.450 individuals 
Predetermined 
selection of 
municipalities in 
South & Mid 
Greenland, Disco 
Bay, North- and 
Population clus-
tered in 17 mu-
nicipalities 
The municipality of Ivittut 
is removed from the total 
number of municipalities 
Based on the official 
regional division of by 
Statistics Greenland 
municipalities 
1.450 households 
SETTLEMENTS 
Predetermined 
selection of the 
main towns of the 
8 selected munici-
palities: 
 
Nanortalik 
Qaqortoq 
Paamiut 
Nuuk 
Aasiaat 
Ilulissat 
Upernavik 
Ammassalik 
Stratified selection of 22 
settlements within the 
selected municipalities 
(Region/Municipality): 
Alluitsup Paa (S/N) 
Tasiusaq (S/N) 
Aappilattoq (S/N) 
Saarloq (S/Q) 
Eqalugaarsuit (S/Q) 
Arsuk (M/P) 
Kapisillit (M/N) 
Qeqertarsuatsiat (M/N) 
Kitsissuarsuit (D/A) 
Akunnaaq (D/A) 
Ilimanaq (D/I) 
Oqaatsut (D/I) 
Qeqertaq (D/I) 
Saqqaq (D/I) 
Kangersuatsiaq (N/U) 
Innaarsuit (N/U) 
Nuussuaq (N/U) 
Kullorsuaq (N/U) 
Isortoq (E/T) 
Kulusuk (E/T) 
Kuummiut (E/T) 
Sermiligaaq (E/T) 
Random (simple 
stochastic) sam-
pling of respon-
dents 
17 Municipalities 
clustered within 5 
main regions 
Random (simple sto-
chastic) sampling of 
respondents 
16. Comparative-historical analysis of 
farming systems and agricultural 
intensification in medieval and early 
modern Iceland 
 
Jón Haukur Ingimundarson180 
Scholarly research on farming systems in medieval and early modern Ice-
land generally assumes a perennial type of “natural subsistence economy” 
and lacks a strong focus on market and tribute production, as well as the 
class relations among farmers. This approach underestimates the political 
and economic significance of domestic and foreign trade, which especially 
involved the export of wool products. This approach also lacks a system-
atic analysis of tributary and tenure relations, as they developed in con-
junction with changes in farming methods. Attempting to fill this gap in 
research, I conducted an ethnographic study on the farming systems of 
Iceland by employing a historical-comparative method for examining eco-
nomic documents in new problem-oriented ways (Ingimundarson 1995). In 
interpreting information and archaeological evidence as well as developing 
hypotheses on changing farming systems in early Iceland, I have inter-
viewed and shared my documents with farmers and agricultural scientists 
in two Icelandic farming communities. Through this, I have employed a 
careful understanding regarding intensified livestock production in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries.  
                                                        
180 Senior Scientist Stefansson Arctic Institute and University of Akureyri, Iceland 
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The following examination is concerned with the productive farming 
system of the Icelandic Commonwealth (10th to the 13th century), which 
developed in conjunction with an elaborate sociopolitical structure, and 
supported a relatively large population (compared to subsequent five cen-
turies). This examination also looks at the forms of mercantile exchange 
and surplus distribution characteristic of this farming system. Furthermore, 
this intensive early Icelandic farming system is compared to the character-
istics of intensified livestock production and trade during the 19th century 
and the first two decades of the 20th century. Specifically, I will describe a) 
the integration of a broad-based subsistence economy which supported 
specialized sheep production and yielded surplus wool for export in the 
“medieval warm period,” b) chiefdom formation in terms of the economic 
rule of merchant-farmers, c) freeholder production intensification in the 
context of mercantile activity, rural credit systems, and kin- and munici-
pally-based insurance systems d) subsequent disintensification and a 
change to a farming system emphasizing sheep reared for efficient milk 
and meat production, e) and the rise of rent tenure, communal property 
rights, and tributary systems in contexts of developing ecclesiastic institu-
tions and colonial relations with Norway. 
16.1. The Early Icelandic Settlement and Commonwealth 
Periods 
Permanent settlement in Iceland began in the second half of the 9th century. 
Most of the settlers came from Norway and the British Isles and brought 
domesticated animals and seeds of grain and grasses. It is estimated that 
about half of the island’s area was covered with vegetation, whereas today, 
half of this area has been deprived of vegetation and soil. A positive feed-
back process is evident where wood cutting, forest fires, over grazing by 
domesticated animals combined with worsening climatic conditions and 
periodic volcanic eruptions led to vegetation decline and soil erosion. The 
climate was on the average, relatively hospitable during the first 3–4 centu-
ries of settlement, which coincided with the Medieval Climatic Optimum 
(10th to the 13th century). The very severe last two decades of the 13th 
century may have marked the beginning of the so-called “Little Ice Age” – 
the period of irregular cooling in the North Atlantic that lasted into the 
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19th century. The Icelandic population is frequently estimated to have been 
around 60,000 in 965, as high as 104,000 in 1100, around 40,000 in 1404, 
and 40,623 in 1785. Reduction in the population size after the Common-
wealth period reveals to be consequential to economic deterioration, colo-
nial rule, climatic conditions, epidemics and natural disasters. 
Society during the period of the Commonwealth (from the establish-
ment of the National parliament (alþing) of 36 chiefdoms in 930 until 
submission to the Norwegian King in 1264) is often described as a time of 
affluence with the island having many freeholders, of which, 4560 were 
thingtax-payers in 1095. All free male farmers could attend alþing with 
their relations, for two weeks in June, if they owned a certain minimum 
amount of property (one cow per adult member in their household). Alþing 
was the center of the legislature and authority. However, the “executive 
powers” and actual administration of the law, was left up to the various 
courts, forwhich the 36 chieftains (goðar) were responsible for. Courts 
were held at “spring assemblies” in twelve places around the country, and 
again in the fall at “autumn assemblies”. These assemblies were loci where 
economic activities were organized, and prices and economic transactions 
where negotiated and authorized.  
Christianity became an official religion in the year 1000, and prominent 
farmers built their own churches for the surrounding community. Tithe was 
introduced in 1097 as universal tax amounting to a yearly payment of one 
percent of all dept-free property, excluding church property. This revenue 
was to be distributed in equal parts for the maintenance of the bishop at 
Skálholt or Hólar , the needy/poor, priests and churches 
The subsistence base was broad during the Settlement and Common-
wealth periods compared to the subsequent ages under the rule of Norway 
and then Denmark (after 1388). Cattle, sheep and horse rearing were sup-
plemented with some rearing of pigs, goat and geese. Fishing in the sea, 
rivers, and lakes was always practiced, along with seal and fox hunting, 
fowling, and some gathering of eggs and plants. Whales could be hunted at 
times and a drifted whale constituted a significant source. Evident during 
this time, however, is the high emphasis on the exploitation of terrestrial 
resources. In contrast, the 14th century saw a significant growth in com-
mercial as well as subsistence fisheries. Juridical farm units held private 
yet sometimes shared property rights with regard to land use for hay-
making, grazing, rivers, lakes, beaches, and forests, as well as land around 
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mountain dairies. The entire country was divided into ca. 165 municipali-
ties (hreppar), the administrations of which were formally independent of 
the authority of the chieftains. 
The most important exports during the Commonwealth period were 
homespun cloth made of sheep wool (called vaðmál), tufted wool cloaks, 
weather-skins (of castrated male sheep) and lambskins. Luxury goods like 
fox skin, cat skin, seal skin, falcons and horses were also exported. Butter 
and cheese from cattle were exported by the 13th century, while cod did 
not become a significant export item until the 14th and 15th centuries. 
Norway, where wool products were in demand, was the most important 
commercial contact. Icelanders also traded with people on the British Isles 
and with the Norse Greenlanders. Icelandic woolens and skins were ex-
ported to England, but more in the latter part of the Commonwealth period. 
Icelanders were in need of sizeable timber, tar, wax, ready-made ships and 
grain. Among other things, they imported tools, fine clothes, weapons, 
religious articles and items of conspicuous consumption. Icelanders based 
their monetary value upon silver, but because a great deal of trade (domes-
tic and foreign) consisted of exchange by barter, homespun and milch-
cows/dairy cattle were important in monetary standards. The value of land 
was expressed in terms of “long-hundred” (120) ells of homespun.  
In the period 1262–1264 chieftains submitted, one by one, to annexa-
tion by Norway. By that time Icelanders had become entirely dependent on 
Norwegian merchants, who were now buying woolens from England and 
Europe’s western seaboard, where the wool industry was thriving at new 
heights. 
Scholars do not agree on how to characterize the Icelandic Common-
wealth in terms of social stratification or mode of production. They do tend 
to concur on these issues with respect to the periods before and after the 
Commonwealth. During the “Age of Settlement” (874–930), there was 
large-scale domestic production among large households that was based on 
extended kinship relations and slavery. After the Commonwealth during 
the late 13th century, a complicated system of dependent land tenure and 
leasing domesticates had been established as the predominant mode of 
production. Scholarship on the Commonwealth period has, in a variety of 
ways, portrayed the existence of classes as chieftains, freeholder-farmers, 
churchwarden-farmers, and landless laborers and to a lesser extent, slaves, 
freedmen, tenants and cottagers and ecclesiastics. It emphasizes a free-
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holder-chieftain dichotomy and notes, after 1100, a transformation towards 
a confrontation between powerful freeholders and churchwardens, against 
the chieftains. (Karlsson 1972, 1980, 2004; Þorláksson 1982; Hastrup 
1985; Byock 1988; Miller 1990; Samson 1992).  
Until the 1960’s, the opinion dominated that foreign trade had been 
very significant, and a crucial aspect of the economy during the Common-
wealth period (Melsteð 1907–15; Jóhannesson 1974; Þorláksson 1991:5). 
More recent views overwhelmingly emphasize subsistence production (see 
Þorsteinsson 1964, 1966; Miller 1990:77–110; Eggertsson 1991; G. Páls-
son 1991; Aðalsteinsson 1991; Durrenberger 1992, 1991; Samson 1992), 
implying some type of “natural economy” or a “domestic mode of produc-
tion”, while downplaying the significance of markets and commercial men-
tality. Significantly, however, in his book Icelandic Enterprise economic 
historian Bruce Gelsinger (1981) emphasizes the Commonwealth trade 
relations with Norway and Britain, and especially trade involving home-
spun, cloaks, skins, and dairy products for grain, timber and ships. Accord-
ing to Gelsinger, commercial prosperity was attained from 930–1022 when 
trade was almost exclusively in the hands of Icelanders. A powerful mer-
chant class did develop in Norway in the 11th century, but as Icelandic 
chieftains controlled relative prices in Iceland, the value and distribution of 
goods brought in by foreigners was subject to their authority.  
Scholars have neglected the political and economic significance of 
trade involving the export of wool products from medieval Iceland. It has 
yet to be noticed, that the early Icelandic farming systems, sociopolitical 
institutions, and class relations, (including those among the freeholders), 
reflect mercantile conditions of exchange and market production incen-
tives. My attempt is to show that domestic credit exchanges at fairs and 
market places – overseen for some time by 3 chieftains at each of 12 
“spring assemblies” (vorþing) and price-districts (Jóhannesson 1974:320) – 
and the foreign markets were key to land tenure and productive relations 
and farming systems prior to 1200.  
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16.2. Intensification and disintensification of medieval 
Icelandic farming and the return of production and trade 
intensification in the 19th century.  
Historians, literary scholars and archaeologists have long concluded that 
during the Commonwealth period – in contrast or relative to the subse-
quent late 13th to early 19th century – the cattle to sheep ratio was high, 
the farming economy diversified, and older wethers (castrated rams) were 
strongly emphasized in sheep herds (Amorosi 1992; Amorosi and 
McGovern 1989); Sigurjónsson 1970:51–78; Þorsteinsson 1953:129; 
Steindórsson 1948–1949; Thoroddsen 1919:213–222, 281; Guðjónsson 
1949:84–89, 91; Sigurðsson 1861:16; Þorláksson 1991). These particular 
farming system characteristics and changes are commonly used in describ-
ing the conditions and changes to climate and ecological succession, that 
was impacted by human habitation. Most academic scholars adhere to the 
assumption that in order to describe farming practices in Commonwealth 
Iceland – when the production of surplus wool was imperative – one 
should disregard certain “modern perspectives” like economic incentives 
and farming system changes of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
My interpretive model for looking at Northern farming derives from my 
ethnographic and historical document research, as well as certain facts and 
inferences drawn from 19th and 20th century writings on farming – includ-
ing publications in modern experimental-agriculture science. Furthermore, I 
have studied the evidence on medieval farming in the light of comparisons 
with livestock production in the early 19th to the early 20th centuries. This 
entails identifying the different steps taken by farmers in this recent period 
towards more intensive economic strategies. These recent steps towards 
(modern) intensive livestock production include the processes by which 
fodder production and the production of wethers and cattle were increased in 
different parts of the country. This includes times when land that was owned 
by freeholders, was intensively cultivated and enclosed to protect hay-fields, 
and when farmers ceased to take milk from their ewes and began culling 
summer-old lambs, instead of newborn and winter-old lambs. My suggestion 
is that, in view of these specific changes, this recent process reversed the 
outcome of an earlier process, that is, a major transformation in herding 
systems and overall resource exploitation that began with the collapse of 
“the Commonwealth trade enterprise” and the development of dependent 
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land tenure, which continued with interruptions throughout the “Little Ice 
Age” into early modern times. 
I gathered data on past and present farming strategies by engaging Ice-
landic farmers, agricultural scientists and farming documents. I noticed 
early on, that the production and processing of commercial wool causes 
direct reduction in the milk yield and meat production efficiency (Ingi-
mundarson 1989:23–26). This particular finding, to be described in further 
detail below, allows me to define different means and levels of intensifica-
tion, especially in reference to contingencies involving specialization in 
Northern sheep-herding. A problem-oriented approach to the farming sys-
tems during the mercantile Commonwealth period makes us look at de-
ployment of labor in wool processing, trade and management at specialized 
sheep-rearing as it was contingent upon a broad subsistence base and nu-
merous cattle conservation methods, and privatization in strategic owner-
ship, and at a subsequent transformation, beginning in the 12th century, 
into a tributary and communal mode along with disintensification – when 
livestock proportions in fact shifted away from cattle in favor of sheep as a 
source of direct subsistence, and butter, cheese and fish became the chief 
export products. I therefore propose a “dual economy” model for examin-
ing the Icelandic Commonwealth period. This model acknowledges the 
regional integration of broad-based subsistence economies with wool pro-
duction for export.  
16.2.1. Intensification-step one, for increasing wool yield: many old 
wethers 
Nineteenth century guide books relating to the rearing of livestock and farm-
ing improvements (Stephensen 1808:164; Einarsson 1879:47, 59–62) tell us 
that the annual yield of washed wool from fertile ewes is 1–1.25 kg., com-
pared to a 1.75–2.5 kg. annual clip from wethers, which are two years and 
older. Furthermore, wethers provide high wool yield until they are 6–7 year 
old, whereas the annual wool yield from fertile ewes decreases drastically 
after their third or fourth year. Wethers were shorn or plucked before they 
would be driven onto pasture around mid-May, but the ewes not until early 
June if they had lambs (Ingimundarson 1995: 64–65).  
Studies of livestock records, export records, and improvements in sheep 
rearing and wool processing techniques reveal the ways in which farmers in 
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Northeast Iceland managed to radically increase wool production and main-
tain it at high levels – before, during, and after the climatically hospitable 
second quarter of the 19th century. As Kristjánsson and Gunnlaugsson 
(1990:35–37) have shown, there was a six-fold increase in the population of 
wethers (two years and older), in Iceland’s East and the North quarter during 
the first part of the 19th century. They attribute this increase only to the fact 
that settlement expanded into the northeast interior during the warm period 
(of the early 19th century), and that the north and the northeast is particularly 
suitable for grazing by sheep. Other important factors to consider are that 
Danish monopoly on trade had been lifted in 1787 (Gunnarsson 1983, 1987), 
and that the export of wool products from Northeast Iceland dramatically 
increased after 1800 (and throughout the first half of the 19th century). This 
increase materialized first, in the form of raw wool, then fleeced skins, then 
homespun, yarn and knitted wares (Andrésson 1988:238–253; Stefánsson 
1952:21–30). New efficient types of looms were imported. Weaving and 
textile work became an increasingly common occupation. The number of 
harbors involved in the export trade increased, and mercantile farmers’ asso-
ciations were formed. Furthermore, farmers in Norður-Múlasýsla county 
began to selectively breed sheep with a focus on obtaining higher wool yield 
of better quality. They also focused on increasing the numbers of older 
wethers in their sheep flocks drastically (H. Stefánsson 1952:28–47, 56–74). 
In the Commonwealth period prior to the early 13th century, older 
wethers were relatively numerous. While wethers yield significantly more 
wool than ewes, a herding strategy of having a high proportion of wethers 
has low meat and milk production efficiency. Hence, the keeping of many 
wethers and letting them grow to be old is a strong sign that the economy 
was led by incentives to produce a surplus of wool and skins – much of 
which would be exported as finished products. Two price lists dated to the 
12th century- one issued by the National Assembly (Diplomatarium Is-
landicum 1:162–167) and the other by the Árnes district “spring-assembly” 
(Diplomatarium Islandicum 1:315–317) reveal a uniquely strong emphasis 
on commercial wool products in Icelandic history. The price table of the 
National Assembly highlights exportable products, and at the top of the list 
are processed wool, cloaks and skins. It first states that 6 ells of new and 
unused homespun (vaðmál) shall be worth one legal eyrir. Then, tufted 
wool cloaks are characterized in terms of length, width and quality, and 
their value is determined at two aurar (plural for eyrir). Six fleeced lamb-
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skins (with the wool) and six shorn wetherskins are of equal value, and 
worth one legal eyrir.  
16.2.2. Intensification-step two, for increasing wool yield: ewes in fleece, 
with lambs, and well sustained 
Housing and the amount and quality of hay have critical effects on fleece 
weight, and on how many lambs will be born and survive (Ingimundarson 
1995:69–70; Thorsteinsson and Þorgeirsson 1989; Einarsson 1879; Þor-
bergsson 1915:108–109). In order to maintain high wool yields from their 
ewes Commonwealth farmers would have provided their ewes with quality 
housing, good grazing and much winter fodder of good quality. Enclo-
sures, private ownership, shared access through private contracts, and the 
intensive cultivation of land appear to characterize farming systems during 
the Commonwealth period. These characteristics can be looked at as being 
parts of an over-all intensive livestock production strategy, marked by 
mercantile incentives.  
The Old Commonwealth law code (Grágás) includes numerous stipula-
tions dictating that farmers shall erect sizeable fences of sod and/or stone 
around their hayfields, grain fields, hay storages, outlying meadows, 
marshy meadows, as well as certain grazing areas that are called afrétt (see 
Grágás 1992:321–324; also Þorsteinsson and Grímsdóttir 1989:84–87). 
Surveys by modern researchers have revealed the structural remains of 
those Early Icelandic fences and walls (Róbertsdóttir and Jóhannesson 
1986; Þórarinsson 1981; Eldjárn 1977). Grágás also includes numerous 
passages referring to the application of dung as natural fertilizer on home 
fields and outlying meadows (see Thoroddsen 1919:118–124; Jóhannesson 
1974:293–294, 348; Þorsteinsson and Grímsdóttir 1989:84–87; Óskarsson 
1992). Dung from livestock may have become an increasingly important 
source of fuel instead of fertilizer towards and during the early modern 
period, as fewer farmers had access to brushwood and driftwood as the 
climate became less hospitable. 
The modern term for mountain pasture as communal property is afrét-
tur (plural afréttir). Interior grazing areas with near universal access are 
called almenningar. The word afréttur does not occur in documents dated 
from the Commonwealth period. Instead, the word which one encounters 
in the Grágás” inventories and ecclesiastical charters is afrétt, which liter-
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ally means “enclosure”. Grágás (1992:342) defines afrétt as grazing land 
which two or more men own together. This definition is also madein Ice-
land’s oldest surviving farm inventory, dated 1140 (Diplomatarium Is-
landicum 1:178–180). The earliest documented description of shared graz-
ing arrangements which evoke notions of communal access to land use, 
appear in the 1220 charter/inventory for the church of Gaulverjabær, near 
the bishop’s see at Skálholt (Diplomatarium Islandicum 1:403–404). As 
for almenningur (the common landed property which implies universal 
access), it is mentioned in the oldest surviving special charter, which dates 
to 1245 (Diplomatarium Islandicum 1:403–404). I infer that dependent 
land tenure and communal access to grazing on formerly private-owned 
land, developed simultaneously. Ecclesiastical institutions may have led 
these developments, from the mercantile ownership rights of freeholders to 
feudal and the prebendal mode of production. 
In 1800, Icelanders numbered around 50,000. The majority of house-
hold heads during this time were tenants and cotters, many of them living 
on land owned by the church, the Danish Crown or by secular landlords. In 
the decades around 1900, when most farms had become freeholds (again), 
farming households gradually began to adopt increasingly intensive strate-
gies for rearing livestock. Several essays (including T. Bjarnason 1884; 
Ásmundsson 1888:3–9; Sveinsson 1882) were published urging farmers to 
utilize dung more extensively for fertilizing their fields, as “ancient men”, 
i.e. the early Icelanders, had done. Farmers began to systematically fertilize 
their fields, erect walls around their home field, and to cultivate, flatten, 
dry up and enclose new land for making more hay (Þórólfsson 1901). 
These were critical steps taken towards (modern) intensive livestock pro-
duction in Iceland.  
16.2.3. Intensification-step three for increasing wool yield: many cows and 
finished suckling lambs  
As referred to above, researchers have long noted that during most of the 
Commonwealth period, , dairy cows and dry cattle were relatively numerous 
in relation to sheep. This is a distinct difference to the period from 13th cen-
tury to 19th century. Given the necessary favorable climatic and environ-
mental conditions during the first three centuries of settlement, Icelandic 
farmers raised many cattle for the meat, relied on their dairy cows for their 
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own milk consumption, and allowed the culling of numerous lambs aged 
five to six months. This intensive farming system was based on large-scale 
cattle production that also emphasized high yield for wool and sheepskins, 
and required that ewes not be milked for human consumption. It has been 
assumed that, just like farmers in early modern times, Commonwealth farm-
ers relied significantly on sheep for dairy products (Aðalsteinsson 1991:289–
290, 1981; Jóhannesson 1974:290–291; Sigurjónsson 1970; Guðjónsson 
1949:92; Thoroddsen 1919:281–282; Ásmundsson 1888:17). This assump-
tion has been maintained in spite of a lack of evidence from quite an exten-
sive documentation of subsistence activities, and in spite of obvious evi-
dence to the contrary. 
We must take one brief look at the changes towards intensive livestock 
production around 1900 before we analyze the Early-Icelandic evidence on 
lamb and cattle production. Icelandic farmers ceased to take milk from 
their ewes and to cull newborn and yearling lambs in the first decades of 
the 20th century. This occurred concurrently with a dramatic increase in 
the heads of dairy cows and the increases in the production and exchange 
of fodder. These changes resulted in farmers that would and could cull 
numerous summer-old suckling lambs (dilkar) which yielded substantial 
meat, fleeces and fleeced skins. Earlier, when farmers were still milking 
their ewes, they had to sustain lambs through one winter, and through a 
critical second summer growth spurt, before the sheep would reproduce 
their own or yield significant meat, wool, and fleece.  
During the Commonwelath period, fleeced lambskins were an impor-
tant export item. The price table issued by alþing (Diplomatarium Islandi-
cum 1: 162–167) lists fleeced lambskin at the top of the list, along with 
homespun and tufted wool cloaks. This clearly tells us that, to some extent 
at least, Commonwealth farmers would cull lambs at five to six months. 
This also means however, that they did not exploit ewes for their milk (for 
human consumption), because lambs need much of their mother’s milk if 
they are to have a first summer growth spurt.  
It is also helpful to look at the tithe law of 1097. This first and oldest 
tithe law (Diplomatarium Islandicum 1:70–162) stipulates what constitutes 
acceptable tithe currencies. Homespun (vaðmál), tufted wool cloaks (va-
rarfeldir) and fleeced lambskins (lambagærur) are highlighted among 
acceptable forms of payment. This shows us that the tithe law stimulated 
the production of exportable products among lesser and larger farmers – 
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which the churchwardens, leading freeholders, chieftains, and bishops 
appropriated. It is important to add that the tithe law that was instituted in 
1097 was not adhered to during the 13th century and thereafter. Instead, 
individual ecclesiastical charters stipulate what is acceptable tithe currency 
for individual parishes (see Þorsteinsson and Grímsdóttir 1989:103–106). 
One notices that butter, cheese, hay, blubber and the winterfeeding of live-
stock had become dominant forms of tithe payment in the 13th century, 
whereas fish is increasingly mentioned after 1300. The economic ruling 
classes were only able to siphon from farmers and fishing-peasants” sur-
pluses – which were in accordance with peasants” changing economic 
survival strategies.  
It is a critical fact that weaning and penned lambs are not mentioned in 
Grágás, price tables, the sagas, or inventories dating to the Commonwealth 
period. On the other hand, the earliest dated manuscript of the so-called 
Búalög ("Farming-laws"), dated around 1400. This manuscript includes 
prices on both weaning and penned lambs (Búalög 1966:18). Neither this 
manuscript nor the comprehensive “Farming-laws” of 1775 include the 
category or term dálkur (suckling lamb). We could say that the term and 
category of dálkur, or finished suckling lamb, was brought back into com-
mon use by the end of the 19th century. This historical evidence suggests 
that large and small Commonwealth farmers, generally reared finished 
suckling lambs. However, these farmers where by the 14th century, increas-
ingly exploiting the ewes for the milk, and as a result their production and 
processing of wool had decreased.  
My attempt has been to show that, towards the end of the Common-
wealth period, sheep became an increasingly important source of subsis-
tence, as opposed to a source of wool surplus. Radical changes in livestock 
production in Iceland reflect the cooling of the climate, vegetation decline, 
and population pressure. They also reflect the collapse of the wool-export 
economy, and the development of a tributary mode of production. 
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16.3. Relations of production and distribution: From the 
chiefdoms of the merchant-farmers to the “dark ages” of 
colonial rule and tributary relations 
So far I have provided an overview of the Commonwealth period’s re-
gional integration of broad-based subsistence economies with wool pro-
duction for export. In the section below I attempt to show how trade enter-
prises were facilitated through class, domestic markets and municipal insti-
tutions. I am primarily concerned here with the period from the 10th 
century until in the late-12th century, when rent tenure systems and other 
tributary forms of surplus extraction (i.e. various taxes) were becoming 
increasingly prevalent.  
The first, salient issue that concerns me is how surplus production was 
stimulated, exchanged and appropriated in society as a whole. This oc-
curred during a time when chieftains were influential administrators and 
negotiators, and acted on authority that was contingent on a powerful eco-
nomic ruling class of the wealthy merchant farmers. Merchant-farmers 
were freeholders who, as leaders in powerful kin groups, controlled a 
broad subsistence base on extensive and private kin- based landholdings – 
partly through dependent-farms. A strong cattle component in herds sup-
ported a sheep-rearing strategy with emphasis on wool yield on these large 
landholdings. A considerable cattle component characterized herds on 
many smallholdings as well. A sizeable and sustainable cattle rearing re-
quired better land with substantial hay and construction. Without these 
requirements, many groups of commoners (smallhold-yeomanry), partici-
pated in domestic credit exchanges, specializing in commercial wool prod-
ucts. In other words, not only did merchant-farmers exploit a broad subsis-
tence base as a way of supporting a wool-yielding, sheep-rearing strategy 
of their own. Merchant farmers plugged into a surplus labor-power, and 
generated or realized surplus wool products from commoners, whose par-
ticipation in credit exchange would have been their way of coping. This 
also constituted an exploitation of class. Foreign trade encouraged popula-
tion growth and labor intensity.  
The earlier mentioned price tables issued by the Árnes “spring-
assembly” and by the National Assembly at Alþing (Diplomatarium Is-
landicum I: 315–317, 162–167) should aid our inferences about the farm-
ing systems and organization of domestic trade when Icelanders were ac-
 The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008 334 
tive as merchants abroad. An important function of each “spring assembly” 
(Þorláksson 1979: 140–42), was to organize economic transactions and to 
authorize or negotiate prices, in particular, setting the value for a standard 
cow (kúgildi) in terms of ells of homespun cloth and þinglagsaurar (Jóhan-
nesson 1974:333, Diplomatarium Islandicum I: 316). This is shown on the 
list issued by the Árnes, things, which also presents the relative values for 
different domestic animals and agricultural products, fish, wax, linens as 
well as silver and gold. The register issued by Alþing includes a similar, 
yet longer list of livestock and goods (excluding fish); however, prices are 
set only in terms of the value of a cow. In addition, a separate list shows in 
terms of eyrir, the prices for homespun, tufted wool cloaks (vararfeldir), 
foxskins, fleeced lambskins, shorn wetherskins, catskins, striped russet, as 
well as gold, silver, iron, iron tools, linen and wax. We can infer that 
commoner households’ indirect participation in the export economy by 
way of local credit systems and labor markets constituted their dependency 
on subsistence sources (other than sheep) which merchant-farmers owned 
and controlled.  
Scholars have celebrated the autonomy of the medieval hreppar (mu-
nicipal) administrations, being independent of the authority of chieftaincies 
(see Benediktsson 1974:185–186; Stein-Wilkeshuis 1982:347). While 
relatives were also required to provide proscribed assistance to their poorer 
kin, documented functions of these communal units were to compensate 
farmers for the loss of cattle and housing (but not for the loss of sheep) and 
to provide tithe relief for the poor. The disjuncture of responsibility that 
separated chiefdoms and municipalities indicates to me, that chieftains 
were not primary agents of redistribution as much as it underscores mer-
chant-farmers’ interests. During the heyday of Icelandic trade enterprise 
these municipalities, as well as the kin-based support system, collectively 
helped neighboring household units to ensure each other’s reproduction (in 
face of severe subsistence risks and without cost to wealthy farmers) main-
tained semi-proletarianized labor-power through winters. This guarantee 
profited these merchant-farmers from whom communal funds purchased 
replacement cattle. It also preserved the incentives for wool products in 
sheep rearing among commoners.  
The weakening of the indigenous economic ruling class of merchant-
farmers ultimately led to the demise of mercantile Chiefdoms in Iceland, 
during a period which Jóhannesson (1974) referred to as the “death throes 
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of the Commonwealth”. I hypothesize that chieftaincies and ecclesiastical 
institutions deriving tributary income (through tithes, rent and special 
taxes), gradually gained independence from the hegemonic block of mer-
chant-farmers, while becoming dependent on Norwegian merchants’ ac-
tivities This dependency led to the submission to the Norwegian King in 
1264. A mercantile family farm system of land tenure was gradually re-
placed by a curious system, which had both prebendal and feudal charac-
teristics, including sharecropping arrangements. Landowners rented out 
land along with a few head of dairy cattle, expecting payments in animals, 
dairy products and labor service. Tithe collectors demanded these forms of 
payment as well. The expansion of rent-tenure systems and an increasing 
concentration of land during the 12th century corresponded with the ten-
dency among smallholders to rely on sheep as the primary means of sub-
sistence. This entailed a production strategy of which considerable surplus 
wool would not be an outcome. Furthermore, in a period of worsening 
climatic conditions and vegetation decline, frequent severe seasons in the 
early 1180’s and through to the first decade of the 13th century (Ogilvie 
1984:141, 1991) led to an increasing number of smallholders who had lost 
both control and direct access to cattle and their products on domestic mar-
ket. This also led to smallholders to lose the ability and incentive to culti-
vate hayfields, produce quality hay for cattle and ewes, rear wethers, and 
provide milk for their lambs. Given the collapse of the woolen export 
economy and its associated local credit systems, the lower peasantry need 
not be depicted as having been mere passive victims of feudalization and 
colonial-state formation, which began first under Norway then Denmark. 
The lower peasants’ struggle for access to more land, (including the for-
merly privately administered enclosures (afrétt)), and against the constant 
construction and reconstruction of fences, may have been relatively re-
solved by the type of rent-tenure system that could provide more income. 
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Resume 
Artiklerne. 
Artiklerne i POENOR projektets årbog fokuserer hovedsageligt på på-
virkninger fra økonomiske systemer, globaliseringen og klimaændringer i 
de nordlige regioner. I forbindelse med komparativ økonomisk systemana-
lyse beskrives udvikling som bevægelse fra den traditionelle økonomi til 
en moderne økonomi. Dette indebærer en udvikling mod enten statsstyrede 
eller kapitalstyrede systemer, ligesom det involverer en differentieret til-
nærmelse indenfor hvert af dikotomiens yderpoler. Mellem centraldirigeret 
økonomi og „laissez faire“ markeder er der andre systemer, som er basere-
de på enten andre planlægningsmodeller eller andre markedsformer. Med 
henblik på at hjælpe med at klassifisere systemer præsenteres databaser og 
beregninger i forbindelse med deskriptiv statistisk analyse i årbogens af-
sluttende kapitler.  
Den systemiske analyse inddrager også globaliseringsaspektet, idet de 
sidste 20 års neo-liberale økonomiske politik globalt set har domineret den 
økonomisk-politiske diskurs i de fleste lande. Dette inkluderer også de 
nordlige regionaløkonomier, hvor man ser forskellige grader af offentlige 
indgreb, der er mere eksplicitte end i „den typiske OECD økonomi’. Enten 
er „kollektivismeprocenten“ meget høj som set i Nunavut og Grønland, 
eller der er forskellige „joint ventures“ mellem det offentlige og private 
selskaber. Offentlig drift er sine steder en uundgåelig konsekvens af de 
geografiske betingelser. Endvidere skal man huske, at fraværet af mar-
kedsmekanismer i fjerntliggende egne, byer og bosteder gør planlægning 
og regulering nødvendigt. Den globale udvikling har imidlertid, som man-
ge af artiklerne viser, en „spin off“ virkning på de nordlige regionaløko-
nomier. I stedet for at anerkende statsinterventionisme som en nødvendig-
hed for at systerne kan fungere, forsøger man at formulere udviklingsstra-
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tegier baseret på en ideologisk og euro-centreret for-forståelse. Neo-
liberale politiske anbefalinger er rodfæstet i neo-klassiske og klassiske 
doktriner og de dominerer fortsat diskursen om optimale udviklingsstrate-
gier. Dette betyder ikke, at neo-liberalismen har været en succes. Nordlige 
økonomier kan stadig ikke sammenlignes med en OECD økonomi, og de 
vil sandsynligvis aldrig kunne blive det.  
Skal der en gang i fremtiden foretages komparativ analyse er det nød-
vendigt først at vurdere, hvordan den systemiske udvikling eller eksiste-
rende systemer, der ikke har ændret sig, kan klassificeres. Disse systemer 
har udviklet sig i forskellig retning som illustreret med tabellen nedenfor. 
Klassifikationen af systemer er ikke så simpel som matrixen måske anty-
der. Adskillige sociale koordinationsmekanismer overlapper hinanden. 
Table 1. Klassifikation af arktiske systemer 
Sociale koordineringsmekanismer: Ejerform: 
Traditionel Planlægning Marked Aftaler &  
kontrakter 
Ingen ejendom 
eller simpel 
ejendom af 
udstyr til jagt 
og fiskeri 
Subsistensøko-
nomi (jagt og 
fiskeri ikke-mone-
tære relationer) 
Subsistensøkonomi 
i et system baseret 
på central planlæg-
ning eller indikativ 
planlægning. 
 
Subsistensøko-
nomi i et mar-
kedsøkonomisk 
system 
Subsistensøko-
nomi et system 
baseret på 
forhandlinger og 
kontrakter 
Statseje Subsistencsøko-
nomi eller mar-
kedssocialisme et 
etatistisk system. 
Central planlægning 
eller indikativ plan-
lægning i hhv. et 
etatistisk eller 
markedssocialistisk 
system 
 
Markeds-
socialisme 
Aftaler og kon-
trakter mellem 
statsejede eller 
samfundsejede 
virksomheder 
Privateje Subsistensøko-
nomi og kapita-
lisme 
Indiativ planlægning 
i et kapitalistisk 
markedssystem. 
 
Markeds- 
kapitalisme 
Aftaler og kon-
trakter mellem 
privatejede 
virksomheder 
Ko-operativt 
eller andelseje 
Subsistensøko-
nomi og koopera-
tive systemer. 
Planlægning i et 
kooperativt system 
og/eller central/ 
indikativ planlæg-
ning 
Kooperativer i et 
markedskapita-
listisk, eller mar-
keds-socialistisk 
system. 
Aftaler og kon-
trakter mellem 
kooperative 
virksomheder 
 
Et system kan f.eks. have en traditionel sektor, en dominerende statslig 
sektor, og en lille privat sektor (Grønland). Alternativt kan systemet have 
en traditionel sektor, et kooperativ sektor, og en privat sektor (Nunavik). 
Det er også muligt, at et system består af en traditionel sektor, der fungerer 
sideløbende med en tidligere statsejet sektor (Etatisme), eller som i dag 
The Political Economy of Northern Regional Development – Yearbook 2008  341 
anvendes parallelt med resterne af en tidligere Etatistisk økonomi sammen 
med en voksende traditionel kapitalistisk sektor (f.eks Barents-regionen). 
Klassificeringsproceduren kan endvidere i forbindelse med f.eks. kapita-
lisme eller etatisme omfatte flere forskellige systemer inden for hver katego-
ri.181 Kapitalismen kan være „laissez faire“ (fx USA), planlagt (fx Frankrig) 
eller social (f.eks Skandinavien, Tyskland og Canada). En måde at klassifi-
cere systemerne kan basere sig på på fordelingen af økonomiske aktiviteter. 
Et eksempel herpå er fordelingen af beskæftigelse og værditilvækst af hver 
sektor med henblik på at finde forskelle mellem de regionale arktiske syste-
mer. Dette tilgang kunne forenkle klassificeringen og gøre sammenlignende 
analyser mulige med henblik på at afdække systemiske faktorer, der hæm-
mer eller fremmer en selvbåret udviklingsvej.  
Den næste tilnærmelse til analyse klimaændringer involverer spørgsmålet om, 
hvordan disse påvirker ressourcebasen, menneskelig udvikling, lokalsam-
fundsudvikling og makroøkonomisk udvikling i nordlige regionaløkonomier. 
Spørgsmålet går på hvorvidt arktiske systemer er modstandsdygtige overfor 
eksogene faktorer. Komparativt set har økonomierne forskellige strukturer og 
funktionsmåder jf. tabel 1, og disse påvirker på sin side de resulterende tilstan-
de, der kausalt forklares ved endogene faktorer (systemimmanente faktorer) og 
eksogene faktorer (klima, verdensmarked, globalisering, energipriser, valuta-
kurser, internationale rentespænd, kapitaleksort etc.) 
Hertil kommer den politiske diskurs, der hviler på den neo-klassiske te-
ori og en forherligelse af det frie marked. Denne tilnærmelse kan næppe 
betegnes som adækvat i forbindelse med en holistisk analyse af de nordlige 
økonomiske systemer. Essensen af POENOR projektet er, at de tre tilnær-
melser globaliseringspåvirkninger, systemiske påvirkninger og klimaæn-
dringernes påvirkning er vævet sammen som et kompleks af påvirknings-
faktorer. Dette repræsenterer både restriktioner og potentialer m.h.t. en 
selvbåret udviklingsvej.  
Som antydet kan modsætninger mellem centrale og decentrale beslut-
ningstagere i en komparativ systemkontekst representere en dikotomi mel-
lem plan og marked og mellem offentlig og privat ejendomsret. På den 
                                                        
181 Etatisme er et system baseret på en dominerende stat. Nogle gange anvendes udtrykket »eta-
tisme” andre gange “statisme’. Et sådant system har en høj procentdel af kollektivisme (offentlige 
udgifter andel af BNP), der er tale om statseje og om planøkonomi. Det kan være den klassiske 
sovjetiske model, rester af denne i det arktiske Rusland eller en modificeret etatisme som i Grønland. 
Se Gorm Winther: Demokrati og magt i Grønland – fremkomsten af en ny klasse? (DIIPER Research 
Series No. 1, Aalborg Universitet 2007: [http://www.diiper.ihis.aau.dk / research/3397011].  
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anden side kan dette også lede til refleksioner om „en tredje vej“ mellem 
disse yderpoler. Gerard Duhaime præsenterer en sammenfattende diskussi-
on af arktisk samfundsvidenskabelig forskning i sin artikel „Theoretical 
Foundation for the Study of Arctic Development Models’. Hans analyse-
tilnærmelse udgør en søgen efter alternativer til udviklingsparadigmer 
baseret på enten stat eller marked. I denne forbindelse inddrages Amartya 
Sens og Martha Nussbaums udvidede behovsmodel baseret på menneske-
lige kapaciteter. Duhaime er på udkig efter en måde at inddrage de lokale 
oprindelige folk i beslutningsprocesserne på. I artikelen præsenteres en 
humanistisk tilnærmelse til udvikling af menneskelige kapaciteter som et 
alternativ til den neo-liberale opfattelse af menneskelig behovsopfyldelse 
og som et alternativ til statslig involvering fra sydlige „moder-økonomier’. 
De forskellige økonomiske metoder til ressourceudnyttelse – traditionel 
udnyttelse af naturen og jorden eller storstilet udvinding af olie, gas og 
råstoffer – betragtes normalt som adskilte verdener i en vision, traditionelle 
videnskabelige disciplinære barrierer har vænnet os til. Duhaime mener, at 
betingelserne, som skaber disse praksisformer og deres effekter alle er en 
del af den samme arktiske økonomiske realitet i en global sammenhæng. 
Projekter i mega-skala konfronteres med den politiske magt hos oprindeli-
ge folk og deres krav om, at lokalsamfundene kan drage fordele af projek-
terne. Hertil kommer lokalbefolkningernes bekymringer for egne levilkår, 
og muligheden for at skabe en bæredygtig udvikling. Udfordringer m.h.t. 
arktisk udvikling kræver, at der tegnes et sammenfattende billede af den 
arktiske økonomi. Sammenligninger af økonomisk praksis, de forskellige 
forudsætninger og de forskellige påvirkninger indenfor denne globale kon-
tekst er først for nyligt blevet indledt. Ved at tage denne tilnærmelse op 
kan det blive muligt, at skabe en omfattende analyse af arktiske udvik-
lingsmodeller og kaste lys over specifikke effekter m.h.t. lokalbefolknin-
gernes kontrol over ressourcerne, sundhed, uddannelse, social integration, 
levevilkår, økonomisk lighed og lokal deltagelse i beslutninger.  
Jack Kruse giver en vis støtte til Duhaimes tese om affinitet mellem et 
traditionelt økonomisk system og et moderne system baseret på mega-
skalaprojekter. Han rejser i artiklen „Sustainability from a Local Point of 
View: Alaska’s North Slope and Oil Development“ spørgsmålet om det er 
muligt, at multinationale stor-skala projekter og en udvikling, der ikke er 
bæredygtig, kan interagere med lokalsamfund på en positiv måde? På 
grundlag af kvantitative spørgemetoder i forbindelse med interviewing af 
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North Slope Iñupiat i 1977 og i 2003 synes resultaterne at bekræfte, at 
Iñupiat i North Slope var lige så godt eller bedre stillet end deres Iñupiat 
naboer ved Beringsstrædet og de nordvestlige arktiske regioner og bedre 
end de oprindelige folk i Chukotka i det nordøstlige Rusland samt Inuit i 
Grønland og Arktisk Canada. Følgelig ser det ud som om, at kombinatio-
ner mellem traditionel økonomi og „storskala-kapitalisme“ eller lokal „fol-
kekapitalisme“ (regionale selskaber) ikke reducerer menneskelig velfærd. 
Indikatorer i empirisk analyse af menneskelig velfærd fra Arctic Human 
Development Report (AHDR) inkluderer variablerne materielle ressourcer, 
godt helbred, adgang til uddannelse, bånd med naturen, kulturel kontinuitet 
og kontrol over egen skæbne. Variablerne fremkommer ved interviewing 
„face to face“ af lokale beboere i North Slope. Essentielt for forståelsen af 
resultaterne er, at Iñupiat etablerede en regional regering „The North Slope 
Borough“ med succes i 1972. Indenfor den regionale grænse administrerer 
North Slopes regering Prudhoe Bays udvikling. Man har en lovfæstet ret til 
at beskatte olieproduktionen på statslig jord indenfor regionen, og man har 
modtaget betydelige indtægter fra denne beskatning. Disse indtægter har 
finansieret The Capital Improvement Program – The North Slope Borough 
har gennem dette program tjent sociale og økonomiske behov hos Iñupiat 
på tre felter nemlig udvikling af det største program af sin slags i Alaska, 
dannelsen af den næststørste regionale administration i delstaten og tilve-
jebringelsen af en bred vifte af sociale ydelser, infrastruktur, og en udbyg-
get sundheds- og uddannelsessektor. Hertil kommer betydelige beskæfti-
gelsesmæssige effekter af programmet. 
I artiklen „The Social Economy and Economic Development in the Ca-
nadian North: Constraints and Opportunities“ operationaliserer Chris 
Southcott Duhaimes „tredje vej’. Den sociale økonomi kan ultrakort be-
skrives som virksomheder, organisationer eller netværk, der har et socialt 
sigte; der skal være demokratisk styring og økonomisk gevinst må ikke 
være hovedmålsætningen.182 Den sociale økonomi forstået som kooperati-
ver, selvejende institutioner, frivillige NGO’er og netværk, der alle arbej-
der mellem stat og marked, er et muligt instrument til at tage fat på udfor-
dinger i Canadas nordlige regioner, ligesom den er et instrument til at sikre 
en øget lokal deltagelse. Forsøg på at ekspandere socialøkonomien i det 
nordlige Canada må imidlertid først tage højde for adskillige unikke karak-
                                                        
182 se kooperationens hjemmeside [www.socialoekonomi.dk] 
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teristika for en regions økonomi, der kan skabe både restriktioner og poten-
tialer. Den traditionelle økonomi, statens rolle m.h.t. økonomisk udvikling 
og udviklingen af ressourceudnyttelsen er alle vigtige karakteristika, der 
påvirker regionernes socio-økonomiske udvikling. Hvordan disse påvirker 
økonomiske organisationer må forstås rigtigt med henblik på at udvikle de 
rette politikker, der kan stimulere væksten i det nordlige Canadas social-
økonomi. Southcott står bag etableringen af „Social Research Network for 
Northern Canada’, hvor formålet netop er dette. Netværket består af uni-
versitetsforskere og lokalsamfunds-baserede organisationer, der fungerer 
som partnere i projektet. Det er endvidere en målsætning at mobilisere ny 
viden, der kan hjælpe til med at udvikle socialøkonomiske kapaciteter i de 
nordlige canadiske lokalsamfund. Man har defineret en række af kerneom-
råder i projektet, hvor man håber at bygge videre på eksisterende forsk-
ningsresultater. 
I en komparativ system-kontekst fremtræder decentraliseringsaspektet 
som reformer med henblik på privatisering og liberalisering. M.h.t. privati-
seringer analyserer Hans Aage med afsæt i mikroøkonomisk teori balancen 
mellem offentlig og privat drift i artiklen „Enterprise Ownership and re-
sources management in Greenland“. I Grønland er markeds-efficiens for-
hindret af alle tænkelige former for markedssvigt. Statsinterventionisme er 
nødvendig primært på grund af eksternaliteter og ressource-afhængighed, 
men dette kan indebære risici for en mislykket politik på grund af overren-
tesøgning. Fordelene ved statslig styring eller markedsstyring kombineres 
ikke i offentlige aktieselskaber, der ofte er lokale monopoler. Monopolerne 
er i det store hele unddraget enhver form for „checks“ fra markedet eller 
det offentlige. Landsstyrets manglende evne til at indgå i langsigtede for-
pligtelser er bestemt et argument for, at magten decentraliseres, og dette i 
nogle tilfælde endda til markedet gennem privatisering. Argumenterne 
peger imidlertid, når sociale eksternaliteter og ressourcekontrol er involve-
ret, mod enten statsvirksomheder med fuld demokratisk kontrol eller mod 
uddelegering af magt til et uafhængigt professionelt organ bundet af detal-
jerede og bindende og foreskrevne regler. Modsat Duhaim og Southcott er 
Aage imidlertid spektisk m.h.t. demokratisk medeje og kontrol hos borgere 
i lokalsamfundene. 
Liberalisering og indførelse af markedssamfundet i en arktisk region 
giver anledning til bekymring over mulige fordelingsmæssige konsekven-
ser, og som et worst case scenario fattigdom. Grønland har indtil for nyligt 
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baseret sig på hjemmestyreejede foretagender og planlagte priser ved hjælp 
af krydssubsidiering. I artiklen „The Reform on Uniform Prices and its 
Consequences for Households in Greenland Settlements“ præsenterer re-
daktøren af denne årbog ensprisreformerne. Om end det sjældent siges 
direkte af de politiske beslutningstagere, synes strategien bag reformerne at 
indeholde et ønske om at skabe en „exodus“ fra bygder og mindre byer ind 
til de fire store byer i Grønland. Reformpakken udgør en gradvis transfor-
mation af forskellige priser på forskellige varer og tjenesteydelser, der 
hidtil har været baseret på princippet om, at en vare eller en ydelse skal 
koste det samme uanset, hvor man bor. „Casen“ der anlyseres i artiklen er 
reformen i 2005 vedrørende taksterne på energi og vand. Intentionen om en 
gradvis overgang til „kostægte“ priser på energi og vand opdeler Grønland 
i to. „Konkurrencebyerne“, Qaqortoq, Nuuk, Sisimiut og Ilulissat skulle 
det første år efter reformens trådte i kraft have en prisnedsættelse på 50 % 
og den resterende del af Grønland skulle så over fem år gradvist se en stig-
ning på 50 %. Intentionen bag denne todelte reform var også en kombina-
tion af skattelettelser og prisreformen, hvor skattelettelserne skulle udligne 
prisstigningerne på energi og vand i „taberbyerne“ og bygderne. Ikke desto 
mindre viser beregninger, at skattereformen i 2004 ikke er nok. Nogle 
husholdningers købekraft vil blive drastisk forringet, hvis ikke der kom-
penseres yderligere. Spørgsmålet er imidlertid, hvor mange husholdninger, 
der rammes drastisk og set i lyset af olieprisstigninger er det også et 
spørgsmål om forringelserne ikke bliver endnu større. 
Privatiserings og liberaliseringsbølgen er ikke kun noget, der relaterer 
sig til Grønland, de relaterer sig også aktuelt til den islandske økonomi. 
Siden 90’erne, da Island privatiserede sin statslige banksektor, har den 
økonomiske struktur og den sociale klassestruktur ændret sig. Ivar Jonsson 
beskriver i sin artikel „Approaching the New Transnational Capitalist 
Class and the mini-keiretzu system in Iceland „ ændringerne I Island som 
en „mini-keiritzu’. Japanske transnationale selskaber er omfattet af Keiret-
zu begrebet, der refererer til familier eller netværk, der leder disse selska-
ber. I denne sammenhæng ser Jonsson de tre privatiserede banker som 
kernen og grundlaget for tre tæt sammenstrikkede „spindelvæv“ bestående 
af selskaber i detail- og transportsektoren. Disse selskaber og bankerne 
opbyggede stærke finansielle positioner som oligopoler med henblik på at 
realisere oligopolrenter hos forbrugerne. Udenlandske investeringer bl.a. i 
Danmark var delvist baserede på disse oligopolrenter. Et nyt lag opstod 
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indenfor den islandske borgerlige magtblok. Denne var forankret i den 
finansielle sektor og lånefinansiering fra udenlandske banker blev investe-
ret i udlandet. Jonssons artikel blev skrevet et år før den internationale 
økonomiske krise og den alvorlige krise for den islandske økonomi slog 
igennem. Jonssons analyse vil sikkert kunne påvirkes af den seneste udvik-
ling. Spørgsmålet er om dette nye lag indenfor den islandske borgerlige 
magtblok har kunnet overleve den finansielle sektors kollaps i Island? 
I Lyudmila Zalkin’s artikel „Local Implications of Housing Reform in 
Northern Regions of Russia“ præsenteres vi for endnu et element i privati-
serings og liberaliseringsbølgen i nordlige regionaløkonomier – denne 
gang boligmarkedet og situationen m.h.t. en privatisering af lejligheder i 
det nordlige Rusland. Den empiriske analyse i artiklen henter sit udgangs-
punkt i en stikprøve af respondenter i byen Apatiti på Kolahalvøen.  
Reformer blev igangsat i 90’erne, og dog er gennemførelsen af reformerne 
stadig forsinkede, når man sammenligner med resten af den russiske føderati-
on. Nogle reformmålsætninger er implementerede. Markeder er etablerede og 
nogle lejere har deltaget aktivt i privatiseringsprocesserne, men erhvervelse af 
ejendomsret for mange mennesker er ikke forbundet med nye rettigheder og 
pligter. For et flertal af mennesker, kan privatisering kun være en mulighed for 
at overdrage en mulighed til andre, fordi man ikke har råd. Boligreformen må 
derfor ud fra en helhedsbetragtning siges ikke at følge beboernes forventnin-
ger. På samme tid opfatter man ikke sig selv som værende en del af reformer-
ne, og man kommer ikke med forslag, der kan ændre forløbet.  
Iulie Aslaksen, Solveig Glomsrød og Anne Ingeborg Myhr understreger 
i deres artikel „Climate change and economic system impacts on self-
sufficiency constraints and potentials – perspectives from ecological eco-
nomics’, at både klimaændringer og økonomiske systemer har en effekt på 
arktiske økonomier. De eksogene faktorer i det arktiske beslutningsteoreti-
ske skema (se introduction side 31), klimaændringer og den globale øko-
nomi påvirker både restriktioner og potentialer m.h.t. at skabe en selvbåret 
udvikling. Traditionel økonomisk teori og tilnærmelser m.h.t. en værdisæt-
telse er måske ikke tilstrækkelige værktøjer til at indfange dette. Neo-
klassisk økonomi og „trade off“ modeller ser naturen som et gode, der er 
kommensurabelt med alle andre goder, og følgelig er der substitutionsmu-
ligheder mellem naturen og goder fremstillet indenfor det markedsøkono-
miske system. Rationel egeninteresse repræsenteret ved „homo oeconomi-
cus“ udgør imidlertid ikke den samme egeninteresse som det ansvarlige 
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individ i den økologiske økonomi. Dette antyder, at det er nødvendigt med 
en bredere tilgang i forbindelse med usikkerhed omkring miljøets tilstand. 
En sådan tilgang tager hensyn til etiske værdier og interessekonflikter. For 
at forbedre mulighederne for en bæredygtig udvikling og for selvforsyning 
kræver forebyggende tiltag udvikling af metoder, hvor anerkendelse af 
usikkerheder indgår, hvor fremme af interessenterne deltagelse indgår og 
hvor anerkendelse af etiske værdier indgår under hensyntagen til den tradi-
tionelle økologiske viden oprindelige folk i Arktis besidder. Som andre 
bidragydere i denne bog sætter de tre forfattere spørgsmålstegn ved den 
centralistiske model. Dette er ikke ensbetydende med, at man erstatter den 
centralistiske model med et „laissez faire“ marked, „homo oeconomicus“ 
og „trade off“ modellen. I stedet peges der på en participatorisk model med 
udgangspunkt i lokal viden. Man aner her en parallel til Duhaimes tanker 
om et humaniseret system der tager afsæt i Amartya Sens og Martha Nuss-
baum tilgang omkring menneskelige kapaciteter. Der er også en parallel til 
Southcott’s artikel om den sociale økonomi i det nordlige Canada. 
Hugo Reinert, Svein Mathiesen og Erik Reinert identificerer I deres arti-
kel „Climate Change and Pastoral Flexibility: A Norwegian Saami Case“ 
fire niveauer for fleksibel tilpasning af rensdyravl til langsigtede klimaæn-
dringer. Artiklen behandler også spørgsmålet om centralisme eller decentra-
lisme i Nordnorge. I den forbindelse er der fire mestringsstrategier – rumlig 
fleksibilitet, rensdyrflokkenes struktur, produktion og social organisation. 
Ved at mindske tabet af jordarealer for rensdyravl og modvirke ødelæggel-
sen af økologiske nicher, giver man rensdyr-besætninger muligheden for at 
mestre forandringer. Den anden mestringsstrategi hviler på aktivering og 
facilitering med henblik på at omstrukturere besætninger så diversificering 
kan modstå dramatiske klimaændringer. Den tredje strategi hænger sammen 
med input-output relationer, hvor monopsonisme dominerer afsætningen af 
rensdyrkød.183 Afsætningen af rensdyr er sæsonbestemt og det monopso-
nistiske marked tjener ikke rensdyravlernes interesser. Dette antyder, at det 
var bedre, hvis rensdyravlerne selv kunne kontrollere afsætningen af kød. 
Dette leder så til den fjerde mestringsstrategi, der hviler på ideen om en de-
centraliseret organisation. Som foreslået af Aslaksen, Glomsrød og Myhr 
inkluderer en sådan strategi lokale interessenters deltagelse og kontrol. Den 
norske stat som en central beslutningstager bevarer kontrollen over rensdy-
                                                        
183 Et monopson er et marked med en køber/få købere og mange sælgere. Dette indebærer, at  
køber(e) kan misbruge en dominerende stilling til at trykke priserne på kød nedad. 
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ravlen, hvilket hviler på koncepter og reguleringer kendt fra traditionelt 
landbrug. Sammenslutninger af samiske rensdyravlere i kollektiver – de 
såkaldte „siidas“ – var den oprindelige sociale organisationsform blandt 
avlerne. Dette antyder et behov for at nedskalere og decentralisere med hen-
blik på at reformere den samiske økonomi i overensstemmelse med et tradi-
tionelt økonomisk system. Forfatternes endelige anbefaling falder i tråd med 
artiklerne ovenfor, hvor et participatorisk system ses som et alternativ til 
både etatisme og markedskapitalisme. 
Joan Nymand Larsen’s artikel „Climate change, natural resource depen-
dency, and supply shocks: The case of Greenland“ beskriver det cykliske for-
løb som karakteriserer udviklingen i efterkrigstidens Grønland. Manglen på et 
diversificeret output og lavere indkomster pr. capita skaber et ustabilt miljø. 
Generelt set kan den manglende stabilitet, som sandsynligvis er forbundet med 
usikkerhed om tilgængeligheden af offentlige og private ressourcer, komplice-
rer udviklingen, planlægningen og den økonomiske vækst. Dette problem kan 
blive endnu mere alvorligt på grund af de fremtidige konsekvenser af klima-
forandringer. Usikkerheder relaterer sig til, at det er svært at modellere de 
forskellige udfald og til, at det er svært at få fat i gode og pålidelige data. Ifølge 
Larsen præsenteres forskermiljøerne for nye udfordringer på grund af klima-
ændringerne kombineret med andre processer, der dukker op i et hastigt tempo 
– hertil kommer en begrænset observationel infrastruktur, manglen på tidssva-
rende, korrekte og pålidelige data og informationsnetværk. Der er i høj grad et 
behov for omfattende databaser, sofistikeret datafangst og udvikling og styring 
af tidssvarende informationssystemer.  
Rasmus Ole Rasmussen tager sit udgangspunkt i diskussioner angående 
konsekvenserne af de klimaændringer, der er under udvikling. I artiklen 
„Climate Change, Informal Economy and Generation and Gender Respon-
ses to Changes“ argumenteres der for, at diskussionerne tenderer til at 
ignorere det faktum, at der kan være foranstaltninger og ressourcer inden-
for lokalsamfundene, som er i stand til at mestre de store ændringer. På 
samme tid tenderer diskussionerne til at glemme, at der er andre sociale 
processer i gang, der uafhængigt af klimaændringerne kan vise sig at være 
endnu mere afgørende for bygdernes fremtid. Rasmussens analyse fokuse-
rer på tre elementer. For det første skal man ikke glemme, at de klimafor-
andringer, vi ser nu ikke er ekseptionelle. Indenfor de sidste hundrede år 
har Grønland været udsat for massive klimaændringer, der haft både nega-
tive og positive konsekvenser for levevilkårene. For det andet tenderer 
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grønlandske lokalsamfund til at reagere på de ændringer, hvor den traditio-
nelle økonomis rolle m.h.t. at tilpasse lokalsamfundslivet til miljømæssige, 
økonomiske og sociale forandringer er vigtig. Dette er ikke specielt for 
Grønland, hvorfor andre dele af Arktis og erfaringerne der m.h.t. informel-
le økonomiske aktiviteter også indgår i Rasmussens argumenter. For det 
tredje fokuseres der på sociale forandringer, fordi disse, som antydet, kan 
have en større indflydelse på bygdelivet og bygdestrukturen end klimaæn-
dringerne måske har. Som Martha Nussbaum og kapacitetsteorien lægger 
Rasmussen vægt på kvinders frihed, som repræsenterer en anden økonomi 
end den traditionelle. I demografiske termer betyder dette, at bygdekvin-
derne rejser til byerne og den moderne økonomi, mens bygderne derfor 
mestendels befolkes af mænd, der udøver det traditionelle erhverv. 
Som Antydet af Joan Nymand Larsen er adgang til databaser og empi-
risk analyse baseret på disse yderst vigtig. The Arctic Human Development 
Report udgør her et pionerarbejde indenfor samfundsvidenskabelig analy-
se. ECONOR projektet fra Norges Statistik, ARCTICSTAT og SLICA 
projektet førte dette arbejde videre. ARCTICSTAT er den eneste omfat-
tende samfundsvidenskabelige database, der er til til rådighed i dag. 
I Solveig Glomsrød’s og Iulie Aslaksen’s artikel „Presenting the Eco-
nomy of the North (ECONOR)“ baseret på ARCTICSTAT og andre kilder, 
præsenteres grundlæggende statistisk analyse af de nordlige regionale øko-
nomier. Man kunne måske få det indtryk, at den agregerede arktiske øko-
nomi spiller en mindre rolle i den globale økonomi, hvilket langtfra er 
tilfældet. Der er i Arktis store ressourcemængder fra olie og mineraler til 
havets resssourcer og skovene. Givet den vigtige rolle Arktis spiller, som 
udbyder af råmaterialer af alle slags er styring af og kontrol med ressour-
cerne vigtig, og dette vil sandsynligvis blive endnu vigtigere i fremtiden på 
grund af klimaændringerne. Et eksempel er den udfording som ændringer 
af fiskebestandenes vandringer og en forøgelse af ressourcemængden stil-
ler. En anden er forbundet med mulige ændringer og kontrollen med den 
lettere adgang til mineraler og fossile brændstoffer. Forureningsproblemer 
vil også indtage en stadig vigtigere rolle som økonomiske aktiviteter eks-
panderer i Arktis. Forurening breder sig over landegrænser og påvirker 
globale offentlige goder som ren luft, vand, biodiversitet og dyrelivet. Det-
te vil også resultere i et stigende behov for supranationale reguleringsme-
kanismer. Forfatterne konkluderer, at der blandt adskillige gode grunde for 
at indsamle sig et overblik over den arktiske økonomi, især er et behov for 
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at skabe en informationsplatform fra hvilken, man kan vurdere de arktiske 
samfunds bæredygtighed med udgangspunkt i kontrol af naturrigdommene 
og sårbarheden i forhold til globale politikker og tendenser. 
Gerard Duhaime og Andre Caron giver et omfattende overblik over den 
første internationale samfundsvidenskabelige database i deres artikel „Analy-
zing Arctic Social Realities Through ARCTICSTAT’.184 De foreliggende 
statistiske data, der beskæftiger sig med arktiske befolkninger kommer fra 
flere kilder. En sådan mangfoldighed af kilder gør søgning og brug af disse 
data vanskelig. ARCTICSTAT blev oprettet med henblik på at overvinde 
disse vanskeligheder. Det er en databank, der indeholder socio-økonomiske 
data dækkende mere end 30 arktiske regioner grupperet som et sammenhæn-
gende og systematisk hele. Denne gruppering letter beskrivelse, analyse, 
fortolkning og sammenligning af levevilkårene for arktiske befolkninger. 
Duhaimes og Carons artikel præsenterer afgrænsningen af det område, der er 
omfattet af ARCTICSTAT, samt den generelle metode, der blev brugt til at 
lokalisere kilder og data, valget af indikatorer og en analyse af det statistiske 
indhold. Fofatterne fremhæver også visse begrænsninger forbundet med data-
basen, og de advarer forskere, der ønsker at bruge de data, der findes i data-
banken, komparativt. Advarslen er formuleret med eksempler på vigtige be-
grebsmæssige og metodiske forskelle i produktionen af de forskellige natio-
nale kontorer, hvorfra de indsamlede oplysninger stammer. 
Birger Poppel præsenter i sin artikel „Some data sources on people, peo-
ples, communities, regions and human activities in the Arctic“ en anden 
omfattende database SliCA.185 I artiklen introduceres både adgang til sam-
fundsvidenskabelige data i Grønland såvel som som den Grønlandsspeci-
fikke del af SliCA. SliCA modellen og relevant litteratur fremstilles i artik-
lens appendix. Resultaterne af SliCA i form af et omfattende tabelmateriale 
er nu tilgængeligt på projektets webside og i publicerede videnskabelige 
artikler og formidling til den grønlandske presse.186 Materialet kan endvi-
dere gøres tilgængeligt gennem aftaler med SliCA forsker teamet. Resulta-
terne har allerede vist sig nyttige i forbindelse med initiativer som projektet 
vedrørende arktiske sociale indikatorer (ASI projektet) og en række andre 
projekter intieret af Arktisk Råd samt godkendte projekter under det inter-
nationale polarår som ECONOR og POENOR projekterne. SLiCA har 
                                                        
184 [http://www.arcticstat.org/] Arctic Statistic Socio-economic Data Base 
185 [http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org/] Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic 
186 Tidskriftet Samfundsøkonomen nr. 1 2007, endvidere en kronikserie i avisen Sermitsiaq i 2009. 
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forbindelser til en række forskningsprojekter, der fokuserer på dataindsam-
ling og – forvaltning, samt på oprettelse af overvågningssystemer og net-
værk dannet med henblik på, at dokumentere de fysiske og biologiske 
ændringer i Arktis. Desuden har deskriptive undersøgelser af to grønland-
ske kommuner været en del af udgangspunktet for diskussioner om udvik-
ling af lokalsamfund. SLiCA er både et begreb og et sæt af resultater. SLi-
CA som et begreb kan anvendes til fremtidige forbedringer af arktiske 
observationer, og projektet kan bidrage til at informere de politiske beslut-
ningstagere, oprindelige folks organisationer og forskere. 
POENOR projektet omfatter ikke en komplet historisk oversigt over Ark-
tis og sub-arktis udvikling. Alligevel havde Skagen workshoppen en præsen-
tation relevant i forhold til en historisk analyse af komparative systemer over 
et længere tidsspand. Artiklen „Comparative-historical analysis of farming 
systems and agricultural intensification in medieval and early modern Ice-
land“ af Jon Haukur Ingimundarsson drejer sig om landbrugssystemet i det 
islandske rige (10. til det 13. århundrede), som udviklede sig i forbindelse 
med en udviklet socio-politisk struktur understøttet af en relativ stor befolk-
ning i forhold til de efterfølgende fem århundreder. Denne periode var end-
videre kendetegnet ved, at man udviklede en merkantil udveksling og forde-
ling af den overskydende produktion. Det intensive tidlige islandske land-
brugssystem sammenlignes med karakteristika på intensiveret animalsk 
produktion og handel i løbet af det 19. århundrede og de første to årtier i det 
20. århundrede. Konkret giver Ingimundarsson for det første et overblik over 
en selvforsynende traditionel økonomi, som understøttede specialiseret fåre-
hold, og som gav overskud af uld til eksport i „den varme middelalderperio-
de’. Efterfølgende uddyber han for det andet, hvordan dannelsen af et ledel-
sessystem var baseret på et lag af handelsmænd og bønder. For det tredje 
undersøger Ingimundarsson, hvordan produktioner baseret på et selveje, der 
gik i arv indenfor familien, intensiveredes indenfor rammerne af merkantile 
aktiviteter, kreditsystemer i landdistrikterne og slægts- og lokalt baserede 
forsikringssystemer. For det fjerde beskriver han en efterfølgende de-
intensivering og en ændring til et landbrugssystem baseret på fåreavl, hvor 
bestandene blev opdrættet til effektiv mælk og kød-produktion. Endelig for 
det femte præsenteres frembruddet af lejebaserede driftsformer, fælles ejen-
domsret og tributære systemer indenfor rammerne af gejstlige institutioner 
og koloniale relationer til Norge. 
 
